A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity by Tyler, John
 
 
 
 
 
 
A PRAGMATIC STANDARD OF LEGAL VALIDITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
by 
 
JOHN OLIVER TYLER, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A PRAGMATIC STANDARD OF LEGAL VALIDITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
by 
 
JOHN OLIVER TYLER, JR. 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Chair of Committee,        John J. McDermott 
Committee Members,      Scott Austin 
                 Gregory F. Pappas 
     Ben D. Welch 
Head of Department,        Gary Varner 
 
 
 
 
May 2012 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity. (May 2012) 
John Oliver Tyler, Jr., B.A., Texas A&M University; 
J.D., SMU School of Law 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John J. McDermott 
 
 American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to 
determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an 
uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human 
reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic 
fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.  
 These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that 
impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal 
validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law 
theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.   
 In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard 
for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of 
law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying 
the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history 
provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential 
feature of this method.  
  This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires 
legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of 
  
iv 
reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent 
and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational 
creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of 
reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable 
guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.  
 The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent 
of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation 
sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. 
  The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy 
over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. 
Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.   
 Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these 
principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably 
treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: THE PRAGMATIC ORIGINS OF NATURAL LAW  
I. The Contemporary Schism in American Jurisprudence 
 The American legal system resembles a planet caught between two suns. One sun is the 
natural law tradition of English common law. Deeply influenced by the philosophy of John 
Locke, this tradition is rooted in the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and elegantly 
expressed in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. The second sun is the tradition 
of legal positivism. Originating in Jeremy Bentham's criticisms of Blackstone, legal positivism 
finds its most influential formulation in H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law.   
 The two suns are wholly incompatible. Since no planet can faithfully orbit opposing 
suns, the course of American law is now unsteady and erratic, and practitioners can no longer 
predict its course. Each sun has sufficient strength to pull the planet in its direction, but each has 
weaknesses that prevent it from overcoming the gravity of its rival.  
A. The Deficiencies of Natural Law Jurisprudence 
 The strength of the natural law tradition is its pragmatism. Its great advocates have 
obscured its pragmatism, however, by formulating its precepts in terms of divine law and human 
reason. This formulation is inadequate for two reasons. First, there is no general agreement 
regarding the terms of divine law, and many reject its very existence. As John Austin observes, 
“the laws of God are not always certain.” 1 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the MLA Style Manual, 7th ed. (New York: MLA, 2009). 
 
1 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 186: “If the 
laws of God are certain, the motives which they hold out to disobey any human command which is at 
variance with them are Paramount to all others. But the laws of God are not always certain. All divines, at 
least all reasonable divines, admit that no scheme of duties perfectly complete and unambiguous was ever 
imparted to us by revelation.” 
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 Second, the traditional formulation adopts inconsistent views of human reason. On one 
hand, human reason is acceptable to natural law theorists as a reliable guide in discerning the 
precepts of natural law.2 On the other hand, human reason is too corrupt to generate reliable 
human law. This corruption requires recourse to divine law as the standard for determining the 
enforceability or legal validity of human law.3  
B. The Deficiencies of Legal Positivism 
 Legal positivism utilizes a narrow and inadequate philosophical methodology to 
formulate its standard of legal validity. Positivism utilizes “a purely analytical study of legal 
concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law” and describes all law 
as consisting of only two types of rules, “primary” and “secondary” rules.4  
 The positivist model of law as a union of rules, however, is inadequate for three reasons.  
First, legal positivism commits the error Dewey calls the philosophical or analytical fallacy by 
separating law from its historical and social contexts. 5 Legal positivism analyzes law based on 
                                                 
2 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 3: “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and 
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”  
3 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 6: “For though it would be beside my present purpose to enter here into the particulars 
of the law of Nature, or its measures of punishment; yet it is certain there is such a law, and that too as 
intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive laws of 
commonwealths, nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and 
intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for truly so are a 
great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right as they are founded on the law of 
Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.” 
4 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–629, 
601, 601: “We must remember that the Utilitarians combined with their insistence on the separation of law 
and morals two other equally famous but distinct doctrines. One was the important truth that a purely 
analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law, was as 
vital to our understanding of the nature of law as historical or sociological studies...” [Emphasis added]. 
5 John Dewey, “Context and Thought,” The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 6 
(Carbondale, IL: S. Illinois UP, 1985) 5-7. Dewey describes this error as “the habit of philosophers of 
neglecting the indispensability of context, both in particular and in general. I should venture to assert that 
the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context.” See discussion of this 
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its linguistic characteristics alone.6 The positivist analysis ignores the rich and concrete 
historical context in which law develops, and it ignores the social context in which law operates. 
Legal positivism commits the philosophical fallacy by regarding its narrow linguistic analysis as 
a complete, final, and sufficient analysis of the nature of law.  
 Second, legal positivism separates law from its application. 7 Legal positivism 
determines legal validity solely by the pedigree of the law's creation. It wholly ignores content.8 
As a result, legal positivism recognizes the validity of “morally iniquitous laws” whose content 
possesses “no moral justification or force whatsoever.” 9 Legal positivism erroneously fails to 
consider the consequences of applying morally iniquitous laws. 
                                                                                                                                                
fallacy in Gregory F. Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
UP, 2008) 26-7. 
6 Hart focuses on “a purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive 
vocabulary of the law.” H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 
71 (4) (1958): 593–629. 
7 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 508. “Without application,” Dewey writes, “there 
are scraps of paper or voices in the air but nothing that can be called law.” Dewey continues: “Application 
is not something that happens after a rule or law or statute is laid down but is a necessary part of them; 
such a necessary part indeed that in given cases we can judge what the law is as matter of fact only by 
telling how it operates and what are its effects in and upon the human activities that are going on.” 
8 Ronald M. Dworkin, “The Model of Rules,” 35 (1) Chi. L. Rev. (1967): 14-46, 17. Dworkin describes the 
first of three tenets of Hart's positivism as follows. “The law of a community is a set of special rules used 
by the community directly or indirectly for the purpose of determining which behavior will be punished or 
coerced by the public power. These special rules can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by 
tests having to do not with their content but with their pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted 
or developed. These tests of pedigree can be used to distinguish valid legal rules from spurious legal rules 
(rules which lawyers and litigants wrongly argue are rules of law) and also from other sorts of social rules 
(generally lumped together as ‘moral rules’) that the community follows but does not enforce through 
public power.” 
9 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268: “I argue in this book that 
though there are many different contingent connections between law and morality there are no necessary 
conceptual connections between the content of law and morality; and hence morally iniquitous provisions 
may be valid as legal rules or principles. One aspect of this form of the separation of law from morality is 
that there can be legal rights and duties which have no moral justification or force whatever.”            
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 Third, as Dworkin demonstrates, the positivist model of law as rules is incomplete. 
When lawyers and judges evaluate hard cases, they make use of standards that do not function as 
the “rules” described by legal positivism. Law thus includes principles as well as rules. 10 
C. The Problem of Legal Validity 
 These differing approaches to legal validity have produced an immense schism in 
American jurisprudence. Legal validity is the most fundamental issue for any legal system, yet 
there is no uniformly recognized approach in the American legal system for determining which 
laws are enforceable. This schism regarding legal validity produces, in turn, a chain reaction of 
secondary schisms involving, inter alia, the selection of judges, the appropriate role of judges, 
the interpretation of statutes, and the interpretation of the Constitution.   
 The natural law tradition, for example, forbids unifying the power to make law with the 
power to enforce law in the same person. Judges are therefore limited to finding the existing law, 
and must never make new law. Legal positivism, on the other hand, accepts that judges should 
make new law in almost every case.  
 Experienced legal practitioners, wary of the fallibility of individual judges, tend to favor 
the natural law approach. Experienced judges, chafed by restrictions on their power, tend to 
favor the positivist approach. One troubling consequence of these conditions is the emergence of 
two opposing bodies of precedent. Another is a developing juristocracy in which unelected 
judges decide policy issues without public input.  
D. A New Approach to Legal Validity 
 
              The brightness of each sun blinds its adherents to the illumination provided by its rival.
                                                 
10 Ronald Dworkin, “The Model of Rules,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 35 (1) (1967): 14-46, 23-24. Dworkin utilizes 
the case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) to illustrate his distinction between rules and principles. 
In Riggs, the statutory rule governing the case allowed a murderer, Elmer Palmer, to inherit from his 
victim, his grandfather Francis Palmer. The court denied the inheritance, however, by applying the legal 
principle that no wrongdoer should benefit from his wrongdoing. This principle did not function as a 
primary or secondary legal rule.  
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  Despite fifty years of debate, the opposing camps remain as unreconciled as ever. A principle or 
set of principles that satisfies the validity concerns of both approaches is needed. This 
dissertation therefore suggests a new approach to jurisprudence that rejects both the theological 
formulation of natural law and the analytical methodology of legal positivism. It adopts instead a 
pragmatic approach that develops a standard for legal validity from practical experience. This 
approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities.11 It 
evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they 
produce. 12  
 Holmes writes in The Common Law that in order to know what law is, “we must know 
what it has been, and what it tends to become.” We must alternately consult legal history and 
legal theory. 13 In order to “know what law has been,” the remainder of this chapter examines the 
pragmatic influence of the seventeenth century English Revolution on natural law jurisprudence. 
Chapter II explains the major differences between natural law theory and legal positivism. It then 
explains the gradual displacement of natural law by legal positivism in the twentieth century.  
 In order to know “what law tends to become,” Chapter III examines the Athenian legal 
system and the case of Socrates in 399 B.C. Chapter IV examines the Congregation of the Holy 
Office and the Galileo Affair of 1616 to 1632, and Chapter V examines the Soviet legal system 
and the “Moscow Trials” of Leon Trotsky from 1936 to 1938. These legal systems demonstrate 
the necessity of validity constraints on both the creation and the content of law. Otherwise, law 
tends to operate in an unjust and arbitrary manner. 
                                                 
11 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 508. 
12 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 509-10.  
13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1881) 1. 
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 The final chapter observes that although these legal systems involved a variety of legal 
forums and cultural settings, they shared common characteristics that produced common 
consequences. Consideration of these commonalities permits the identification of three general 
principles in whose absence legal systems tend to become arbitrary and unjust.  
 The first principle is the principle of reason. Reason addresses the concern of natural 
law theory for the validity of law's content. The principle of reason recognizes that every subject 
is a rational creature with a free will. To be stable, the legal system must treat its subjects as ends 
in themselves, and not merely as means to some other end. The legal system must also permit 
rational individuals to orient their own behavior in order to achieve a society based on ordered 
liberty. The requirements of procedural due process protect against the punishment of the 
innocent and the tyranny of the majority.  The requirements of substantive due process enable 
laws to provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. 14  
 The second principle is the principle of consent. Consent addresses the concern of legal 
positivism for the validity of law's creation. The principle of consent provides that the legitimacy 
of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine 
of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence 
consent. 
  The third principle is the principle of autonomy, which addresses both the content and 
the creation of law. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield 
superiority over political rulers. The ruler must be under the same laws as his subjects, and the 
laws must not be subject to arbitrary change to reflect the will of the political ruler. To 
                                                 
14 Lon L. Fuller, “A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin,” 10 (3) Villanova Law Review (1965): 655-
66, 657. 
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paraphrase de Bracton, the law makes the king; the king does not make the law.15 To paraphrase 
Aristotle, rightly constituted laws must be the final sovereign. 16   
 Legal systems that consistently violate the principles of reason, autonomy, and consent 
tend to treat their subjects, not as ends in themselves, but as means to other ends. Although such 
legal systems manifest the power of the state, they are not valid legal systems. As demonstrated 
in the following chapters, these legal systems tend to become arbitrary and unjust. They also 
tend to destabilize the societies that suffer their injustice. The history of law in the Western 
tradition is very much a history of revolution. 17 As shown below, the natural law tradition in 
English jurisprudence originates in the English Revolution of 1603-1701. 
II. The Pragmatic Origins of the Natural Law Tradition 
A. The English Revolution: From James I (1603) to the Act of Settlement (1701) 
A page of history is worth a volume of logic in understanding the law.18 Natural law 
jurisprudence developed as a pragmatic response to Stuart absolutism, and Blackstone's 
formulation of this jurisprudence in his Commentaries on the Laws of England became the 
foundation of American jurisprudence. Legal positivism is a reaction to Blackstone's 
Commentaries. The starting point for evaluating natural law jurisprudence and legal positivism, 
                                                 
15 Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England), ed. 
George E. Woodbine, trans. Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) 33: “The king must 
not be under man but under God and under the law, because the law makes the king … there is no king 
where the will and not the law has dominion.”  
16 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1946) 127: “Rightly 
constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single 
person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to 
the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement.”  
17 Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.  Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1983; and Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003). 
18 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). 
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therefore, is the seventeenth century constitutional struggle that shaped the natural law tradition 
in English common law.  
Fueled by arbitrary abuses of power by the Stuart kings, this struggle spanned almost a 
century, involved three revolutions, and witnessed seven years of civil war. At the beginning of 
the struggle, Stuart absolutism held that kings ruled by divine right and were only accountable to 
God. Kings were above the law. Kings made laws, laws did not make kings. At the end of the 
constitutional struggle, kings were no longer above the law, and kings no longer made the law. 
As the Act of Settlement of 1701 made emphatically clear, laws now made kings.  
Subjects were protected by a written Bill of Rights. The philosophy of John Locke 
provided a philosophical justification for these “natural” rights based on the consent of the 
governed. Blackstone justified law on consent as well, and Blackstone's Commentaries on the 
Laws of England integrated common law, natural rights, and the lessons of history in a 
systematic jurisprudence.  
B. Overview: Three Categories of Constitutional Conflict 
The struggle between the Crown and Parliament began with the accession of James I of 
England in 1603. It progressed through three phases before final resolution was achieved in the 
Act of Settlement of 1701.19 The Stuarts sought to impose an absolute monarchy on England. 
Parliament resisted and sought to establish limits to the Crown’s powers. Parliament ultimately 
prevailed, but the struggle was bitter, long, and bloody. In the end, an autonomous legal system 
                                                 
19 The first phase began with the ascension of James I on March 24, 1603. It continued until Charles I’s 
seizure of parliament with four hundred men at arms on January 4, 1642. The second phase began with 
Charles I’s seizure of Parliament with armed men and the resulting armed conflict. This period included 
the three civil wars and Cromwell’s Protectorate. The second period ended with the opening of the 
Convention Parliament on April 24, 1660, and its invitation to Charles II to return to England and ascend 
the throne. The third phase began on May 8, 1660 with the declaration of Charles II as king. It included 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the coregency of William of Orange and Mary, daughter of the deposed 
James II, and the passage of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Despite all the bitter struggles of the 
previous century, William began intermittent attempts to reassert royal supremacy. The 1701 Act of 
Settlement finally resolved all issues of supremacy in Parliament’s favor.   
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emerged with clear authority over the Crown, the Parliament, and the judiciary. The powers of 
the state were delimited by a written Bill of Rights. John Locke was an active participant in these 
events, and his works reflect the principles that prevailed. 
Analysis of the radical legal developments emerging from the constitutional struggle is 
aided by dividing the disputes between Parliament and the Stuarts into three categories, bearing 
in mind that these disputes were always interrelated. The first and broadest category of disputes 
involved the issue of Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown. This dispute played out in three 
contexts. The first involved the power of Parliament to control the collection of revenues. The 
second involved the freedom of Parliament to debate issues concerning the royal prerogative. 
The third involved the power of the Crown to pardon ministers impeached by Parliament.  
The second major category involved the rights of the individual against the Crown. This 
dispute originated in the context of “liberty of conscience,” or religious liberty. As the struggle 
between the Crown and Parliament progressed, however, the liberties demanded against the 
Crown grew in number. The 1689 Bill of Rights lists thirteen specific rights delimiting the power 
of the Crown.  
The third major category involved the autonomy and supremacy of the common law. 
This dispute played out in three contexts. The first was the jurisdictional contest between the 
common law courts and the courts of the royal prerogative. The second was the establishment of 
the jury as a fact finder independent from judicial control. The third was the emergence of an 
independent judiciary, free from interference by the Crown.  
C. Stuart Absolutism  
James VI of Scotland became James I of England on March 24, 1603. In 1589, five 
years before ascending to the English throne, James stated his views on kings and parliaments in 
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“The Trew Law of Free Monarchies.” 20  His troubles with the English Parliament were 
immediate and profound, reflecting his view that the king was only accountable to God and thus 
above the law.  
According to “The Trew Law,” the king possessed the sole power to make law, and the 
king could exercise that power without the advice or consent of Parliament “or any other estate.” 
Parliament, on the other hand, had no power to make “any kinde of Lawe or Statute” unless the 
king’s “Scepter be to it.” Only the king, therefore, could give force to a law.21  
Speaking to Parliament in 1610, James stated, “The state of monarchy is the supremest 
thing upon earth, for kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth and sit upon God's throne, 
but even by God himself they are called gods.” James concluded his speech with this ominous 
claim. “That as to dispute what God may do is blasphemy... so is it sedition in subjects to dispute 
what a king may do in the height of his power.” 22 Prosecuting political opponents for sedition 
would become a staple Stuart tactic in the troubled times ahead. 
James also wrote an instruction manual in kingship in 1599 for his son entitled 
“Basilikon Doron,” or Royal Gift. James gave his son the following advice: “And therefore hold 
no Parliaments, but for necessitie of new Lawes, which would be but seldome: for few Lawes 
                                                 
20 James Stuart, “The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: or the Reciprock and Mutuall Duetie betwixt a Free 
King and His Naturall Subjects,” The Political Works of James I, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain 
(Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1918) 53-71: “Kings are called Gods by the propheticall King David, because 
they sit upon GOD his Throne in the earth, and have the count of their administration to give unto him.”  
21 James Stuart, “The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: or the Reciprock and Mutuall Duetie betwixt a Free 
King and His Naturall Subjects,” The Political Works of James I, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain 
(Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1918). “For albeit the king made daily statues and ordinances, enjoyning such 
paines thereto as hee thinkes meet, without any advice of Parliament or estates; yet it lies in the power of 
no Parliament, to make any kinde of Lawe or Statute, without his Scepter be to it, for giving it the force of 
a Law.” 
22 Marvin Perry, Joseph R. Peden and Theodore H. Von Laue, eds., Sources of the Western Tradition, 
Volume II: From the Renaissance to the Present, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995) 22-24. 
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and well put in execution, are best in a well ruled common-weale.” 23 James’ son and successor 
Charles I followed his father’s advice, refusing to convene Parliament during the eleven years of 
his “Personal Rule.” These and other actions by Charles led to three civil wars, Charles' 
conviction for treason on January 27, 1649, and his beheading three days later. The refusal of 
James' grandson James II to convene Parliament led to the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 and 
the end of the Stuart dynasty.  
D. The Prelude to Civil War 
1. James I and “Impositions” (1606) 
The first major conflict between Crown and Parliament involved the collection of 
revenues without parliamentary consent. James I relied on the royal “prerogative,” the inherent 
power of the Crown, to unilaterally levy “impositions” without the consent of Parliament in 
1606. These “impositions” consisted of extra duties on imports and exports beyond the usual 
customs duties of “tunnage and poundage” granted by the first parliament of his reign.24  
The levying of impositions without Parliamentary consent was challenged as invalid in 
Bates’ Case 25 under a series of statutes, including chapter 30 of the Magna Carta.26 The king’s 
impositions were nevertheless upheld by the Court of Exchequer. Bates is the first of a series of 
cases in the constitutional conflict which upheld the royal prerogative in contradiction of 
                                                 
23 James Stuart, “Basilikon Doron: or His Maiesties Instructions to his Dearest Sonne, Henry the Prince,” 
The Political Works of James I, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1918) 20.  
24 “Tunnage” was the levy assessed on each “tun” or cask of wine. 
25 Excerpts of the case opinion are reprinted in Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Bates’ 
Case (1606),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 435-37. John 
Bates was a merchant who refused to pay James I’s impositions on imported currants.  
26 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Magna Carta (1215),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 120: “No sheriff or bailiff of ours, nor any other 
person, shall take the horses or carts of any freeman for carrying service, except by the will of that 
freeman.” [Emphasis in original].  
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previously established principles of law.  These decisions reflect the king’s power to appoint and 
dismiss judges at his pleasure.  
The Court of Exchequer held that although the King’s ordinary power to raise revenues 
was subject to the consent of Parliament, 27 the King nevertheless had an absolute power to 
regulate foreign trade.28 The King was thus empowered to impose a duty without Parliamentary 
consent so long as the purpose of the duty was the regulation of foreign trade, and not simply to 
raise revenue. In this case, the Court of Exchequer strained reason to hold that the imposition 
was not being levied upon John Bates as a subject, but instead “as a merchant who imports 
goods.” 29 Emboldened by this ruling, James issued a general order levying impositions without 
Parliament’s consent.30 This general order and the Bates decision increased the tensions between 
the Crown and Parliament. 
2. Charles I and “Forced Loans” (1626) 
Charles I ascended the throne in 1625. Suspicious of Charles I’s religious and foreign 
policy, Charles’ first or “Useless Parliament” refused to grant the usual lifetime taxes to the new 
king upon his ascension, granting them instead for only one year. Momentum began to build in 
                                                 
27 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Bates’ Case (1606),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 436: “Ordinary power, which exists for the 
purpose of civil justice, is unalterable save by consent of Parliament.” 
28 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Bates’ Case (1606),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 437: “All customs, be they old or new, are no 
other but the effects and issues of trade and commerce with foreign nations. But all commerce and affairs 
with foreigners, all wars and peace, all acceptance and admitting for current foreign coin, all parties and 
treaties whatsoever, are made by the absolute power of the King; and he who hath power of causes has 
power also of effects.”  
29 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Bates’ Case (1606),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 437: “But the impost here is not upon a subject; 
but here it is upon Bates as upon a merchant who imports goods within this land charged before by the 
king. And at the time when the impost was imposed upon them they were the goods of the Venetians, and 
not the goods of the subject nor within the land.” 
30 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “James I: Levy of Impositions (1608),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 424-25. 
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Parliament for impeaching Charles’ advisor the Duke of Buckingham,31 as well as for a 
requirement that the king’s ministers receive Parliamentary approval. Charles dissolved 
Parliament to prevent Parliament’s acting on these initiatives. 
Charles' first reaction to the “Useless Parliament” was to manipulate its membership. He 
appointed his opponents to official posts that prevented their sitting in the next Parliament.32 His 
strategy failed. When the second Parliament of his reign met in 1626, the House of Commons 
again tried to impeach Buckingham for high treason. The Commons also threatened to delay all 
votes on taxation until the House of Lords delivered its verdict on Buckingham’s impeachment. 
                                                 
31 Some in the Commons hoped they could effect a change in Charles I’s policies by effecting a change in 
his advisors. Buckingham was also responsible for two of the most humiliating defeats in English military 
history, the Cadiz expedition of 1625 and the siege of Saint-Martin-de-Ré in 1627. These defeats helped 
motivate Parliament’s continuing efforts to impeach Buckingham for treason and corruption. In the Cadiz 
expedition of 1625, Buckingham planned a desert crossing without supplying food or water. When the 
men captured the wine stores of the Spanish navy, they were permitted to drink the wine. They became 
drunk and began fighting amongst themselves. The English commander ordered a retreat back to the 
English ships. When Spanish forces arrived, they found more than one thousand drunken English soldiers 
remaining and killed them all. The English did not fire a single shot in their defense. Although the English 
initially outnumbered the Spanish four to one, they lost 62 of their 105 ships and 7,000 of the English 
force of 15,400 were killed or captured. The expedition did not accomplish a single objective. Spanish 
losses, on the other hand, were negligible. The cost of the Cadiz expedition was £250,000, equal to the 
revenue raised by Charles during the first year of the “forced loans” in 1625. See A.W. Ward, G.W. 
Prothero, and Stanley Leathes, eds., “The Constitutional Struggle in England (1625–40),” The Cambridge 
Modern History, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1902) 262; Roger B. Manning, An Apprenticeship in 
Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006) 114; Samuel Rawson 
Gardiner, A History of England under the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I, 1624-1628, vol. 1 (London: 
Longmans 1875) 302-26. In 1627, Buckingham commanded the siege against the French at Saint-Martin-
de-Ré. Buckingham ordered his troops to storm the French fortress of Saint-Martin. Their ladders, 
however, were too short to reach the top of the walls. Despite an initial numerical superiority of five to one 
over the French, Buckingham lost 5,000 of his force of 7,000.  See A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero, and 
Stanley Leathes, eds., “The Constitutional Struggle in England (1625–40),” The Cambridge Modern 
History, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1902) 272; Samuel Rawson Gardiner, A History of England 
under the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I, 1624-1628, vol. 2 (London: Longmans 1875) 111-66. 
32 A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes, eds., “The Constitutional Struggle in England (1625–
40),” The Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1902) 263. Charles I sought to 
secure a more docile body than his first Parliament by reducing the numerical strength of his opponents 
that were returned to the House of Commons. Potentially troublesome members were chosen to be sheriffs 
of their county, requiring their presence in their counties and precluding their attending Parliament. 
Charles also raised other opponents to aristocratic titles, making them ineligible for the Commons. Of 
course, this tactic gave them an automatic place in the House of Lords, where at least one of the new lords 
used his seat to continue his opposition to Charles’ policies. 
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When Buckingham’s impeachment appeared likely, Charles was forced to dissolve his second 
Parliament without gaining any subsidies. 
Charles now responded to his frustrations in Parliament by imposing “forced loans” to 
raise revenue, and he imprisoned seventy-six prominent subjects who refused to give them. 
Fearful that the magistrates might rule against him, however, Charles did not file charges against 
his prisoners. The prisoners were also denied bail.  
3. Charles I and the Case of the Five Knights (November 15-28, 1627) 
The Case of the Five Knights 33 involved a habeas corpus proceeding in 1627 by five 
such prisoners challenging the King’s right to imprison subjects for refusing to make forced 
loans. They also challenged the right of the King to hold prisoners without charges and without 
bail. The Court of the King’s Bench observed that the prisoners “are detained in prison by 
special command of the king.” Since the King had stated no cause for the arrests, the Court 
presumed that the arrests were “a matter of state [meaning the royal prerogative], which we 
cannot take notice of.” As a court of common law jurisdiction, it had no jurisdiction to review 
any exercise of the royal prerogative. “We are sworn to maintain all prerogatives of the king; 
that is one branch of our oath.”  
The Court of the King’s Bench therefore denied the writ of habeas corpus. Charles’ 
judges in the Case of the Five Knights thus permitted the imprisonment of English subjects by 
the King without charges, without bail, and without trials. The purpose of the imprisonment was 
to force the “loans” of private property, against the owners’ will, and all without the consent of 
Parliament. All these acts violated previously established law. 34 
                                                 
33 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Case of the Five Knights (1627),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 457-58. The case was tried during 
November 15-28, 1627. 
34 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Magna Carta (1215),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 115-26. The principle of taxation by consent is 
  
15 
Charles’ third Parliament convened ten weeks later on March 17, 1628. In reaction to the 
Case of the Five Knights, Parliament began its deliberations by criticizing the King’s 
infringements of “The Subject’s Liberty in His Person.” On May 6, 1628, the House of 
Commons voted to draft a petition stating their grievances to the King. The House proceeded by 
way of petition of right rather than by bill as the most politic means of obtaining a redress of 
grievances without overtly threatening the royal prerogative. This decision would prove to be a 
significant miscalculation.  
On May 27, 1628, Parliament unanimously adopted the “Petition of Right” 35 
condemning eight measures taken by Charles and the Privy Council to compel subscription to 
the forced loans. 36 Desperate for funds, and faced with a unanimous Parliament arrayed against 
him, Charles putatively accepted the Petition of Right on June 7 by stating, “Soit droit fait come 
est désiré,” (“Let right be done as is desired”). Parliament then voted Charles the subsidies he 
needed. Since the Petition of Right was only a petition and not a bill, however, Charles would 
later claim that his assent to the Petition of Right placed no limits on the royal prerogative.  
Three weeks later, Charles was again forced to prorogue his third Parliament to prevent 
the impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham. In proroguing Parliament on June 26, Charles 
reasserted the full power of the royal prerogative despite the Petition of Right. “I owe an account 
                                                                                                                                                
contained in chapters 12 through 15 of the Magna Carta, and had recently been upheld against James I in 
Bates’ Case in 1606. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta forbids the imprisonment of any freeman “except by 
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” Chapter 40 prohibits the king from denying or 
delaying “right or justice” to any one. 
35 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Petition of Right (1628),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 450-52.  
36 These measures included: (1) imprisonment without lawful cause, (2) denial of habeas corpus, (3) denial 
of bail, (4) taxation not authorized by Parliament, (5) billeting of soldiers in private houses, and (6) 
summary trials under martial law. Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Petition of Right 
(1628),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 450-52. These 
rights were claimed under laws and statutes dating from the Magna Carta in 1215 and the laws of Edward 
I, Edward III, and Richard III. 
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of my actions to none but to God alone,” he said, admonishing Parliament that “none of the 
house of commons, joint or separate, what new doctrine soever may be raised, have any power 
either to make or declare a law without my consent.” 37  
Charles intended to recall Parliament the following year. The Duke of Buckingham was 
assassinated in the interim by former army officer John Felton.38 Charles hoped that the second 
session of the third Parliament would be more productive without the polarizing figure of 
Buckingham, but these hopes were soon dashed. When Parliament reconvened on January 23, 
1629, Puritans in the House of Commons were concerned with the growing influence of the 
Arminian faction in the Church of England, and they complained about the continuing collection 
of tunnage and poundage without Parliamentary consent.  
Furthermore, John Rolle, a Member of Parliament who refused to pay the tunnage and 
poundage levy, had been arrested and his goods seized. Rolle was imprisoned and questioned 
before the infamous Court of the Star Chamber. Since Parliament was debating the legitimacy of 
seizing merchants’ goods at the time, Rolle’s treatment was viewed by the Commons as a 
provocative breach of Parliamentary privilege.  
On March 2, 1629, the King’s opponents in Commons issued a protestation known as 
the “Three Resolutions.” 39 First, any person seeking to extend or introduce popery, 
Arminianism, or other “innovation of religion” was declared a capital enemy of the kingdom and 
commonwealth. Second, any person counseling or advising the levying of tunnage and poundage 
without Parliament’s approval was declared a capital enemy of the kingdom and commonwealth. 
                                                 
37 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Proceedings on the Petition of Right (1628),” 
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 450-52. 
38 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, A History of England under the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I, 1624-
1628, vol. 2 (London: Longmans 1875) 325-48. Felton became widely popular throughout England for 
this act.  
39 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Resolutions of the Commons (1629),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 454-55. 
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Third, any merchant paying such tunnage and poundage was declared “a betrayer of the liberties 
of England, and an enemy to the same.”  
4. Charles I and the “Eleven Years’ Tyranny” (1629-1640) 
An angry Charles ordered Parliament dissolved. When the Speaker of the House of 
Commons rose to announce that Parliament was adjourned on order of the King, two members of 
the House, Denzil Holles and Benjamin Valentine, pushed him down and held him in his seat. 
Sir John Eliot read the three resolutions while guards sent by the King pounded on the locked 
doors of the chamber. The House of Commons passed the resolutions and then voted its own 
adjournment. 
On March 10, 1629, Charles denounced his enemies in Parliament in a royal 
proclamation and asserted the Crown’s right to collect tunnage and poundage without 
Parliamentary consent. The next day, Charles arrested nine members of the House of Commons 
and charged them with sedition and libel. Sir John Eliot, Denzil Holles, and William Strode were 
imprisoned. Eliot died in prison two years later, and Holles and Strode remained in prison until 
1640.  
Charles viewed himself as the sun of the constitutional system. Parliament was merely 
one of the planets orbiting his throne. Charles now resolved to rule England without Parliament 
and govern instead through two men. Charles’ fiscal policy was determined by his treasurer, Sir 
Richard Weston. Charles’ religious policy was determined by the Bishop of London, Sir William 
Laud, whom Charles elevated to Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633. Both men's policies 
produced disaster. The eleven years of Charles' “personal rule” that followed became popularly 
known as the “Eleven Years’ Tyranny.” 
Regarding matters of fiscal policy, Treasurer Weston scoured the law to revive obsolete 
means of raising funds that did not require Parliamentary consent. On July 13, 1630, Weston 
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resurrected a long abandoned thirteenth century custom known as the “distraint of knighthood.”40 
This custom required freeholders with land worth more than £40 per year to present themselves 
for knighthood at the King's coronation. Fines were levied in 1630 on freeholders that had not 
attended Charles I’s coronation on February 2, 1625. The freeholders were forced to buy their 
knighthoods, and their elevation to knighthood then subjected them to increased taxes on their 
lands.  
In 1635, the King declared that the true limits of the Royal forests were those that had 
been in force during the reign of King Edward I from 1272 to 1307. These borders had long been 
disregarded. Persons residing within these boundaries were now fined, however, for encroaching 
on the King's land. 41 
5. Charles I and “Ship Money” (October 20, 1634) 
These measures were understandably unpopular, but they were nevertheless within the 
royal prerogative and thus did not require Parliamentary consent.42 The most unpopular of 
Charles’ measures, however, was the collection of ship money, which was less clearly within the 
king’s prerogative.43 Ship money was a tax traditionally levied against coastal counties for naval 
                                                 
40 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Proclamation for Distraint of Knighthood (1630),” 
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 455. A “distraint” is a 
seizure of property in order to obtain payment for a debt. 
41 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Commission for Levying Fines under Forest Law 
(1635),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 456-57. 
42 A “forest” was an area designated by royal prerogative to be governed by the Forest Courts applying 
forest law, a separate body of law from common law. Forests were reserved to the royal pleasure, and 
forest law protected the “venison,” or animals of the chase, the “vert,” or “greenwards” supporting the 
animals of the chase, and the “covert” that provided them shelter. The common law additionally prohibited 
the occupation of certain classes of natural resources by private subjects because they belonged to the 
Crown by virtue of the royal prerogative. These resources included gold and silver ore, swans, venison in a 
rural forest, and certain “great fish,” including whales, sturgeon, porpoises, and dolphins. These natural 
“flowers of the Crown” could only be acquired by subjects through royal grant or prescription. See J.H. 
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworth, 1990) 430; Sir William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 335-340. 
43 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Writ for the Collection of Ship Money (1634),” 
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 455-56. 
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expenses incurred for their protection during time of war. On October 20, 1634, Charles 
expanded his levy of ship money to inland counties during a time of peace. This levy was 
unprecedented in English history, and it was widely perceived as the levying of a new tax 
without the consent of Parliament.  
To preserve a pretense of legality, Charles obtained an advisory judicial opinion in “The 
Question of Ship Money” 44 from the twelve justices of the combined Court of the King’s Bench, 
the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of the Exchequer. The twelve judges rendered the 
unanimous opinion that the royal prerogative permitted the king to command and compel all his 
subjects to pay ship money in times of danger. The opinion further held that the king is the sole 
judge both of the danger and of the expenses required to protect against it. 
A concerted campaign of non-payment of ship money was led by Viscount Saye and 
Sele. In Hampden's Case, the Viscounts’ associate John Hampden was ordered to show cause 
before the Court of the Exchequer for failing to pay the levy of ship money on his lands in 
Buckinghamshire. Hampden claimed the levy was illegal because it issued without Parliament’s 
consent. After twelve days of argument by counsel, the twelve justices of the combined Court of 
the King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of the Exchequer rendered 
judgment for the King by a vote of seven to five. 45 Foreshadowing the travails into which the 
nation would soon descend, five of the judges reversed their position from the advisory opinion 
                                                 
44 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Question of Ship Money (1637),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 455-56. This advisory opinion was 
issued on February 7, 1637. The twelve judges consisted of John Bramston, John Finch, Humphrey 
Davenport, John Denham, Richard Hutton, William Jones, George Crooke, Thomas Trevor, George 
Vernon, Francis Crawley, Robert Berkeley, and Richard Weston. Because of the dramatic consequences 
flowing from the issuance of this opinion. American federal courts categorically refuse to issue advisory 
opinions or to decide “political questions,” holding that advisory opinions are outside their limited 
jurisdiction. 
45 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The King v. John Hampden (1638),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 459-62. 
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they had rendered just one year earlier in “The Question of Ship Money.” 46 Hampden’s Case 
would soon prove a Pyrrhic victory for Charles and the judges of the majority.  
6. Charles I and Religious Repression   
Regarding matters of religious policy, Archbishop William Laud introduced theological 
doctrines and liturgical practices identified with Roman Catholicism that had been repudiated by 
Anglicanism. Laud brutally and systematically repressed all who publicly opposed these 
changes. Clergy and laity were disciplined by the Court of the High Commission.47 Some were 
subjected to cruel and severe penalties by the Court of the Star Chamber.48 In one such case, the 
                                                 
46 These judges were George Crooke, Richard Hutton, Humphrey Davenport, John Denham, and John 
Bramston. Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The King v. John Hampden (1638),” 
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 459 n. 5.  
47 The Court of the High Commission was a prerogative court with jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. It 
had original jurisdiction over immorality and violations of ecclesiastical laws by the clergy as well as 
jurisdiction over heresy, schism, and nonconformity committed by either the clergy or laity. These 
offenses were defined very broadly. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the 
Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 312. “The 
quarreling of two old women in church was schism, witchcraft was heresy, and the failure of the parson to 
read prayers on Wednesday because he was reaping his harvest was nonconformity.” Sir William Searle 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol.1, (Boston: Little Brown, 1926) 608.  
48 The Court of the Star Chamber referred to meetings of the King's Privy Council in judicial session and 
took its name from the starred roof of the chamber in which it sat in judicial session. The Privy Council 
was the chief executive arm of the King, with ultimate control of the entire system of courts. It was itself a 
judicial body. When the Privy Council set as the High Court of the Star Chamber, the chief justices of the 
King's Bench and Common Pleas also participated, even though they were not members of the Privy 
Council. The Chancellor usually presided over judicial sessions, which heard both criminal and civil cases. 
Except in rare cases when the king chose to personally intervene, the Court of the Star Chamber could not 
impose the death sentence and could not determine rights in freehold land. These were reserved to the 
jurisdiction of the common law courts. Therefore the Court of the Star Chamber normally had no 
jurisdiction over felonies and treason, since these involved capital punishment and escheat of land. 
Instead, the Court of the Star Chamber normally imposed punishments such as fines, imprisonment up to 
life, loss of ears, nose, or tongue, whipping, the pillory, public confessions, and wearing a paper specifying 
the offense. In contrast, common law court punishments were limited in felony cases to sentences of death 
by hanging, mutilation of eyes or legs, escheat of land, forfeiture of chattels, and outlawry. In cases of 
lesser crimes, common law courts could issue small fines and imprisonment up to one year. Proceedings 
before the Court of the Star Chamber were adapted from canon law and often resembled proceedings 
before the Inquisition, including such features as secret sessions and the use of torture to extract 
confessions. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 309-11; A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero, and Stanley 
Leathes, eds., “The Constitutional Struggle in England (1625–40),” The Cambridge Modern History, vol. 
4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1902) 278-280. Under the Tudor and Stuart dynasties, the Court of the Star 
Chamber was used for the persecution of political and religious dissidents and known for its cruel and 
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Puritan lawyer William Prynne authored a pamphlet entitled Historiomatrix criticizing the 
theater on religious grounds. For his “crime,” Prynne was sentenced to life imprisonment, a fine 
of £5,000, and expulsion from his profession. On June 30, 1637, Prynne was publicly pilloried, 
his nostrils were slit, his ears were cut off, and his cheeks were branded “S & L” for sedition and 
libel.49 To escape such religious oppression, more than 20,000 English subjects emigrated from 
England to the Massachusetts Bay Colony. An equal or greater number went to the 
Netherlands.50 
In 1637, Charles and Archbishop Laud sought to control Calvinism and Presbyterianism 
in Scotland by forcing Scotland to accept an Anglican style prayer book. Scotland responded by 
entering a “National Covenant,” rejecting the prayer book and abolishing the Scottish 
episcopacy. Charles invaded Scotland in 1639 and again in 1640 to enforce compliance with the 
new prayer book.  
The Scots defeated both invasions in what became known as the “Bishop’s Wars.” In the 
second war, the Scots counter-invaded and occupied parts of northern England. Under the Treaty 
of Ripon, Charles bore the humiliation of agreeing to pay the Scots £850 per day to maintain 
their forces in northern England in order to obtain a truce.51 
7. The “Long Parliament” (November 3, 1640) 
The financial demands of the Bishop’s Wars and the Treaty of Ripon forced Charles to 
recall Parliament, and the “Long Parliament” assembled on November 3, 1640. Provoked by 
                                                                                                                                                
unusual punishments. In American jurisprudence, the Court of the Star Chamber symbolizes legalized 
tyranny and cruelty without due process protections.  
49 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., Documents Relating to the Proceedings against William Prynne in 1634 
and 1637 (Westminster: Nichols, 1877) 75-76. 
50 The great majority of émigrés were not Separatists, but Episcopalians who disagreed with Laud’s 
religious “innovations.” It was thus said of Laud that “what he grasped with one hand he destroyed with 
the other.”  
51 A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes, eds., “The Constitutional Struggle in England (1625–
40),” The Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1902) 284-85. 
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eleven years of Charles’ “personal rule” and chafing from Charles’ perceived bad faith in 
assenting to Parliament’s Petition of Right in 1628, the Long Parliament took a bold series of 
steps to curtail the royal prerogative and assert Parliamentary supremacy. It abolished the Court 
of the Star Chamber 52 and the Court of the High Commission, 53 the instruments of Charles' 
political and religious oppressions. Parliament demanded the release and compensation of all 
persons imprisoned by both courts. It impeached and imprisoned Archbishop Laud, 54 the 
architect of Charles’ religious policies and “innovations,” and issued a Bill of Attainder against 
the Earl of Stafford, 55 Charles’ principal domestic advisor and architect of Charles' policies of 
repression. A crowd of 200,000 gathered at Tower Hill for the execution of Strafford on May 12, 
1641.56 Laud was executed on January 10, 1644. 
Parliament next made itself a permanent institution of government and took firm control 
of all sources of revenue. No more than three years could pass without a Parliament being 
called.57 Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent.58 Ship money was 
abolished.59 Levying tunnage and poundage without Parliamentary consent was forbidden, and 
                                                 
52 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Act Abolishing Arbitrary Courts (1641),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 479-80. 
53 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Act Abolishing the Court of the High Commission 
(1641),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 479-80. 
54 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., “The Grand Remonstrance with the Petition Accompanying It,” The 
Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 (Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1906) 202-231.  
55 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Act for the Attainder of Strafford (1641),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 477-78. Bills of Attainder were a device 
used by Parliament to secure the deaths of political opponents solely by the will of Parliament. The U.S. 
Constitution prohibits Bills of Attainder in Article I, section 9. 
56 Samuel R. Gardiner, A History of England, 1603-1642, vol. 9 (London: Spottiswoode, 1884) 369. 
57 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Triennial Act (1641),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 476-77. 
58 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Act to Continue the Existing Parliament (1641),” 
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 477. 
59 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Act Abolishing Ship Money (1641),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 477. 
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Parliamentary grants were limited to only two months, rather than the king’s lifetime.60 The 
boundaries of royal forests were restored to the boundaries recognized during the reign of James 
I.61 Parliament abolished fines for distraint of knighthood.62  
 Parliament also rejected the religious policies of the Crown. Bishops and all members of 
holy orders were forbidden from holding secular offices.63 The Grand Remonstrance demanded 
reparations for 204 listed grievances occasioned by the influence of “Jesuited Papists,” the 
“Bishops” and “corrupt part of the Clergy” (meaning Archbishop Laud), and “Councillors and 
Courtiers” (meaning the Earl of Strafford).64  
8. Charles I and the Attempted Arrests in the House of Commons (January 4, 1642) 
On January 3, 1642, Charles sent his sergeant-at-arms to arrest five leaders in the House 
of Commons for treason. Charles claimed the five members had conspired with the Scots to 
                                                 
60 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Tunnage and Poundage Act (1641),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 478-79. 
61 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Act Defining Forests and Forest Law (1641),” 
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 482-83. 
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support the establishment of Presbyterianism in Scotland.65 The House of Commons invoked 
parliamentary privilege and refused to permit the arrests.  
Charles then determined to end his sea of Parliamentary troubles by taking arms against 
them. On January 4, Charles came to the House of Commons accompanied by 400 men at arms 
to make the arrests himself and accomplish a coup d'état of Parliament. Taking the speaker’s 
chair, Charles justified his invasion of parliamentary privilege by claiming the traitors he sought 
retained no privileges. Charles then asked Speaker William Lenthall to tell him where the five 
members were. The Speaker replied, “May it please your Majesty, I have neither eyes to see nor 
tongue to speak in this place but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant I am here.” 
“Well,” Charles replied, “since I see all the birds have flown, I do expect from you that you shall 
send them in to me as soon as they return hither.” 66  
Civil war was now inevitable. Parliament quickly took control of London and the 
militia.67 Charles fled London with his family on January 10 to raise an army in the north.  
E. The Civil War (1642-1651) 
1. Charles I and the Scottish “Engagement” (December 26, 1647) 
                                                 
65 The five targeted members were John Pym, John Hampden, Denzel Hollis, William Strode, and Sir 
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66 Francois Guizot, History of the English Revolution of 1640, trans. William Hazlitt (London: Bogue, 
1846) 132-33. Charles continued: “But I assure you, on the word of the King, I never did intend any force, 
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Resolving the great issues of supremacy under the English constitution was no longer a 
matter for Parliamentary bills or court cases, and England endured three periods of civil war 
from 1642 until 1651. The first phase, fought between Royalists and Parliament from 1642-1646, 
ended in victory for the parliamentary forces under Cromwell with Charles I as their prisoner. 
Negotiations ensued for restoring Charles to the throne. Charles bartered with Parliament in bad 
faith, simultaneously negotiating a secret agreement with the Scots known as “the Engagement.” 
Charles signed the Engagement on December 26, 1647, and promised in the Engagement to 
establish Presbyterianism in both England and Scotland for three years if Scotland would invade 
England and restore Charles to the throne. 68  
The resulting Scots invasion and Royalist uprisings comprised the second phase of the 
civil war, from 1648 to 1649. Parliamentary forces under Cromwell’s command prevailed again. 
The discovery of Charles’ secret “Engagement” with the Scots convinced many Parliamentarians 
that Charles could never be trusted. Cromwell, who had supported negotiations with Charles for 
his restoration, wrote that Charles’ “Engagement” was “a more prodigious treason than any that 
had been perfected before; because the former quarrel was that Englishmen might rule over one 
another; this to vassalise us to a foreign nation.” 69 
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26 
2. Parliament Abolishes the Monarchy and the House of Lords (March 17 and 19, 1649) 
A “High Court of Justice” was established on January 4, 1629, to try Charles for 
treason.70 Although the House of Lords refused to accept the High Court of Justice, the High 
Court convicted Charles of treason on January 27,71 and Charles was executed three days later. 
Charles’ final words reiterated his faith in Stuart absolutism. English subjects had no rightful 
“share” in their own government.72 Charles I then laid his head upon the block, signaled the 
executioner, and “the kingly head, with its crown of sorrows, dropped upon the scaffold.” 73 
Parliament abolished the monarchy 74 on March 17, 1649 and the House of Lords on 
March 19, 1649. 75 England was declared a Commonwealth, and the House of Commons was 
declared the supreme authority of the land.76 
The third and final phase of the civil war began with Cromwell’s suppression of 
Royalists and their Confederates in Ireland in 1649. The dead king’s son, the future Charles II, 
landed in Scotland in 1650 and formed an alliance with the Scots. Charles made a futile attempt 
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to invade England, but his army was crushed by Cromwell at the Battle of Worcester on 
September 3, 1651. Charles escaped and reached France after six weeks of narrow escapes. 77 
3. Cromwell becomes Lord Protector (1653-1658) 
Cromwell’s victory at Worcester marked the end of the civil war, but it did not mark the 
end of England’s troubles. With the kingship abolished and the civil war ended, the great 
common causes that united the Parliamentarians were gone. Political factions within Parliament 
began to fight among themselves. When Cromwell returned from his campaigns in Ireland and 
Scotland, he attempted to prod the “Rump Parliament” into setting new elections and 
establishing a single government for England, Ireland, and Scotland that recognized liberty of 
religious conscience. On April 20, 1653, after two years of Parliamentary inaction, Cromwell 
cleared the chamber with the assistance of forty musketeers and dissolved the Rump Parliament 
by force.78  
Cromwell’s actions were as incompatible with the great principle of Parliamentary 
supremacy as Charles I's failed coup d'état had been. Cromwell, however, was no Charles, and 
there was no force in England sufficient to resist his will. Another Parliament, the “Barebones 
Parliament,” 79 convened on July 4, 1653, its 140 members selected by Cromwell’s officers. It 
also proved ineffectual and dissolved itself on December 12, 1653. The “Instrument of 
Government” was then adopted, appointing Cromwell as Lord Protector for life. The 
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“Instrument,” the first written constitution of England, granted Cromwell the executive powers 
of government. The “Instrument” granted de jure legislative powers to Parliament.80  
Cromwell was offered the crown in 1657 but declined, stating, “I would not seek to set 
up that which Providence hath destroyed and laid in the dust, and I would not build Jericho 
again.”81 Nevertheless, despite all the upheavals and struggles of the great civil war, Parliament 
still did not function as the supreme body of government. It remained the de facto creature of 
Cromwell’s will. 82 Although Cromwell succeeded in obtaining a significant degree of liberty of 
conscience,83 he failed to resolve the other root issue that precipitated civil war, the conflict 
between the Crown and Parliament for constitutional supremacy. Under Cromwell, the conflict 
between Parliament and Crown was merely transformed into a conflict between Parliament and 
the Lord Protector.  
F. The Stuart Restoration (1660-1688) 
1. Charles II and the Declaration of Breda (April 4, 1660) 
Cromwell died on September 3, 1658. A new “Convention Parliament,” dominated by 
Royalists, convened on April 25, 1660.  In an effort to regain the throne, Charles II issued his 
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Declaration of Breda on April 4, 1660.84 The Declaration of Breda pledged a general pardon and 
paid lip service to both parliamentary supremacy and liberty of religious conscience. Regarding 
Parliamentary supremacy, Charles II pledged support for reenactment in 1660 of much of the 
legislation of the Puritan Long Parliament of 1641-42 whereby government by royal prerogative 
was abolished. Regarding religion, Charles II promised to permit “a liberty to tender 
consciences” permitting differences of opinion in matters of religion.  
The Declaration of Breda was delivered to Parliament on May 1, and both houses 
unanimously declared Charles to be King Charles II on May 8, 1660. Although the restored 
Stuarts initially enjoyed great prestige, they soon reverted to the excesses of James I and Charles 
I.  Charles II quickly renewed the Stuart claim that the king is above the law, repressed liberty of 
conscience, and challenged the supremacy of Parliament. James II continued and expanded these 
policies. As explained below, these policies provoked a second, “Glorious Revolution” that 
ended the Stuart dynasty forever.  
The three great issues under the restored Stuarts involved the Clarendon Code of 1661-
1665, the “Exclusion Crisis” of 1678-1681 (which required John Locke and his patron the Earl 
of Shaftesbury to flee England), and James II’s Declaration of Indulgence of 1688. The restored 
Stuarts again employed the Anglican Church as an instrument for repressing political opposition 
and liberty of conscience. The renewed Parliamentary conflicts focused on the restored Stuarts’ 
claim of a “dispensing power” to unilaterally exempt Roman Catholics from Parliament's laws 
regulating religion. 85 
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2. Charles II and the Clarendon Code (1661-1665) 
The Clarendon Code was a series of four religious statutes passed between 1661 and 
1665. The code took its name from Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, who served as Lord 
Chancellor to Charles II and helped secure their passage. The Clarendon Code sought to compel 
a uniform state religion, the same goal which Charles I and Archbishop William Laud pursued a 
generation earlier at the cost of civil war. Directed against Presbyterians, Puritans, and Quakers, 
the Clarendon Code reestablished the supremacy of the Church of England and reversed the 
religious liberty afforded Quakers and dissenting Protestant groups under Cromwell. These 
statutes betrayed the promises of liberty of conscience in Charles II’s Declaration of Breda, 
which Clarendon had helped write. 
The Corporation Act of 166186 excluded all religious nonconformists from public office. 
The act accomplished this exclusion by requiring all municipal officials to take Anglican 
communion. They were also required to take an oath never to take arms against the king as well 
as rejecting the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643.87 
The Act of Uniformity of 1662 88 excluded religious nonconformists from the ministry, 
from holding public office, and from teaching in any capacity, from private tutor to university 
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86 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Corporation Act (1661),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 542-43. The Corporation Act was not rescinded 
until 1828. 
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professor. The act accomplished this exclusion by requiring anyone employed in these 
professions to take an oath pledging (1) never to take arms against the king, (2) to comply with 
the liturgy of the Church of England, (3) to reject the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, and 
(4) never to seek any change in the government of the state or the government of the church. 
The Conventicle Act of 1664 89 prohibited “seditious conventicles,” meetings of five or 
more persons for “any exercise of religion in other manner than is allowed by the liturgy or 
practice of the Church of England.” Owners who “wittingly and willingly” permitted such 
meetings to take place on their property were equally culpable. Punishment for first offenders 
was three months’ imprisonment and a £5 fine. Second offenders received six months’ 
imprisonment and a £10 fine. The punishment for third offenders was transportation “to his 
majesty's plantations in the New World” for seven years.90  
The act also required the episcopal ordination of all ministers. No preaching or lecturing 
was permitted without such ordination. More than two thousand members of the clergy refused 
to comply with this statute. These ministers were forced to resign their livings, an event known 
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as the “Great Ejection.” The lay preacher John Bunyan wrote his religious allegory The 
Pilgrim’s Progress in the Bedford jail while imprisoned under the Conventicle Act. 
 The Five Mile Act of 1665 91 forbade nonconforming ministers from coming within five 
miles of any city or town in England. It also forbade any person from teaching in a private or 
public school without first taking the oath required by the Act of Uniformity of 1662. The 
penalty for each violation was a £40 fine. 
The enforcement of these acts excluded a large segment of the English population from 
participation in English universities, churches, and public life. The Earl of Clarendon was 
eventually impeached by the House of Commons for blatant violations of habeas corpus. 
Renewing the strategies employed by Charles I in the 1627 Case of the Five Knights, Clarendon 
arrested the King's political opponents and had them “imprisoned against law, in remote islands, 
garrisons and other places” to prevent their access to a writ of habeas corpus.92    
3. Charles II and the Exclusion Crisis (1678-1681) 
On March 15, 1672, Charles II issued a Royal Declaration of Indulgence exempting 
Roman Catholics from any penalties under English law.93 This declaration alarmed Parliament 
for two reasons. First, the Declaration of Indulgence invoked the King’s arbitrary “dispensing 
power” to dispense the application of English law to subjects of the king’s choosing. The 
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Declaration dispensed with more than forty statutes.94 This reasserted the royal prerogative on a 
grand scale in disregard of Charles II’s promises in the Declaration of Breda and the 
constitutional supremacy established by Parliament prior to the Restoration.   
Second, the Declaration of Indulgence corroborated Parliament's suspicions that a 
Roman Catholic sat on the English throne. These suspicions intensified when Charles II 
supported Catholic France in making war on the Protestant Dutch. Parliament’s suspicions 
proved well-founded. Charles was received into the Roman Catholic Church on the final night of 
his life. 95   
When Parliament resumed, its first response was to force Charles to revoke the 
Declaration of Indulgence.96 Parliament’s second response was the Test Act of 1673.97 Under 
this act, all civil and military officials were required to take Anglican communion within three 
months of receiving their office. They were also required to disavow the doctrine of 
transubstantiation.98 Charles’ brother, the future James II, was publicly revealed as a Catholic 
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when he refused to comply with the Test Act and resigned his office of Lord High Admiral.99 
The failure of Charles II to produce an heir meant that the throne could possibly pass to a 
publicly avowed Roman Catholic, precipitating a constitutional crisis. Parliament’s efforts to 
prevent the succession from passing to James became known as the “Exclusion Crisis.”  
The leader of the effort to exclude James from the royal succession was John Locke’s 
patron, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and Locke was busily writing his Two Treatises on Government 
during this crisis.100 Shaftesbury introduced his Exclusion Bill 101 on May 15, 1679. Fearing that 
supporters of the Exclusion Bill would be arrested and sent out of the country as Clarendon had 
done, Shaftesbury introduced the Habeas Corpus Act 102 eleven days later. The Habeas Corpus 
Act became law, but Shaftesbury's Exclusion Bill died in the House of Lords.  
Shaftesbury's fear of arrest proved well-founded. Charles II had Shaftesbury arrested on 
July 2, 1681, and charged with high treason for introducing the Exclusion Bill. The case was 
dismissed for lack of evidence on February 8, 1682, when government prosecutors conceded 
their witnesses had perjured themselves.  
On September 28, 1682, however, new sheriffs were installed who were sympathetic to 
Shaftesbury's political opponents.103 The new sheriffs had the ability to pack the London juries. 
Fearing a second arrest and prosecution for treason, the prudent Shaftesbury fled to Holland in 
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November, 1682.104 John Locke was named as a suspect in the “Rye House Plot” to assassinate 
Charles II and James soon after, and Locke followed his patron to Holland in September, 
1683.105   
4. James II Establishes a Standing Army (1685) 
James II ascended the throne on February 6, 1685. The Duke of Monmouth, the 
illegitimate Protestant son of Charles II, attempted to seize the throne in May, 1685. Monmouth 
was defeated at the battle of Sedgemoor on July 5, 1685, and executed at the Tower of London 
on July 15, 1685. Monmouth’s gruesome death, however, marked only the beginning of James 
II’s troubles. 106 
James refused to disband the army after the Monmouth rebellion was over, choosing 
instead to enlarge it without Parliament’s consent.107 James then defied the Test Act of 1673 and 
placed his standing army under the command of Roman Catholic officers.  The army was then 
stationed in locations viewed as threatening by London Protestants. Popular dismay at these 
actions deepened when Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes on October 22, 1685.108  
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were both armed and employed, contrary to law.” Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The 
Bill of Rights (1689),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 599-
602.  
108 Originally issued on April 10, 1598 by Henry IV of France, the Edict of Nantes granted civil liberties to 
Huguenots and ended religious violence in France. The revocation drove approximately 400,000 
Protestants out of France, many of whom came to England, cementing Louis XIV’s reputation among 
English Protestants as a totalitarian monarch. 
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On November 9, 1685, James II gave a speech informing Parliament that he intended to 
dispense with the Test Act, appoint Roman Catholics to civil offices, and maintain command of 
the army under Roman Catholic officers.109 Parliament formally objected to this policy, claiming 
that Catholics were incapacitated from holding these positions by law and that only Parliament 
could remove their incapacity.110 James responded by proroguing and eventually dissolving 
Parliament.111 Like Charles I before him in 1642, James II resolved to govern without 
Parliament. Parliament would never meet again during his reign. 
James' Roman Catholic wife, Mary of Modena, publicly announced her pregnancy that 
same month. Protestants now feared the birth of a Roman Catholic heir. In 1686, the Court of the 
King’s Bench in Godden v. Hales upheld the king’s prerogative power to dispense with the Test 
Act and appoint Roman Catholic military officers.112  
To a majority of Englishmen, James II had returned to the arbitrary absolutism of 
Charles I. James II ignored settled law by invoking the royal prerogative to “dispense” with the 
                                                 
109 Andrew Browning, ed., “Speech of James II in support of the standing army and the Catholic officers, 
and the address of the Commons in reply, 1685,” English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 (New York: 
Routledge, 1996) 81-82.  
110 Andrew Browning, ed., “Speech of James II in support of the standing army and the Catholic officers, 
and the address of the Commons in reply, 1685,” English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 (New York: 
Routledge, 1996) 82. 
111 James II prorogued Parliament on five consecutive occasions beginning November 20, 1685, and 
finally dissolved Parliament on July 2, 1687.  
112 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Godden v. Hales (1686),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 582-83. Sir Edward Hales was a Catholic 
convert who served as the colonel of a regiment of foot and as a Lord of the Admiralty under James II. 
The Court stated the following in making its ruling: “We were satisfied in our judgments before and, 
having the concurrence of eleven out of twelve, we think we may very well declare the opinion of the 
court to be that the king may dispense in this case; and the judges go upon these grounds: 1. that the kings 
of England are sovereign princes; 2. that the laws of England are the king's laws; 3. that therefore it is an 
inseparable prerogative in the kings of England to dispense with penal laws in particular cases and upon 
particular necessary reasons; 4. that of those reasons and those necessities, the king himself is sole judge; 
and then, which is consequent upon all, 5. that this is not a trust invested in, or granted to, the king by the 
people, but the ancient remains of the sovereign power and prerogative of the kings of England; which 
never yet was taken from them, nor can be. And therefore, such a dispensation appearing upon record to 
come [in] time enough to save him from the forfeiture, judgment ought to be given for the defendant.” Id. 
at 583.  
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Test Act. He deprived the people of any share of government by dissolving Parliament. He also 
maintained an illegal standing army without Parliamentary consent.  
5. James II and the Declaration of Indulgence (April 24, 1688) 
The final act of the Stuart dynasty commenced on April 4, 1688, when James II 
deepened the constitutional crisis by issuing his Declaration of Indulgence.113  The Declaration 
opened by stating the king’s desire that all his subjects become Roman Catholic.114 The 
Declaration then invoked the royal prerogative to suspend all penal laws in ecclesiastical 
matters.115  
Although the language of the Declaration applied to all religious worship, James’ 
opponents remembered Charles II’s false promises in the 1660 Declaration of Breda and feared 
the Indulgence was a ploy to re-establish Roman Catholicism in England. Anglicans feared the 
Indulgence would, at a minimum, disestablish the Anglican Church.  Even James’ former 
supporters in Parliament opposed the Declaration as an arbitrary use of the royal prerogative in 
violation of Parliament’s powers.  
6. James II and the Trial of the Seven Bishops (June 29-30, 1688) 
On May 4, 1688, James II ordered his Declaration of Indulgence to be read from the 
pulpit of every Anglican church and chapel in England. 116 Tensions heightened on June 10 when 
                                                 
113 Andrew Browning, ed., “Declaration of Indulgence, 1687,” English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 
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114 Andrew Browning, ed., “Declaration of Indulgence, 1687,” English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 
(New York: Routledge, 1996) 395: “We cannot but heartily wish, as it will easily be believed, that all the 
people of our dominions were members of the Catholic Church.” 
115 Andrew Browning, ed., “Declaration of Indulgence, 1687,” English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 
(New York: Routledge, 1996) 396: “We do likewise declare, that it is our royal will and pleasure, that 
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116 Andrew Browning, ed., “Order in Council requiring James II’s declaration of indulgence to be read in 
churches, 1688,” English Historical Documents, 1660-1714 (New York: Routledge, 1996) 83.  
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Mary of Modena gave birth to a son. On June 18, two days before the Declaration was to be read 
from the pulpits, seven bishops of the Anglican Church petitioned James in a personal audience 
to withdraw his order.  
The bishops' petition explained that James' “declaration is founded upon such a 
dispensing power as hath often been declared illegal in parliament, and particularly in the years 
1662, 1672, and in the beginning of your Majesty's reign.” 117 The king read the petition and 
declared it to be a “standard of rebellion.” “God has given me the dispensing power and I will 
retain it,” he stated angrily. “I will be obeyed. My declaration shall be published. You are 
trumpeters of sedition.” 118  
Although the Bishops’ petition was presented to the king in private, it was in public 
circulation by that evening. An angry James II arrested the Bishops and charged them with 
publication of a seditious libel. 
The “Trial of the Seven Bishops” took place before a jury in the Court of the King’s 
Bench on June 29 and 30, 1688. The Crown’s burden included proving that the Bishops’ petition 
of was (1) false, (2) malicious, and (3) tended towards sedition. In summing up the evidence 
before the jury’s deliberations,119 Justice Powell stated that there was no evidence of falsity or 
malice. Furthermore, in his judgment, the Declaration of Indulgence was a nullity, and James II’s 
recent exercises of the dispensing power were utterly inconsistent with all law. If these 
encroachments of prerogative were allowed, Powell warned, that would be the end of 
Parliaments. “If this be once allowed of, there will need no Parliament; all the Legislature will be 
                                                 
117 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Case of the Seven Bishops (1688),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 583-84. 
118 Thomas Macaulay, The History of England from the Ascension of James II (New York: Harper, 1849) 
168-69. 
119 English procedure allows the judges to give the jury their evaluation of the proof offered by both sides 
before the jury deliberates. American procedure strictly forbids such “comments on the weight of the 
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in the King-which is a thing worth considering, and I leave the issue to God and your 
consciences.” 120 
G. The Glorious Revolution (1688) 
1. William of Orange Lands at Brixham (November 5, 1688) 
The jury acquitted the Bishops to widespread public rejoicing.121 On that same day, 
seven prominent Englishmen sent a letter of invitation to the Protestant William of Orange, 
husband of James II’s Protestant daughter Mary, pledging their support if William would land in 
England with a small army.122 William landed at Brixham in southwest England on November 5, 
1688. He led an invasion force of 11,000 soldiers and 4,000 cavalry. James II fled to France on 
December 23, 1688.  
Parliament finally had constitutional supremacy within its grasp and with it the end of 
arbitrary monarchies. Cognizant however of Macbeth’s observation that “To be thus is nothing; 
But to be safely, thus,” Parliament busied itself in securing its constitutional supremacy. A 
                                                 
120 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Case of the Seven Bishops (1688),” Sources of 
English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 586. 
121 Thomas Macaulay, The History of England from the Ascension of James II (New York: Harper, 1849) 
199. Macaulay gives a detailed description of the trial and the jury’s deliberations at pages 188-204, 
describing the public reaction to the acquittal at page 199: “At that signal, benches and galleries raised a 
shout. In a moment ten thousand persons, who crowded the great hall, replied with a still louder shout, 
which made the old oaken roof crack; and in another moment the innumerable throng without set up a 
third huzza, which was heard at Temple Bar. The boats which covered the Thames gave an answering 
cheer. A peal of gunpowder was heard on the water, and another, and another; and so, in a few moments, 
the glad tidings went flying past the Savoy and the Friars to London Bridge, and to the forest of masts 
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acclamations. Yet were the acclamations less strange than the weeping. For the feelings of men had been 
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122 Andrew Browning, ed., “Letter of invitation to William of Orange, 1688,” English Historical 
Documents, 1660-1714 (New York: Routledge, 1996) 120-22. The seven signatories, popularly known as 
the “Seven Immortals,” included the Earl of Danby, the Earl of Shrewsbury, the Earl of Devonshire, the 
Viscount Lumley, Henry Compton, Bishop of London, Edward Russell, and Henry Sydney. This group 
included members of Parliament that had been continuously prorogued by James II from November 20, 
1685 until its final dissolution on July 2, 1687.  William had requested such an invitation to ameliorate 
public resentment at an armed landing by a foreign power. Thomas Macaulay, The History of England 
from the Ascension of James II (New York: Harper, 1849) 216. 
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Convention Parliament convened on January 22, 1689. On January 29, Parliament resolved that 
England was a Protestant kingdom and that only a Protestant could be King. All Roman Catholic 
claimants to the throne were disinherited by law.  
2.  William and Mary Publicly Accept the Declaration of Right (February 13, 1689) 
The ship carrying Mary, Princess of Orange docked at Greenwich February 13, 1689.123 
John Locke was among its passengers. Later that day, Parliament met with William and Mary at 
Whitehall in the Banqueting House,124 the site of Charles I’s beheading forty years earlier.  
The Convention Parliament read its Declaration of Right aloud. The Declaration 
recounted twelve categories of arbitrary powers illegally exercised by James II. 125 The 
Declaration then declared that James II had abdicated the throne, and offered the crown to 
William and Mary on condition that they recognize the supremacy of Parliament and thirteen 
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125 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Bill of Rights (1689),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 600-601: “Whereas the late King James the 
Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did 
endeavour to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this kingdom. 1. By 
assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws, and the execution of laws, 
without consent of parliament. 2. By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates, for humbly 
petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power. 3. By issuing and causing to be 
executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court called, the court of commissioners for 
ecclesiastical causes. 4. By levying money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, for 
other time, and in other manner, than the same was granted by parliament. 5. By raising and keeping a 
standing army within this kingdom in time of peace, without consent of parliament, and quartering soldiers 
contrary to law. 6. By causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time 
when papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law. 7. By violating the freedom of election of 
members to serve in parliament. 8. By prosecutions in the court of King's Bench, for matters and causes 
cognizable only in parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses. 9. And whereas of late 
years, partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons have been returned and served on juries in trials, and 
particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason, which were not freeholders. 10. And excessive bail hath 
been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty 
of the subjects. 11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments have been 
inflicted. 12. And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or 
judgment against the persons, upon whom the same were to be levied. All which are utterly and directly 
contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of this realm.” 
  
41 
rights protecting English subjects from the arbitrary exercise or power demonstrated by James 
II.126 Each right was a response to the arbitrary exercises of power named earlier in the Bill of 
Rights. When the reading of the Declaration of Right was concluded, William said, “We 
thankfully accept what you have offered us.” As Lord Macaulay writes, “Thus was 
consummated the English revolution.” 127 The Declaration of Right was codified as law on 
December 16, 1689, as the English Bill of Rights.128 
3. William III Vetoes the Judges Bill (February 24, 1691)  
Parliament recognized that freedom from arbitrary monarchies could never be secured so 
long as judicial appointments remained politicized and within the Crown’s control. During the 
course of the Stuart dynasty, Sir Edward Coke had helped to establish the supremacy of the 
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127 Thomas Macaulay, The History of England from the Ascension of James II (New York: Harper, 1849) 
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128 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Bill of Rights (1689),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 599-602. This action was required to remove 
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Constitutional Parliament that had drawn up the Declaration of Right on February 13, 1689 had not been 
appointed by a king. Its validity was thus open to challenge under English law. 
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common law courts over the prerogative courts.129 Parliament had also abolished the most 
abusive courts of the royal prerogative, including the Court of the Star Chamber and the Court of 
the High Commission.130  
The Crown nevertheless retained the powers to appoint and remove judges. In order to 
ensure the loyalty of the higher judiciary, the “twelve men in scarlet,”131 the Crown used loyalty 
to the king, the hereditary succession, and the established church as political tests for 
appointment.132 The result was a biased bench that rendered result oriented decisions, based not 
on the law, but on partiality to the king’s will. Rather than ensuring a government based on law, 
these courts enabled royal absolutism and set the nation on the course to civil war.  The twelve 
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members of the higher judiciary were held in such low esteem by 1688 that its members were 
considered incompetent to render legal advice.133  
Parliament acted to establish an independent judiciary.  Both houses passed the Judges 
Bill of 1691, providing that judges could not be dismissed by the king. William refused to 
release his hold on the judiciary, however, and vetoed the bill on February 24, 1691. 134   
This veto of Parliament was the first of William’s reign, and generated significant public 
resentment.135 William's veto was just one of a series of intermittent efforts to reassert royal 
supremacy.136 The people and the Parliament were realizing with William III,137 as they had 
previously with Charles II138 and with Cromwell,139 that promises to abide by constitutional 
limits on power are often forgotten once the reins of power are firmly grasped.  
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4. The Act of Settlement (June 12, 1701) 
This realization led to the final event in the English legal revolution, the Act of 
Settlement of 1701.140 The Act describes itself as “An act for the further limitation of the crown 
and better securing the rights and liberties of the subject,” and the Act was designed to resolve 
any lingering doubts regarding Parliament’s constitutional supremacy.  
The Act reduced royal influence over the judiciary. Judicial appointments were no 
longer at the Crown’s pleasure. Judicial commissions were granted quamdiu se bene geserint, 
“during good behavior” for life. Judges could only be removed by agreement of both houses of 
Parliament.  
The Act also reduced royal influence over Parliament. No person who held an office 
under the crown or received a pension from the crown could sit as a Member of Parliament. The 
crown was also stripped of its power to pardon those impeached by Parliament. 
The Act also revised the coronation oath. Previous monarchs swore to keep the laws and 
customs of their predecessors, making no mention of Parliament. The new oath required all new 
                                                                                                                                                
James II to honor these promises renewed all the disputes that led to civil war, and ultimately to the 
“Glorious Revolution” of 1688 and the demise of the Stuart dynasty. 
139 Cromwell led the Parliamentary forces in civil war as a consequence of Charles I’s eleven years of 
“personal rule” by royal prerogative, climaxed by Charles’ entry into the Long Parliament at the head of 
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Henry Parry, The Parliament and Councils of England, From the Reign of William I to the Revolution in 
1688 (London: Murray, 1889) 510. Cromwell stated: “You are no longer a Parliament. I tell you, you are 
no longer a Parliament. The Lord has done with you. He has chosen other Instruments for carrying on his 
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140 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Act of Settlement (1701),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 610-612. In addition to provisions discussed in 
the text, the act provided for the succession to the throne and barred Roman Catholics from the throne 
forever.  
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monarchs to swear that they would govern “according to the Statutes in Parliament agreed on, 
and the Laws and Customs of the same.”141 
III. Two Pragmatic Principles Transform English Law 
As the foregoing account demonstrates, the natural law tradition in the common law 
developed as a pragmatic response to the arbitrary rule of English monarchs. The above 
discussion sets out twenty-two acts of Parliament 142 that constitute direct responses to specific 
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instances of arbitrary rule. The thirteen rights contained in the Bill of Rights were direct 
reactions to twelve specific instances of arbitrary rule by the Stuart kings.143 To make this clear, 
the twelve instances of arbitrary rule were carefully listed in the Bill of Rights itself. 144  
                                                                                                                                                
56; Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Second Test Act (1678),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 556-57; Carl Stephenson and Frederick George 
Marcham, “The Act of Settlement (1701),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1937) 610-612. 
143 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Bill of Rights (1689),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 599-602. The thirteen protected rights included 
the following: “1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal 
authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal. 2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or 
the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal. 3. That 
the commission for erecting the late court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other 
commissions and courts of like nature are illegal and pernicious. 4. That levying money for or to the use of 
the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, for longer time, or in other manner 
than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal. 5. That it is the right of the subjects to petition the King, and 
all committments [sic] and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. 6. That the raising or keeping a 
standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law. 
7. That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and 
as allowed by law. 8. That election of members of parliament ought to be free. 9. That the freedom of 
speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or 
place out of parliament. 10. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 11. That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and 
jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason ought to be freeholders. 12. That all grants and 
promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void. 13. And that 
for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, parliaments 
ought to be held frequently.” 
144 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Bill of Rights (1689),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 600-601: “Whereas the late King James the 
Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did 
endeavour to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this kingdom. 1. By 
assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws, and the execution of laws, 
without consent of parliament. 2. By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates, for humbly 
petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power. 3. By issuing and causing to be 
executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court called, the court of commissioners for 
ecclesiastical causes. 4. By levying money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, for 
other time, and in other manner, than the same was granted by parliament. 5. By raising and keeping a 
standing army within this kingdom in time of peace, without consent of parliament, and quartering soldiers 
contrary to law. 6. By causing several good subjects, being protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time 
when papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law. 7. By violating the freedom of election of 
members to serve in parliament. 8. By prosecutions in the court of King's Bench, for matters and causes 
cognizable only in parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses. 9. And whereas of late 
years, partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons have been returned and served on juries in trials, and 
particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason, which were not freeholders. 10. And excessive bail hath 
been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty 
of the subjects. 11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments have been 
inflicted. 12. And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures, before any conviction or 
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The pragmatic process that generated these statutes and rights also generated the 
principles of government and law contained in the works of Locke and Blackstone. Natural law 
jurisprudence synthesizes the lessons of the English Revolution into a framework of practical 
principles. These principles originate in experience “from the bottom up.”  
Locke and Blackstone share two fundamental principles that emerged from the English 
constitutional struggles of 1603-1701. These principles radically transformed common law 
jurisprudence. The first principle is the requirement of autonomy in law, the requirement that law 
is supreme over political rulers. Both ruler and the ruled must be subject to the same laws, and 
the rulers may not arbitrarily change the law to reflect their will.145 The second principle is 
Locke’s claim that all power derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. 146 For 
Blackstone, the consent of the governed determines the legitimacy of law. Common law is based 
on long-standing and freely adopted custom, and such custom evidences universal consent.147 
                                                                                                                                                
judgment against the persons, upon whom the same were to be levied. All which are utterly and directly 
contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of this realm.” 
145 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 5: “The historicity of law, as it came to be understood in 
the West in the twelfth century and thereafter, was linked with the concept of its autonomy and of its 
supremacy over political rulers. The supreme political authority-the king, the pope himself-may make law, 
it was said, but he may not make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it-lawfully-he is bound by it. In 
Bracton’s famous words, written in the early thirteenth century, ‘the King must not be under man but 
under God and under the law, because law makes the King.’” “Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo 
et sub lege, quia lex fecit regem.” Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws 
and Customs of England), ed. George E. Woodbine, trans. Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1968) 33. 
146 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 2002) 44: “95. Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can 
be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only 
way whereby anyone divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by 
agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community...” [Emphasis added].  
147 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
393, in which Blackstone states that the common law is “nothing else but custom, arising from the 
universal agreement of the whole community.” At page 21, Blackstone writes: “And this immemorial 
usage is binding upon all parties; as it is in its nature an evidence of universal consent and acquiescence, 
and with reason supposes a real composition to have been formerly made.” [Emphasis added]. 
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Acts of Parliament evidence consent because they are enacted by the legitimate representatives 
of the governed.148  
IV. Goal and Philosophical Method 
 The goal of this dissertation is to establish a new standard of legal validity using a 
different philosophical method from those used by natural law theory and legal positivism. The 
standard for legal validity represents the most fundamental issue for any legal system because 
legal validity determines the enforceability of law. The English Revolution of 1603-1701 
illustrates the problems created by the lack of a uniformly recognized standard of legal validity.  
 The natural law standard of legal validity formulated by Locke and Blackstone 
dominated American jurisprudence until the second half of the 20th century when a new 
standard based on legal positivism began to displace it. Today, as in seventeenth century 
England, there is no uniformly recognized standard for legal validity in American jurisprudence. 
Jurists divide between the incompatible standards provided by natural law and positivism.  
 The validity schism in American jurisprudence produces, in turn, a chain reaction of 
secondary schisms involving the selection of judges, the appropriate role of judges, the 
interpretation of statutes, and the interpretation of the Constitution. These conflicts affect every 
individual living under American law. One troubling consequence of this schism is the 
emergence of two opposing bodies of precedent. Another is a developing juristocracy in which 
unelected judges decide policy issues without public input.  
                                                 
148 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1  (New York: W.E. Dean, 1840) 
33: “By the sovereign power, as was before observed, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that 
power resides, all others must conform to and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and 
administration of the government may put on. In a democracy ... the right of making laws resides in the 
people at large.” Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1  (New York: W.E. 
Dean, 1840) 101: “For no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the 
defence of the realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of 
his representatives in parliament.” [Emphasis added]. 
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 Despite fifty years of debate, the opposing camps remain as unreconciled as ever. The 
validity schism persists because the validity standards offered by natural law and legal 
positivism are both inadequate. The goal of this dissertation is to promulgate a new standard for 
legal validity that overcomes these inadequacies and offers a pragmatic guide for lawyers, 
judges, and philosophers in determining the validity of law.  
 The first step in accomplishing this goal is identifying the inadequacies of the validity 
standards advanced by natural law and legal positivism. The second step is selecting a 
philosophical method to overcome these inadequacies. The final step is evaluating legal 
principles to formulate a pragmatic standard of legal validity.  
A. Inadequacies of the Natural Law Standard for Legal Validity 
 The natural law tradition in English common law, concretized in the works of Locke and 
Blackstone, reflects the theories, intuitions, and theology that emerged from the turbulence of 
seventeenth century England. Natural law recognizes the validity of positive law but denies 
enforcement of any law that violates its validity standard. The task of the natural law jurist is to 
formulate a standard for legal validity within parameters dictated by human reason and divine 
law.  
 Natural law fails to formulate an adequate validity standard for two reasons. The first is 
its reliance on divine law. There is no general agreement regarding the terms of divine law, and 
many reject its very existence. As John Austin observes, “the laws of God are not always 
certain.” 149  
 Second, natural law theory adopts inconsistent views of human reason. On one hand, 
human reason is acceptable to natural law theorists as a reliable guide in discerning the precepts 
                                                 
149 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 186. 
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of natural law.150 On the other hand, human reason is too corrupt to generate reliable human law. 
This corruption requires recourse to divine law as the standard for determining the validity of 
human law.151  
B. Inadequacies of the Legal Positivist Standard for Legal Validity  
 Chapter II explains the origin of the legal positivist tradition in Bentham's rejection of 
Blackstone's jurisprudence. Starting with Bentham, and continuing through John Austin and 
H.L.A. Hart, legal positivism applies linguistic analysis to describe law as a simple system of 
rules created by a political sovereign and enforced by sanctions. The positivist's goal is a 
definition for law that lists the “existence conditions” of law, those characteristics common to all 
laws in all societies.  
 Legal positivism dominates contemporary legal philosophy. Positivist methodology is so 
widely accepted among legal philosophers that the leading opponents of legal positivism often 
adopt its methodology in voicing their criticisms.152 Nevertheless, legal positivism bears little 
fruit for the jurist or legal practitioner seeking just results in actual cases. 
 
 
                                                 
150 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 3.  
151 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 6. 
152 The most notable example of this phenomenon is Ronald Dworkin's “semantic sting” criticism of 
H.L.A. Hart. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986) 32, 45. This argument 
has set the agenda for much of the recent debate in the Philosophy of Law. Dworkin argues that legal 
positivists have a misguided view of language, and of the relation between law and language. Legal 
positivists such as Hart suffer from a “semantic sting” because of their insistence “that lawyers all follow 
certain linguistic criteria for judging propositions of law.” Dworkin claims that legal theories like Hart's 
cannot explain theoretical disagreement in legal practice. They think that lawyers share uncontroversial 
tests provided by the conventional meaning of the word “law” for the truth of propositions of law. The 
semantic sting is the misconception that the language of the law can be meaningful only if lawyers share 
such criteria. Dworkin argues that the semantic sting is fatal to legal positivism because it leads the 
positivist theorist to think that people cannot have any “substantive” disagreement about the law.  
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1. The Fruitlessness of Legal Positivism 
 Legal positivism is concerned almost exclusively with the question, “what makes a 
law?” This question is of little interest to legal professionals, who already know the applicable 
law in their case. The question of concern for legal professionals is “what makes a good law?” 
 Legal positivism intentionally excludes this question from legal philosophy. The 
dissection of “what law is” from “what law ought to be” is, in fact, the credo of legal 
positivism.153 Legal positivism rejects any philosophical method that addresses the issue of what 
law ought to be. Legal positivism thus accepts “morally iniquitous laws” as perfectly valid and 
enforceable, even if their content possesses “no moral justification or force whatsoever.” 154  
 For all of its analytical clarity, legal positivism is a largely fruitless endeavor. It provides 
no pragmatic guidance to judges, lawyers, or juries. In fact, practicing lawyers and jurists often 
react to the positivist acceptance of morally iniquitous laws with surprise and disbelief. One 
reason for this reaction is the fact that lawyers and jurists must cope with the results in their 
cases. Legal philosophers, on the other hand, enjoy the insulation of theory and hypothesis. 
Executions do not occur in classrooms.  
2. Legal Positivism Commits the Philosophical Fallacy 
 The fruitlessness of legal positivism results from two aspects of its methodology. First, 
legal positivism commits the error Dewey calls the philosophical or analytical fallacy by 
separating law from its historical and social contexts. 155 Legal positivism analyzes law based on 
                                                 
153 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 594.  
154 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268.            
155 John Dewey, “Context and Thought,” The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 6 
(Carbondale, IL: S. Illinois UP, 1985) 5-7. Dewey describes this error as “the habit of philosophers of 
neglecting the indispensability of context, both in particular and in general. I should venture to assert that 
the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context.” See discussion of this 
fallacy in Gregory F. Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
UP, 2008) 26-7. 
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its linguistic characteristics alone.156 The positivist analysis ignores the rich and concrete 
historical context in which law develops, and it ignores the social context in which law operates. 
Legal positivism commits the philosophical fallacy by regarding its narrow linguistic analysis as 
a complete, final, and sufficient analysis of the nature of law.  
3. Legal Positivism Separates Law from its Application 
 Second, positivist methodology separates law from its application.157 Legal positivism 
concludes from its linguistic analysis that the pedigree of a law's creation is adequate to 
determine its validity. Legal positivism therefore ignores the substantive content of law. 158 As a 
result, legal positivism erroneously fails to consider the consequences of applying morally 
iniquitous laws. It accepts the validity of any law, however repugnant, so long as its pedigree of 
creation satisfies positivism's minimal requirements.  
4. Legal Positivism Produces an Incomplete Description of Law 
 In addition to accepting morally iniquitous laws, these methodological shortcomings 
produce an incomplete description of law. Legal positivism maintains that legal systems are 
unions of primary and secondary rules.159 As Dworkin demonstrates, however, lawyers and 
                                                 
156 Hart focuses on “a purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive 
vocabulary of the law.” H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 
71 (4) (1958): 593–629, 601. 
157 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: U Penn P, 1959) 508. “Without application,” Dewey writes, “there are scraps of paper or 
voices in the air but nothing that can be called law.” Dewey continues: “Application is not something that 
happens after a rule or law or statute is laid down but is a necessary part of them; such a necessary part 
indeed that in given cases we can judge what the law is as matter of fact only by telling how it operates 
and what are its effects in and upon the human activities that are going on.” 
158 Ronald M. Dworkin, “The Model of Rules,” 35 (1) Chi. L. Rev. (1967): 14-46, 17.  
159 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) 77-99,117, 213, 249-250. 
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judges evaluate hard cases by applying standards that do not fit the positivist definition of rules. 
Law thus includes principles as well as rules. 160 
C. Selecting A New Philosophical Method 
 The second step in formulating a pragmatic standard of legal validity is selecting a 
philosophical method that overcomes the inadequacies of natural law and legal positivism. This 
method must recognize, as Holmes did, that the life of the law is experience, not logic. Laws are 
determined less by logic than by the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, and the prejudices that judges share with their fellow man. 
We cannot treat law as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics.161 
 This dissertation therefore adopts a methodology, adapted from the philosophy of John 
Dewey, that evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the effects and 
social consequences those legal principles produce. This evaluation of legal principles focuses 
on the operations of law and the effects of these operations upon ongoing human activities.162  
 History is an essential feature of this method. History informs us of the effects and social 
consequences that legal principles produce and the effect of their operation upon ongoing human 
activities. Legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles. In 
Dewey's terms, history provides punitive verifications that give some legal principles a well-
                                                 
160 Ronald Dworkin, “The Model of Rules,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 35 (1) (1967): 14-46, 23-24. Dworkin utilizes 
the case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) to illustrate his distinction between rules and principles. 
In Riggs, the statutory rule governing the case allowed a murderer, Elmer Palmer, to inherit from his 
victim, his grandfather Francis Palmer. The court denied the inheritance, however, by applying the legal 
principle that no wrongdoer should benefit from his wrongdoing. This principle did not function as a 
primary or secondary legal rule.  
161 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1881) 1. 
162 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 508-10. 
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earned prestige and bring others into disrepute. “Lightly to disregard them is the height of 
foolishness.” 163   
 This pragmatic methodology avoids the problems created by natural law's reliance on 
divine law and natural law's inconsistent views of human reason. It avoids the analytic fallacy 
committed by legal positivism in separating law from its historical and social contexts. It avoids 
the positivist separation of law from its application, and thus avoids the incomplete description 
of law offered by legal positivism.   
D. Evaluation of Legal Principles 
The final step in formulating a new standard of legal validity is the evaluation of legal 
principles. Chapter II explains how Locke and Blackstone adopt and expand on the principles of 
autonomy and consent that emerged from the English experience of the seventeenth century. 
Chapter II then explains how legal positivism abandons the principles of autonomy and consent. 
It does so by dissecting law from its historical and social context and by evaluating legal 
principles by “a purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the 
distinctive vocabulary of the law.” 164 Lastly, Chapter II explains the process by which legal 
positivism is displacing natural law in American jurisprudence. 
 Chapters III, IV, and V evaluate the legal principles applied in three famous cases. 
Chapter III examines the Athenian legal system and the case of Socrates in 399 B.C. Chapter IV 
examines the Congregation of the Holy Office and the Galileo Affair of 1616 to 1632, and 
                                                 
163 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Random 
House, 1930) 221. 
164 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 61: “We must remember that the Utilitarians combined with their insistence on the separation of law 
and morals two other equally famous but distinct doctrines. One was the important truth that a purely 
analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law, was as 
vital to our understanding of the nature of law as historical or sociological studies…” [Emphasis added]. 
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Chapter V examines the Soviet legal system and the “Moscow Trials” of Leon Trotsky from 
1936 to 1938.   
 Although these trials cover a span of twenty-four centuries, they share a number of 
common characteristics. The courts convicted the defendants in each case despite their 
innocence of the charges against them. The underlying legal system in each case treated its 
defendants, not as ends in themselves, but as means to political ends. In each case, the legal 
system did so by disregarding the principles of reason, consent, and autonomy.  
 This dissertation therefore combines the principles of reason, autonomy, and consent to 
formulate a new standard for legal validity. Requiring laws to meet this standard of validity 
ensures that legal systems treat their subjects, not as means to other ends, but as ends in 
themselves. 
 Another principle emerges from this study that casts its shadow beyond the Philosophy 
of Law. Legal systems that treat their subjects as means to an end tend to operate unjustly and 
corrode the society they serve. Just laws alone cannot guarantee continuity, order, and justice in 
society. No constitution can enforce itself. Unjust legal systems, however, inevitably catalyze 
their subjects to revolt. The history of the Western legal tradition, therefore, is very much a 
history of revolutions.165  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.  Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1983; and Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003). Berman explains that the 
Western legal tradition developed through six great revolutions: the Papal Revolution of 1075-1122, the 
Protestant Reformation of 1517-1555, the English Revolution of 1640-1689, the American Revolution of 
1775-1783, the French Revolution of 1789-1799, and the Russian Revolution of 1917.  
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CHAPTER II  
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 
This chapter presents the major tenets of natural law jurisprudence and legal positivism 
and explains the practical impact of their conflicts on American jurisprudence. This chapter 
contains three sections. The first section explains the major sources and tenets of the natural law 
tradition in American jurisprudence. The second section explains the major sources and tenets of 
the positivist tradition. The third section describes four factors facilitating the displacement of 
natural law jurisprudence by legal positivism.  
I. The Natural Law Tradition in Jurisprudence 
A. Three Types of Law 
Although natural law theory evolves through the centuries, it consistently demonstrates 
the following characteristics. Natural law theory divides jurisprudence into three parts, natural 
law, positive law, and the law of nations.166 Natural law originates in nature, and positive law 
originates in man.  
Most legal provisions involve positive law, and these provisions are easily changed. 
Natural law, on the other hand, consists of a small number of immutable principles. These 
principles are discernible through reason and enjoy universal application. Justinian names three 
such principles, which Blackstone adopts. 167  
B. Justice as the Goal of Natural Law 
The goal of natural law theory is the procurement of justice, usually defined as long-
                                                 
166 For Blackstone, the “law of nations” or international law refers to the “mutual compacts, treaties, 
leagues, and agreements between” nation states. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 25.  
167 The Institutes reduces natural law to three precepts or principles: “to live honestly, to injure no one, and 
to give every man his due.” The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1889) 2, 3. Blackstone expressly adopts these three precepts. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 27. 
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term human happiness or eudaimonia in the Aristotelian sense.168  Blackstone adopts the term 
“felicity.”169 Adherence to the principles of natural law leads to justice and human happiness. 
Failing to adhere to the principles of natural law inevitably leads to injustice and unhappiness.   
C. The Validity of Positive Law 
Natural law does not determine every legal issue. Natural law recognizes the validity of 
most provisions of positive law, and man is at liberty to adopt positive laws that benefit society. 
170 If a provision of positive law violates a principle of natural law, however, then that provision 
is invalid. In the absence of such a violation, natural law is usually “indifferent” to provisions of 
positive law.  
D. The Standards of Autonomy and Consent 
As explained in Chapter I, Locke and Blackstone adopt two standards that re-emerged in 
English jurisprudence from the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century. Legal 
                                                 
168 Aristotle defines justice as lawfulness that is concerned with the common advantage and happiness of 
the political community. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V.1.1129b 11–19, cf. Politics III.12.1282b 16–17. 
Aristotle writes that justice has two parts, natural justice and legal justice. Natural justice consists of 
principles of natural law that originate in nature, not in the minds of men “by people’s thinking this or 
that.” Natural law principles apply with equal force everywhere, “just as fire burns both here and in 
Persia.” Legal justice, on the other hand, consists of positive law. Positive law principles, such as the 
conventional measures for grain and wine, “are just not by nature but by human enactment” and “are not 
everywhere the same.” Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, trans. W.D. Ross, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 
2009) 92. 
169 Blackstone holds God interwove justice and felicity so closely that neither is obtainable without the 
other.  Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 
1838) 27: “For [God] has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice 
with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if 
the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual 
connexion of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of 
abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly 
surmised, but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, ‘that man should 
pursue his own true and substantial happiness.’” 
170 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
28. “There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points in which [natural law leaves] man at his own 
liberty, but which are found necessary, for the benefit of society, to be restrained within certain limits. And 
herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not 
indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, [natural law].” 
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positivism rejects both these standards. This divide produces many of the conflicts in 
contemporary American jurisprudence. 
The first standard is the requirement of autonomy of law, the supremacy of law over 
political rulers. The autonomy of law was an established principle of English jurisprudence by 
1235. 171 As explained in Chapter I, however, the kings of the Stuart dynasty repudiated this 
principle.172 Under the principle of autonomy, the ruler and the ruled must both be subject to the 
same laws, and laws are not subject to arbitrary change by political rulers.  
The second standard is that all power derives its legitimacy from the consent of the 
governed.  English law formally adopted the principle of consent in 1297. The statutes of 
Edward I provided that “the king shall not take any aids or tasks, but by the common assent of 
the realm.” 173 As explained in Chapter I, however, the kings of the Stuart dynasty repudiated 
this principle as well. For Locke, the consent of the governed is “absolutely necessary” for the 
legitimacy of law,174 and the consent of the governed determines the legitimacy of 
                                                 
171 The earliest statement of the principle of autonomy appears in Henry de Bracton’s 1235 treatise on 
common law, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England), ed. George 
E. Woodbine, trans. Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) 33): “The king must not be 
under man but under God and under the law, because the law makes the king … there is no king where the 
will and not the law has dominion.”  
172 See discussion of “Stuart Absolutism” at pages 9-10 of Chapter I, supra.  
173 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
101: “For no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the 
realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his 
representatives in parliament. By the statute 25 Edw. I. c. 5 and 6. it is provided, that the king shall not 
take any aids or tasks, but by the common assent of the realm. And what that common assent is, is more 
fully explained by 34 Edw. I. sf. 4. c. 1. which enacts, that no talliage or aid shall be taken without the 
assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land: and 
again by 14 Edw. III. st. 2, c. 1, the prelates, earls, barons, and commons, citizens, burgesses, and 
merchants, shall not be charged to make any aid, if it be not by the common assent of the great men and 
commons in parliament. And as this fundamental law had been shamefully evaded under many succeeding 
princes, by compulsive loans, and benevolences extorted without a real and voluntary consent, it was made 
an article in the petition of right.” 
174 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 61. 
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government.175 Blackstone agrees. 176  
Legal positivism rejects both of these standards.  Law has no autonomy because 
positivism founds law on the will of the lawmaker.177 Law possesses no supremacy over political 
rulers. The ruler and the ruled are not subject to the same rules. Different rules govern public 
officials than govern the rest of society, and public officials have the sole authority to determine 
legal validity. 178 Legal positivism also rejects the view that all power derives its legitimacy from 
the consent of the governed. The general population may be compelled to obey the law “from 
any motive whatsoever” and by any necessary sanction.179 The consent of the governed is 
                                                 
175 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 2002) 44. In sections 212-217, Locke states four ways by which governments are “dissolved from 
within,” each reflecting actions of the Stuart kings during the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth 
century. Id. at 96-99. 
176 Regarding consent and the legitimacy of government, Blackstone holds that “the king shall not take any 
aids or tasks, but by the common assent of the realm.” Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1840) 101. Regarding consent and the legitimacy of law, 
common law derives from long-standing and freely adopted custom, and such custom evidences universal 
consent. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 
1838) 21, 393. Acts of Parliament evidence consent because they derive from the consent of the legitimate 
representatives of the governed. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 
(New York: W.E. Dean, 1840) 33, 101.  
177 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 241. 
178 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 79-99. Hart’s model of law 
depicts law as the union or primary and secondary social rules. Primary rules impose an obligation or duty 
on the general population, such as tort law and criminal statutes. Secondary rules confer powers to 
introduce, change, or modify a primary rule. Secondary rules confer private powers on the general 
population to establish or amend contracts, wills, trusts, etc. Secondary rules confer public powers on 
public officials to change, adjudicate, and determine the validity of legal duties and obligations for the 
general population. The paradigm rule is the secondary rule of recognition, which empowers public 
officials (only) to determine the validity of a law. 
179 John Austin's “command theory” of positive law defines law as (a) commands, (b) backed by threat of 
sanctions, (c) from a sovereign, (d) to whom people have a habit of obedience. John Austin, The Province 
of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 14, 225-31. H.L.A. Hart explains that 
there are only two conditions for the existence of a legal system. The first condition for a legal system is 
that private citizens generally obey the primary rules of obligation. It is sufficient that each member of the 
population obeys the primary rules “for his part only” and “from any motive whatsoever.” H.L.A. Hart, 
The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116. The second condition is that public 
officials adopt the rule of recognition specifying the criteria for legal validity as their “public standard of 
official behavior.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 117. 
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irrelevant to the validity of law.  
Legal positivism furthermore accepts “morally iniquitous” laws as legally valid,180 even 
if they have “no moral justification or force whatsoever.” 181 The positivist acceptance of morally 
iniquitous laws not only permits a legal system that denies the natural law principles of reason, 
autonomy, and consent; it also permits a legal system where “anything goes” and any legal 
provision is potentially enforceable as valid.  
E. Sources of the Natural Law Tradition 
The dominant source of natural law in American jurisprudence is Sir William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Common Law of England.182 Blackstone incorporates 
contributions from multiple sources, but three are particularly noteworthy. The first of these 
sources is the Institutes of Justinian,183 written as a textbook for law schools in 535 A.D. The 
Institutes provides the fundamental precepts of natural law adopted by Blackstone from Roman 
law. 184  
A second source for Blackstone's jurisprudence is a series of English treatises on the 
                                                 
180 H.L.A. Hart resurrected the positivist claim that law has no necessary connection with morality on 
April 30, 1957, in the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. lecture at Harvard Law School. His lecture is published 
as H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629. Hart gives the final statement of his positivist jurisprudence in H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
181 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268: “I argue in this book 
that though there are many different contingent connections between law and morality there are no 
necessary conceptual connections between the content of law and morality; and hence morally iniquitous 
provisions may be valid as legal rules or principles. One aspect of this form of the separation of law from 
morality is that there can be legal rights and duties which have no moral justification or force whatever.”            
182 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2 vols.  (New York: W.E. Dean, 
1840). 
183 Justinianus, Flavius Petrus Sabbatius, The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle. 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1889). 
184 See, e.g., Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. 
Dean, 1838) 2, 10, 13, 37, 39, 55, 56, 110, 190, 332. 
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common law, including those written by Ranulf de Glanvil in 1188,185 Henry de Bracton circa 
1235,186 Sir John Fortescue circa 1470,187 and Sir Matthew Hale in 1713. 188 These treatises 
provide an historical approach to law as well as the rules of common law based in ancient 
custom. Hale, the most influential of these authors, presents a formulation of law as a science 
founded on legal principles.  
A third source for Blackstone's jurisprudence is the seventeenth century constitutional 
struggle described in Chapter I, including the works of John Locke. This struggle generated, 
inter alia, the re-emergence of the standards of autonomy and consent, and Blackstone interprets 
the common law to meet these standards.189 Along with the Institutes of Justinian, Locke 
provides the model of natural law based on reason adopted by Blackstone. Both Locke and 
                                                 
185 Ranulf de Glanvil, Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (Treatise on the laws and 
customs of the Kingdom of England), ed. John Rayner (London: White and Brooke, 1780). See, e.g., Sir 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 61, 63, 
66, 105, 128, 170, 175, 199, 231, 282, 412. 
186 Henry de Bracton, Legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (Laws and customs of the Kingdom of 
England), ed. George E. Woodbine (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1915). See, e.g., Sir William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 49, 55, 78, 84, 94, 123, 176, 
180, 182, 217, 220, 223, 217, 255, 310, 316, 344, 412, 427, 430. 
187 Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae (“In Praise of the Laws of England, On the Laws and 
Governance of England”), trans. Andrew Amos (Cambridge: Butterworth, 1825). See, e.g., Sir William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 9, 14, 21, 43, 
46, 120, 171, 176, 180, 187, 256, 257, 381. 
188 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, ed. Charles M. Gray (Chicago: U. of 
Chicago P., 1971); Sir Matthew Hale, The Analysis of the Law; Being a Scheme, or Abstract, of the 
several Titles and Partitions of the Law of England, Digested into Method (London: Nutt and Gosling, 
1739). See, e.g., Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. 
Dean, 1838) 8, 51, 64, 76, 125, 172, 180, 189, 192, 208, 291, 323, 364, 365, and 430. In addition to these 
general treatises on the common law, two influential treatises on the common law of real property include 
Thomas Littleton, Littleton's Tenures (London: Hastings, 1846) first published circa 1481, and Sir Edward 
Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or A Commentary on Littleton, 3 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Johnson, 1812), written in 1648. 
189 In Michael Zuckert’s view, Blackstone “is as much a social compact thinker as Hobbes or Locke,” but 
Blackstone seeks to reinterpret the common law to meet the standard of consent. Michael Zuckert, “Social 
Compact, Common Law, and the American Amalgam: The Contribution of William Blackstone,” The 
American Founding and the Social Compact, ed. Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2003), 56, 64. 
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Blackstone meticulously avoid any mention of Thomas Aquinas' theory of natural law.190 
1. The Institutes of Justinian 
The Institutes of Justinian 191 defines justice as “the set and constant purpose that gives 
                                                 
190 Locke and Blackstone are both antagonistic to Roman Catholicism, viewing Roman Catholics as 
disloyal and a threat to English security for recognizing the supremacy of a foreign prince. In A Letter 
regarding Toleration, Locke views Roman Catholics as bound by their faith to depose Protestant princes. 
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 144. Aquinas' views on natural law are nevertheless historically and philosophically 
important outside of Anglophone jurisprudence. Aquinas describes four types of law in Summa 
Theologiae. William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, eds., Saint Thomas Aquinas on Law, Morality, 
and Politics (Indianapolis: Hackett 1988), 17-28. Divine law is the law that pertains to “our last end,” after 
divine judgment. Eternal law is the set of timeless truths that govern the movement and behavior of all 
things in the universe. Natural law is that part of eternal law that applies to man.  “Natural law,” writes 
Aquinas, “is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.” Id. at 20. Human 
law is law that “purports” to have a human source. Natural law derives from human nature, and human 
nature for Aquinas is free and rational. Aquinas emphasizes a single first precept in his theory of natural 
law. Since rational beings are naturally disposed to pursue the good, the first precept of natural law is to 
pursue what is good and avoid what is bad.  All other precepts of natural law derive from this first precept. 
The general precepts of natural law, known to all men, “can nowise be blotted out from men’s hearts.” Id. 
at 55. Secondary precepts of natural law, however, can be blotted out from the human heart by “evil 
persuasions,” “vicious customs,” and “corrupt habits.” This is true, even though secondary precepts follow 
closely from general precepts. Aquinas offers such “evil, vicious, and corrupt” influences as the 
explanation for why “theft and even unnatural vices” are “not esteemed sinful” by some men. Aquinas 
concludes that such “blotting out” of secondary precepts explains why “some legislators have framed 
certain enactments which are unjust.” Id. at 55. To guard against unjust enactments, human laws must 
comply with natural law: “As Augustine says, ‘that which is not just seems to be no law at all;’ wherefore 
the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice.  Now, in human affairs a thing is said to be just from 
being right according to the rule of reason.  But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from 
what has been stated above.  Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law is it is 
derived from the law of nature.  But if, in any point, it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law 
but a perversion of law.” Id. at 55. [Emphasis added]. In Thomist doctrine, eternal law is a rational 
principle that guides both God and man. Natural law consists of principles of practical reason. These 
principles direct human beings to maintain their existence and to achieve their natural perfection as 
rational beings capable of contemplating God. Blackstone agrees with Thomas that God also abides by 
natural law. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. 
Dean, 1838) 27, but Duns Scotus and William of Ockham challenged Thomas on this point in the 
fourteenth century. John Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, ed. Allan Wolter 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997); William of Ockham. Opera Theologica, 
10 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Press, 1967-1986) vol. V, pp. 352-53. Scotus and 
Ockham argued the Thomist view erroneously limits God’s omnipotence. They argued instead that natural 
law binds only human beings, not God, and further that natural law binds human beings as the 
consequence of God’s will. J.B. Schneewind, “Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 299-225. 
191 Justinian ordered the production of the Corpus Juris Civilis or “body of civil law,” and the Corpus 
consisted of three works. The Institutes, issued in 535, served as a legal textbook for law schools. It 
includes extracts from two other works, the Codex Justinianus, issued in 529, and the Digest, issued in 
533.  All three works enjoyed the full force of law. The Codex compiled all of the extant imperial 
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to every man his due.” 192 “Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human, the 
science of the just and the unjust.” 193 Roman law recognizes the distinction between natural law 
and positive law and divides law into three types, the jus civile, the jus naturale, and the jus 
gentium. The jus civile is “civil” or positive law and consists of “those rules which a state enacts 
for its own members.” The civil law of a state is “peculiar to itself.” 194 The jus naturale or law 
of nature “is that which she has taught all animals; a law not peculiar to the human race, but 
shared by all living creatures, whether denizens of the air, the dry land, or the sea.” 195 The jus 
gentium is the “law of nations,” or those laws “common to the whole human race.” 196 
The Institutes reduces natural law to three precepts or principles: “to live honestly, to 
injure no one, and to give every man his due.” 197 These principles of natural law are 
                                                                                                                                                
constitutions from the time of Hadrian, and the Digest compiled the writings of great Roman jurists such 
as Ulpian along with current edicts. Although Justinian originally intended the Codex to serve as the sole 
legal authority in the empire, he found that new laws were necessary, and the Novellae Constitutiones or 
“new laws” became the fourth part of the Corpus. The Corpus was lost in the eighth century but recovered 
circa 1070 in Italy. The Corpus provided the foundation for the development of law in civil code 
countries, and its three precepts of natural law still influence common law jurisdictions through 
Blackstone.  See S. P. Scott, trans., Corpus Juris Civilis, The Civil Law, 17 vols. (Cincinnati: Central 
Trust, 1932). 
192 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 3. 
193 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 3. 
194 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 4: “Those rules 
which a state enacts for its own members are peculiar to itself, and are called civil law.” 
195 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 4: “Hence comes 
the union of male and female, which we call marriage; hence the procreation and rearing of children, for 
this is a law in the knowledge of which we see even the lower animals taking pleasure.” 
196 Unlike the jus civile or civil law, which is unique to the originating state, “The law of nations is 
common to the whole human race; for nations have settled certain things for themselves as occasion and 
the necessities of human life required. For instance, wars arose, and then followed captivity and slavery, 
which are contrary to the law of nature; for by the law of nature all men from the beginning were born 
free.” The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 4. Since the 
focus of this dissertation is restricted to natural law and positive law, this dissertation omits further 
discussion of the law of nations.  
197 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 2, 3. Blackstone 
expressly adopts these three precepts. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 
1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 27: “Such, among others, are these principles : that we should live 
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“established” by “divine providence,” and they are permanent and unchanging.198 Positive laws, 
on the other hand, change frequently. 199   
2. English Treatises on Common Law 
 Blackstone's Commentaries rely on six centuries of common law treatises, and four 
authors are particularly influential in Blackstone’s jurisprudence. The first is Ranulf de Glanvil. 
Glanvil served as Henry II's chief minister and assisted in accomplishing Henry's celebrated 
judicial reforms. Glanvil's Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (Treatise on the 
laws and customs of the Kingdom of England) 
200
 is the earliest treatise on English law. Written 
in 1188 and first printed in 1554, Glanvil's Tractatus codified a systematic legal process and 
system of writs, innovations still utilized today. 
 The second influential author is Henry de Bracton. Bracton was an English jurist who 
lived circa 1210-1268. Scholars call Bracton, a contemporary of the Magna Carta of 1215, the 
“Blackstone of the thirteenth century” for his treatise Legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae 
(Laws and customs of the Kingdom of England),
201 written circa 1235. Bracton's Legibus 
contributes the earliest statement in English jurisprudence regarding the autonomy of law and its 
supremacy over political rulers. “The king must not be under man but under God and under the 
law, because the law makes the king … there is no king where the will and not the law has 
                                                                                                                                                
honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts 
Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.” 
198 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 6. “But the laws 
of nature, which are observed by all nations alike, are established, as it were, by divine providence, and 
remain ever fixed and immutable.” 
199 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 6. The positive 
laws “of each individual state are subject to frequent change, either by the tacit consent of the people, or 
by the subsequent enactment of another statute.”   
200 Ranulf de Glanvil, Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (Treatise on the laws and 
customs of the Kingdom of England), ed. John Rayner (London: White and Brooke, 1780).  
201 Henry de Bracton, Legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae (Laws and customs of the Kingdom of 
England), ed. George E. Woodbine (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1915). 
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dominion.” 202  
 In a famous colloquy on November 10, 1608, between King James I and Sir Edward 
Coke, Coke cited the Latin version of Bracton's maxim “Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub 
deo et sub lege, quia lex fecit regem” to James I. The king was highly offended and declared the 
ancient maxim treasonous.203 James I eventually dismissed Coke as Chief Justice of the King's 
Bench in 1616 after Coke authored a series of decisions from 1610-1616 asserting the supremacy 
of the common law courts over the courts of the royal prerogative.204   
 The third noteworthy treatise is Sir John Fortescue's De laudibus legum Angliae (In 
Praise of the Laws of England),205 circa 1470, a fictitious dialogue between a young exiled 
English prince and his Chancellor. Fortescue traces the foundation of common law to 
immemorial custom dating back to pre-Roman times.206 Blackstone holds that law based on such 
                                                 
202 “Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex fecit regem.” Henry de Bracton, De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England), ed. George E. Woodbine, 
trans. Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) 33. De Bracton wrote his treatise De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae circa 1235, a mere two generations after the Conquest. As de Bracton 
states, “But the king himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and to the law, for the law 
makes the king. Let the king, then, attribute to the law what the law attributes to him, namely dominion 
and power, for there is no king where the will and not the law has dominion; and that he ought to be under 
the law, since he is the vicar of God, appears evidently after the likeness of Jesus Christ, whose place he 
fills on earth; for the true mercy of God, when many things were at his command to restore the human race 
in an ineffable manner, chose this way in preference to all others, as if to destroy the work of the devil he 
should use not the vigor of his power, but the reason of his justice, and so he was willing to be under the 
law, that he might redeem those who were under the law, for he was not willing to use his strength, but his 
reason and judgment.” Id.  
203 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 242, 464 n.35.  
204 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 214-15. James I removed Coke after a dramatic personal 
confrontation on November 14, 1616. The precipitating conflict involved the issue of the autonomy of the 
common law. Coke asserted that the King did not have authority to limit the common law courts' 
competence to determine their own competence. After James I removed Coke from his seat as Chief 
Justice, Coke entered Parliament and became the leader of the opposition. Id. at 214. 
205 Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae (In Praise of the Laws of England), trans. Andrew 
Amos (Cambridge: Butterworth, 1825). 
206 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 231-32. 
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custom evidences universal consent.207  
 Fortescue holds that statutes contrary to natural law are void,208 and Fortescue is the 
earliest English writer to emphasize due process for defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Fortescue was a harsh critic of the procedures used by the Inquisition,209 and he gives the first 
statement of the principle known as “Blackstone’s Theorem” in arguing against the use of torture 
to extract confessions. “Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons should escape 
the punishment of death, than that one innocent person should be condemned, and suffer 
capitally.” 210  
 The fourth author, and the author whose influence on Blackstone was most profound, is 
Sir Matthew Hale, 1609-1676. Hale was a lawyer and jurist famous for his integrity. Although 
Hale lived during the most turbulent periods of the constitutional struggle of the seventeenth 
century, both Crown and Parliament respected Hale for his incorruptible character and 
                                                 
207 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
21, 393. 
208 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 461 n. 3. 
209 Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae (In Praise of the Laws of England), trans. Andrew 
Amos (Cambridge: Butterworth, 1825) 100: “That man cannot in any wise be safe either in his life or 
property, whom his adversary (in many cases which may happen) will have it in his power to convict out 
of the mouth of two witnesses, such as are unknown, produced in court and pitched upon by the 
prosecutor. And, though in consequence of their evidence, he be not punished with death, yet an acquittal 
will not leave him in a much better condition after the question has been put, which cannot but affect the 
party with a contraction of his sinews and limbs, attended with constant disorders and want of health. A 
man, who lives under such a government, as you describe, lives exposed to frequent hazards of this sort: 
enemies are designing and desperately wicked.” 
210 Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae (In Praise of the Laws of England), trans. Andrew 
Amos (Cambridge: Butterworth, 1825) 93: “Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons 
should escape the punishment of death, than that one innocent person should be condemned, and suffer 
capitally. Neither can there be any room for suspicion, that in such a course and method of proceeding, a 
guilty person can escape the punishment due to his crimes; such a man's life and conversation would be 
restraint and terror sufficient to those who should have any inclination to acquit him : in a prosecution, 
carried on in this manner, there is nothing cruel, nothing inhuman; an innocent person cannot suffer in life 
or limb: he has no reason to dread the prejudices or calumny of his enemies, he will not, cannot, be put to 
the rack, to gratify their will and pleasure. In such a Constitution, under such laws, every man may live 
safely and securely.” [Emphasis in original]. 
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impartiality. Hale represented leading royalists tried for treason in the 1640s and 1650s, yet 
interceded for Puritans charged with treason under Charles II in the 1660s. He served as a judge 
of the Court of Common Pleas under Cromwell, yet also served as Chief Justice of the Court of 
the King's Bench under Charles II.  
 Hale's ability to maintain political neutrality throughout an era of revolution and civil 
war reflects his allegiance to the common law. Political regimes came and went, but the common 
law abided without interruption.211 Hale's History of the Common Law 212 was the first attempt to 
give a comprehensive portrayal of the historical origins and growth of English law. It remained 
the standard book on early English legal history until the late 19th century. Hale's The Analysis 
of the Law 
213 presented the English common law as a coherent system.  
Hale believed that natural law constitutes a distinct and binding body of law.214 Harvard 
law professor Harold J. Berman writes that Hale's legal philosophy “represents the philosophy 
which dominated English legal thought in the late 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries.” This 
philosophy “still plays an important part in the intellectual outlook of many, if not most, English 
(and American) practicing lawyers and judges, though not - any longer - of many English (or 
American) writers on legal philosophy.” 215 
 Hale influenced Blackstone in three significant ways. First, Hale's treatises influenced 
                                                 
211 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 248-51. 
212 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, ed. Charles M. Gray (Chicago: U. of 
Chicago P., 1971). 
213 Sir Matthew Hale, The Analysis of the Law; Being a Scheme, or Abstract, of the several Titles and 
Partitions of the Law of England, Digested into Method (London: Nutt and Gosling, 1739). 
214 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 271. 
215 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 251. 
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Blackstone by presenting law as a science.216 This was a new approach to law that emerged from 
the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century.217 Hale inspired Blackstone to present law 
“not only as a matter of practice but as a rational science,” grounded on “general principles” 
inherent in the law itself. It is the task of a legal scholar to discern those principles.218  
 Second, Hale's treatises influenced Blackstone by championing the (then) revolutionary 
doctrine of legal precedent.219 For Hale, a line of judicial decisions that consistently applied a 
legal principle to various analogous fact situations was “evidence” of the existence and validity 
of such a principle. Previous decisions evidenced the approval of the principle by the judiciary. 
The prior decisions were thus a source of principles that possessed the force to bind subsequent 
courts.220 
 Third, Hale's treatises originated one of Blackstone's signature doctrines, the 
“declaratory theory” of law. The role of judges was not to “make” law, but rather to “find” law 
in the received legal tradition and “declare them.” This “declaratory theory” of law viewed 
                                                 
216 For a discussion of Blackstone's reliance on Hale's The Analysis of Law, which Blackstone 
acknowledged as “the most natural and scientifical... as well as the most comprehensive” of “all the 
schemes hitherto made public for digesting the laws of England,” see Alan Watson, “The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.” Yale L. J. 97 (5) (1988): 795–821. 
217 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 297. 
218 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
2: “But, when law is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational science, it 
cannot be improper or useless to examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these positive 
constitutions of society.” Cf. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on 
Blackstone's Commentaries (Boston: Beacon, 1958) 20 in which Boorstin characterizes Blackstone's 
conception of English legal science as “Everywhere in English law 'principles' were waiting to be found.” 
219 Chief Justice Vaughan made the earliest attempt to distinguish a case holding from the mere obiter 
dictum of the judge in the Court of Common Pleas in 1673. “An opinion given in court, if not necessary to 
the judgment, ... is no more than a gratis dictum.” Bole v. Norton (1673), Vaughan Reports 382. 
220 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, ed. Charles M. Gray (Chicago: U. of 
Chicago P., 1971) 45: “The decisions of courts of justice... do not make the law properly so-called (for that 
only the King and Parliament can do); yet they have a great weight and authority in expounding, declaring, 
and publishing what the law of this kingdom is, especially when such decisions hold a consonantcy and 
congruity with resolutions and decisions of former times, and though such decisions are less than the law, 
yet they are a greater evidence there of in the opinion of any private persons, as such, whatsoever.” 
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precedent as a source of law, and was highly analogous to the common law's view of custom as a 
source of law. Both precedent and custom were in turn subject to a requirement of 
“reasonableness,” which permitted unreasonable precedents or customs to be set aside when 
necessary.221 The prohibition against judges making new law is a fundamental source of the 
contemporary conflict between natural law jurisprudence and legal positivism.  
3. John Locke and the Constitutional Struggle of 1603-1701 
A third source for Blackstone's jurisprudence is the seventeenth century constitutional 
struggle described in Chapter I, including the works of John Locke. The English constitutional 
struggle continues to exert a profound influence on American legal and political culture, and the 
philosophy of John Locke is an important vehicle of this influence. 222 Locke's influence shapes 
Blackstone's formulation of natural law in the Commentaries. Blackstone and Locke share 
common views regarding the role of reason in natural law, the validity requirements for positive 
law, the principle of autonomy, and the principle of consent.  
a. Locke and Natural Law 
Locke’s work emphasizes the epistemological and political aspects of natural law. Locke 
rejects the view that knowledge of natural law is innately “inscribed in the minds of men.” 223 
Instead, man discovers the precepts of natural law by applying his reason. Reason teaches natural 
                                                 
221 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 274-75. 
222 Nozick documents the importance of Lockean liberal theory on American institutions in Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Thomas Jefferson described Locke’s Second Treatise, 
Locke’s “little book on government,” as “perfect.” Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and The 
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1987), 3.  
223 John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
Locke’s epistemology famously attacks innate knowledge in Book I of Locke’s Essay. John Locke, An 
Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1996) 4-32.  
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law to “all mankind, who will but consult it.” 224 Locke describes “the pursuit of happiness” as 
“our greatest good,” and stresses the “necessity of …pursuing true happiness” as “the foundation 
of our liberty.” 225   
Natural law dominates Locke's political philosophy.226 Locke rejects Hobbes’ 
description of the state of nature as a war of all against all in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.” 227 Although Locke’s state of nature possesses “inconveniences” that 
ultimately motivate men to form societies,228 the state of nature is generally peaceable and 
governed by a single precept of natural law. “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions.”229  
b. Locke and Legal Validity 
Positive laws that violate natural law precepts are not valid. Natural law provides 
inalienable rights to “life, health, liberty, and possessions” that exist prior to and independent of 
society. 230 Human beings, however, pass corrupt laws in the form of “intricate contrivances of 
                                                 
224 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 3. 
225 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1996) 108. 
226 See John Yolton, “Locke on the Law of Nature,” Philosophical Review 67 (1957): 477-498. 
227 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994) 74.  
228 These inconveniences center on violations of another’s natural rights, and include the lack of adequate 
agencies for finding facts, for rendering impartial judgments in disputes, and for imposing just 
punishments. “I easily grant,” writes Locke, “that civil government is the proper remedy for the 
inconveniences of the state of nature.” John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter 
concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2002) 4-6. 
229 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 3.  
230 The concept of inalienable natural rights is also the point of attack for Bentham’s legal positivism. See 
text at page 13, infra. 
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men following contrary and hidden interests.” 231 To protect against such laws, Locke holds that 
human laws are “only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature.” 232  
c. Locke and the Principle of Autonomy 
Locke adopts the principles of autonomy and consent. Law is the “great instrument and 
means” of achieving the “great end of men's entering into society,” “the enjoyment of their 
property in peace and safety.” 233 For law to achieve this great end, law must be autonomous and 
wield supremacy over political rulers. “Wherever law ends tyranny begins,” writes Locke. “And 
whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law and makes use of the force he 
has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not... may be 
opposed as any other man who by force invades the right of another.” 234   
Locke gives four examples of lawless tyranny that “dissolve governments from 
within.”235 Each example reflects an actual abuse of power by the Stuart kings set out in Chapter 
I.  Locke holds that when each type of tyranny occurs, “the people are at liberty to provide for 
themselves by erecting a new legislative, different from the other, by the change of persons, or 
                                                 
231 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 6: “For though it would be beside my present purpose to enter here into the particulars 
of the law of Nature, or its measures of punishment; yet it is certain there is such a law, and that too as 
intelligible and plain to a rational creature and a studier of that law as the positive laws of 
commonwealths, nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood than the fancies and 
intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for truly so are a 
great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right as they are founded on the law of 
Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.” 
232 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 6. “[T]he positive laws of commonwealths [are understood as] the fancies and intricate 
contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of 
the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by 
which they are to be regulated and interpreted.”  
233 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 60-61. 
234 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 92.  
235 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 97-99. 
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form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good.” 236 These examples include the 
prince’s replacing the laws with his will; 237 hindering the free assembly of parliament; 238 
altering parliamentary elections; 239 and subjecting the people to a foreign power. 240  
                                                 
236 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 99. Locke continues: “For the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the native 
and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and 
impartial execution of the laws made by it.” Id. 
237 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 97: “214. First, that when such a single person or prince sets up his own arbitrary will 
in place of the laws which are the will of the society declared by the legislative, then the legislative is 
changed. For that being, in effect, the legislative whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required to 
be obeyed when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended and enforced than what the legislative, 
constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new 
laws, not being thereunto authorized, by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the old, 
disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative.” James I 
levied impositions of tunnage and poundage in 1606 without parliamentary consent as required by law. 
Charles I levied forced loans beginning in 1626, distraint of knighthood beginning in 1630, inland ship 
money during peacetime beginning in 1634, and forest fines beginning in 1635, all without parliamentary 
consent as required by law.  Charles I's “personal rule” without Parliament spanned eleven years from 
1629 to 1640. Charles II in 1672 and James II in 1688 attempted to use their “dispensing power” to 
disregard more than forty laws regulating religion.   
238 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 98: “215. Secondly, when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due 
time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered. 
For it is not a certain number of men—no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating 
and leisure of perfecting what is for the good of the society wherein the legislative consists; when these are 
taken away, or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is 
truly altered. For it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers that 
were intended to accompany them; so that he who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the 
legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.” 
Each of the four Stuart Kings repeatedly prorogued and dissolved Parliament for these ends, and Charles I 
and James II both attempted two “personal rules” by prohibiting Parliament from assembling, Charles 
from 1629 to 1640, and James from 1685 until the end of his reign in 1688. Both attempts resulted in 
revolution. In 1621, James I imprisoned Sir Edward Coke and two other members of Parliament in the 
Tower for drafting Parliament's “Protestation” against the king. James I attempted to forbid Parliament 
from discussing his impositions in 1610, imprisoning members who did so in the Tower. In 1629, Charles 
I arrested nine members who criticized his fiscal and religious policies during sessions of Parliament. In 
1642, Charles I attempted a coup d'état of Parliament to arrest five more, provoking the English civil war. 
Charles II also arrested members of Parliament who opposed his policies. Locke's patron, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, was arrested, charged with treason, and tried for his life in 1681 by Charles II, all in 
retaliation for Shaftesbury's introducing the Exclusion Bill in Parliament in 1680. Locke was writing his 
Two Treatises on Civil Government during this period. Peter Laslett, “The English Revolution and Locke's 
'Two Treatises of Government',” Cambridge Historical J. 12 (1) (1956): 40–55. The fear of further arrests 
forced Shaftesbury and Locke to flee England. 
239 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 98: “216. Thirdly, when, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors or ways of 
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d. Locke and the Principle of Consent 
All legitimate political power for Locke originates solely in the consent of the governed 
to entrust their “lives, liberties, and possessions” to the oversight of the community as a whole, 
as expressed in the majority of its legislative body.241  “Men being, as has been said, by nature all 
free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political 
power of another, without his own consent.” 242  
If the government unduly interferes with the property interests of its citizens, then the 
                                                                                                                                                
election are altered without the consent and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the 
legislative is altered. For if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto do choose, or in 
another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the 
people.” Charles I attempted to remove his political opponents from Parliament in 1626 by “fixing” the 
elections. Charles I made many of his opponents sheriffs of their counties, requiring them to remain at 
home and precluding their sitting in Parliament. Charles I also raised other opponents to the aristocracy, 
preventing their sitting in the House of Commons. 
240 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 98: “217. Fourthly, the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign 
power, either by the prince or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a 
dissolution of the government. For the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one 
entire, free, independent society, to be governed by its own laws, this is lost whenever they are given up 
into the power of another.” In the “Danby Affair” of 1678, Charles II formulated his foreign policy to 
support French policies in exchange for a bribe of £200,000 a year for three years. Locke considered the 
use of the “dispensing power” by Charles II in 1672 and James II in 1688 to permit Roman Catholics to 
hold civil, teaching, and military offices as a delivery of the people to the subjection of a foreign power in 
the person of the Pope. He viewed James II's establishment of an illegal standing army under Roman 
Catholic command from 1685 to 1688 in the same light.  In A Letter regarding Toleration, Locke views 
Roman Catholics as bound by their faith to depose Protestant princes. John Locke, The Second Treatise of 
Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2002) 144: “What can be 
the meaning of their asserting that kings excommunicated or forfeit their crowns and kingdoms? It is 
evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they challenge 
the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their hierarchy.” Locke thus argues that Roman 
Catholics do not deserve toleration. Id. at 145: “That church can have no right to be tolerated by the 
magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto 
deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate 
would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be 
listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own government.” 
241 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 79. 
242 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 44. [Emphasis added]. Locke continues: “The only way whereby anyone divests 
himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join 
and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a 
secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it.” 
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citizens are bound to protect themselves by withdrawing their consent.243 When misgovernment 
includes a “long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices,” then the government itself is in 
rebellion against the people.244 Only the people can decide if this has occurred, for the very 
existence of the civil order depends upon their consent.245 The people have the right in such 
instances either to erect a new form of government or to place the old form of government “in 
new hands, as they think good.” 246  
 The consent of the governed is also “absolutely necessary” for the legitimacy of law. 
Without the sanction of a legislature “which the public has chosen and appointed,” “the law 
could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society, 
over whom nobody can have a power to make laws but by their own consent, and by authority 
received from them.” 247 
F. Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England 
1. Blackstone’s Formulation of Natural Law 
“Law,” writes Blackstone, “signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to 
all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational.” 248 Man is governed by 
immutable laws of human nature.249 These laws are discernible by reason, 250 and man’s 
                                                 
243 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 100-101. 
244 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 102-103. 
245 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 110-111. 
246 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 111-112. 
247 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2002) 61.  
248 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
25. 
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happiness depends on conformity with these laws.251  
Human nature obtains happiness by pursuing justice. Failing to pursue justice inevitably 
leads to unhappiness. 252 Because justice and happiness are mutually interdependent, natural law 
derives from the precept “that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness.” 253 
This precept “is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.” 254 Natural law permits 
                                                                                                                                                
249 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
26. “For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain 
rules for the perpetual direction of that motion, so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to 
conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that 
freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the 
purport of those laws.” 
250 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
26. “For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain 
rules for the perpetual direction of that motion, so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to 
conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that 
freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the 
purport of those laws.” Reason is also required to guide man in applying the precepts of natural law in 
order to obtain happiness. Man corrupted his reason in the fall. Providence therefore reveals divine law in 
scripture. Such divine law is a part of the original law of nature, and its application leads to man’s felicity. 
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 28. 
251 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27. “This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law; for the several articles into which it is 
branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating that this or that action tends to man's real 
happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, 
on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law 
of nature forbids it.” 
252 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27.  “For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the 
happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the 
former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter.” 
253 George Mason, the driving force behind the American Bill of Rights, echoes Blackstone in article I of 
the Virginia Bill of Rights: “Government is, or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, 
and security of the people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that 
is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and the most effectually 
secured against the danger of maladministration.” 
254 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27.  “In consequence of which mutual connexion of justice and human felicity, he “has not perplexed the 
law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness 
of things, as some have vainly surmised, but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one 
paternal precept, ‘that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness.’ This is the foundation of 
what we call ethics, or natural law.” Note that ethics and natural law are identical for Blackstone, contrary 
to the positivist claim that there is no necessary connection between law and morality.  
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actions that promote man’s real happiness, and forbids actions that destroy it. 255  
Substantively, natural law consists of eternal immutable laws of good and evil. “Such, 
among others, are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should 
render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole 
doctrine of law.”256  
Blackstone divides jurisprudence into natural law and positive law, distinguishing the 
rights and duties arising under each. 257 Positive law derives its validity and force from natural 
law, and any positive law that is contrary to natural law is invalid.258 Individuals are furthermore 
bound to transgress positive laws that violate natural law, such as a law requiring us to commit 
murder.259  
Nevertheless, natural law does not determine every legal issue. On most issues, man is at 
                                                 
255 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27.   
256 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27. Blackstone explains that the precept “that we should live honestly” invoked by Justinian has a richer 
meaning than merely avoiding dishonest conduct. Instead, it requires one to live honorably and avoid 
conduct that ultimately proves ruinous to society, such as “drunkenness, debauchery, profaneness, 
extravagance, gaming, etc.” Id. at n. 2. 
257 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
36, 38. Acts that violate natural law, such as murder, are “mala in se” or evil in themselves. Acts that 
violate positive law, such as counterfeiting, are “mala prohibita.” They are evil only to the extent they are 
prohibited. Natural law is superior to all other law, and applies in all countries at all times. Sir William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 27.  Therefore, 
although an ambassador of a foreign nation may enjoy immunity from prosecution for violating a positive 
law against counterfeiting, he cannot escape prosecution for violating natural law’s prohibition of murder. 
Id. at 189. 
258 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27. “[N]o human laws are of any validity, if contrary to [natural law]; and such of them as are valid derive 
all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.” “No human law 
should be suffered to contradict” natural law. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 28. 
259 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
28-29. 
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liberty to adopt positive laws that benefit society.260 Natural law is indifferent, for example, as to 
whether positive law permits the export of wool.261  
2. Blackstone’s Formulation of Natural Rights 
Blackstone divides rights into two types, absolute rights and relative rights. The 
“immutable laws of nature” vest absolute rights in individuals.262 Blackstone names the same 
absolute rights as Locke: personal security, personal liberty, and private property.263 Individuals 
enjoy absolute rights in the state of nature, prior to the formation of society.264  
The absolute right of personal security consists of “the legal enjoyment of life, limb, 
                                                 
260 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
28. “There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points in which [natural law leaves] man at his own 
liberty, but which are found necessary, for the benefit of society, to be restrained within certain limits. And 
herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not 
indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, [natural law].” 
261 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
28-29. “But, with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden 
by those superior laws,—such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries,—here the inferior 
legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was not 
so.” 
262 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
89. “For the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, 
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace 
without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social 
communities.” 
263 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
93-94. Blackstone’s right to personal security includes the rights to life and health. Locke names the 
natural rights to life, health, liberty, and possessions in John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government 
and A Letter concerning Toleration (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2002) 3. 
264 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
89. “By the absolute rights of individuals, we mean those which are so in their primary and strictest sense; 
such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, 
whether out of society or in it.” Although Blackstone often refers to a pre-social state of nature, he treats it 
as a heuristic legal fiction. This is a common legal practice, such as the fiction that a corporation is a 
person for some legal purposes. Unlike Locke, Blackstone does not believe that man ever existed in an 
historical state of nature. “Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that there ever was a 
time when there was no such thing as society either natural or civil; and that, from the impulse of reason, 
and through a sense of their wants and weaknesses, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into 
an original contract, and chose the tallest man present to be their governor.” Id. at 32. 
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body, health, and reputation.” 265 The absolute right of personal liberty consists of the free 
“power of locomotion, of changing situation, a moving of one’s person to whatsoever place 
one’s own inclination may direct, without an imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of 
law.”266 The absolute right of property consists of “every man’s free use and disposal of his own 
lawful acquisitions, without injury or illegal diminution.”267 
Relative rights, in contrast to absolute rights, exist only in society.268 The purpose of 
relative rights is “to serve as outworks or barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three 
great and primary rights, personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”269 Unlike 
absolute rights, which are “few and simple,” relative rights “are far more numerous and more 
complicated.” 270  
                                                 
265 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
93-97. Life is the inherent natural right of every individual, “and it begins in contemplation of law as soon 
as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb.” The unborn have legal capacities and substantial legal 
rights, “as if it were then actually born in the womb.” These capacities and rights include, in addition to 
the natural right to life, the capacities to receive a legacy, to receive a copyhold estate, to have a guardian, 
and to have sole possession of an estate. Blackstone points out that “in this point the civil law [the 
European code law system based on Roman law] agrees with ours.”  
266 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
97-100. Blackstone considered the right to liberty the most important of the natural rights. “Of great 
importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty; for if once it were left in the power of 
any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in 
France it is daily practiced by the Crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities… 
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or 
forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.” 
Id. at 98. 
267 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
100-02. 
268 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
88. Relative rights “are incident to [individuals] as members of society, and standing in various relations to 
each other.”  
269 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
102. 
270 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
89. Relative rights are of two types. The first type is public relative rights. These rights involve the “public 
relations of magistrates and people.” Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 
1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 332. Blackstone names five public relative rights. These include (1) the 
constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; (2) clear and certain limitations on the “king’s 
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3. Blackstone’s Prohibition against Judge-Made Law 
The power of judges to make new law is a key point of conflict in contemporary 
American jurisprudence. Legal positivism’s “penumbra doctrine” holds that judges have 
discretion to make new law in almost every case.271 Blackstone’s jurisprudence, on the other 
hand, prohibits judges from making new law.272 In Blackstone’s view, judge-made law unites the 
power to make and enforce law in one body, and this invites tyranny.273  
In applying the common law, the judge should determine the law “not according to his 
own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land.” The judge is 
not “delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expand on the old one.” 274 
                                                                                                                                                
prerogative,” or sovereign power; (3) the right of access to the courts for redress of injuries; (4) the right to 
petition the king and parliament for the redress of grievances, and (5) the right to bear arms sufficient to 
allow resistance and self-preservation when the laws and society “are insufficient to restrain the violence 
of oppression.” Id. at 105. The second type of relative rights is private relative rights. These rights govern 
the legally significant relationships between members of society. Blackstone names four such 
relationships: (1) master and servant, (2) husband and wife, (3) parent and child, and (4) guardian and 
ward. Id. at 32. 
271 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 12. See discussion of the 
penumbra doctrine in text at pages 28-29, infra.  
272 Blackstone’s limits on judicial discretion reflect the Puritan emphasis on the sinfulness of all persons, 
including the judge himself, which Blackstone adopts from Sir Matthew Hale’s groundbreaking work on 
the common law of England. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 265, 296-97. See Matthew 
Hale, The Analysis of Law: A Scheme or Abstract of the Several Titles and Partitions of the Law of 
England, Digested into Method (London: Nutt, 1716).  
273 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
105: “In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right of both making and of enforcing 
the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two 
powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and 
execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the 
power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give himself.” Blackstone continues: “But, where the 
legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter 
with so large a power as may tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty 
of the subject. With as, therefore, in England, this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one 
legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of king, lords, and commons; the other executive, consisting 
of the king alone.” Id. 
274 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
46-47. “For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in 
litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waiver with every new 
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before 
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Nevertheless, since all law is subject to the standard of reason, judges may set aside common law 
precedents that are “manifestly absurd or unjust” and contrary to reason. Blackstone, following 
Sir Edward Coke, saw the common law as the embodiment of reason itself, and no one man is 
wiser than the common law.275 Setting unreasonable precedents aside does not create new law. 
Instead, it “vindicates the law from misrepresentation.” 276 Such precedents are not set aside 
because they are bad law, but because they are not law. Unreasonable rules of common law, by 
definition, are not law. 
In applying statutory law, however, the judge may not exercise his discretion to set aside 
the will of parliament. The judge’s role is to “interpret and obey” the clear mandates of the 
legislature.277 Judges may not act as legislatures in miniature. “In a democracy,” writes 
Blackstone, “the right of making laws resides in the people at large.” 278 The only authority that 
                                                                                                                                                
was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of 
any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he being sworn to 
determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws, and customs of 
the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.” 
275 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, vol. 1 (London: Hansard, 
1809) §139: “Reason is the life of the law, nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason; which is 
to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, 
and not of every man’s natural reason; for, Nemo nascitur artifex [no one is born an artist]. This legal 
reason est summa ratio [is the highest reason]. And therefore, if all the reason that is dispersed into so 
many several heads, are united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the law of England is; 
because, by many successions of ages, it has been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and 
learned men, and will experience growth to such a perfection, for the government of this realm, as the old 
rules may be justly verified of it, Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus: no man (out of his own 
private reason) ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.” 
276Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
46-47. “Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to 
reason; “much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent 
judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be 
found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was 
bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been 
erroneously determined.” 
277 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
27 n. 3. 
278 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
33.  It must be borne in mind that parliament plays the same role in the English legal system as the Bill of 
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can declare an act of parliament void is parliament itself.   
II. The Positivist Tradition in Jurisprudence 
A. Bentham's Criticism of Blackstone 
Bentham marks the beginning of the transition from Blackstone’s natural law 
jurisprudence to Hart’s legal positivism. Blackstone wrote the Commentaries on the Laws of 
England after failing to obtain a professorship in civil law at Oxford.279 Blackstone then 
delivered a series of private lectures at Oxford on the common law, and these lectures became 
the foundation of the Commentaries.280 One of the attendees was sixteen-year-old Jeremy 
Bentham, who paid six guineas to attend Blackstone’s lectures. 281  
Bentham listened with rebel ears. He published scathing criticisms of Blackstone twelve 
years later in his anonymous Fragment on Government.282 Bentham criticizes Blackstone as “a 
determined and persevering enemy” of understanding and improving the law.283 Bentham 
describes Blackstone’s natural law theory as “theological grimgribber” and an “excursion into 
                                                                                                                                                
Rights plays in the American legal system. England has no formal written Constitution. Rather, the 
English “constitution” developed historically through significant enactments of Parliament. Blackstone 
lists these acts in his discussion of the historical development of Parliament. Id. at 105-112. 
279 Julian S. Waterman, “Mansfield and Blackstone’s Commentaries,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (4) (1934): 549-
571, 550. 
280 W. S. Holdsworth, “Some Aspects of Blackstone and His Commentaries,” Cambridge L. J. 4 (3) 
(1932): 261-285, 263. 
281 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J.H. Burns 
and H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press 1977) xix-xxi. According to the Library of the House of 
Commons, the British pound in 1750 was worth 116 times its value in 1998. Library of the House of 
Commons, “Inflation: the Value of the Pound 1750-1998,” Research Paper 99/20, 23 Feb. 1999.  
282 Bentham’s Fragment was described as “the most trenchant critique ever penned by a youthful pupil on 
the doctrines of a celebrated teacher whose dogmas were accepted by the learned world as profound 
truths.” Julian S. Waterman, “Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries,” Ill. L. Rev. 27 (6) 
(1933): 629-659, 629. 
283 Richard Posner summarizes A Fragment on Government as making two fundamental criticisms of 
Blackstone: “The first was that Blackstone was a shameless apologist for the status quo, an enemy of all 
reform, a Pangloss blind to the shocking deficiencies of the English legal system. The second was that 
Blackstone’s analysis of the nature and sources of legal obligation was shallow, amateurish, and 
contradictory; that, as Samuel Johnson is reported to have said, Blackstone ‘thought clearly, but he thought 
faintly.’” Richard Posner, “Blackstone and Bentham,” J. Law and Econ. 19 (3) (1996): 569-606, 570. 
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the land of fancy.” 284 Bentham displays a ferocious antipathy towards Blackstone, describing 
Blackstone as “corrupting everything he touches,” “vulgar,” “infected with the foul stench of 
intolerance,” “prejudiced,” and “disingenuous.” 285 
B. Bentham’s “Imperative Theory” of Law 
Although legal positivism has antecedents in ancient and medieval thought,286 it finds its 
first full elaboration in Bentham’s work.287 H.L.A. Hart, the leading commentator on Bentham’s 
legal philosophy, highlights two distinguishing features in Bentham’s legal theory. The first is 
Bentham’s “imperative” theory of law, and the second is the view that law has no necessary 
conceptual connection with morality.288  
Bentham defines law as (1) the assemblage of signs of a sovereign’s volition, (2) 
directing the conduct of persons under his power, (3) accompanied by an “expectation” in such 
                                                 
284 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J.H. Burns 
and H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press 1977) 10. Bentham asks, “What is there to be learned from these 
speculations? Nothing. What is to be concluded from them? Nothing.” Id. at 11. 
285 Richard Posner, “Blackstone and Bentham,” J. Law and Econ. 19 (3) (1996): 569-606, 590. Bentham’s 
descriptions of Blackstone include the following: “His hand was formed to embellish and to corrupt 
everything it touches. He makes men think they see, in order to prevent their seeing.” “His is the treasury 
of vulgar errors, where all the vulgar errors that are, are collected and improved.” “He is infected with the 
foul stench of intolerance, the rankest degree of intolerance that at this day the most depraved organ can 
endure.” “In him every prejudice has an advocate, and every professional chicanery an accomplice.” “His 
are crocodile lamentations.” “He carries the disingenuousness of the hireling Advocate into the chair of the 
Professor. He is the dupe of every prejudice, and the abettor of every abuse. No sound principles can be 
expected from that writer whose first object is to defend a system.” 
286 John Finnis, “The Truth in Legal Positivism,” The Autonomy of Law, ed. Robert P. George (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996) 195-214.  
287 Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, ed. H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970), originally 
published in 1832. 
288 H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 17-18. This collection brings together Hart’s most important discussions of 
Bentham’s legal theory. Works which deal with Bentham’s legal theory in detail include G.J. Postema, 
Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); D. Lieberman, The 
Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); M.J. Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760–1850 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); and O. Ben Dor, Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere: A Critical 
Study of Bentham’s Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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persons, that (4) motivates obedience. 289 Bentham denies Blackstone’s claim that nature 
establishes the existence of immutable standards of right and wrong that inevitably lead to justice 
and happiness. Instead, Bentham asserts that “Nature has placed mankind under the governance 
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to 
do,” and they alone are “the standard of right and wrong.” 290  
Bentham founds his legal positivism on his claims about the meaning and use of words. 
Describing natural law and natural rights as “so much bawling on paper,” Bentham rejects the 
existence of any form of legal rights other than those expressly granted by “real” positive law. In 
Anarchical Fallacies, Bentham’s criticism of the Declaration of Rights issued by the French 
National Assembly in 1789, Bentham argues that natural laws and rights are “imaginary:”  
Right is the child of law; from real laws come real rights, but from imaginary 
laws, from the “laws of nature,” come imaginary rights… Natural rights is 
simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptable rights, nonsense upon stilts…They 
know not of what they are talking under the name of natural rights, and yet they 
would have them imprescriptable. 291 
Only positive laws can create rights, and since positivism sees law as founded on the will of its 
maker, all positive laws require the existence of a sovereign. There can be no rights outside the 
existence of a sovereign command, and no rights can exist prior to the formation of a 
                                                 
289 Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, ed. H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 1. Bentham 
states his definition as follows: “an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by 
the sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certain person or 
class of persons, who in the case in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power: such volition 
trusting for its accomplishment to the expectation of certain events which it is intended such declaration 
should upon occasion be a means of bringing to pass, and the prospect of which it is intended should act as 
a motive upon those whose conduct is in question.” 
290 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1907), 1. 
291 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of The Declarations of Rights Issued 
During the French Revolution,” The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William Tate, 1843) 
501. 
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government.292 Applying the linguistic methodology that has become the hallmark of legal 
positivism, Bentham labels the concept of pre-existing “natural rights” as a “perversion of 
language.” The term “natural rights” is “ambiguous,” “sentimental,” and “figurative,” and it has 
anarchical consequences. 293  
 In contrast to Austin and Hart, Bentham opposed judge-made law. Like Blackstone, 
Bentham recognized the ex post facto problem with judges making the law at the same time they 
decide the case. Bentham famously compares a judge making law to a man beating his dog.294   
C. John Austin's “Command Theory” of Law 
John Austin’s jurisprudence provides the starting point and “credo” for H.L.A. Hart’s 
legal positivism. John Austin’s “command” theory of law adopts and modifies Bentham’s 
“imperative” theory. Austin defines law as “a rule laid down for the guidance of intelligent 
                                                 
292 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of The Declarations of Rights Issued 
During the French Revolution,” The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William Tate, 1843) 
505.  Bentham argues that there are no rights in the absence of positive law, and that rights are determined 
solely by positive law: “These bounds [of rights] cannot be determined but by the law. More contradiction, 
more confusion. What then? This liberty, this right, which is one of four rights that existed before laws, 
and will exist in spite of all that laws can do, owes all the boundaries it has, all the extent it has, to the 
laws. Till you know what the laws say to it, you do not know what there is of it, nor what account to give of 
it: and yet it existed, and that in full force and vigour, before there were any such things as laws; and so 
will continue to exist, and that for ever, in spite of anything which laws can do to it. Still the same 
inaptitude of expressions--still the same confusion of that which it is supposed is, with that which it is 
conceived ought to be.” [Emphasis added].  
293 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of The Declarations of Rights Issued 
During the French Revolution,” The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William Tate, 1843) 
407.  “In a play or a novel, an improper word is but a word: and the impropriety, whether noticed or not, is 
attended with no consequences. In a body of laws--especially of laws given as constitutional and 
fundamental ones--an improper word may be a national calamity--and civil war may be the consequence 
of it. Out of one foolish word may start a thousand daggers.” 
294 Jeremy Bentham, “Truth versus Ashhurst; or, Law as it is, contrasted with what it is said to be,” The 
Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. Sir John Bowring, vol. 5 (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) 231-238, 245: “Do you 
know how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to 
break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: 
and this is the way the judges make laws for you and me. They won't tell a man beforehand what it is he 
should not do—they won't so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something which 
they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it.”   
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beings, by an intelligent being having power over him.” 295 Austin names four elements in his 
“command theory” of positive law: (a) commands,296 (b) backed by threat of sanctions, (c) from 
a sovereign, (d) to whom people have a habit of obedience. 297  Austin’s “command” theory of 
law is widely criticized, often because the command of a gun-wielding highwayman arguably 
satisfies its requirements. H.L.A. Hart abandons the “command theory” of law altogether, 
replacing it with a model of law as the union of primary and secondary social rules.298  
Unlike Bentham, Austin accepts a broad exercise of judicial discretion.299 Austin agrees 
with Bentham, however, that Blackstone’s analysis that absurd or unjust legal provisions are not 
law is “stark nonsense:”  
The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or 
be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed 
standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we 
happen to dislike it.300  
                                                 
295 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 1. 
296 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 14: 
“‘Commands’ involve an expressed wish that something be done, combined with a willingness and ability 
to impose ‘an evil’ for failure to comply with that wish.” 
297 The “sovereign” is defined as a person (or determinate body of persons) who receives habitual 
obedience from the bulk of the population, but who does not habitually obey any other (earthly) person or 
institution. Austin thought that all independent political societies, by their nature, have a sovereign. John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 225-31. 
298 See discussion of primary and secondary rules in text at pages 16-17, infra.  
299 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 191: “I 
cannot understand how any person who has considered the subject can suppose that society could possibly 
have gone on if judges had not legislated, or that there is any danger whatever in allowing them that power 
which they have in fact exercised, to make up for the negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator. 
That part of the law of every country which was made by judges has been far better made then that part 
which consists of statutes enacted by the legislature. Notwithstanding my great admiration for Mr. 
Bentham, I cannot but think that, instead of blaming judges for having legislated, he should blame them 
for the timid, narrow, and piecemeal manner in which they have legislated, and for legislating under cover 
of vague and indeterminate phrases.” Id. Hart agrees with Austin and legitimizes judicial discretion as 
normal and necessary. “The judge [in cases in which the law is indeterminate or incomplete] …must 
exercise his discretion and make law for the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled 
law.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 272-276. 
300 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 184. 
Austin continues: “Sir William Blackstone, for example, says in his ‘Commentaries,’ that the laws of God 
are superior in obligation to all other laws; that no human law should be suffered to contradict them; that 
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Hart adopts this statement as the credo for his version of positivism, characterizing it as 
a distinction between “law as it is” and “law as it ought to be.” 301 Hart employs this distinction 
to provide the basis for two core tenets of legal positivism. The first claim, known as the 
“Separability Thesis,” asserts that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. 302  
The second claim, known as the “Social Fact Thesis,” maintains that the moral content 
of a law is irrelevant to its validity and enforceability. The sole determinant of legal validity is 
the law’s compliance with a social fact.303 The paradigm social fact asserted by Hart is a 
“secondary rule,” the “rule of recognition” by public officials.304 Legal positivism holds that any 
law, even “morally iniquitous laws” with “no moral justification or force whatever,” are 
enforceable so long as public officials recognize the law as valid.305 Unlike natural law 
jurisprudence, the validity of law under legal positivism is “unrestricted” by the demands of 
reason and natural law precepts. 
D. Hart’s Positivism 
1. Three Doctrines of the Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence 
The modern era of legal positivism began on April 30, 1957, with H.L.A. Hart’s lecture 
                                                                                                                                                
human laws are of no validity if contrary to them; and that all valid laws derive their force from that  
Divine original… Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is 
to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense.” Id. 185. 
301 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 594. “Bentham and Austin constantly insisted on the need to distinguish, firmly and with the 
maximum of clarity, law as it is from law as it ought to be. This theme haunts their work, and they 
condemned the natural-law thinkers precisely because they had blurred this apparently simple but vital 
distinction.” 
302 In The Concept of Law, Hart writes, “In some legal systems, as in the United States, the ultimate 
criteria of legal validity explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values …” H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 204. 
303 For Austin, the paradigm social fact was the existence of a sovereign. The paradigm social fact for Hart 
is the rule of recognition. See discussion of the rule of recognition in the text at pages 16-17, infra.  
304 See discussion of Hart’s concepts of “primary” and “secondary” rules in the text at pages 16-17, infra. 
305 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268.            
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“Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” at Harvard Law School. Hart’s lecture 
emphasizes three doctrines asserted by Austin and Bentham “that constitute the utilitarian 
tradition in jurisprudence.”306 The first of these doctrines is the positivist commitment to the 
separation of law and morals, which Hart describes as the distinction between law “as it is” and 
law “as it ought to be.” This theme “haunts the work” of Bentham and Austin, who criticize 
natural law thinkers for “blurring this distinction.” 307 
Hart explains that the distinction between “law as it is” and “law as it ought to be” 
implies two things. First, in the absence of an express constitutional or legal provision, the mere 
fact that a rule violates standards of morality does not mean that it is not a valid rule of law. 
Secondly, the mere fact that a rule is morally desirable does not make it a rule of law.308 
 Hart then addresses the second and third traditional doctrines of positivism. The second 
is the importance of an analytical approach to legal concepts. “A study of the meaning of the 
distinctive vocabulary of the law is as vital to our understanding of the nature of law as historical 
or sociological studies.”309 The third is the imperative theory that law is “essentially a 
command.” “These three doctrines constitute the utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence; yet they 
                                                 
306 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 601. These three doctrines are (1) the separation of law and morals, (2) the importance of a purely 
analytical study of legal concepts, and (3) the imperative theory of law that law is essentially a command.  
307 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 594. “Bentham and Austin constantly insisted on the need to distinguish, firmly and with the 
maximum of clarity, law as it is from law as it ought to be. This theme haunts their work, and they 
condemned the natural-law thinkers precisely because they had blurred this apparently simple but vital 
distinction.” 
308 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629. Hart further explains that although there is no necessary connection between law and morality, the 
separation between laws and morals need not be absolute. “[N]either Bentham nor his followers denied 
that by explicit legal provisions moral principles might at different points be brought into a legal system 
and form part of its rules, or that courts might be legally bound to decide in accordance with what they 
thought just or best… [Austin] would have recognized that a statute, for example, might confer a delegated 
legislative power and restrict the area of its exercise by reference to moral principles.” 
309 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 601.  
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are distinct doctrines.” 310 
Hart is careful to present these three ideas as “distinct doctrines,” for although Hart 
adopts the first two doctrines, he dispenses with the most heavily criticized of the three 
doctrines, Austin’s “command” theory of law. Hart replaces the “command” theory with his 
most significant contribution to jurisprudence, the model of law as a union of primary and 
secondary rules.311  
2. Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules 
 Austin’s imperative theory of law depicts law as the command of a sovereign backed by 
a coercive threat. 312  Hart rejects Austin’s theory for four reasons. First, Austin’s model fails to 
recognize that laws generally apply to those who enact them. Second, Austin’s model does not 
account for laws granting public powers, such as the power to legislate or adjudicate, or for laws 
granting private powers to create or vary legal relations. Third, Austin’s model fails to account 
for laws that originate, not from a sovereign, but out of common custom. Fourth, Austin’s model 
fails to account for the continuity of legislative authority characteristic of a modern legal 
system.313 
 In place of Austin’s theory of law as the orders of a sovereign backed by threats, Hart 
offers the model of law as the union of primary and secondary social rules. A primary rule is a 
rule that imposes an obligation or a duty.  “[P]rimary rules are concerned with the actions that 
                                                 
310 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629. “The other doctrine was the famous imperative theory of law — that law is essentially a command. 
These three doctrines constitute the utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence; yet they are distinct doctrines.” 
311 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 79-99. 
312 Hart restates Austin’s theory, for purposes of discussion, as “the laws of any country will be the general 
orders backed by threats which are issued either by the sovereign or subordinates in obedience to the 
sovereign.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 25. 
313 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 79.  
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individuals must or must not do.”314 Examples of primary rules include torts and criminal laws.  
A rule imposes an obligation or duty when the demand for conformity is insistent and the social 
pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate from the rule is great.315 
 In order for a system of primary rules to function effectively, Hart states that secondary 
rules may also be necessary in order to provide an authoritative statement of all the primary 
rules.  In contrast to primary rules, which impose obligations and duties, secondary rules confer 
powers to introduce, to change, or to modify a primary rule. These powers may be public or 
private. 316  
 There are three types of secondary rules.  The first type is the rule of change.  This type 
of secondary rule allows legislators to make changes in the primary rules if the legislators 
determine that the primary rules are defective or inadequate.317 The second type of secondary 
rule is the rule of adjudication.  This type of secondary rule enables courts to resolve disputes 
over the interpretation and application of the primary rules.318   
The third type of secondary rule is the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition 
provides “a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation,” 319 and it also 
serves as Hart’s ultimate criterion for the validity of law.320  A rule is legally valid, and therefore 
                                                 
314 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 94. Primary rules “contain 
in some form restrictions on the free use of violence, theft, and deception to which human beings are 
tempted but which they must, in general, repress, if they are to coexist in close proximity to each other.” 
Id. at 91.  
315 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 91. 
316 Private powers include such powers as making wills, contracts, transferring property, and other 
voluntarily created structures of rights and duties that typify life under law. Public powers include such 
powers as creating, repealing, or amending legislation and adjudicating disputes. H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 96-97.  
317 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 95-96. 
318 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 97-98. 
319 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 95. 
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enforceable, if it conforms to the requirements set forth in the rule of recognition. 321  
3. External and Internal Points of View 
In addition to primary and secondary rules, Hart's theory of law also contains two ways 
of looking at sets of legal rules, commonly referred to as the external and internal points of 
view. Hart uses primary and secondary rules to determine the existence and validity of an 
individual law. Hart uses the external and internal points of view to define the existence and 
validity, not of an individual law, but of a legal system in its entirety.  
The external point of view is the view of a person who feels no obligation that he 
“should” follow the law. 322 The person adopting the external point of view has no feeling or 
sense that he “should” or “ought” to follow the law. He has no sense that it is “right” to follow 
the law or that it is “wrong” not to do so, and refuses to look upon the law as a standard of 
conduct for himself or others.323 The external point of view is present in people engaging in mere 
“social habits” and “group habits.”324  
The internal point of view, on the other hand, is the view of a person who feels obligated 
to follow the law. The internal point of view requires an affirmative endorsement of the legal 
rules and standards governing behavior. A person acting from the internal point of view follows 
the law because he thinks it is right to do so, and wrong not to do so. He feels that he ought, 
                                                                                                                                                
320 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 105: “The rule of 
recognition providing the criteria by which the validity of other rules of the system is assessed is in an 
important sense, which we shall try to clarify, an ultimate rule: and where, as is usual, there are several 
criteria are ranked in order of relative subordination and primacy one of them is supreme.”  
321 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 103: “To say that a given 
rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of 
the system.  We can indeed simply say that the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it 
satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.” 
322 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56.  
323 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56. 
324 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56, 57. Hart defines such 
habits as regular, uniform behavior that occurs without the pressure of a social rule mandating that 
behavior “in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’.” 
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must, and should follow the law. The internal point of view distinguishes social rules, such as the 
rule of recognition,325 from mere group habits. 326  
4. Hart’s Two Conditions for the Existence and Validity of a Legal System 
 Using the external and internal points of view, Hart next explains the two conditions for 
the existence and validity of a legal system. The first condition is that private citizens generally 
obey the primary rules of obligation. It is sufficient that each member of the population obeys 
the primary rules “for his part only” and “from any motive whatsoever.” In Hart’s terms, it is 
sufficient that citizens take an external point of view toward primary rules. 327 Contrary to natural 
law jurisprudence, the consent of the governed is irrelevant under positivism to the existence or 
validity of a legal system.   
The second condition for the existence and validity of a legal system is that public 
officials adopt the rule of recognition specifying the criteria for legal validity as their “public 
standard of official behavior.” Officials must feel themselves obligated to adopt and abide by the 
rule of recognition and censure those public officials who fail to do so. In Hart’s terms, it is a 
minimum necessary condition that officials take the internal point of view toward secondary 
                                                 
325 Social rules include ordinary social customs, which may or may not have legal force, as well as 
important legal rules, including the rule of recognition. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 256. 
326 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56-57. Demands for 
conformity with the internal point of view are expressed “in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, 
and ‘should’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’.” 
327 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116. “There are therefore 
two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, 
those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be 
generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity 
and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of 
official behaviour by its officials. The first condition is the only one which private citizens need satisfy: 
they may obey each ‘for his part only’ and from any motive whatever; though in a healthy society they 
will in fact often accept these rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowledge an obligation to 
obey them, or even trace this obligation to a more general obligation to respect the constitution. The 
second condition must also be satisfied by the officials of the system. They must regard these as common 
standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.” 
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rules.328  
Contrary to natural law jurisprudence, law is not autonomous under positivism. Law 
wields no supremacy over political rulers because positivism founds law on the will of the 
lawmaker.329 Different rules govern public officials than govern the rest of society, and only 
public officials have the authority to determine legal validity. 330    
5. Hart’s Acceptance of Judge-Made Law 
Hart accepts the broad exercise of judicial power in making new law. One of the most 
significant and controversial aspects of Hart’s positivism is his justification of judge-made law 
on linguistic grounds under the “penumbra doctrine.” Laws, Hart argues, consist of rules that can 
determine results only at the core of their meaning. Outside this core of meaning, legal terms 
present a penumbra of uncertainty. This “uncertainty at the borderline” of meaning gives law an 
“open texture.” 331 According to Hart, only the judge’s discretion can resolve this uncertainty. 
Hart expressly rejects the tradition, adopted by Sir Matthew Hale and Blackstone, that judges 
“find” and do not “make” law. 332 
                                                 
328 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 117. 
329 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 241. 
330 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 79-99. Hart’s model of law 
depicts law as the union of primary and secondary social rules. Secondary rules confer powers to 
introduce, change, or modify a primary rule. Secondary rules confer public powers on public officials 
(only) to change, adjudicate, and determine the validity of legal duties and obligations for the general 
population. The paradigm rule is the secondary rule of recognition, which empowers public officials (only) 
to determine the validity of a law. 
331 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 128: “Whichever device, 
precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of behavior, these, however 
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point when their application is in 
question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture. So far we have 
presented this, in the case of legislation, as a general feature of human language; uncertainty at the 
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of communication 
concerning matters of fact.” 
332 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 12. See discussion of the 
“declaratory theory” that judges “find” and do not “make” law at page 7, supra and Hart’s “penumbra 
doctrine” at pages 28-29, infra. 
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6. Hart’s Acceptance of “Morally Iniquitous Provisions” as Valid Law 
 Hart denies any necessary connection between the validity of law and morality:  
I argue in this book that though there are many different contingent connections 
between law and morality there are no necessary conceptual connections 
between the content of law and morality; and hence morally iniquitous 
provisions may be valid as legal rules or principles. One aspect of this form of 
the separation of law from morality is that there can be legal rights and duties 
which have no moral justification or force whatever.333 [Emphasis added]. 
Hart justifies the “separation of law and morality,” the unrestricted validity of morally 
iniquitous laws, as an analytical aid. 334 Hart’s linguistic analysis, however, wholly ignores the 
practical consequences of accepting “morally iniquitous provisions” of law having “no moral 
justification or force whatsoever.” 335 The positivist acceptance of morally iniquitous laws 
permits a legal system that does more than merely denying the natural law principles of reason, 
autonomy, and consent. It permits a legal system where “anything goes” and any legal provision 
is potentially enforceable as valid. 336  
 
                                                 
333 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268. 
334 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 211. Hart argues that the 
refusal to recognize evil laws as valid is “too crude a way [to deal] with delicate and complex moral 
issues. The concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its immorality, 
enables us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law 
which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them.”  
335 An apparent inconsistency in Hart’s version of legal positivism involves his claim that it is necessary to 
the existence of a legal system that officials take the internal point of view towards secondary rules. 
According to Hart, a person acting from the internal point of view follows the law because he thinks it is 
right to do so, and wrong not to do so. He feels that he ought, must, and should follow the law. H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56-57. Thus, the internal point of view 
involves a moral duty. 
336 Contemporary natural law theorists also find “morally iniquitous provisions” unacceptable. For the 
contemporary natural rights theorist, the acceptance of “morally iniquitous provisions” serves no valid 
purpose. Fuller would argue that “morally iniquitous provisions” violate his eight principles of internal 
morality, and “results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all.” Lon L. Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 39. John Finnis would argue that “morally 
iniquitous provisions” could not be legally valid, for they cannot provide any adequate justification for use 
of the state coercive power. Although such provisions might be legally binding, such provisions are not 
obligatory in the fullest sense because they fail to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. 
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 23-24. 
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III. The Supplanting of Natural Law by Legal Positivism 
A. Blackstone’s Dominance in American Jurisprudence 
Published in four volumes from 1765 to 1769, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England became the most influential book in American legal history. 337 The Commentaries 
dominated American jurisprudence. Marbury v. Madison, arguably the most significant court 
decision in American history, cites the Commentaries four times in support of its power of 
judicial review. 338 In the first century of American jurisprudence, Blackstone's Commentaries 
were not merely an approach to the study of law. For most lawyers and judges, the 
Commentaries constituted all there was of the law. 339   
The Commentaries shaped the intellect of the founders. Blackstone is the European 
scholar most often cited in the writings of the founders. 340 Subscribers to the first American 
edition of the Commentaries included John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court; John Marshall, the most influential justice in the history of the United States 
Supreme Court; James Wilson, the most learned and influential delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention; 341 Nathaniel Greene, Washington’s most able and dependable general; and John 
                                                 
337 Gareth Jones, ed., The Sovereignty of the Law, Selections from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). Blackstone originally published the 
Commentaries in four volumes from 1765 to 1769. “The influence of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England…was phenomenal and as great in America as in England.” Lee Cameron McDonald, 
Western Political Theory (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc, 1968), 360. 
338 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). 
339 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on Blackstone’s Commentaries 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1958) 3: “In the first century of American jurisprudence, the commentaries were 
not merely an approach to the study of law; for most lawyers that constituted all there was of the law.”  
340 Donald S. Lutz, “The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth Century American 
Political Thought,” American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 184. 
341 James Wilson was a member of the Continental Congress, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, 
a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, a justice of the United States Supreme Court, and the first 
professor of law in what became the University of Pennsylvania. Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering 
Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55, 10 n. 44. 
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Adams. 342 Blackstone’s Commentaries “taught American Revolutionaries their rights, helped 
inspire the Declaration of Independence, influenced the deliberations of the Constitutional 
Convention, articulated a sense of providence like the one that touched Abraham Lincoln, and 
instructed the [descendents] of his initial American readers of the virtues of the English common 
law.” 343  
The Commentaries also helped to lay the foundation stones of the new republic. “All of 
our formative documents-the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist 
papers, and the seminal decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall-were drafted by 
attorneys steeped in [Blackstone’s Commentaries]. So much was this the case that the 
Commentaries ranked second only to the Bible as a literary and intellectual influence on the 
history of American institutions.” 344  
 
                                                 
342 Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55, 5-6.  
343 Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55, 15-16. 
Blackstone’s favorable reception in America was dampened, however, by his political opposition to the 
positions of the American colonists. As a member of Parliament from 1761 to 1770, Blackstone voted to 
maintain the Stamp Act. Blackstone’s Commentaries denies that Americans enjoyed the common law 
rights of British subjects, because the common law did not extend to territories such as America that had 
been conquered and that already had their own law. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1840) 77-78. Blackstone also maintains that freedom of the press 
consists only of freedom from prior censorship. “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature 
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from 
censure for criminal manner when published.” This restraint on the press is “necessary for the preservation 
of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.” Sir 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4, sec. 151-53 (New York: W.E. Dean, 
1840). James Wilson challenged Blackstone’s views of parliamentary supremacy and the rights of 
colonists. Altschuler explains that Blackstone’s reception was also tempered by his apologies for the 
Crown, the established church, and other English institutions rescinded by the colonists, as well as by the 
“determination of Americans to create their own law.” Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” 
U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55, 9-10. 
344 Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984) 11. Daniel 
Boorstin observes that “in the history of American institutions, no other book-except the Bible-has played 
so great a role.” Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958) iii. Boorstin continues: “In the first century of American 
jurisprudence, the commentaries were not merely an approach to the study of law; for most lawyers that 
constituted all there was of the law.” Id. at 3. 
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B. Transition from Natural Law to Positivism 
American jurisprudence is nevertheless transitioning from Blackstone to Hart. As 
explained below, four factors are propelling this transition. The first is the abandonment of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries in the study of law. The second is the rise of value skepticism in 
American jurisprudence. The third is the entrenchment of analytic philosophy in the American 
academy.  The fourth is the ubiquitous desire of judges to make law, and not merely find it.   
C. The Abandonment of Blackstone’s Commentaries in American Legal Education 
1. Blackstone’s Former Dominance of Legal Education 
For more than a century, almost every American lawyer studied Blackstone’s 
Commentaries as the foundation of their legal education.345  Published reports of American 
decisions did not exist in the decades surrounding the American Revolution, and reports of 
English decisions were frequently unavailable.346 In many jurisdictions, Blackstone's four 
volumes represented “all there was of the law.”347  
Carl Sandburg describes Blackstone’s influence on the life of Abraham Lincoln. The 
young Lincoln was advised by a lawyer friend that Blackstone‘s Commentaries was the first 
book that a prospective lawyer should read, and Lincoln fortuitously obtained a copy from a man 
driving west who needed to lighten the load of his covered wagon. 348 Twenty-five years later, 
Lincoln wrote a letter advising another young man to “come to the law” as Lincoln had, by 
                                                 
345 David A. Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1938) 176. Lockmiller 
estimates that reported decisions in the United States between 1879 and 1915 cited Blackstone’s 
Commentaries at least 10,000 times. Id. at 181.  
346 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 
1991) 23. 
347 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on Blackstone’s Commentaries 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1941) 3. 
348 Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1926) 
164. 
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reading Blackstone “for himself, without an instructor.” 349  
A 1914 Carnegie Foundation study records that “all of the older American law schools 
started by being so-called lecture schools. Blackstone’s Commentaries, which, as we know, were 
used for purposes of instruction earlier and with far more lasting effect in America than in 
England, formed the almost exclusive basis of the work.” 350 For more than 100 years, “thousands 
upon thousands of lawyers and influential laymen on both sides of the Atlantic read Blackstone's 
Commentaries and believed them.” 351 
2. Christopher Columbus Langdell and the Case Law System 
The first factor facilitating the transition from Blackstone’s natural law jurisprudence to 
Hart’s positivism is the abandonment of Blackstone’s Commentaries in the study of law. 
American legal education began its abandonment of Blackstone in 1871 when Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, the new dean of the Harvard Law School, published the first casebook, 
Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts.
352 Langdell’s casebook marks the beginning of the 
“case law system,” which soon became the exclusive and universal method of study in American 
law schools. Rather than reading treatises, law students now read and analyze case opinions 
selected by their professors. Rather than giving lectures, law professors now question their 
students during class.  
 The case law system abandons Blackstone’s vision of law. Blackstone presents law as a 
coherent and cohesive system, continuously refined in the crucible of practical experience since 
the twelfth century. Blackstone originates law in reason, empowers law through autonomy, and 
                                                 
349 Abraham Lincoln, letter to James T. Thornton, 2 Dec. 1858, Roy P. Basler, ed., Abraham Lincoln: His 
Speeches and Writings (New York: Da Capo Press, 1990) 485. 
350 Josef Redlich, The Common Law And The Case Method In American University Law Schools, (Boston: 
Marymount Press, 1914) 7 [emphasis added]. 
351 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven: Yale UP, 1977) 5. 
352 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (New York: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1879). 
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justifies law by consent.  
The case law system, on the other hand, presents law as a collection of technical rules 
utilized for resolving disputes in a disjointed selection of unrelated cases. Casebooks are not 
treatises. The court opinions they contain are highly edited to remove all but the facts of the case 
and the specific rule of law required to resolve the dispute. The case law system removes 
Blackstone's jurisprudential framework for law, but it provides no substitute.  
Students in the case law system learn that laws are merely rules for governing behavior 
and resolving disputes, exactly as Hart’s model of law as a “union of primary and secondary 
rules” describes them. Law students retain this view of law as a disjointed set of technical rules 
when they take their places as lawyers, judges, and law professors.  
 The exclusion of Blackstone’s Commentaries from the American legal curriculum for 
more than a century has significantly reduced its influence on the profession. Although an 
increasing number of scholars are rediscovering its merits,353 opponents of Blackstone have 
                                                 
353 See Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55; Richard 
Posner, “Blackstone and Bentham,” J. Law and Econ. 19 (3) (1996): 569-606; Howard L. Lubert, 
“Sovereignty and Liberty in William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,” Rev. Pol. 72 
(2010): 271-297; and William S. Brewbaker, III., “Reconsidering Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory,” J. of 
Law & Rel. 22 (1) (2006): 255-86. Howard Lubert writes, “alternative and more sympathetic treatments 
[of the Commentaries] are now ascendant.” Howard L. Lubert, “Sovereignty and Liberty in William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,” Rev. Pol. 72 (2010): 271-297, 273-74. Lubert 
references the following authorities as examples. Gerald Stourzh demonstrates Blackstone’s importance in 
American revolutionary thought, particularly in 1775–1776, concluding that the jurist was a “Conservative 
Whig” who believed in the popular right of revolution. Gerald Stourzh, “William Blackstone: Teacher of 
Revolution,” Jahrbuch für Amerikanstudien 15 (1970): 184-200, 198. Another sympathetic treatment of 
Blackstone’s use of the natural law is found in John N. Finnis, “Blackstone’s Theoretical Intentions,” 
Natural Law Forum 12 (1967): 163–83. More recently, scholars like David Lieberman, Michael Zuckert, 
and Paul Carrese have likewise sought to rescue Blackstone from the charge that his Commentaries are a 
confused and contradictory treatise that ultimately stands at odds with liberal political thought. For 
Lieberman, Blackstone wrote the Commentaries not as an endorsement of legislative omnipotence but 
rather to improve legislators’ understanding of the common law and thus to “preserve the strengths of 
England’s system of law from the [frequent and incautious] violations of its acknowledged constitutional 
masters,” namely, Parliament. David Lieberman, “Blackstone’s Science of Legislation,” Journal of British 
Studies 27 (1988): 142. But in Lieberman’s view, Blackstone’s desire to protect the constitution from 
“incautious” legislation did not detract from his goal of promoting legal reform. Michael Lobban also 
finds Blackstone to be less conservative in his intentions, arguing that his effort to reconcile the common 
law with Roman (Institutional) jurisprudence was ultimately unsuccessful and led commentators to 
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subjected the Commentaries to poor scholarship and mischaracterization since the early 
twentieth century. During this time, “misperceptions of Blackstone’s view of natural law have 
reinforced the other misperceptions.” 354 Chicago law professor Albert Altschuler lists four 
mischaracterizations that he describes as “unfair” and “crude parodies” of Blackstone.355 These 
misperceptions have further lowered Blackstone's influence in contemporary jurisprudence. 
D. The Rise of Value Skepticism in American Jurisprudence 
The second factor facilitating the transition from Blackstone’s natural law jurisprudence 
to Hart’s legal positivism is the trend towards value skepticism in American jurisprudence. 356 In 
                                                                                                                                                
misconstrue his project as fundamentally conservative. Michael Lobban, “Blackstone and the Science of 
Law,” The Historical Journal 30 (2) (1987): 311–35; see also J. W. Cairns, “Blackstone, an English 
Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the Nation State,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (1984): 
318–60; Duncan Kennedy, “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,” Buffalo L. Rev. 28 (1979): 
209–382; Alan Watson, “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,” Yale L. J. 97 (5) (1988): 795–
821. In Zuckert’s view, Blackstone “is as much a social compact thinker as Hobbes or Locke,” but 
Blackstone seeks to reinterpret the common law so that it meets the standard of consent. This “amalgam” 
of liberal political philosophy and customary law “is not the least bit incoherent” and reflects Blackstone’s 
aim to answer some of the criticisms inherent in social contract theory. Michael Zuckert, “Social Compact, 
Common Law, and the American Amalgam: The Contribution of William Blackstone,” The American 
Founding and the Social Compact, ed. Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2003), 56, 64. For another important treatment that sees Blackstone as attempting to reconcile 
liberal political theory and the common law, see James Stoner Jr., Common Law and Liberal Theory: 
Coke, Hobbes and the Origins of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
1992). Carrese, too, rejects the view of Blackstone as “an advocate of pure legal positivism and simple 
parliamentary supremacy” and as an opponent of constitutional reform. Blackstone’s “Gothic” or 
common-law constitutional jurisprudence was liberal and reformist but also subtle and complex; at its 
heart lay a judicial power “as the moderating, tempering element that ensures individual liberty and 
tranquility [within] a complex constitutionalism of separated powers.” Paul O. Carrese, The Cloaking of 
Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial Activism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 134, 150. 
354 Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55, 18. 
355 Albert W. Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55, 18. The first 
mischaracterization is that Blackstone envisions law as a “brooding omnipresence” from which judges 
must deduce timeless answers to every legal question. The second mischaracterization is that Blackstone is 
a rights-zealot, particularly regarding property rights. The third mischaracterization erroneously 
characterizes Blackstone holding that judges may never innovate nor improve the law. The final 
mischaracterization is that Blackstone exalts individual self-interest to the detriment of the community. 
Altschuler’s article successfully rebuts each mischaracterization. 
356 This is a term coined by University of Chicago law professor Albert Altschuler, a leading critic of this 
trend. See Albert Altschuler, “Rediscovering Blackstone,” U. Penn. L. Rev. 145 (1) (1996): 1-55; “The 
Descending Trail: Holmes’ ‘Path of the Law’ One Hundred Years Later,” Fla. L. Rev. 49 (3) (1997): 353-
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addition to Christopher Columbus Langdell, notable figures contributing to this trend include 
Roscoe Pound, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Justice Learned Hand. Langdell and 
Pound dramatically influenced American legal education. Holmes and Hand significantly 
influenced American case law. 
1. Pound’s “Sociological Jurisprudence” 
Langdell served as Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870-1895 and transformed 
American legal education as described above. Roscoe Pound also served as Dean of Harvard 
Law School, from 1916 to 1936. Pound’s “sociological jurisprudence” made three significant 
departures from Blackstone’s jurisprudence.  
  Pound’s first departure was the suppression of individual rights in favor of the interests 
of society as a whole. 357 Such rights include Blackstone’s natural rights to personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property. Pound’s second departure was a marginalization of the 
significance of the procedure followed in reaching a case decision. 358 American practice 
considers the legal process to be as important as the result. Lon Fuller’s “internal procedural 
morality” reflects this tradition.359 Pound considered this focus on procedure to be overly 
                                                                                                                                                
420; and Law without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
2000). 
357 See generally Roscoe Pound, “Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?” Colum. L. Rev. 5 (3) (1905): 338-
353; Roscoe Pound, “The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence,” Green Bag 19 (1907): 607; Roscoe 
Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Colum. L. Rev. 8 (3) (1908): 605-623; Roscoe Pound, “The Purpose 
and Scope of Sociological Jurisprudence.” Harv. L. Rev. 24 (8) (1911): 591-611 and Harv. L. Rev. 25 (2) 
(1911):140-168; Roscoe Pound, “Legislation as a Social Function,” 18 (6) Am. J. Socio. 755-768 (1913): 
Roscoe Pound, “Interests of Personality.” Harv. L. Rev. 28 (4) (1915): 343-365; Roscoe Pound, “A Theory 
of Social Interests,” Papers and Proceedings of the American Sociological Society 15 (1921):16-45, 
revised as Roscoe Pound, “A Survey of Social Interests.” Harv. L. Rev. 57 (1) (1943): 1-39; Roscoe 
Pound, “A Survey of Public Interests,” Harv. L. Rev. 58 (7) (1945): 909-929. See also Terry di Filippo, 
“Pragmatism, Interest Theory and Legal Philosophy: The Relation of James and Dewey to Roscoe Pound,” 
Trans. of the Charles S. Peirce Soc. 24 (4) (1988): 487-509.  
358 Roscoe Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Colum. L. Rev. 8 (3) (1908): 605-623.  
359 Fuller sets out eight principles in The Morality of Law that constitute existence conditions for law. Lon 
L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Fuller presents his principles 
through the literary device of King Rex, a well-intentioned but incompetent king who violates these 
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“contentious.” Instead, courts should decide cases based on the consequences of the legal 
decision for all of society. Pound thus called for “a jurisprudence of ends” that narrows the focus 
of law to obtaining results that benefit society as a whole. 
Pound’s third departure from Blackstone was the abandonment of the common law 
system of case law and precedent,360 which Pound maintained was “mechanically” applied. 361 
Pound advocated the abandonment of common law and the adoption of a civil code system, 
drawing unfavorable comparisons between the American common law system and the German 
Civil Code of 1896. 362  The abandonment of common law advocated by Pound eviscerates the 
entirety of Blackstone's natural law jurisprudence. 
2. Holmes’ “Law without Values” 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935) is the most significant jurist in the trend 
                                                                                                                                                
principles in formulating his laws. Each violation produces adverse consequences. These eight principles 
include: (P1) The rules must be expressed in general terms in a manner that guarantees due process. 
(Criminal laws, for example, must give fair warning of the prohibited conduct). (P2) The rules must be 
publicly promulgated. (P3) The rules must be prospective in effect. (P4) The rules must be expressed in 
understandable terms. (P5) The rules must be consistent with one another. (P6) The rules must not require 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties. (P7) The rules must not be changed so frequently that 
the subject cannot rely on them. (P8) The rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their 
wording. Fuller also argues that because an evil legal system would have difficulty incorporating these 
eight principles, these procedural principles of internal morality constrain the substantive norms of a 
system. Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) 
(1958) 630–672, 661. Hart vigorously challenges Fuller’s position. H.L.A. Hart, “Review of The Morality 
of Law” Harv. L. Rev. 78 (4) 1281-1313 (1965). 
360 Blackstone's “declaratory theory” of law views precedent as a source of law, and is highly analogous to 
the common law's view of custom as a source of law. Both precedent and custom are in turn subject to a 
requirement of “reasonableness,” which permits unreasonable precedents or customs to be set aside when 
necessary. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 274-75.  
361 Roscoe Pound, “Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?” Colum. L. Rev. 5 (3) (1905): 338-353.   
362 Roscoe Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Colum. L. Rev. 8 (3) (1908): 605-623. By “mechanical 
jurisprudence,” Pound refers to the determination of case outcomes by previous precedents rather than 
consideration of the consequences of the case for society as a whole. 
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towards value skepticism in American jurisprudence.363 For Holmes, “nearly every assertion of 
values beyond personal or, at most, class self interest was pretense, and just about every ethical 
question could be reduced to an issue of dominance, power, death, and survival.”364 Human 
rights to Holmes signified nothing more than what “a given crowd will fight for.”365 Holmes also 
remarked that people will fight for their rights just as a “dog will fight for his bone.”366 
a. Holmes’ Skepticism 
Holmes was an admitted value skeptic. “[W]hile one’s experience thus makes certain 
preferences dogmatic for oneself,” he wrote, “recognition of how they came to be so leaves one 
able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about something else. And this again 
means skepticism.”367  
Holmes was also skeptical regarding truth. “Our test of truth is a reference to either a 
present or an imagined future majority in favor of our view.” 368  Truth is only “the majority vote 
of that nation that could lick all others.” 369 Holmes equates both “the philosopher’s effort to 
prove that truth is absolute” and “the jurist’s search for criteria of universal validity which he 
collects under the head of natural law” with “the poor devil” who has no other way of satisfying 
his “demand for the superlative” other than “by getting drunk.”370 Like many appellate judges, 
                                                 
363 See Albert Altschuler, Law without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes (Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 2000), and Albert Altschuler, “The Descending Trail: Holmes’ ‘Path of the Law’ One 
Hundred Years Later.” Fla. L. Rev. 49 (3) (1997): 353-420. 
364 See Albert Altschuler, Law without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes (Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 2000) 6. 
365 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Letter to Harold Laski, July 23, 1925. The Holmes-Laski Letters: The 
Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe,  vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1953) 761-62. 
366 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Natural Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 32 (1) (1918): 40-44, 42. 
367 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Natural Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 32 (1) (1918): 40-44, 41. 
368 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Natural Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 32 (1) (1918): 40-44, 40. 
369 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Natural Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 32 (1) (1918): 40-44, 40. 
370 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Natural Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 32 (1) (1918): 40-44, 40. 
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Holmes rejects Blackstone’s prohibition against judge-made law.371  
b. Holmes’ “The Path of the Law” 
Holmes essay “The Path of the Law” 372 makes four significant contributions to value 
skepticism in American jurisprudence. The first contribution involves purging all “moral 
significance” and “ethical associations” from the law. “For my own part, I often doubt whether it 
would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law 
altogether. . . . We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got 
from ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain 
very much in the clearness of our thought.” 373  
Holmes’ second contribution to value skepticism is Holmes' “prediction theory” of law. 
The prediction theory reduces all legal concepts to “nothing more” than predictions of case 
outcomes. Values play no role in law. As Holmes writes, “The prophecies of what the courts will 
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” 374 “The primary rights 
and duties with which jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but prophecies… a legal duty 
so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to 
suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; - and so of a legal right.375  
Holmes’ third contribution to value skepticism is the “bad man” perspective on law. The 
bad man perspective strips law of all values. “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you 
must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
                                                 
371 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917): “I recognize without hesitation that judges 
do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from Moeller to molecular 
motions.” 
372 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009. 
373 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009, 997. 
374 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009, 994. 
375 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009, 991-92. 
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knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.” 376 Good and bad have no 
meaning in the law other than indicating a favorable or unfavorable outcome. “But what does it 
mean to a bad man?” asks Holmes. “Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does 
certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or 
compulsory payment of money.”377 Hart's positivism adopts the “bad man” perspective as the 
“external point of view.” 378  
Holmes’ fourth contribution to value skepticism is his rejection of ethical obligations in 
the law of contracts. “Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest 
than in the law of contract. . . . The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else.”379  Holmes' rejection of an 
ethical obligation to honor one's contracts is noteworthy in that it violates all three of the 
fundamental precepts of natural law that Blackstone adopts from the Institutes of Justinian: “that 
we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which 
three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.” 380 Natural law 
jurisprudence considers breach of contract to be dishonest, injurious to the other parties to the 
                                                 
376 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009, 993. 
377 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009, 994. 
378 Hart's external point of view is the view of a person who feels no obligation that he “should” follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56. This person has no 
sense that it is “right” to follow the law or that it is “wrong” not to do so, and refuses to look upon the law 
as a standard of conduct for himself or others. Id. The external point of view is present in people engaging 
in mere “social habits” and “group habits.” Hart defines such habits as regular, uniform behavior that 
occurs without the pressure of a social rule mandating that behavior “in the normative terminology of 
‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’.” Id. at 56, 57. 
379 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “The Path of the Law,” Harv. L. Rev. 110 (5) (1997): 991-1009, 995. 
380 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. J.B. Moyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889) 2, 3. Blackstone 
expressly adopts these three precepts. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 
1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 27. The admonition to “live honestly” is better translated as “live 
honorably.” 
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contract, and a denial of the other parties' due. 
3. Learned Hand’s Rejection of the Bill of Rights 
Justice Learned Hand (1872-1961) of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also made a 
significant contribution to value skepticism in American jurisprudence by rejecting the values 
incorporated within the Bill of Rights. Hand was a moral relativist who considered moral values 
to be the product of their times and primarily a matter of taste. 381 Hand adopted the positivist 
denial of the existence of any natural rights, including those incorporated in the United States 
Constitution. 382  
Hand denied that the Bill of Rights constituted law at all. He viewed the Bill of Rights as 
nothing more than a set of “admonitory principles” designed to ensure the fair exercise of 
constitutional powers. 383 Hand denounced overturning legislation on the basis that it violated the 
Bill of Rights, and he publicly advocated the removal of the Bill of Rights from the 
Constitution.384  
Hand's rejection of the Bill of Rights is noteworthy because it repudiates both the 
principle of autonomy and the principle of consent that underlie natural law jurisprudence. The 
Bill of Rights, like its model the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 385 exemplifies the principles of 
autonomy and consent that emerged from the constitutional struggles in seventeenth century 
                                                 
381 Kathryn Griffith, Judge Learned Hand and the Federal Judiciary, (Norman: OK U. P., 1973) vii. 
382 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford U 
P, 1996), 342. 
383 Kathryn Griffith, Judge Learned Hand and the Federal Judiciary, (Norman: OK U. P., 1973) 130-138.  
384 Kathryn Griffith, Judge Learned Hand and the Federal Judiciary, (Norman: OK U. P., 1973) 130-138. 
Hand regarded the advancement of civil liberties as a task for the legislature, not the courts. Marvin 
Schick, Learned Hand's Court, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins P, 1970) 355. In his 1958 Holmes Lectures at 
Harvard Law School, he challenged the constitutionality of the Warren Court’s civil rights rulings, 
including the unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The 
lectures were published as Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1958). 
385 Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “The Bill of Rights (1689),” Sources of English 
Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 599-602. 
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England. The Bill of Rights establishes the principle of autonomy by establishing the supremacy 
of law over political rulers, ensuring that ruler and ruled are governed by the same rules of law, 
and preventing arbitrary changes in the law. The Bill of Rights exemplifies the principle of 
consent in that ratification of the United States Constitution succeeded only after its supporters 
amended the Constitution to include the Bill of Rights as its first ten amendments. 
E. The Influence of Analytic Philosophy in the Academy 
The third factor facilitating the transition from Blackstone’s natural law jurisprudence to 
Hart’s legal positivism is the broad influence of analytic philosophy in American universities 
and law schools. Hart was an analytic philosopher and legal positivism is analytic in 
methodology. One of the distinct doctrines of Hart’s positivism is the “important truth” that “a 
study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law is as vital to our understanding of 
the nature of law as historical or sociological studies.” 386 Hart justifies the “separation of law 
and morality,” the unrestricted validity of morally iniquitous laws, as an analytical aid, 387 
ignoring the practical consequences of such a separation. 
Analytic philosophy dominates the American philosophical community. Brian Leiter 
writes that “in the U.S., all the Ivy League universities, all the leading state research universities, 
all the University of California campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the 
flagship campuses of the second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments 
                                                 
386 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 601 (1958). “We must remember that the Utilitarians combined with their insistence on the separation 
of law and morals two other equally famous but distinct doctrines. One was the important truth that a 
purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law, 
was as vital to our understanding of the nature of law as historical or sociological studies, though of course 
it could not supplant them.” 
387 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 211. Hart argues that the 
refusal to recognize evil laws as valid is “too crude a way [to deal] with delicate and complex moral 
issues. The concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its immorality, 
enables us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law 
which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them.”  
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that overwhelmingly self-identify as ‘analytic:’ it is hard to imagine a ‘movement’ that is more 
academically and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy.” 388 Since analytic 
philosophers share the methodology of legal positivism, it follows that they are receptive to the 
tenets generated by those methods. 
F. Legal Positivism and Judicial Power 
The fourth factor facilitating the transition from Blackstone’s natural law jurisprudence 
to Hart’s legal positivism is the desire of many judges to “make” new law, which Blackstone’s 
jurisprudence prohibits.389 Famous judges through history have chafed at limitations on their 
power, from Sir Edward Coke through Holmes through Richard Posner today. Hart's positivism 
liberates judges from this limitation. As seen in the below discussion of Griswold v. 
Connecticut,390 positivism gives judges virtually unlimited power to set aside statutes without 
regard to the anti-democratic effect of their rulings. Many appellate judges therefore embrace 
legal positivism. 
1. Blackstone Limits Judicial Power 
Under Blackstone's “declaratory theory” of law, the role of judges is not to “make” law, 
but rather to “find” law in the received legal tradition and “declare them.” This “declaratory 
theory” of law views precedent as a source of law, and is highly analogous to the common law's 
                                                 
388 Brian Leiter, “‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental” Philosophy,” The Philosophical Gourmet Report 2009, 7 
July 2011 (http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp). 
389 Blackstone’s limits on judicial discretion reflect the Puritan emphasis on the sinfulness of all persons, 
including the judge himself, which Blackstone adopts from Sir Matthew Hale’s groundbreaking work on 
the common law of England. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 265, 296-97. See Matthew 
Hale, The Analysis of Law: A Scheme or Abstract of the Several Titles and Partitions of the Law of 
England, Digested into Method (London: Nutt, 1716).  
390 Griswold v. Connecticut, 281 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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view of custom as a source of law. 391 Blackstone justifies his theory on the lessons of history. 
In Blackstone’s view, judge-made law unites the power to make and enforce law in one 
body, and this invites tyranny.392  These powers achieved de facto unification during the Stuart 
monarchies through the Crown's power to appoint and dismiss judges at will. The result of this 
unification was a highly politicized judiciary that produced a series of result-oriented decisions. 
These decisions denied long-standing and generally accepted principles of law in order to 
facilitate the royal will.393  
These cases disregarded the fundamental principles of autonomy of law and consent of 
the governed. They wreaked havoc in England by eroding public confidence, both in the 
                                                 
391 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 274-75. 
392 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
105: “In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right of both making and of enforcing 
the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two 
powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and 
execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the 
power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give himself.” 
393 These cases include the following. Bates’ Case (1606) upheld James I's impositions of tunnage and 
poundage without Parliamentary consent. Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Bates’ Case 
(1606),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 435-37. The Case of 
the Five Knights (1627) upholding Charles I's forced loans by denying habeas corpus and permitting the 
indefinite imprisonment of English subjects without charges and without bail. Carl Stephenson and 
Frederick George Marcham, “The Case of the Five Knights (1627),” Sources of English Constitutional 
History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 457-58. Hampden’s Case (1636), upheld Charles I's inland 
levies of ship money during peacetime without Parliamentary consent. Carl Stephenson and Frederick 
George Marcham, “The King v. John Hampden (1638),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1937) 459-62. Godden v. Hales (1686) upheld the king’s dispensing power to 
disregard any penal statute at his pleasure. Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, “Godden v. 
Hales (1686),” Sources of English Constitutional History (New York: Harper & Row, 1937) 582-83. 
Furthermore, the creation and application of a rule of law in the same case violates the provision against ex 
post facto laws. Alexander Hamilton adopts Blackstone’s view in The Federalist No. 78. Hamilton writes 
that the judiciary “may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” Hamilton, 
Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalists on the New Constitution (New York: Putnam, 
1904) 483. 
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judiciary394 and in the government as a whole. As described in Chapter I, their disregard of 
autonomy and consent catalyzed two revolutions, including seven years of civil war.  
2. Positivism's “Penumbra Doctrine” Removes Blackstone's Limits 
Contrary to Blackstone, legal positivism regards judicial law making as both ordinary 
and appropriate in most cases. Hart disregards Blackstone's historical approach and justifies his 
position on linguistic grounds. Laws, Hart argues, consist of rules that can determine results only 
at the core of their meaning. Outside this core of meaning, legal terms present a “penumbra of 
uncertainty” at “the fringe of their meaning.” This “uncertainty at the borderline” of meaning 
gives law an “open texture.”395 According to Hart, only the judge’s discretion can resolve this 
uncertainty. Hart therefore expressly rejects “the tradition that judges ‘find’ and do not ‘make’ 
law.” 396 
3. Application of the Penumbra Doctrine in Griswold v. Connecticut 
Justice Douglas famously applied Hart’s “penumbra” doctrine in Griswold v. 
                                                 
394 By 1688, the twelve members of the higher judiciary were considered incompetent to render legal 
advice. Thomas Macaulay, The History of England from the Ascension of James II (New York: Harper, 
1849) 380. 
395 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 128: “Whichever device, 
precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of behavior, these, however 
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point when their application is in 
question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture. So far we have 
presented this, in the case of legislation, as a general feature of human language; uncertainty at the 
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of communication 
concerning matters of fact.” 
396 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 12. This tradition was 
adopted by Blackstone from the legal treatises of Sir Matthew Hale. Under Blackstone's “declaratory 
theory” of law, the role of judges is not to “make” law, but rather to “find” law in the received legal 
tradition and “declare them.” This “declaratory theory” of law views precedent as a source of law, and is 
highly analogous to the common law's view of custom as a source of law. Both precedent and custom are 
in turn subject to a requirement of “reasonableness,” which permits unreasonable precedents or customs to 
be set aside when necessary. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 274-75. “While Blackstone 
is always cited as the foremost exponent of the declaratory theory, a very similar view was stated by Sir 
Matthew Hale in his History of the Common Law, which was published 13 years before the birth of 
Blackstone. Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law 206 (1st ed. 1909).”  
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Connecticut, 281 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold overturns two Connecticut statutes that prohibited 
contraception on the basis that they violated a “right of privacy.” 397 Griswold enforces the right 
to privacy, even though the majority opinion admits that the express language of the United 
States Constitution does not contain any such right.  
Under a traditional Blackstonian analysis, the Supreme Court should apply the 
Constitution as written and ratified. Since the Constitution expressly lists other rights, the right 
of privacy is excluded from protection under the rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.398 
The ratifiers of the Constitution chose not to protect a right of privacy, and the Connecticut 
statutes do not violate any Constitutional rights. 
To overturn the Connecticut statutes, Justice Douglas had to make new law, and Hart 
showed him the way. Justice Douglas adopted Hart’s penumbra doctrine in deciding the case: 
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance.  Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy.”399  
Justice Black’s dissent argued that the majority justices were voiding validly enacted 
legislation “on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The 
power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body.” 400 The dissent echoes 
                                                 
397 Douglas describes the subject statutes as follows: “The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in 
this appeal are 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides: 
“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception 
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be 
both fined and imprisoned.” Section 54-196 provides: “Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, 
hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the 
principal offender.” 281 U.S. at 480. 
398 A rule of statutory interpretation that holds when if a list of rights is expressly given, all unlisted rights 
are excluded from the purview of the statute. 
399 281 U.S. at 484. Emphasis added. 
400 “The due process argument which my Brothers HARLAN and WHITE adopt here is based, as their 
opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is vested with power to invalidate all state laws that it 
considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court's belief that a particular 
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Blackstone’s view that judges have no legitimate power to substitute their judgment for the 
judgment of the people’s legitimate representatives. 401  
4. Griswold’s Anti-Democratic Effect 
This fundamental conflict regarding the power of judges to make new law continues to 
divide American jurisprudence. Since Griswold, the implied right of privacy has been invoked in 
cases involving the right to marry,402 the right to an abortion,403 the right to educate one’s 
children,404 the right to engage in homosexual conduct,405 and the right to live together as a 
family.406 Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies its highest level of review, “strict scrutiny,” to 
statutes accused of violating the right to privacy. 407  
The Griswold opinion produces a troubling anti-democratic effect that transcends the 
                                                                                                                                                
state law under scrutiny has no 'rational or justifying' purpose, or is offensive to a 'sense of fairness and 
justice.' If these formulas based on 'natural justice,' or others which mean the same thing, are to prevail, 
they require judges to determine  what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what 
laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body. 
Surely it has to be admitted that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives such blanket power to 
courts to exercise such a supervisory veto over the wisdom and value of legislative policies and to hold 
unconstitutional those laws which they believe unwise or dangerous.” 281 U.S. at 511-12. 
401 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
46-47. “For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in 
litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waiver with every new 
judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before 
was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of 
any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he being sworn to 
determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws, and customs of 
the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.” 
402 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
403 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
404 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) 
405 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Griswold cited, but the case is decided under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
406 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
407 E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).  
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merits of the social issues involved in the case. 408 A jurisprudence that permits justices to create 
and enforce new rights admittedly omitted from the Constitution also permits justices to destroy 
and disregard established rights expressly included in the Constitution. The standard of meaning 
in both instances shifts from the ratified language of the Constitution to the will of the 
interpreting justice. Such interpretation destroys the autonomy of the Constitution and renders 
the consent of the governed irrelevant.  
Such interpretation also violates Blackstone’s warning against uniting the power to make 
law and the power to enforce law in the same body.409 The cases discussed in the following 
chapters illustrate the effects that obtain when legal systems disregard the principles of 
autonomy and consent to unify the powers to make and enforce law in a single body.  
IV. The Need for a New Validity Standard and Philosophical Method 
A. Natural Law and Legal Positivism are Irreconcilably Incompatible 
 Natural law jurisprudence and legal positivism are irreconcilably incompatible for four 
reasons. The first incompatibility involves the standard for legal validity. The validity 
constraints of natural law demand that positive laws comply with the precepts of natural law. 
Legal positivism, however, denies the existence of natural law precepts. Bentham derides natural 
                                                 
408 In Griswold, five justices of a federal court overturned two validly enacted state statutes. The only 
ground for their action was that the statutes violated a putative right, a right the Constitution did not 
expressly contain. No one elects a federal judge. Federal judges are not subject to recall, and they do not 
have to run for reelection. Federal judges receive life appointments, and they bear no accountability for 
their case decisions. 
409 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (New York: W.E. Dean, 1838) 
105: “In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right of both making and of enforcing 
the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two 
powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and 
execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the 
power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give himself.” 
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law precepts as “imaginary,” “a perversion of language,” and “nonsense upon stilts.” 410  
 Legal positivism requires only two conditions for legal validity. The first condition is 
that private citizens generally obey the primary rules of obligation, even if coercion is required to 
compel obedience. The second condition is that public officials adopt the rule of recognition as 
their “public standard of official behavior.” 411 Consequently, legal positivism accepts morally 
iniquitous laws as legally valid.412  
 The second incompatibility involves the autonomy of law. Law exercises autonomy 
under natural law jurisprudence by wielding supremacy over political rulers. Political rulers are 
subject to the same laws as the general population, and political rulers may not arbitrarily change 
or disregard the law to reflect their will. In de Bracton’s terms, “the laws make the king.”  Legal 
positivism, on the other hand, denies the autonomy of law. Legal positivism founds law on the 
will of the political ruler. 413 Under legal positivism, “the king makes the laws.”  
 The third incompatibility involves the consent of those subject to law. Natural law 
jurisprudence holds that the legitimacy of law requires the consent of those under its power. 
Legal positivism, in contrast, rejects consent as a requirement for law. Austin, for example, 
posits law as the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of sanctions.414 Hart holds that 
                                                 
410 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of The Declarations of Rights Issued 
During the French Revolution,” The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: William Tate, 1843) 
407, 501. 
411 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116-17. 
412 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268. 
413 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003) 241. 
414 Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, ed. H.L.A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 1; John Austin, 
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 14, 225-31. 
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the general population may be compelled to obey the law “from any motive whatsoever” and by 
any necessary sanction.415  
 The fourth incompatibility involves philosophical methodology. Natural law theory 
observes history and seeks to synthesize its lessons in a cohesive set of legal principles. Legal 
positivism rejects history as irrelevant and relies instead on linguistic analysis.416 Legal 
positivism thus commits the philosophical fallacy. 417   
 Legal positivism also separates law from its application by ignoring the consequences of 
applying its precepts.418 Consequently, legal positivism gives an incomplete description of law. 
Furthermore, by considering only the issue of “what law is” and intentionally excluding the issue 
of “what law ought to be,” 419  legal positivism provides no pragmatic guidance to judges, 
lawyers, or juries engaged in the justice system.  
B. Problems Created by Legal Positivism 
 The growing acceptance of legal positivism creates two problems that work against the 
consistency, stability, and predictability of law. The first problem involves the positivist 
acceptance of morally iniquitous laws as legally valid and enforceable. Morally iniquitous laws 
permit, inter alia, the execution of innocent men.  
                                                 
415 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000) 14, 225-
31; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 117. 
416 Hart focuses on “a purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive 
vocabulary of the law.” H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 
71 (4) (1958): 593–629, 601. 
417 John Dewey, “Context and Thought,” The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 6 
(Carbondale, IL: S. Illinois UP, 1985) 5-7. Legal positivism disregards the historical and social 
context of law, yet still regards its narrow linguistic analysis as a complete, final, and sufficient 
analysis of law. 
418 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: U Penn P, 1959) 508. “Without application,” Dewey writes, “there are scraps of paper or 
voices in the air but nothing that can be called law.” 
419 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harv. L. Rev. 71 (4) (1958): 593–
629, 594. 
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 The enforcement of “legal rights and duties which have no moral justification or force 
whatever” 420 foments disrespect for the law and motivates the citizenry to disobey the law on 
moral grounds. Coercion becomes necessary to enforce the law. Although legal positivism 
expressly approves of coerced obedience,421 coerced obedience is inconsistent with a society 
based on ordered liberty and founded on the consent of the governed.  
 The second significant problem involves the positivist acceptance of adjudication by 
judicial discretion. Under natural law jurisprudence, law wields supremacy over judges. Judges 
perform a limited function, identifying existing legal rules and legal principles and applying 
those rules and principles to the facts. Judges act in a predictable manner consistent with pre-
existing law. Judges should only find the law, not make it.422 
 The linguistic methodology of legal positivism, however, legitimizes broad judicial 
discretion. Under legal positivism, judges wield supremacy over law. In cases in which the 
meaning of the applicable legal rule is indeterminate or incomplete, the judge “must exercise his 
discretion and make law for the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled 
law.”423  
 Natural law judges resolve indeterminate or incomplete meanings of legal rules by 
applying a set of pre-existing interpretative principles. Legal positivism’s description of law, 
however, does not recognize the existence of such principles.424  Legal positivism thus relies 
upon the discretion of the individual judge to supply the meaning.  
                                                 
420 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 268. 
421 It is sufficient that each member of the population obeys the primary rules “for his part only” and “from 
any motive whatsoever.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116 
[emphasis added].  
422 Ronald Dworkin, “Judicial Discretion,” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963) 624-638. 
423 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 272-276. 
424 Ronald Dworkin, “The Model of Rules,” U. Chi. L. Rev. 35 (1) (1967): 14-46, 23-24.  
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This reliance on individual judicial discretion creates its own series of significant 
problems. Case outcomes are increasingly determined, not by pre-existing law, but rather by the 
interpretation of the individual judge. The meaning of statutes or Constitutional provisions no 
longer reside in the objective meaning of the text, but rather in the subjective consciousness of 
the judge. Judges are susceptible to varying their interpretations to produce result-oriented 
decisions by a process of reverse legal reasoning. New interpretations created after the operative 
facts of the case violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.  
Legal positivism’s acceptance of adjudication by judicial discretion erodes the 
consistency, stability and predictability of law. The combined acceptance of broad discretion and 
morally iniquitous laws produces unrestrained judicial discretion. Justice Richard Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals describes the growing acceptance of broad judicial discretion 
as leaving “an enormous blank space in which the judge can inscribe any decision he pleases.”425 
Posner even accepts the legitimacy of judicial discretion unsupported by any evidence. Posner 
concedes that adjudication by judicial discretion “will inevitably be based to a disquieting extent 
on hunches and subjective preferences rather than on hard evidence.” 426  
Adjudication by judicial discretion is profoundly anti-democratic. It creates a 
juristocracy by allowing judges to decide matters of public policy without public input and 
without accountability to those affected by the decision. Adjudication by judicial discretion also 
allows judges to unilaterally change or invalidate statutory and Constitutional provisions through 
discretionary interpretations. 
Adjudication by judicial discretion is also anathema to a constitutional democracy. It 
inevitably skews the selection of judicial candidates towards political litmus tests and away from 
                                                 
425 Richard A. Posner, “Legal Pragmatism,” Metaphilosophy 35 (2004): 144-159, 149-50. 
426 Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) 
126. 
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judicial qualifications based on training, ability, and temperament. The ultimate result of this 
process is the politicization of the Constitution. Justices interpret the Constitution, not by the 
objective meaning of its text, but by the political views of the prevailing majority that secured 
the justice's appointment. The Constitution consequently becomes unable to perform its primary 
function of protecting the minority within a democracy from the tyranny of the majority.   
C. The Need for a New Approach 
 The problems created by the positivist acceptance of morally iniquitous laws require the 
rejection of legal positivism’s validity standard. The problems created by the positivist 
acceptance of broad judicial discretion require the rejection of legal positivism’s linguistic 
methodology. A new approach to legal validity and a new philosophical method are required.     
 Natural law theory, unfortunately, is inadequate to the task for two reasons. Natural law 
theory adopts inconsistent views of human reason. It also fails to recognize the uncertainties 
inherent in basing its validity standard on divine law.  
 This dissertation therefore adopts a methodology, adapted from the philosophy of John 
Dewey, that evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the effects and 
social consequences those legal principles produce.427 This evaluation of legal principles focuses 
on the operations of law and the effects of these operations upon ongoing human activities.428  
 History is an essential feature of this method. Unless the past illuminates the future, the 
mind proceeds in shadows.429 Legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with 
                                                 
427 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 509-10. 
428 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 508. 
429 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Oliver Zunz, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: 
Literary Classics, 2004) 519.  
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legal principles.430 Applying this pragmatic methodology to legal history, this dissertation 
formulates a new standard of legal validity that overcomes the shortcomings of natural law 
theory and legal positivism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
430 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Random 
House, 1930) 221. 
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CHAPTER III 
 ATHENS AND THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 
“Don’t you see that the Athenian courts have often been prevailed upon by argument to 
put innocent men to death, and equally have often acquitted the wrongdoers, either out 
of pity aroused by the speeches or because they’ve been flattered?” 
Xenophon, Socrates’ Defence, c. 390 B.C.  
 
I. Political Instability and Athenian Law 
 
The Athenian political system oscillated violently between tyranny, oligarchy, and 
democracy in the two centuries before Socrates’ trial. The legal system that emerged from this 
turmoil treated its citizens as means to political ends and not as ends in themselves. The 
Athenian legal system facilitated political prosecutions by forsaking the protections afforded by 
procedural and substantive due process. Consequently, Athenian law knowingly permitted the 
conviction and execution of the innocent. It also criminalized thought and expression.  
The Athenian experience demonstrates that the principles of autonomy and consent, 
although necessary, are insufficient to formulate a viable standard of legal validity. A third 
principle, the principle of reason, is also required. At a minimum, the principle of reason must 
protect the minority within a democracy from the tyranny of the majority. It must also establish 
due process protections against convicting the innocent.  
Three forms of prosecutions dominated political tactics in Socrates’ day. Graphai or 
public prosecutions permitted any Athenian to prosecute any other Athenian for violating the 
law. The trial of Socrates was a graphe prosecution for impiety (asebeia). Ostrakismos or 
ostracism permitted the exile and execution of any individual by the popular will. Ostracism 
denied its victims a trial and required no evidence of wrongdoing. Eisangeliai or impeachments 
permitted the bad faith prosecution and possible execution of any office holder or any citizen 
making a public proposal.  
As demonstrated below, these proceedings violated the principles of reason, autonomy, 
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and consent. The political instability and the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War was, in 
large part, a consequence of these political prosecutions. The rapid rise and fall of regimes in the 
political violence that accompanied Athens’ defeat led in turn to the trial of Socrates, which 
earned Athens “the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day 
and statues on the next.” 431  Nevertheless, the Athenian legal system satisfied the requirements 
of legal positivism for a valid legal system.   
Athenian political instability resulted from deeply seated regional and class antagonisms. 
From 632 B.C. until Socrates’ trial in 399 B.C., Athens suffered through a series of regime 
changes that produced a succession of tyrannies,432 oligarchies,433 and democracies.434 Each new 
regime sought to perpetuate its form of government. Tyrannies disarmed the populace and 
maintained power through force and terror. Oligarchic regimes sought to maintain power 
through the economic enslavement of the many. Democratic regimes responded by stripping the 
                                                 
431 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, “Federalist No. 63,” The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Ernest O'Dell (Sundown, TX: CreateSpace, 2010) 289. 
432 Tyrannies established or attempted include the attempted tyranny of Cylon in 632 B.C.; the tyranny of 
Pisistratus from 546-527 B.C.; the tyranny of Hippias and Hipparchus from 527-510 B.C., and the attempt 
of the deposed Hippias to reestablish his tyranny with the aid of the invading Persians in 490 B.C. 
433 The first oligarchy was the Council of the Areopagus, which established itself in the eleventh century 
B.C. The Oligarchy of the 400 displaced democracy in 411 B.C. after democratic mismanagement of the 
Sicilian Campaign and the political prosecution of Alcibiades during the Peloponnesian War created a 
military emergency. The Oligarchy of the 400 was replaced by the Oligarchy of the 5000 four months 
later. The 5000 were themselves displaced by a return to democracy four months later in 410 B.C. The 
Thirty Tyrants took power in 404 B.C. after Athens was defeated in the Peloponnesian war and ruled eight 
months before Athens restored democracy by armed uprising. 
434 Solon’s constitution of 594 B.C. introduced the first elements of democracy. Pisistratus’ tyranny 
supplanted democracy in 546 B.C. Athens remained under tyrants until 510 B.C. Cleisthenes introduced 
democratic reforms in 508 B.C., but the oligarchic Council of the Areopagus resumed control of the state 
in 480 B.C. after it orchestrated the Greek victory at Salamis. Ephialtes successfully limited the powers of 
the Council of the Areopagus in 462 B.C and restored democratic government. From 462 B.C. to 406 
B.C., political factions usurped the courts for political purposes with destabilizing effects. Democratic 
mismanagement of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the overthrow of democratic government. Oligarchy 
returned, first in the Oligarchy of the 400 in 411 B.C. and then in the Oligarchy of the 5000 later that same 
year. Athens restored democracy from 410-404 B.C., but the democracy again mismanaged the 
Peloponnesian War. Oligarchy returned after Athens’ defeat in the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. An armed 
uprising restored democracy in 404 B.C., and a democratic regime was in power at the time of Socrates’ 
trial in 399 B.C. 
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oligarchs of their property and expanding the franchise.  
Regimes also sought to perpetuate their power by manipulating the laws. In only 160 
years, from Athens’ first legislator Draco in 621 B.C. to the radical democratic reformer 
Ephialtes in 462 B.C., Athens' constitution underwent four major reformations.435 These reforms 
gradually elevated the democratic heliastic courts (heliaea) and the general assembly (ekklesia) 
to political dominance while suppressing the aristocratic Council of 500 (boule) and the 
oligarchic Council of the Areopagus. These reforms also established the politically expedient 
ostrakon, graphe, and eisangeliai forms of action described below.  
II. The Athenian Legal System 
A. Draco's Ordinances Create a Political Crisis (621 B.C.) 
Draco’s ordinances of 621 B.C. extended the franchise to all who could furnish 
themselves with military equipment.436 Draco’s ordinances are famous for their severity, 
providing the death penalty for such minor offenses as idleness and stealing a cabbage. Plutarch 
writes that Draco's laws “were written not with ink, but blood.” 437   
Draco's commercial ordinances created a class enmity that became a political crisis. 
Draco's laws permitted security interests in the person of the debtor. Lenders demanded this 
security as a standard practice, and default on a debt meant a life of servitude for the defaulting 
debtor. The consequence of these laws, writes Aristotle, was that “the land was in the hands of a 
few” and “the many were in slavery to the few.” 438 The poorer classes became the serfs of the 
                                                 
435 These reformations included the ordinances of Draco in 621 B.C.; the constitution of Solon in 594 
B.C.; the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C.; and the repeal of the powers of the Council of the 
Areopagus by Ephialtes in 462 B.C. See generally Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic 
G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 6, 9, 27-29, and 34-37. 
436 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 6.  
437 Plutarch, “Solon,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1880) 62-63.  
438 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 7. 
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rich. “The hardest and bitterest part of the constitution in the eyes of the masses was their state of 
serfdom… to speak generally, they had no part or share in anything.” 439  
Regional factionalism added to the political discord. Those living within the hill district 
of the city favored democracy. Those living in the plains district favored oligarchy. Those living 
in the coastal district favored a mixed form of government. Each faction prevented the other 
from gaining the upper hand, 440 causing Athens to suffer “a continual state of internal 
disorder.”441  
 The people finally rose against the upper class. As Aristotle tells us, “the strife was keen, 
and for a long time the two parties were ranged in hostile camps against one another, till at last, 
by common consent, they appointed Solon to be their mediator and Archon.” The people gave 
Solon absolute power and “committed the entire constitution to his hands.” 442  
B. Solon Changes the Athenian Political Structure (594 B.C.) 
 In order to ameliorate the class enmity crisis, Solon’s constitution introduced popular 
participation in the general assembly (ekklesia) and the heliastic courts (heliaea). Solon 
instituted four major reforms in the structure of Athenian government. First, because of the 
severity of Draco's laws, Solon repealed all of them except those concerning homicide.443 
Second, Solon cancelled all debts, private and public, and prohibited the securing of any future 
                                                 
439 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 3. 
440 Plutarch, “Solon,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1880) 60.  
441 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 18. 
The oligarchic Pedieis residing in the plains district had the ability to grow grain, which gave them a 
political advantage during food shortages. The moderate Paralioi residing in the coastal district did not 
have the ability to grow grain. The democratic Hyperakrioi residing in the hill district were the poorest and 
least numerous faction.  
442 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 7-9. 
443 Plutarch, “Solon,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1880) 62; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 
2009) 9. 
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debts with the persons of the debtor.444 Third, Solon divided the citizens into four classes based 
on wealth.445  
 Solon's fourth reform changed the procedure for selecting magistrates (archons). Before 
Solon, the oligarchic Council of the Areopagus selected the archons with the effect that most of 
the archons came from a small number of families. Under Solon’s reforms, each of the four 
tribes of Athens chose ten of its members by lot. A second lot selected nine of these forty 
candidates as archons. 446  
 Solon’s reformed government functioned through five organs. The nine archons 
managed the civic, military, and religious affairs of the city. The Council of the Areopagus, 
consisting of former archons, superintended the laws and served as the guardian of the 
constitution.447 The Council of 400, consisting of 100 members from each of the four tribes, 
controlled all matters coming before the general assembly or ekklesia. 448 Membership in the 
ekklesia was open to every citizen.  
                                                 
444 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 8. 
This measure was known as the seisachtheia, or “shaking off of burdens.” 
445 Plutarch, “Solon,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1880) 62. The first class, the Pentacosiomedimni, consisted of those producing 500 measures of fruit or 
more per year. The second class, the Hippida Teluntes or horsemen consisted of those capable of keeping 
a horse or producing three hundred measures of fruit per year. The third class, the Zeugitae or yoked men 
(from the Greek word for “yoke”), consisted of those producing 200 measures of fruit per year. The fourth 
class, the Thetes or hired men, consisted of everyone else.  Accord, Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin 
Jowett (Toronto: Dover, 2000) 96; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon 
(Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 9-10. Members of the top three classes were eligible to become archons. 
Members of the fourth class were ineligible to hold office, but they were eligible to participate as a 
member of the assembly and on the jury in the law courts. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir 
Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 10-11; Plutarch, “Solon,” Plutarch’s Lives of 
Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 1880) 62. 
446 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 11.  
447 The Council of the Areopagus “watched over the affairs of the state in most of the more important 
matters, and corrected offenders, with full powers to inflict either fines or personal punishment.” Aristotle, 
The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 11. 
448 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Toronto: Dover, 2000) 96. Membership on the Council of 
the 400 was limited to the top three classes, 
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 Solon lastly established the heliaea or heliastic courts. These courts took their name 
from the fact that they conducted their proceedings “in the face of the sun.” 449 The heliaea, 
described in more detail in the discussion of Socrates' trial, selected its jurors (dikastai) 450 by lot 
from a volunteer pool of citizens aged thirty or older.451 Dikastai means “those who have 
sworn,” a reference to the oath taken by each dikast before deciding a case.  
 Aristotle describes Solon's constitution as a mixture of political types that harmonized 
the different elements of the state. The Council of the Areopagus was oligarchic. The Council of 
400 was aristocratic. The ekklesia and heliaea were democratic.452   
C. The Heliastic Courts (Heliaea) 
 Solon wished to grant the people at large only the minimum amount of power necessary 
to prevent their re-enslavement.453 He intended that the oligarchic Council of the Areopagus and 
the aristocratic Council of 400 would serve as “anchors” that were “less liable to be tossed by 
tumult” than the ekklesia.454  Nevertheless, the power of the heliaea eventually usurped the 
power of the oligarchic and aristocratic elements of the government. The heliaea ultimately 
became the center of power in the Athenian empire. 
 Three of Solon’s reforms contributed to the political dominance of the heliaea.  First, 
Solon permitted any citizen who felt himself aggrieved by the government to appeal directly to 
                                                 
449 G.H. Smith, A Manual of Grecian Antiquities (London: Priestly, 1832) 32. 
450 The dikastai differed from modern jurors and functioned like an audience at a debate. The dikastai 
combined the roles of the modern judge in interpreting law and the modern juror in finding facts. Adriaan 
Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006) 38. 
451 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969) 36-37. 
The selection of the dikasts was the responsibility of the thesmothetae, the six junior archons. Id. at 36. 
Aristotle gives a detailed description of the lottery process. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir 
Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 82-86.  
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the heliaea. This reform vested supremacy in all governmental matters in the heliaea.455 Aristotle 
writes that the institution of the appeal to the heliaea is the institution to which “the masses have 
owed their strength most of all, since, when the democracy is master of the voting-power, it is 
master of the constitution.” 456 
Second, the heliaea decided all disputes regarding the interpretation of Solon’s vaguely 
defined laws.457 Solon failed to state his laws in “simple and explicit terms.”  Consequently, 
disputes inevitably occurred regarding the application of the laws, and the heliaea resolved these 
disputes.458 This power rendered the Council of the Areopagus’ traditional role as guardian of the 
laws and the constitution largely irrelevant.  
Third, Solon created the graphe or “public” prosecution. This form of legal proceeding 
gave every Athenian citizen standing to bring almost any dispute to trial, as described below. 459   
D. Solon Introduces the Graphe or “Public” Prosecution 
 Prior to Solon's creation of the graphe or “public” prosecution, litigants were required to 
bring their cases in a dike or “private” prosecution. Only individuals who personally suffered a 
wrong had standing to bring a dike. An exception existed in homicide cases, in which the 
relatives of the deceased acted as the deceased's personal representatives.460 Private actions 
included actions for breach of contract (sunthekon parabaseos), slander (kakegorias), assault 
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(aikias), and theft (klopes).461  
 Solon's graphai, on the other hand, removed the standing requirement and permitted the 
victim or any other citizen to institute the action. The term for such third parties was ho 
boulomenos, literally “whoever wishes” to do so. Solon intended the graphe proceeding to offer 
protection for the weak in society.462 The graphe proceeding also reflected the principle that 
some wrongdoings affected not only the wronged individual but also the public interest.463 Any 
citizen should therefore have the right to prosecute on behalf of the state. He did so by laying a 
written charge (graphe) before the magistrate (archon).  
 Socrates’ trial involves a graphe prosecution for impiety (asebias). Other graphai 
proceedings included actions for mistreatment of parents and orphans (kaboseos), temple 
robbery (hierosulias), idleness (argias), male prostitution (hetaireseos) cowardice (deilias), and 
desertion (astrateias). Public officials were subject to prosecution for malfeasance in office such 
as accepting bribes (doron), malicious official behavior (bouleuseos), or refusing to submit 
accounts (alogiou). 464 
Proceedings before the heliaea lacked even basic due process protections. The governing 
laws were usually undefined. There were no judges, no meaningful rules of evidence, and the 
litigants had no right to counsel. Every case was determined on an ad hoc basis without regard to 
precedent. The heliaea decided even capital cases in the heat of a single sitting, and there was no 
appeal from their decisions.  
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Since the heliaea determined the meanings of Athens' vaguely defined laws anew in 
every case, the dikastai acted simultaneously as legislatures, judges, and juries. Every case 
applied its newly defined law retroactively. This practice violated Blackstone's admonition 
against uniting the power to make law and the power to enforce law in the same entity.465 It also 
violated Blackstone's principle that judges should declare the law, not make it.466  
 The universal standing of any citizen to sue public officials for malfeasance, combined 
with the absence of procedural safeguards for due process, invited the filing of graphe actions 
for purely political ends. Consequently, the heliaea were often political rather than judicial 
bodies in practice.467 Aristotle observes that the power of the heliaea changed the Athenian 
constitution into a direct democracy with “the people playing the tyrant.” 468  
 Universal standing and lack of due process protections also encouraged the filing of 
frivolous graphai proceedings. To protect against frivolous filings, Athens fined prosecutors as 
much as 1,000 drachmas if they failed to obtain at least one fifth of the dikast's votes. This 
equaled 1,000 days' wages for a skilled worker. The frivolous prosecutor also suffered a partial 
loss of privileges (atimia), such as standing to bring any graphai in the future.469 
E. Solon's Constitution Fails 
Solon took significant precautions to ensure the stable application of his constitution. He 
forced the Athenians to take an oath to follow his laws for ten years under penalty of a “heavy 
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curse.” Solon then left Athens for ten years to avoid pressure to change his laws.470 Even the 
greatest constitutions, however, cannot enforce themselves, and the social concord Solon sought 
was short-lived. 
Political dissension became so widespread by 589 B.C., only five years after the 
introduction of Solon's constitution, that Athens was unable to select an archon. Some Athenians 
objected to Solon’s nullification of debts, some to Solon’s constitution, and others simply 
preferred to pursue personal rivalries.471 Regional factions reemerged and their strife mired 
Athens in “a continual state of internal disorder.” 472  
F. Cleisthenes Introduces Ostracism (Ostrakismos) (508 B.C.) 
1. The Pisistratid Tyrants (546-510 B.C.) 
 Beginning in 546 B.C., Pisistratus and his sons Hippias and Hipparchus ruled Athens as 
tyrants. The Pisistratid tyranny endured until the Alcmeonidae, a powerful noble family, 
expelled Hippias from Athens in 510 B.C. with the aid of the Spartans. 473 Cleisthenes, a member 
of the Alcmeonidae and the next constitutional reformer, introduced ostracism (ostrakismos) in 
508 B.C. to prevent Athens from relapsing into tyranny.  
 The expulsion of Hippias precipitated a violent power struggle between Cleisthenes and 
Isagoras, a “friend of the tyrants.” Cleisthenes emerged as the victor after gaining the support of 
                                                 
470 Herodotus, The Histories, trans. George Rawlinson (Lawrence, KS: Digireads, 2009) 28; Plutarch, 
“Solon,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 1880) 65; 
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 13-14. 
471 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 18. 
472 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 18. 
The plains faction followed Lycurgus and desired oligarchy. The coastal faction followed Megacles and 
desired a moderate government. The hill faction followed Pisistratus and desired a radical democracy.   
473 Herodotus, The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Andrea L. Purvis 
(New York: Anchor, 2007) 393. 
  
129 
the lower classes.474 Cleisthenes then instituted three reforms in 508 B.C. that mark the 
beginning of classical Athenian democracy.  
2. Cleisthenes' Reforms (508 B.C.) 
 Cleisthenes’ first reform sought to diminish the power of the aristocratic families by 
replacing patronymic names identifying one’s father with demotic names identifying one’s 
village (deme). 475 Socrates’ deme was Alopece, a suburb of Athens. Under Cleisthenes’ first 
reform, Socrates son of Sophroniscus became Socrates of Alopece.   
 Cleisthenes’ second reform sought to replace regional factionalism with pan-Athenic 
solidarity. Cleisthenes replaced the four traditional tribes of Athens with ten “eponymous” tribes 
named after Greek heroes. Each tribe was composed of ten demes from the hill district, ten from 
the plains district, and ten from the coastal district. Each of the ten tribes sent fifty members each 
year to comprise a Council of the Five Hundred (boule).476 Cleisthenes’ Council of the Five 
Hundred replaced Solon’s Council of the Four Hundred and controlled the agenda of the 
democratic ekklesia. 
 Cleisthenes’ third reform sought to prevent the rise of future tyrants through the 
procedure of ostracism (ostrakismos).477 Cleisthenes created ostracism in order to prevent the 
relatives of Pisistratus from reestablishing a tyranny in Athens.478 Ostracism required the exile of 
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any political ruler or other individual upon the vote of 6,000 members of the ekklesia.479 Failure 
to leave the city within ten days was punishable by death.480  
3. Ostrakismos Procedure 
The ekklesia could conduct an ostrakismos once a year, during the sixth month of the 
official calendar. The ekklesia utilized the following procedure in conducting an ostrakismos. 
The boule presided over the proceeding. A section of the Agora was marked off with wooden 
rails with an entrance for each of the ten tribes.481 Each voter scratched the name of the 
individual he wished to ostracize on a potsherd (ostrakon).482 Entering through his tribe's 
entrance, each voter deposited his potsherd with the nine archons, keeping the ostrakon 
facedown.483  
So long as 6,000 or more voters deposited an ostrakon, the person receiving the most 
votes was required to leave Athens within ten days. The term of his exile was ten years. 
Although Athens permitted the ostracized individual to retain his property, failure to comply 
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with the terms of exile carried the death penalty.484  
Ostrakismos procedure provided no due process protections. No impartial tribunal 
presided over the proceeding. Litigants received no counsel. The targeted subject received no 
notice of any charges, no evidence of wrongdoing was required, and the law provided no 
defense. Targeted individuals received no trial and no opportunity to address the voters. The first 
vote was final, and no appeal was possible. In sum, ostrakismos intentionally permitted the exile 
and sometimes even the execution of the innocent.  
4. Misuse of Ostracism (Ostrakismos) (505 B.C.) 
Although Cleisthenes introduced ostrakismos as a shield against tyranny, its lack of due 
process protections rendered it susceptible to misuse. Athens employed ostracism as a shield 
against tyranny for only three years.485 Athens then transformed ostrakismos into a sword for the 
envious and the politically ambitious.  
Plutarch observes that ostrakismos merely gave “the name of fear of tyranny” to 
Athenian jealousy in order to obtain “relief and mitigation of envious feeling.” 486 “The spirit of 
the people,” Plutarch continues, “naturally entertained feelings of dislike toward all of more than 
common fame and reputation.” 487 “[O]stracism was not a penalty,” Plutarch continues, “but a 
way of pacifying and alleviating that jealousy which delights to humble the eminent, breathing 
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out its malice into this disfranchisement.” 488 Ostracism “was not usually inflicted on the poorer 
citizens, but on those of great houses, whose station exposed them to envy.” “Every one was 
liable to it whom his reputation, birth, or eloquence raised above the common level.” 489 
Diodorus records that “this law was used at Athens, not so much as a punishment for any 
particular offence, as to humble the spirit of proud and aspiring men, and by their banishment to 
reduce them to more moderation and submission.” 490  
Originally intended to protect Athens against vaulting political ambition, ostrakismos 
became the most powerful tool for realizing such ambitions. Politicians took advantage of the 
absence of due process protections to harness the envy and gullibility of common men. The 
archon Aristides, a follower of Cleisthenes and a hero of the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C., was 
an early victim of a politically motivated ostrakismos. Themistocles became archon in 483 B.C. 
by ostracizing Aristides. 491 Themistocles secured Aristides' ostrakismos by spreading the false 
rumor that Aristides intended to establish himself as king.492  
Although Themistocles saved Athens from the second Persian invasion in 480 B.C., his 
wealthy rival Cimon became general in 471 B.C. after ostracizing Themistocles.493 Athens 
ostracized Themistocles from envy for the honors he received for saving Athens from the 
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Persians at the Battle of Salamis.494 Cimon’s rival Pericles became general in 461 B.C. 495 after 
ostracizing Cimon “on a trifling pretext.” 496 Pericles was himself removed from office and fined 
in an eisangelia impeachment before the ekklesia in 443 B.C.497  
 Since ostrakismos required no evidence of wrongdoing and provided no due process 
protections, the ekklesia often made imprudent decisions that it later regretted. The ekklesia 
recalled Aristides, Cimon, and Alcibiades and restored them to leadership before their ten years 
of exile were completed.498 Ostrakismos did more than deprive Athens of her most talented 
leaders. Ostrakismos actually transformed its victims into some of Athens’ most dangerous 
enemies.499   
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G. Impeachment Proceedings (Eisangelia)  
1. Procedure 
 The third politically significant proceeding was the impeachment (eisenangelia). 
Eisangeliai permitted the prosecution and execution of any public office holder or any citizen 
making a public proposal.500 The eisangelia procedure, which literally means a “public 
announcement” or “laying of information,” offered significant advantages for politically 
ambitious litigators. Unlike graphai proceedings, there was no penalty if the prosecutor failed to 
obtain at least one fifth of the dikasts' votes or dismissed the case in exchange for payment.501 
Unlike the euthanai proceeding for official malfeasance, which a prosecutor could file only at 
the end of a public official's term, a prosecutor could file an eisangeliai action at any time.502 
These advantages made the eisangelia the preferred vehicle for political prosecutions.  
 Any citizen could act as prosecutor and initiate an eisangelia in one of two ways. First, 
the prosecutor could lay the eisangelia before the Council of the 500 (boule).503 The boule, 
whose primary function was to determine the agendas for meetings of the ekklesia,504 would pass 
a preliminary verdict. It would then refer any meritorious case to the heliaea for trial.  
 The second and more common procedure for initiating an eisangelia was to bring the 
action directly before the ekklesia.505 In such cases, the boule would draft an indictment but it 
would not reach a preliminary verdict. The ekklesia would then decide whether to hear the case 
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itself or refer it to the heliaea for trial.506 
Like the graphai proceeding, the eisangelia lacked basic due process protections. If tried 
before the ekklesia, the proceeding usually involved undefined laws. There were no trained 
judges, no meaningful rules of evidence, and the litigants had no right to counsel. Every case 
was determined on an ad hoc basis without regard to precedent.  
In addition to the above, if the boule or ekklesia referred the case to the heliaea for trial, 
the heliaea decided the case in the heat of a single sitting. There was little or no time for 
deliberation because the dikasts had to deliver their verdicts before sunset. There was no appeal 
from the initial decision. Since the heliaea supplied new meanings and penalties for Athens' 
undefined laws in every case, the dikastai acted simultaneously as legislatures, judges, and 
juries. The heliaea thus acted retroactively in every case.  
2. Impeachment Proceedings (Eisangelia) Used Against the Areopagites (462 B.C.)  
 The next great reformer after Solon and Cleisthenes was the Athenian general Ephialtes.  
Utilizing a series of eisangelia prosecutions, Ephialtes orchestrated the demise of the oligarchic 
Council of the Areopagus in 462 B.C.507 Solon had drastically reduced the powers of the Council 
of the Areopagus under the constitution of 594 B.C.,508 but the Council resumed control of the 
state after leading the repulsion of the Persian invasion in 480 B.C. at the Battle of Salamis.509  
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Among other powers, the Council of the Areopagus could nullify laws and disqualify candidates 
from seeking office. It thus constituted an oligarchic stronghold in Athens’ government.   
 Ephialtes’ reforms succeeded in transferring most of the Areopagites’ powers to the 
heliaea.  Ephialtes’ first strategy in attacking the Council of the Areopagus was to ruin 
individual members of the Council through eisangelia prosecutions. Aristotle describes these 
prosecutions as a series of “actions against them with reference to their administration.” 510  
 Ephialtes' second strategy was to form an alliance against the Council of the Areopagus 
with the Athenian general Themistocles. Themistocles, architect of the Greek victory at 
Salamis,511 was a member of the Council. Themistocles had recently learned, however, that his 
enemies on the Council were planning to bring false charges against him for treason with 
Persia.512  
 Together, by denouncing the Council of the Areopagus to both the boule and the 
ekklesia, Ephialtes and Themistocles succeeded in depriving the Council of its power.513 By 462 
B.C., the Council of the Areopagus was “deprived of its superintendence of affairs,” and its 
authority reduced to conducting trials for murder, wounding, and death by poison. It could 
conduct preliminary investigations of political corruption, but was required to forward its 
findings to the boule and the ekklesia for further action.  
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 To bar the oligarchic Council of the Areopagus from ever returning to power, Ephialtes 
adopted a third strategy of permanently diminishing the prestige of membership on the Council. 
Ephialtes accomplished this goal in two steps. First, he reinstated Solon’s earlier reform that 
Athens select her nine archons by lot rather than by election.514  The archons comprised the 
future membership of the Council. Second, Ephialtes broadened the eligibility for archonship to 
include the third of Solon’s four social classes, the zeugitae or “yoked men.” 515  
 Many writers are effusive in their praise of Ephialtes’ character.516 Unable to defeat 
Ephialtes politically, and finding him a relentless and incorruptible champion of the people’s 
rights, the oligarchs murdered him in 461 B.C.517 In life, Ephialtes' reforms transferred most of 
the Areopagites' powers to the heliaea. His death brought his protégé Pericles to political 
prominence. Pericles’ introduction of payment to the dikasts for service in the heliaea marked 
the final step in the rise of the heliaea to political dominance.  
H. Pericles Introduces Payment of the Dikasts (451 B.C.) 
The great political rivalry in Athens after the assassination of Ephialtes was between 
Cimon, a wealthy member of the Council of the Areopagus, and Ephialtes’ protégé Pericles. 
Cimon used his great wealth to curry popular favor and political advantage, even refusing to 
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fence his estate so that anyone who wished could help himself to its fruit.518 Realizing that he 
was “beaten in the matter of private possessions,” Pericles accepted the advice of Damonides 
and countered Cimon’s wealth by making “gifts to the people from their own property.” 519 
Accordingly, as a “bid for popular favor to counterbalance the wealth of Cimon,” Pericles 
instituted pay for dikasts in 451 B.C. 520 
The Athenian legal system utilized large numbers of dikasts selected by lot from a 
volunteer pool. Many of the potential dikasts, however, could not afford to lose their income to 
serve in the heliaea. The amount of pay introduced by Pericles was three obols per day, equal to 
one day’s living wage. 521 By comparison, the payment for a day’s work by an artisan, including 
architects, was six obols. 522 Pericles’ innovation allowed every citizen to serve and exercise the 
formidable powers granted the heliaea by previous reforms.  
The impact of Pericles’ innovation on Athenian history must not be underestimated. The 
heliaea were the dominant political force in the Athenian empire.523 Solon, Cleisthenes, and 
Ephialtes had elevated the power of the heliaea above all other institutions in the Athenian 
constitution. The expansion of the Athenian empire in the fifth century B.C. added to the 
business conducted by the heliaea. “The courts [heliaea] were in almost perpetual session; their 
jurisdiction extended to every aspect and department of public life; and from their decision there 
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was no appeal.”524  
Pericles’ reform of the Athenian constitution made Athens the most complete democracy 
“the world has ever known.  Yet it was that constitution which in the long run proved the 
undoing of Athens.” 525 The sovereignty of the people found expression in the heliaea even more 
effectively than in the boule or the ekklesia. “Yet it was the citizen of the poorest class who was 
attracted by the pay, and it was he who sat enthroned in the courts.” 526  
I. Political Prosecutions in Athens 
Pericles' payment of dikasts placed the reins of unrestrained power in the grasp of those 
least able to wield them, and they soon drove Athens to her destruction. The absence of basic 
procedural safeguards enabled litigants to utilize the full powers of the ekklesia and the heliaea 
in order to realize their personal political ambitions, satisfy their envy, and discharge their 
personal grudges. Political prosecutions were effective in part because of the gullibility of the 
Athenian dikast. 527   
Democrats and oligarchs alike employed graphai, eisangeliai, and ostrakismos 
proceedings for these purposes. The democratic reformer Ephialtes used eisangeliai prosecutions 
to weaken the oligarchic Council of the Areopagus in 462 B.C.528 In 411 B.C., oligarchic 
conspirators led by the orator Antiphon used systematic eisangeliai prosecutions of democratic 
officials for embezzlement to discredit democracy in the wake of the disastrous campaign in 
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Sicily. These prosecutions helped establish the brutal Oligarchy of the 400.529 In 404 B.C., the 
even more brutal Thirty Tyrants silenced popular opposition by securing the legal condemnation 
and death of their most effective leaders.530 “So convenient was this method of dealing with 
opponents that the hundreds of virtual assassinations which made the brief tyranny of the Thirty 
notorious were cloaked by a simulation of legal procedure.”531 
Athens is justly infamous for political prosecutions of those men who most deserved her 
honors. Themistocles saved Athens from the Persians in 480 B.C. Nevertheless, Athens 
condemned the exiled Themistocles in an eisangelia prosecution in absentia and sentenced him 
to death in 470 B.C.532 Pericles was Athens' noblest public servant. Nevertheless, Athens 
prosecuted, fined, and removed Pericles from office in an eisangelia prosecution in 443 B.C.533  
These injustices brought disastrous consequences. Alcibiades was Athens' ablest 
commander. Nevertheless, Athens condemned Alcibiades to death in an eisangelia prosecution 
on fraudulent evidence in 415 B.C.534 Eight of Athens' generals won a great naval victory against 
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530 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969) 100; 
George Miller Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin: U. Texas Bull., 1913) 105: 
“The possibilities of the political suit are particularly to be seen in the revolution of 404. Opposition to the 
carrying out of the revolutionary program was effectually crushed by a series of prosecutions brought 
against the democratic leaders. First Cleophon, the reigning demagogue, was cited before a court made up 
of oligarchic sympathizers and was condemned and executed, ostensibly for desertion of post, ‘but in 
reality because he spoke against tearing down the walls.’ Shortly thereafter, Strombichides, Dionysodorus, 
Eucrates, and others of the more influential politicians who had combined to resist the oligarchic 
movement were arrested on trumped-up charges and in course of time were put to death, in order that they 
might not speak in the assembly against the program which the oligarchic conspirators had arranged.”  
531 George Miller Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin: U. Texas Bull., 1913) 105. 
532 Plutarch, “Themistocles,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1880) 185-97; Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The 
Cambridge Ancient History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 63-64. 
533 Plutarch, “Pericles,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: 
Coates, 1900) 269.   
534 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 286; Plutarch, “Alcibiades,” Plutarch’s Lives of 
Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: Coates, 1900) 317.  
  
141 
the Spartans at Arginusae in 406 B.C.535 The generals were nevertheless condemned to death in 
an eisangelia prosecution when a sea storm prevented the rescue of survivors.536  
The eisangelia prosecution of Alcibiades in 415 B.C. led to disaster in the Sicilian 
campaign and cost Athens the initiative in the Peloponnesian War. The eisangelia prosecution of 
the Arginusae generals in 404 B.C. led to a disastrous naval defeat at Aegospotami the following 
year and the loss of the war. The graphe prosecution of Socrates for impiety in 399 B.C. gave 
democratic Athens the indelible reputation of “decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one 
day and statues on the next.” 537  As demonstrated below, each of these prosecutions illuminates 
the failure of the Athenian legal system to satisfy the principles of reason, autonomy, and 
consent.  
1. The Trial of Alcibiades (415 B.C.)  
 The absence of due process safeguards subjected the Athenian legal system to 
exploitation through fraudulent evidence. This susceptibility is illustrated by the eisangelia 
prosecution of the Athenian general Alcibiades before the ekklesia in 415 B.C. Motivated by a 
spirit of adventure, aggrandizement, and greed, the ekklesia voted to send an expedition to Sicily 
in 415 B.C.538 Two of Athens’ generals, Alcibiades and Nicias, adopted rival positions in the 
debates leading up to the decision. Alcibiades favored the expedition and Nicias opposed it.539  
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 In an effort to persuade the ekklesia to abandon the expedition, Nicias intentionally 
exaggerated the resources that the expedition would require for success. Rather than cancel the 
expedition, however, the ekklesia appropriated the massive resources enumerated by Nicias, 
including one hundred triremes and 5,000 hoplites.540  Almost all of these men and resources 
would be lost as the result of a fraudulent eisangelia prosecution brought by Alcibiades' enemies. 
 As the moving force behind the expedition, Alcibiades stood to gain the most politically 
from its success. “There was hardly a politician in Athens who did not dread for himself or the 
city the predominance that awaited Alcibiades should he return victorious from Sicily.” 541 This 
was particularly true for two of Alcibiades' political opponents, the demagogue leaders Peisander 
and Androcles. Even before the expedition left Athens, Peisander and Androcles searched for 
any opportunity to damage Alcibiades.  
 The opportunity they sought soon presented itself. Shortly before Alcibiades' expedition 
sailed, vandals defaced nearly all the stone hermae in the city in one night.542 The city interpreted 
this sacrilege as an evil omen for the Sicilian expedition preparing to sail. Athens offered large 
rewards and promised immunity to anyone who came forth with information to identify the 
responsible parties. Alcibiades' enemies managed to broaden the scope of the investigation to 
include any act of impiety,543 and paid informers soon accused Alcibiades of mocking the 
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mysteries of Eleusis at a private party. 544    
Alcibiades’ enemies charged that the impieties of Alcibiades and other prominent 
Athenians revealed the existence of a conspiracy among the Athenian elite to overthrow the 
democracy.545 Alcibiades demanded an immediate trial, but his enemies succeeded in delaying it. 
They sought the delay for two reasons. First, they believed that a conviction would be easier to 
obtain once Alcibiades’ supporters in the military had left Athens. Second, the ability to recall 
Alcibiades at a time of their choosing made them, not Alcibiades, masters of his military 
career.546    
Cimon’s son Thessalus filed formal charges against Alcibiades that Alcibiades 
“committed a crime against the goddess Ceres and Proserpine, by representing in derision the 
holy mysteries, and showing them to his companions in his own house.” 547 Plutarch records the 
fraudulent evidence supporting the charges against Alcibiades. One informer testified that he 
recognized Alcibiades by the light of the moon, even though the events occurred under a new 
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moon.548  
Nevertheless, Athens recalled Alcibiades and dispatched a galley to return him to Athens 
for trial. Fearing a mutiny of the forces under Alcibiades’ command, however, the authorities 
ordered the galley not to seize Alcibiades. Instead, they instructed Alcibiades to follow the galley 
back to Athens in his own ship. Alcibiades pretended to acquiesce to the recall but escaped at the 
Greek colony of Thurii on the Italian mainland.549  
Athens convicted Alcibiades as contumacious for failing to appear. The ekklesia 
condemned him to death, ordered his property seized, and required the priests and priestesses of 
Athens to curse him.550 When Alcibiades learned that the ekklesia had ordered his death, he 
replied, “I will make them feel that I am alive.” 551  
Condemned to death, and judging that the radical democracy of Athens would never 
restore him, Alcibiades sought refuge with Sparta.552 Guided by Alcibiades, the Spartans 
intervened against the Athenians in Sicily.553 The Spartans also fortified Decelea, a village 
approximately fourteen miles north of Athens and visible from Athens.554 This fortification gave 
the Spartans control of the plain of rural Attica and worked “great damage” upon Athens.  By 
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maintaining a year round presence at Decelea, the Spartans cut off food supplies to Athens and 
denied access to the Larium silver mines, one of Athens’ chief sources of revenue.  
 Alcibiades’ defection also left command of the Sicilian expedition in the hands of the 
less able Nicias. The result of all these factors was the destruction of the Athenian expedition. 
Athens lost more than 207 triremes and more than 40,000 hoplites and rowers. 555  Thucydides 
records the Sicilian expedition as “the most calamitous defeat; for they were utterly and entirely 
defeated; their sufferings were on an enormous scale: the losses were, as they say, total; army, 
navy, everything was destroyed, and, out of many, only few returned. So ended the events in 
Sicily.”556  
 Athens had exhausted its financial resources as well. Athens’ allies began to desert her 
and her traditional enemy Persia intervened on the Spartan side.557 These reversals led to the fall 
of the democratic government and a return to oligarchy in 411 B.C.  
2. The Trial of the Arginusae Generals (406 B.C.)  
 The absence of due process safeguards subjected the Athenian legal system to emotional 
manipulation as well as fraudulent evidence.  The eisangelia condemnation of the Arginusae 
generals by the ekklesia after their naval victory at Arginusae in 406 B.C. illustrates this 
susceptibility. Socrates attempted but failed to prevent the generals' condemnation.558 
In July 406 B.C., the Spartans trapped the Athenian fleet in the harbor of Mitylene on 
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the island of Lesbos.559 The Athenian commander Conon sent Athens a desperate plea for help. 
Although the Sicilian disaster had largely depleted Athens' resources, Athens made a heroic 
effort to rescue its imperiled fleet.560 The Athenians converted the silver plate in their temples 
into currency, and they minted their gold statues of Nike into coins. Athens pressed citizens, 
subjects, metics, and slaves into service as oarsmen without regard to social status. The 
Athenians managed to place 110 ships into service within thirty days, and this fleet 
rendezvoused with forty additional ships at Samos.  
The Athenians engaged the Spartan fleet at the Arginusae Islands, between the mainland 
and the trapped Athenian fleet at Mitylene. The Athenian fleet divided its command between 
eight generals, each of whom commanded a squadron of fifteen ships. The battle at Arginusae 
was the most desperate of the entire Peloponnesian War. If Athens lost the battle, she was 
defeated, for she “had ventured her last stake.”561  
Athens achieved an unexpected and heroic victory. The Spartan fleet lost sixty-nine 
ships. Athens suffered only thirteen ships sunk and twelve ships seriously damaged. A jubilant 
Athens emancipated the slaves who fought in the battle and granted them citizenship. 
The generals, however, received different treatment. After the battle, the Athenian 
generals sailed to rescue the Athenian fleet trapped at Mitylene, where the Spartans had a reserve 
force of fifty ships. The generals delegated two captains, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, to rescue 
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survivors from the stricken ships, but a storm prevented their rescue, doubling the number of 
Athenian losses. The ekklesia consequently impeached the Arginusae generals and removed 
them from command. 
Theramenes and Thrasybulus, fearing for their lives, threw the full weight of their 
political influence against their superior officers.562 Wary of Athenian justice, two of the 
Arginusae generals fled into voluntary exile.563 When the other six returned, the boule instituted 
an eisangelia prosecution against them before the ekklesia.564  
In the generals' first appearance before the ekklesia, Theramenes falsely denied that the 
violence of the storm had prevented the rescue of survivors. He argued instead that the generals 
were guilty of criminal negligence. The generals nevertheless made a good impression, 
presenting many of the steersman and sailors as witnesses. It had grown too dark by the end of 
the day to count hands when it came to voting. The ekklesia therefore instructed the boule to 
bring a motion specifying how the ekklesia should proceed.565  
The delay proved fatal for the generals for two reasons. First, the Festival of Kinsmen 
(Apaturia), which celebrated family reunion and rejoicing, took place during the intervening 
period. The relatives of the men who perished at Arginusae attended the festival clad in black 
with shaved heads. Inspired by the dramatic effect of their appearance on the attendees at the 
festival, Theramenes and his supporters arranged for a number of people to pose as kinsmen of 
those lost after the battle. When the trial of the generals reconvened, Theramenes' posers 
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Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1964) 357. 
564 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 357. 
565 Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica), trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 87. 
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attended the ekklesia attired in black and with shaved heads.566  
The delay also provided Theramenes the opportunity for bribing Callixenus, a member 
of the boule, to attack the generals when the Council met to consider its proposal to the ekklesia 
for proceeding with the trial. When the ekklesia reconvened, the emotional effect of the 
pretended kinsmen on the ekklesia was overwhelming. Callixenus introduced the proposal of the 
boule that the ekklesia immediately decide the guilt or innocence of all eight defendants by a 
single ballot.”567  
On cue, another man then shouted to the ekklesia that he had survived the battle by 
clinging to a barrel. He further claimed that the drowning Athenians had begged him, if he 
survived, to report to the people “that the generals were doing nothing to rescue men who had 
fought most gallantly for their country.”568 
Some members of the ekklesia, including Euryptolemus, objected that trying all the 
generals together was illegal. Each general was legally entitled to a separate trial. The ekklesia 
responded that it was intolerable to forbid the ekklesia from exercising its will and threatened the 
objectors with the same fate as the generals. The intimidated objectors withdrew their 
objection.569  
By luck of the lottery, Socrates was serving that day as the epistates or president of the 
prytanes, the committee of fifty boule members that presided over the ekklesia. Although 
                                                 
566 Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica), trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 87. 
567 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 357; Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica), 
trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 87-88.  
568 Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica), trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 88. 
569 Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica), trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 88. Bury, 
J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient History, 
14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 358. The forced withdrawal of the objection was itself illegal. 
Evelyn Abbot, A History of Greece, Part III: From the Thirty Years Peace to the Fall of the Thirty at 
Athens, 445-403 B.C. (New York: Putnam's, 1900) 449. 
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Socrates refused to put Callixenus' proposal for an immediate verdict to a vote, the impassioned 
ekklesia intimidated the other forty-nine members of the prytanes. The ekklesia first disregarded 
the prohibition against joint trials 570 and passed Callixenus' proposal. The ekklesia then 
disregarded the appeal of Euryptolemus that it not “turn victory into defeat, visit inevitable 
misfortune with cruel punishment, and treat inability as treachery.”571 Instead, as it had done 
with Themistocles in 470 B.C. and Alcibiades in 415 B.C., the ekklesia convicted its benefactors 
on fraudulent evidence and condemned them to death.  
Like the condemnation of Alcibiades nine years earlier, the execution of the generals had 
disastrous military consequences for Athens. One year later, without competent leadership, the 
Athenian fleet suffered a disaster against the Spartans at Aegospotami that forced Athens' 
surrender to Sparta.572 Remorse for the execution of the generals seized Athens. “Not long 
afterwards the Athenians repented and voted to bring charges against those who had deceived the 
people.” 573 Athens regarded Callixenus with universal hatred and allowed him to starve to 
death.574 
 
                                                 
570 Xenophon records that the decree of Cannonus required a separate trial for each general. Each trial 
should have consisted of three parts: “one for the prosecution, one for the defense, and one for deliberating 
and voting on whether the accused are innocent or guilty.” Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica), 
trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 90. The Cambridge Ancient History records, however, that 
the prohibition against joint trials was only in a decree, it therefore did not have binding effect as law.  
Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 358.  
571 Evelyn Abbot, A History of Greece, Part III: From the Thirty Years Peace to the Fall of the Thirty at 
Athens, 445-403 B.C. (New York: Putnam's, 1900) 448. 
572 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 358-62; Xenophon, A History of My Times 
(Hellenica), trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 97-108.  
573 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin, 2003) 466. 
574 Xenophon, A History of My Times (Hellenica) trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1979) 94; Evelyn 
Abbot, A History of Greece, Part III: From the Thirty Years Peace to the Fall of the Thirty at Athens, 445-
403 B.C. (New York: Putnam's, 1900) 448. 
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III. The Trial of Socrates (399 B.C.) 
A. Conflicting Accounts of the Trial 
The most famous of Athens' trials is the graphe prosecution of Socrates for impiety 
(asebeia) in 399 B.C. A fair evaluation of this trial requires a recognition that some details of 
events are beyond certain proof. Plato and Xenophon provide the only extant contemporaneous 
descriptions of Socrates' trial.575  
Plato gives the only eyewitness account. Xenophon’s account depends on Hermogenes 
for its facts. Plato, Xenophon, and Hermogenes were all members of Socrates’ inner circle and 
presumably biased in Socrates’ favor.576 Furthermore, both Plato and Xenophon may have 
waited ten years before recording their accounts.577  
The accounts of Plato and Xenophon differ on three significant subjects. First, the 
accounts differ in how Socrates describes himself to the jurors. Plato’s Socrates humbly 
describes himself as wise only in that he recognizes his wisdom “is in truth worth nothing.”578 
                                                 
575 Details of the trial also appear in Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent 
Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: Bell, 1901) 72. Xenophon states in the opening of his 
“Socrates’ Defence” that others have written accounts of the trial but he fails to name them. For a list of 
other authors of accounts of the trial, see Albin Leskey, A History of Greek Literature, trans. Cornelis de 
Heer and James Willis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996) 499, and W. A. Oldfather, “Socrates in Court,” 
Classical Weekly 31 (21) (1938): 203-11. The Athenian orator Polycrates wrote a third account in 392 
B.C., The Accusation of Socrates, but it does not survive. Polycrates’ Accusation is reconstructed, 
however, in both Anton-Hermann Chroust, Socrates, Man and Myth (South Bend: U Notre Dame P, 1957) 
69-100, and Robin Waterfield, Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (New York: Norton, 2009) 197-
201.  
576 John Burnet and Gregory Vlastos argue for the accuracy of Plato’s account by assuming that Plato’s 
favorable depiction of Socrates shows Plato was motivated to defend Socrates’ character. An untrue 
account, they argue, would have been counter-productive to this purpose because surviving attendees of 
the trial would have discredited it. John Burnet, Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1924) 63-64; Gregory Vlastos, Introduction: The Paradox of Socrates, The 
Philosophy of Socrates, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City: Anchor, 1971) 3. The difficulty with this 
argument is that it is entirely speculative and unsupported by any evidence. Plato, for example, never 
expresses his purpose in writing his account of the trial.  
577 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989) 1-2. 
578 Plato, “Apology,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New 
York: Dover, 1992) 24. “And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the 
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Xenophon’s Socrates, on the other hand, brashly presents himself as “the most free, upright, and 
prudent of all people.”579 “Socrates was so arrogant in court,” writes Xenophon, “that he invited 
the jurors’ ill-will and more or less forced them to condemn him.”580 
Second, the accounts differ in Socrates’ attitude towards death.  Plato’s Socrates 
reluctantly accepts an unjust death as preferable to an unrighteous escape.581 Xenophon’s 
Socrates, however, welcomes his execution as the “easiest possible death,” a divine kindness 
providing escape from “the penalties of old age.” 582 Prior to the trial, Xenophon’s Socrates “had 
already decided that for him death was preferable to life.”583 
Third, the accounts differ in Socrates’ evaluation of Athens’ laws. Xenophon’s Socrates 
recognizes that “the Athenian courts have often been prevailed upon by argument to put innocent 
men to death, and equally have often acquitted the wrongdoers, either out of pity aroused by the 
speeches or because they’ve been flattered.”584 Plato’s Socrates, on the other hand, describes 
Athens’ laws and institutions, like virtue itself, as “the best things among men.”585 The laws 
                                                                                                                                                
wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in 
this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is 
only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows 
that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing.” 
579 Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990) 44. 
580 Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990) 49. 
581 Plato, “Crito,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Dover, 1992) 52-53. Socrates explains that he has agreed to obey the laws by living in Athens, and 
escaping to avoid execution would be turning his back on the compacts and agreements he made as a 
citizen. Socrates argues further that we must not commit injustice in return for an injustice committed 
upon us. Id. at 49. 
582 Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990) 42. See Sam 
Silverman, “The Death of Socrates: A Holistic Reexamination,” Omega 61 (1) (2010): 71-84 for an 
argument that Socrates welcomed his execution. Socrates wished to die, but his philosophy forbade 
suicide. 
583 Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990) 41. 
584 Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990) 41-42. 
585 Plato, “Crito,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Dover, 1992) 53. In describing a hypothetical dialogue with the laws of Athens, Socrates states the 
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“speak truly,” and Socrates must submit to their authority as their child and slave, even at the 
cost of his own destruction.586 Even after his unjust condemnation, Plato’s Socrates sees himself 
as “a victim, not of laws, but of men.” 587  
Contrary to the assessment of Plato's Socrates, and as demonstrated below, Socrates was 
the victim of both laws and men. The evidence of history supports Xenophon’s description of the 
Athenian courts. By denying even primitive due process protections to the accused, Athens’ 
legal system exposed the innocent to an unconscionably high risk of condemnation. Rather than 
treating Athenians as ends in themselves, Athenian law permitted their exploitation as means to 
political ends. As seen with the trials of Alcibiades and the Arginusae generals detailed above, 
Athens’ legal system ultimately brought disaster to the condemned and the condemner alike. 
B. Three Puzzles Presented by Socrates' Trial 
Socrates’ trial presents three puzzles. The first puzzle involves the motive behind the 
prosecution. Many commentators conclude that Socrates’ accusers sought his death because 
Socrates posed a threat to democracy. Socrates, however, was no revolutionary. As portrayed in 
the Crito, Socrates felt obliged to obey the laws as their child and slave.  
The second puzzle involves the choice of proceeding. Socrates' chief accuser Anytus 
                                                                                                                                                
following: “For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the young and 
foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? And is 
existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? 
And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being 
the best things among men?”  
586 Plato, “Crito,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Dover, 1992) 51. “Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can 
you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is 
true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are 
doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your 
master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his 
hands? — you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have 
any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies?” 
587 Plato, “Crito,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Dover, 1992) 54. 
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was a sophisticated veteran of Athenian political prosecutions. The eisangelia procedure 
presented significant advantages for the accusers. Nevertheless, the accusers chose to prosecute 
Socrates in a graphe proceeding.  
The third puzzle involves Socrates' defense. Socrates’ indictment charged Socrates with 
impiety (asebeia) and sought the death penalty. Socrates' defense, however, focuses on charges 
that Socrates considers more dangerous than those in the indictment. The answers to these 
puzzles illuminate significant shortcomings in the Athenian legal system. 
C. The Puzzling Motive behind the Prosecution of Socrates 
1. Political Turmoil in Athens (415 - 403 B.C.) 
The answer to the puzzle regarding the prosecutors’ motive lies in the political turmoil 
that tormented Athens in the fifteen years preceding Socrates’ trial. This political instability 
reached its greatest intensity in the aftermath of the eisangelia prosecutions of Alcibiades in 415 
B.C. and the Arginusae generals in 406 B.C. Five regime changes rocked Athens between 411 
B.C. and 403 B.C. as Athens reeled between alternating oligarchic and democratic regimes.  
2. Oligarchy of the 400 (411 B.C.) 
 Democratic mismanagement of the Peloponnesian War, particularly the eisangelia 
prosecution of Alcibiades with its disastrous consequences for the Sicilian campaign, enabled the 
“oligarchy of the 400” to overthrow the democratic government and take power in 411 B.C. 588 
Led by the rhetorician Antiphon, the oligarchic conspirators first sought to discredit democracy 
in the popular mind. To accomplish this goal they instituted a series of eisangeliai prosecutions 
against democratic officials for embezzlement. 589  
                                                 
588 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1972) 574-77.   
589 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969) 100. 
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 The conspirators claimed legitimacy under Solon's “ancestral constitution of Athens” 590 
and modeled their “oligarchy of the 400” on the aristocratic Council of 400 established by Solon. 
Since the boule had replaced Solon's Council of 400 under Cleisthenes' reforms in 508 B.C., 
Antiphon's oligarchs targeted the boule in a coup d'état. 
 The 400 executed the coup d'état by confronting the boule with an armed gang of 120 
“Hellenic youths.” The oligarchs paid the members of the boule their stipend and sent them 
home at dagger point. Thucydides records that “no objection was raised.” 591 Once the 400 
secured their power, they recalled Alcibiades and gave him command of the Athenian fleet.592 
The oligarchy then instituted a brutal program of exiling, imprisoning, and executing its political 
adversaries.  
3. Oligarchy of the 5,000 (411 B.C.) 
 A dispute soon developed within the regime of the 400. A moderate faction, led by 
Theramenes and Aristocrates, called for the replacement of the 400 with a broader oligarchy of 
“the 5,000.” This oligarchy would include all citizens of the highest three classes. The extremist 
faction, led by Antiphon and Phrynichus, responded by opening peace negotiations with Sparta.  
In exchange for Spartan support, the extremists agreed to construct a fortification in the harbor of 
Piraeus and turn it over to the Spartans. The extremists began constructing the fortification.  
 The moderates assassinated the extremist leader Phrynichus. Emboldened by this 
success, the moderates then arrested the extremist general Alexices. A confrontation ensued, 
which ended with the hoplites in Piraeus tearing down the new fortification. The moderates tried 
                                                 
590 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 44. 
591 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1972) 578. 
Accord, Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 
2009) 44.   
592 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003) 389; Plutarch, “Alcibiades,” 
Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Coates, 1900) 323. 
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and executed the extremist Antiphon for treason with Sparta,593 and the oligarchy of the 400 lost 
power after only four months.  
 The oligarchy of the 5000 remained in power for four more months. 594 During their rule, 
the Athenian navy won a crushing victory at Cyzicus under the brilliant leadership of 
Alcibiades.595 Aristotle records that the oligarchy of the 5000 governed well. Nevertheless, after 
the victory at Cyzicus relieved the people of their fears of an immediate military crisis, they 
“deprived the 5000 of their monopoly of the government” and restored democracy in 410.596 
4. Democracy Restored (410-404 B.C.) 
 The restored democracy quickly returned to destroying its competent military leaders 
through political prosecutions. Despite his decisive victory at Cyzicus in 410 B.C., Alcibiades’ 
political enemies succeeded in unjustly fixing him with blame for Athens' naval defeat at Notium 
in 406 B.C. 597 Alcibiades' enemies persuaded Athens to deprive Alcibiades of command, just as 
they had done in the Sicilian campaign of 415 B.C. 
 Athens had convicted Alcibiades in an eisangelia prosecution on fraudulent evidence 
and sentenced him to death in 415 B.C. His enemies now brought another fraudulent eisangelia 
prosecution against him in 406 B.C. Rather than fight another fraudulent political prosecution, 
Alcibiades chose to remove himself permanently from Athenian affairs by voluntary exile. 598  
                                                 
593 Plutarch, Morals, “Lives of the Ten Orators,” trans. Charles Barcroft, vol. 5 (Boston: Little, Brown, 
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 Athens soon compounded the loss of Alcibiades by executing the best of her remaining 
military leaders in the trial of the Arginusae generals detailed above. The Athenian fleet, now 
demoralized by incompetent leaders and irregular pay, suffered a “sudden and complete” defeat 
the following year at Aegospotami. This defeat lost the Peloponnesian War and caused the 
downfall of the Athenian democracy.599  
5. The Oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants (404 B.C.) 
 The peace treaty ending the Peloponnesian War with Sparta ambiguously provided that 
Athens' “ancient constitution” would determine her form of government. The popular party tried 
to preserve the democracy, but the upper class favored oligarchy. When the Spartan leader 
Lysander threw his influence to the oligarchic party, “the popular assembly was compelled by 
sheer intimidation to pass a vote establishing the oligarchy.”600  
 Some of the leading actors in the drama that followed played an important role in the 
trial of Socrates. Critias, a former pupil of Socrates described by Xenophon as “the most 
avaricious and violent of the oligarchs,” was the leader of the Thirty Tyrants.601 Charmides, 
another of Socrates’ students, was also prominent in the oligarchy.602 Aristotle explains that the 
Thirty Tyrants, like the oligarchy of the 400 seven years earlier, initially pretended to restore the 
                                                                                                                                                
Coates, 1900) 332; Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003) 446-47: 
“Alcibiades again went into exile, knowing better than to return to Athens where his many opponents were 
waiting with a flurry of private lawsuits and who knew what public charges.”  
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J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient History, 
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601 Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield (London: 
Penguin, 1990) 38. 
602 Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield (London: 
Penguin, 1990) 38. 
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“ancient constitution.” The Thirty succeeded in duping the city for a season. “With all of this the 
city was much pleased, and thought that the Thirty were doing it with the best of motives.”603  
 Once the Thirty Tyrants secured their power, however, their true brutality emerged. The 
Thirty killed the wealthy to take their possessions and killed every other eminent citizen who 
posed a potential threat to their power. The Thirty killed 1500 Athenians in only eight months. 604 
 Socrates disobeyed the Thirty Tyrants on two occasions.  First, Socrates refused to stop 
conversing with the young when the Thirty ordered him to do so. Second, the Thirty ordered 
Socrates and four others to arrest Leon of Salamis, a democrat. Socrates refused to do so and 
went home instead. The Thirty nevertheless arrested Leon and put him to death.605  
 Despite their brutal killing of political rivals, the Thirty failed to root out their political 
opponents among the Athenian exiles that occupied Phyle. Fearing that they might lose power, 
the Thirty passed a law disarming all but a Council of 3000 with whom they promised to share 
power. After disarming the people, the Thirty “showed in every respect a great advance in 
cruelty and crime.” The Thirty granted the 3000 the power to put any other Athenians to death 
without trial. The Thirty also admitted 700 Spartan troops into Athens to help them maintain 
power, allowing the Spartans to occupy the Acropolis, the holiest ground in the city.606  
6. Second Restoration of Democracy (403 B.C.) 
 The exiles under Thrasybulus overthrew the Thirty Tyrants by force in 403 B.C. at the 
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battle of Munychia, a hill overlooking the Athenian port of Piraeus.607 Anytus, Socrates’ later 
accuser, gained prominence by playing a leading role in the overthrow of the Thirty. The exiles 
killed Critias during the battle. The remaining Thirty fled to Eleusis, and the Athenians elected a 
temporary governing board of ten men in their place. The Thirty had ruled for eight months. 
 After a brief fight with the Athenians, the Spartan king Pausanias arranged a settlement 
that restored democracy in Athens.608 The people decreed that “Athens be governed as of old” 
under the “laws of Solon” and the “statutes of Draco.” 609 The archon Eucleides established a 
general amnesty, and those who wished to secede from Athens left in peace to settle at Eleusis.610  
 Democracy’s hold on Athens remained tenuous despite this second restoration. Athens 
thwarted yet another attempt to overthrow the restored democracy in 401 B.C. by executing its 
leaders.611 The leaders of this effort to overthrow democracy, like Alcibiades, Critias, and 
Charmides before them, also had close ties to Socrates. The Athenians tried Socrates soon 
afterwards.   
7. Conclusion: The Motives of Socrates’ Accusers 
 Many scholars address the motives behind Socrates' prosecution and reach contradictory 
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conclusions.612 Nevertheless, the foregoing demonstrates the difficulties encountered by the 
democratic party in maintaining a democratic government in Athens from 411 B.C. until 
Socrates’ trial in 399 B.C. The tenuous grip of democracy on power suggests that the most 
probable motive behind the prosecution was the removal of Socrates as an opponent of 
democracy.613 Anytus, Socrates’ chief accuser, played a prominent role in deposing the Thirty 
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Socrates in his play “The Clouds;” and (4) Socrates' opposition to democracy and his personal relationship 
with tyrants, including Critias. In Robin Waterfield, Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (New York: 
Norton, 2009), Waterfield argues at p. 202 that Socrates was punished (1) for an intergenerational conflict 
caused by social factors rather than by individuals; (2) as a morally subversive teacher; (3) as a critic of 
democracy; and (4) because the Athenians wanted to purge themselves of undesirable trends, not just an 
undesirable individual. In E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, (Berkeley: U. Cal. P., 1951) Dodds 
argues at p. 182 that Socrates was the victim of a thirty year period of heresy trials that was marked by 
“banishment of scholars, lingering of thought and even (if we can believe the tradition of Protagoras) 
burning of books.” In I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (Boston: Little, 1988), Stone rejects Dodds’ heresy 
explanation and argues at pp. 138 and 140-173 that Socrates’ prosecutors desired to eliminate Socrates’ 
anti-democratic political views after the three oligarchic regimes between 411 B.C. and 404 B.C. In 
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and 
Controversies (New York: Oxford UP, 2002), the authors argue at page 209 that the motive was primarily 
religious. 
613 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 391: “The [people] considered him disloyal to 
democracy, and that his criticisms were more to be feared than the plots of the oligarchic conspirator. It 
was therefore deemed highly desirable to rid Athens of the citizen whose influence and careless tongue 
were felt to be a danger, though he took no part in politics and was the least likely of men to do the same 
contrary to the law. Anytus, an honest and moderate Democrat and at this moment perhaps the most 
important Athenian statesman next to Thrasybulus, was the prime mover in preparing the prosecution 
intended to silence the embarrassing.” Libanius, a rhetorician of the fourth century A.D., wrote an Apology 
that emphasizes the political aspects of Socrates' prosecution by the democratic party in Athens. Libanius 
attempts to defend Socrates against the following charges. First, Socrates was a man “who smiled on three 
tyrants.” Second, “Socrates hated democracy, and would have liked to have seen a tyrant at the head of the 
republic.” Third, Socrates “praised” the tyrant Pisistratus, “admired” the tyrant Hippias, “honored” the 
tyrant Hipparchus, and called the period of their tyranny [546-510 B.C.] the happiest period in Athenian 
history. Xenophon, Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, with English Notes, ed. Charles Athlon (New 
York: Harper's, 1876) 432 n. 1.  
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Tyrants, restoring democracy, and attempting to achieve social concord by reconciling oligarchs 
and democrats.614 Anytus probably perceived Socrates as a threat to a stable democracy.615  
 Socrates’ relationship with prominent members of the recent oligarchies certainly 
bolstered this perception. Two members of the Thirty Tyrants were close friends and former 
students of Socrates, including the leader Critias and Plato’s uncle Charmides.616 Plato depicts 
Critias as a long time acquaintance of Socrates in the Charmides, and Socrates is attracted to 
Charmides in Plato’s Charmides and Symposium.617 Alcibiades, recalled from exile by the 
Oligarchy of the 400 in 411 B.C. and given command of the fleet,618 publicly ridiculed Athenian 
democracy to the Spartans as an “acknowledged folly.”619 Plato depicts Alcibiades as one of 
Socrates’ lovers in Plato’s Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium.  
 Personal animosity may have provided another motive for the prosecution. Anytus was a 
politician and Meletus was a poet. Socrates admits in Plato’s Apology that he had made enemies 
and obtained “an evil name” by publicly deriding their professions.620 According to Xenophon, 
Anytus took pride in killing Socrates. Socrates once offended Anytus by telling Anytus that he 
                                                 
614 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 391; Peter John Rhodes, A Commentary on the 
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1981) 431-32. 
615 Robin Waterfield, Why Socrates Died: Dispelling the Myths (New York: Norton, 2009) 194, 202; J. 
Burnet, Plato: Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924) 100-01. 
616 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 390. Plato relates in the Symposium that Socrates 
saved Alcibiades’ life at the Battle of Delium in 424 B.C. 
617 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and 
Controversies (New York: Oxford UP, 2002) 202. 
618 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003) 389.  
619 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 390. 
620 Plato, Apology, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Dover, 1992) 22-24. Socrates had gone to politicians, poets, and artisans to test the Delphic oracle’s 
proclamation that no man possessed greater wisdom than Socrates did. Members of each profession had 
disappointed Socrates by proving themselves no wiser than Socrates.   
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should not raise his son to be a tanner like his father.621  
 Plato also describes a disputation between Socrates and Anytus in the Meno. At the end 
of the discussion, Anytus angrily tells Socrates that he is too apt to speak ill of people. Anytus 
ends the conversation by threatening Socrates: “If you'll take my advice, I would recommend 
you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do 
them good, and this is certainly the case in Athens, as I believe that you know.” 622  
 This threat by Anytus clearly refers to graphai, ostrakismos, and eisangeliai proceedings 
in the Athenian legal system. Of the three proceedings, the graphe procedure presented the 
greatest difficulty and risk to Socrates' accusers. Their selection of the graphe procedure for their 
prosecution presents the second puzzle in Socrates' trial.  
D. The Puzzling Choice of the Graphe Procedure 
Athenian political prosecutions generally took one of three forms: ostracism, eisangelia 
prosecutions, or graphe prosecutions. Of the three forms, only the graphe prosecution presented 
a significant risk to the prosecutor. Athens fined prosecutors as much as 1,000 drachmas if they 
failed to obtain at least one fifth of the dikast's votes. The prosecutor also suffered a partial 
dishonor (atimia) and lost any standing to bring graphai in the future.623  
Given the disadvantages of a graphe prosecution, it is perhaps surprising that Anytus, 
Socrates’ chief accuser, chose to institute a graphe against Socrates. Anytus was a cunning 
litigator and experienced in eisangelia prosecutions. He was the first man in Athenian history to 
“fix” a case, bribing an entire dikastery in 409 B.C. to escape his own eisangelia prosecution. 
                                                 
621 Xenophon, “Apology of Socrates to the Jury,” The Shorter Socratic Writings: Apology of Socrates to 
the Jury, Oeconomicus, and Symposium, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996) 17.  
622 Plato, Meno, Five Great Dialogues of Plato (Claremont, CA: Coyote Canyon P., 2003) 86. 
623 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 58; S.C. 
Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) 114. 
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His prosecution involved the loss of Pylos under his command during the Peloponnesian War.624  
 There are two reasons that Anytus selected graphe over ostracism and eisangelia. First, 
the limited availability of ostracism rendered it impracticable. Ostracism was only available on 
one day a year, and Athens could only ostracize one man per year.625  
 Second, the “reinscription” of Athenian law in 403 B.C. rendered an eisangelia 
prosecution against Socrates impracticable as well. The “reinscription” was a consequence of 
Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War the previous year. The Thirty Tyrants suspended 
Athens' democratic constitution when they assumed power in 404 B.C. After the Athenians 
forcibly restored democracy in 403 B.C., they no longer viewed their laws as adequate. A decree 
passed on the proposal of Teisamenos to review the laws and recommend supplementation.626 
Two boards of “law-makers” (nomothetai) prepared supplemental laws, and the boule 
scrutinized their proposals.627  
 The archons inscribed the approved supplements on a wall at the royal stoa (stoa 
basileios).628 The archons completed the reinscription in 403 B.C. during the archonship of 
                                                 
624 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 36. 
Anytus’ method of bribery, dekazein, literally means “to make into one’s cronies.” Modern scholars do not 
fully understand its details, but Athens later criminalized such bribery and made it punishable by death. 
Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1978) 173; Debra Nails, 
The People of Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002) 37. 
625 The Athenian Assembly could conduct an ostracism once a year, during the sixth month of the official 
calendar. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 
2009) 29-30.  
626 This project originally began in 410 B.C. but developments during the Peloponnesian War interrupted 
its progress. Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 46-
47. 
627 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 46-47; Bury, 
J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient History, 
14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 382; Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 373. 
628 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 48. The royal 
stoa was located on the northwest corner of the Agora. The magistrates inscribed a revised sacrificial 
calendar on the back of the wall. 
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Eucleides, who then declared the beginning of a “new era.” Any decrees or laws predating the 
“new era” were invalid, unless they were included in the new inscriptions. 629  
 Athens also made it more difficult to amend her laws. The ease of amending the law had 
contributed to the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B.C.630 Lastly, Eucleides declared a 
general amnesty for all persons except the Thirty Tyrants. The amnesty forbade prosecutions for 
any offenses committed before the “new era.” 631 
 Prior to the “new era” and the reinscription of Athens' laws, the decree of Diopeithes 
provided an ideal vehicle for prosecuting Socrates. This decree, circa 430s, authorized an 
eisangelia prosecution against any person who did not conform to the religious practices of the 
city, believe in the gods, or who taught new doctrines about things in the sky. 632 As described 
below, Diopeithes created his decree for the specific purpose of prosecuting the philosopher 
Anaxagoras.  
 The reinscription of 403 B.C., however, repealed the decree of Diopeithes. The most 
                                                 
629 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 46-47. 
630 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 48. Under the 
old method, a simple majority vote at one meeting of the boule and one meeting of the ekklesia was 
enough to abolish any existing law, however fundamental, or to make any new one, however drastic. 
631 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 51-
52; Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 47; Bury, 
J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient History, 
14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 392. Historians debate the scope of the amnesty. Waterfield, 
among others, contends that the scope of the amnesty was limited. Robin Waterfield, Why Socrates Died: 
Dispelling the Myths (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009) 134. Thomas R. Martin, on the other hand, 
describes the amnesty as “general…under which all further charges and official recriminations concerning 
the [reign of] terror were forbidden.” Thomas R. Martin, Ancient Greece: From Prehistoric to Hellenistic 
Times (New Haven: Yale U P, 2009) 162. 
632 Plutarch, “Pericles,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: 
Coates, 1900) 264: “And Diopeithes proposed a decree, that public accusation should be laid against 
persons who neglected religion, or taught new doctrines about things above, directing suspicion, by means 
of Anaxagoras, against Pericles himself.” Accord, Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 
478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 382; 
Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 200. Harold 
Mattingly places the date of Diopeithes' decree as 427 B.C. Harold B. Mattingly, The Athenian Empire 
Restored: Epigraphic and Historical Studies (Ann Arbor: U. Mich. P., 1996) 526-27. 
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attractive vehicle for prosecuting Socrates after the reinscription was the law against impiety 
(asebeia). Asebeia prosecutions against philosophers had succeeded in the past. The asebeia law, 
however, only authorized “public” or graphe proceedings in the heliaea.633 The more 
advantageous eisangelia proceeding was therefore unavailable for Socrates' accusers.  
 Anytus therefore arranged for Meletus, a known religious reactionary, to initiate a 
graphe prosecution against Socrates for asebeia in the heliaea. Anytus’ assistance in the 
prosecution capitalized on his political influence as leader of the democratic party. Cognizant of 
the potential penalties if the graphe prosecution of Socrates failed, Anytus procured the 
assistance of Lycon, a rhetorician of whom we know little else.634   
E. Socrates' Puzzling Defense 
 The third puzzle of Socrates’ trial involves Socrates' defense. Socrates’ indictment 
charged Socrates with impiety (asebeia) and sought the death penalty. Socrates' defense, 
however, focused on charges outside the indictment that Socrates considered more dangerous.  
 Plato, Xenophon, and Diogenes Laertius agree that Meletus’ indictment charged 
Socrates with three wrongful acts. First, Socrates did not believe in the gods of the state. Second, 
Socrates introduced new divinities. Third, Socrates corrupted the youth. 635 
 Socrates nevertheless began his defense by addressing a different set of charges. 
                                                 
633 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 199. 
634 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 391. 
635 Plato recites the official charges stated in Meletus' indictment as follows: “That Socrates is a doer of 
evil, and corruptor of the youth, and he does not believe in the gods of the state, and he has other new 
divinities of his own.” Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett 
(New York: Dover, 1992) 25. Xenophon gives a similar description: Socrates “did not believe in the gods 
the city believed in, but that he introduced other strange divinities, and corrupted the young.” Plato and 
Xenophon, Apologies, trans. Mark Kremer (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2006) 31. Diogenes states Meletus’ 
indictment of Socrates as follows: “Socrates is guilty inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods whom 
the city worships, but introduces other strange deities; he is also guilty, inasmuch as he corrupts the young 
men, and the punishment he has incurred is death.”  Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the 
Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: Bell, 1901) 72.  
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Socrates described these as the charges of his “old accusers” and stated them as follows: 
“Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and in 
heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines 
to others.” 636 Socrates regarded these charges as a greater danger than those in the indictment. 
The accusers leveling these accusations, says Socrates, “are the accusers whom I dread.” 637  
 As shown below, Socrates had three reasons to dread these charges. First, Athens gave 
no legal protection to free thought or free expression, choosing instead to criminalize them. 
Athenian dikasts had recently convicted philosophers on the same charges as those leveled by 
Socrates’ “old accusers.”  
 Second, Athens’ trial procedures lacked even basic due process protections. The absence 
of these protections permitted the dikasts, inter alia, to convict Socrates on charges outside the 
indictment and for reasons outside the evidence. Third, the dikasts often rendered unjust verdicts. 
Rather than basing their decisions on reliable evidence, the dikasts based their decisions on 
flattery, pity, and bribery. 
1. Athenian Criminalization of Thought and Expression 
The ad hoc criminalization of thought and expression by the ekklesia and the heliaea 
justified Socrates' “dread” of the older accusations. Neither freedom of thought nor freedom of 
expression was a protected legal right in Athens. To the extent that either of these freedoms 
existed, it existed only in the absence of restricting laws.638  
                                                 
636 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Dover, 
1992) 21.  
637 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Dover, 
1992) 21: “And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers… who began when you 
were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise 
man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse 
appear the better cause. These are the accusers whom I dread…” [Emphasis added].  
638 James A. Colaico, Socrates against Athens: Philosophy on Trial (New York: Routledge 2001) 122. 
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Any citizen making a public proposal or speaking in the ekklesia was subject to an 
eisangelia prosecution before the ekklesia or the heliaea for giving bad advice, accepting a bribe 
in exchange for his speech, or making a proposal that conflicted with existing laws. Potential 
penalties included large fines, loss of citizenship privileges, and even death. Citizens were also 
subject to the same penalties in a graphe paranomon prosecution before the heliaea for making 
any proposal that contravened existing law. 639  Since these procedures lacked due process 
protections, the potential for prosecution for every utterance exerted a significant chilling effect 
on freedom of thought and expression. 
 Socrates was not the first significant philosopher prosecuted in Athens for his thought 
and expression under the guise of asebeia. Prosecutors brought actions against Anaxagoras and 
Protagoras for asebeia prior to the trial of Socrates. The old accusers' accusations that Socrates 
“speculated about the heaven above, searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear 
the better cause” closely track the charges alleged in these earlier trials. 640  As explained below, 
the charges that Socrates “searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the 
worse appear the better cause” reflect the charges levied against the natural philosopher 
Anaxagoras circa 430 B.C. The charge that Socrates “makes the worse appear the better cause” 
almost certainly reflects the charges urged against the Sophist Protagoras circa 415 B.C. 
2. The Trial of Anaxagoras (circa 430 B.C.) 
Pericles' personal interest in philosophical questions and his regard for expert knowledge 
led him to seek to make Athens the center of the Hellenic “Age of Illumination” circa 530 to 400 
                                                 
639 Elizabeth Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech, and Democratic Judgment 
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640 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Dover, 
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B.C.641 Anaxagoras was reportedly the first of the early Greek philosophers to settle in Athens. 
Anaxagoras claimed, inter alia, that everything is in everything and that “of the small there is no 
smallest, but always smaller.” He also taught that Mind directs the cosmos. 642 Anaxagoras 
became a close friend and political adviser to Pericles. 
In an effort to damage Pericles politically, the oligarchic party in Athens targeted 
Pericles’ advisers in political prosecutions. The oligarchs succeeded in ostracizing Damonides 
“as a dangerous intermeddler and a favorer of arbitrary power.” Damonides first suggested that 
Pericles institute payment to the dikasts to curry favor by making “gifts to the people from their 
own property.” 643   
 Pericles' enemies also targeted Anaxagoras, focusing on Anaxagoras' denial that the sun 
and the moon were divine beings. Anaxagoras insisted instead that the moon was a stone and the 
sun was a piece of red-hot burning iron.644 These claims threatened the foundation of the Greek 
religion and rendered Anaxagoras susceptible to prosecution by Pericles' enemies for asebeia or 
impiety.  
 Successful asebeia prosecutions at this time, however, usually required the actual 
performance of irreligious deeds by the defendant, such as failing to participate in religious 
                                                 
641 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 377. 
642 Patricia Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia (Toronto: U. Toronto P., 2007) 
3. Anaxagoras was also the first to claim that the sun illuminates the moon, and that the sun is the source 
of generation of fruit in plants. Id. at 112, 126. 
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rituals or actively mocking them. Although Solon's asebeia statute did not technically require 
such proof, dikasteries refused to give guilty verdicts in the absence of irreligious action.645 The 
oligarchs had no grounds for allegations of irreligious action against Anaxagoras. Furthermore, 
Solon’s statute required prosecutors to pursue asebeia prosecutions as graphe actions before the 
heliaea. Prosecutors bringing meritless claims in graphe actions were subject to sanctions of 
1,000 drachmas and partial loss of their civic privileges (atimia).646  
 Since the oligarchs could not prosecute Anaxagoras under the existing law, they changed 
the law. Diopeithes introduced a decree during the 430s designed for prosecuting Anaxagoras.647 
The decree of Diopeithes authorized the eisangelia prosecution for asebeia of anyone who did 
not conform to the religious practices of the city, believe in the gods, or who taught new 
doctrines about things in the sky.648 The decree thus tracked Anaxagoras' teaching that the moon 
was a stone and the sun was a piece of red-hot burning iron. 649 Furthermore, the eisangelia 
prosecution authorized by the decree involved no penalty for malicious prosecution.650 
 The oligarchs brought an eisangelia prosecution against Anaxagoras under the decree of 
Diopeithes. Athens convicted Anaxagoras. Some accounts report that his penalty was death, but 
                                                 
645 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 200.  
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others report that his penalty was only exile.651 Diopeithes' decree represents the criminalization 
of philosophical thought and expression, not irreligious action.  
 Two of the charges that most concerned Socrates, that Socrates “searches into things 
under the earth and in heaven,” and that Socrates “teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others,” 
clearly echo the charges from the prosecution of Anaxagoras. Socrates expressly confirms this in 
the Apology by stating that Meletus thinks he is accusing Anaxagoras.652  
3. The Trial of Protagoras (circa 415 B.C.) 
 The third charge, that Socrates “makes the worse appear the better cause,” is a clear 
reference to the Sophist Protagoras. 653 The asebeia prosecution of Protagoras circa 415 B.C. 
closely parallels the prosecution of Anaxagoras fifteen years earlier. Protagoras was a close 
associate of Alcibiades, 654 and Alcibiades had recently returned to the political stage. Protagoras 
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Ashgate, 2007) 21. 
  
170 
probably came to Athens to assist Alcibiades in formulating his political strategy.655 The 
prosecution of Protagoras was an effort to damage Alcibiades politically. It was probably 
coordinated with the fraudulent prosecution of Alcibiades for profaning the Eleusinian mysteries 
in 415 B.C. 656 
 Alcibiades’ enemies prosecuted Protagoras in an eisangelia proceeding under the decree 
of Diopeithes. 657 Diogenes Laertius reports that the prosecutors charged Protagoras with 
agnosticism arising from a public reading of Protagoras’ “On the Gods.” 658  “On the Gods” 
contains the following statement: “Concerning the Gods, I am not able to know to a certainty 
whether they exist or whether they do not. For there are many things which prevent one from 
knowing, especially the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of the life of man.” 659  
 Protagoras’ chief accuser was Pythodorus. The ekklesia banished Protagoras for his 
agnosticism. 660  A public crier ordered Athenians to bring their copies of Protagoras’ “On the 
Gods” to the market place where officials burned them.661  
 
                                                 
655 Ugo Zilioli, Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism: Plato's Subtlest Enemy (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2007) 21. 
656 Ugo Zilioli, Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism: Plato's Subtlest Enemy (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2007) 21. Protagoras was in Athens by 421 B.C., and 415 B.C. is the most probable date of 
Anaxagoras’ departure from Athens. 
657 Ugo Zilioli, Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism: Plato's Subtlest Enemy (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2007) 21; Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1978) 201.  
658 Diogenes Laertius, “Life of Protagoras,” The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. 
C.D. Yonge (London, Bell, 1901) 397-99. 
659 Diogenes Laertius, “Life of Protagoras,” The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. 
C.D. Yonge (London, Bell, 1901) 398. 
660 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 201: 
“Although our evidence does not make the legal procedure clear, and one cannot be quite sure that the 
trials were held at all, I regard it as probable that both Anaxagoras and Protagoras were prosecuted by 
eisangelia in accordance with the decree of Diopeithes.”  
661 Diogenes Laertius, “Life of Protagoras,” The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. 
C.D. Yonge (London, Bell, 1901) 398. 
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4. Lack of Due Process Protections 
 The second reason that justified Socrates' dread of his old accusers' charges was the lack 
of due process protections in Athens’ trial procedures. The absence of these protections 
permitted the dikasts, inter alia, to convict Socrates on charges outside the indictment and for 
reasons outside the evidence. 
 American law requires, for example, that criminal statutes define the prohibited conduct 
and the potential penalties with clarity and specificity. The law must furthermore fix these 
definitions and penalties prior to the defendant’s criminal conduct. Criminal convictions also 
require proof of mens rea, proof that the defendant intended to engage in the prohibited conduct 
and did so knowingly. No conviction will stand for any act unless the indictment specifically 
lists that act. The punishment must not be excessive, and appeal is automatic in all capital 
convictions.  
 Athenian law provided none of these due process protections. Douglas MacDowell 
reconstructs the asebeia statute as follows:  “If anyone commits asebeia, let anyone who wishes 
submit a graphe.”662  The statute gives no definition for asebeia. 663 Second, the statute specifies 
no penalty.664 Third, the asebeia statute contains no mens rea requirement for conviction.665 
Fourth, there was no appeal from any decision of the heliaea. 
 Even the heliastic oath taken by each dikast reflects the pervasiveness of undefined laws 
                                                 
662 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 129. 
MacDowell reconstructs the asebeia statute using the Athenian hybris statute as a model. The hybris 
statute survives in a speech composed by Demosthenes for a hybris case. Demosthenes, “Against 
Meidias,” Legal Speeches of Democratic Athens: Sources for Athenian History, trans. Andrew Wolpert 
and Konstantinos Kapparis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011) 79-136. 
663 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 12. 
Solon failed to state his laws in “simple and explicit terms.”  
664 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 129, 199. 
Demosthenes preserves the law against hybris.  
665 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 198-99. 
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in the heliaea. “I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees passed by 
the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there is no law, in consonance with my sense of what is 
most just, without favor or enmity. I will vote only on the matters raised in the charge, and I will 
listen impartially to the accusers and defenders alike.” 666  
 Socrates realized that the dikasts would not restrict their deliberations to the charges 
listed in the indictment. They would not restrict their deliberations by any legal definition of 
asebeia. They would not restrict their judgment by any prescribed penalty. There would be no 
appeal from their initial judgment. These realizations, plus Athens' recent history of convicting 
philosophers, gave Socrates ample reason to dread the charges of his old accusers.  
5. The Character and Corruption of the Dikasteries 
 The third reason that justified Socrates' dread of his old accusers' charges was the 
character of the dikasts in the heliaea. Thucydides notes the gullibility of the Athenian dikast, 
writing that the Athenians were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.667 In 
Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ trial, Hermogenes remarks on the dikasts’ reputation for unjust 
decisions. The dikasts often put innocent men to death. The dikasts also acquitted the guilty 
equally often, persuaded by flattering arguments or moved by pity. 668  
 Pericles’ politically motivated payments to the dikasts had a corrupting effect on the 
heliaea. 669 Socrates charges Pericles in Plato’s Gorgias with corrupting the Athenian character 
                                                 
666 James A. Colaico, Socrates against Athens: Philosophy on Trial (New York: Routledge 2001) 125. 
Colaico reconstructs the heliastic oath from the work of Demosthenes. Socrates refers to the heliastic oath 
in Plato's Apology. Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New 
York: Dover, 1992) 35.  
667 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1972) 442-43. 
668 Xenophon, Socrates’ Defense, Conversations of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Robin 
Waterfield (London: Penguin, 1990) 41-42: “Don’t you see that the Athenian courts have often been 
prevailed upon by argument to put innocent men to death, and equally have often acquitted the 
wrongdoers, either out of pity aroused by the speeches or because they’ve been flattered?”  
669 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 37. 
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at large by instituting pay, making the citizens “idle, cowardly, talkative, and avaricious.” 670 
Aristotle relates that contemporary critics charged Pericles with corrupting the character of the 
juries. After payment was instituted, “it was always the common people who put themselves 
forward for selection as jurors, rather than men of better position.” 671 “It was the citizen of the 
poorest class who was attracted by the pay, and it was he who sat enthroned in the courts.” 672 
Aristotle also blames the payment of dikasts for the problem of bribery to the Athenian 
courts. Bribery was unknown until Pericles introduced payment for dikasts and the poor, the 
elderly, and city-dwellers became disproportionately overrepresented in the volunteer pool.673 
The first instance of bribery involved Anytus.  
Anytus, of course, was the chief accuser at Socrates’ trial in 399 B.C. The wealthy 
Anytus was the target of an eisangelia prosecution for the loss of Pylos by his command during 
the Peloponnesian War. Anytus obtained an acquittal by bribing the entire dikastery. 674 Socrates 
was certainly aware that Anytus could resort to bribery to secure a conviction in Socrates’ case 
as well.   
The extent of the precautions employed by the heliaea to prevent bribery exposes the 
pervasiveness of the problem. One precaution was the use of large dikasteries in hopes that their 
size would render bribery economically impracticable. The usual size of the dikasteries was 501 
for a graphe or “public” prosecution and 201 for a dike or “private” case. Important cases, 
                                                 
670 Plato, “Gorgias,” Plato in Twelve Volumes, trans. W. R. M. Lamb vol. 3 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
1967) 515e.   
671 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 36.  
672 Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 112. 
673 Adriaan Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006) 
38. 
674 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 36; 
Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1978) 173; Debra Nails, 
The People of Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002) 37. 
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however, required dikasteries as large as 6,001.675 Odd numbers of dikasts prevented hung 
verdicts. 
Another precaution against bribery was the heliastic oath taken by each dikast.676 
Although every dikast was required to take this oath, Athens did not require any litigants to take 
an oath before presenting their case. Furthermore, litigants were not subject to prosecution for 
perjury. 677  
F. The Verdicts in Socrates’ Trial 
 Although the exact number of dikasts in Socrates' trial is unknown, many scholars accept 
the typical dikastery of 501 utilized in graphe prosecutions as the size of the dikastery in 
Socrates' trial. 678 Accepting this number arguendo, the heliaea convicted Socrates by a vote of 
280 to 221.679 Athenian law permitted dikasts to vote for the execution of innocent defendants, 
and eighty dikasts who found Socrates innocent voted for his execution.680 
 After the conviction, each side presented its proposed punishment. Socrates' accusers 
proposed death. The three main sources for Socrates' apology vary regarding Socrates' counter 
                                                 
675 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969) 33. 
6,000 jurors deliberated in 415 B.C. when Leogoras prosecuted Speusippos during the alarm over the 
mutilation of the hermae and the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries (which also led to the prosecution 
of Alcibiades). Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 
36.  
676 James A. Colaico, Socrates against Athens: Philosophy on Trial (New York: Routledge 2001) 125.  
677 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989) 42. 
678 Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989) 26.  
679 Socrates states that if thirty votes had “gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted.”  
Plato, “Apology,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Dover, 1992) 36. Diogenes Laertius records the vote as 281 to 220. Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and 
Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: Bell, 1901) 72. J.B. Bury records it as 
225 to 276. Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The Cambridge 
Ancient History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 393. 
680 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: 
Bell, 1901) 72. Diogenes is the sole source for this result. Although this result is widely accepted, 
Brickhouse and Smith are “deeply suspicious” of this report since there is no confirming source. Thomas 
C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989) 230. 
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proposal. Plato's Socrates initially likened himself to a hero and stated that he deserved to 
receive free meals at the Prytaneion.681  Athens bestowed such meals to honor citizens who 
performed special services for the state. 682 Socrates rejected any penalty that the dikastery might 
have deemed appropriate, and finally offered a fine of thirty minae. Many scholars contend this 
small fine incensed the judges.683  
 Xenophon's Socrates refused to offer any counter-penalty, claiming that any proposed 
penalty would constitute an admission of guilt. He also refused to let his friends offer one. 684 
Diogenes' Socrates initially offered to pay a fine of twenty-five drachmas. He withdrew it, 
however, when the dikastery voiced its disapproval. “My real opinion,” he stated, “is that as a 
return for what has been done by me, I deserve maintenance in the Pyrtaneum for the rest of my 
life.” 685 
 As often happened in Athenian history, Athens soon regretted its decision to execute 
Socrates and turned on his accusers.686 According to Diogenes, Athens condemned Meletus to 
                                                 
681 Plato, “Apology,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New 
York: Dover, 1992) 36-37. 
682 Stephen G. Miller, The Pyrtaneion: Its Function and Architectural Form (Berkeley: U. Cal. Press, 
1978) 129.  
683 Plato, “Apology,” The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New 
York: Dover, 1992) 38; Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook and F.E. Adcock, eds., Athens: 478-401 B.C., vol. 5 of The 
Cambridge Ancient History, 14 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964) 393-395. Scholars dispute 
whether this was actually a trivial sum. Brickhouse and Smith argue that it was a substantial amount, 
particularly in view of Xenophon's statement that Socrates' entire net worth was only five minae. One 
mina was enough to purchase a small herd of goats, or two oxen, or 120 gallons of wine, or thirty gallons 
of olive oil. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicolas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1989) 225-30. 
684 Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” Conversations of Socrates (London: Penguin, 1990) 46-47. 
685 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: 
Bell, 1901) 72. 
686 See discussion of the accusers in the trial of the Arginusae generals in Donald Kagan, The 
Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin, 2003) 466. 
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death and banished Anytus and Lycon. 687 Athens then honored Socrates with a bronze statue by 
Lysippus,688 thus earning “the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock 
on one day and statues on the next.” 689   
IV. Evaluation of the Athenian Legal System 
A. The Athenian Legal System Satisfies Hart's Conditions for a Valid Legal System 
 Athenian law lacked even primitive due process protections and gave the minority no 
protection from the tyranny of the majority. As demonstrated by the Athenian ostrakismos 
procedure, the Athenian legal system intentionally permitted the conviction and punishment of 
the innocent. As demonstrated by the punishment phase of Socrates' trial, dikasts could vote to 
execute a defendant despite finding the defendant innocent. Nevertheless, the Athenian legal 
system satisfied all of legal positivism's requirements for a valid legal system.  
 As explained in Chapter II, Hart utilizes the external 690 and internal points of view 691 to 
explain the two conditions required for the existence of a valid legal system. The first condition 
                                                 
687 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: 
Bell, 1901) 73. Anytus had left Athens to travel to Heraclea. The people of Heraclea banished him on the 
day of his arrival. Id.  According to one source, supporters of Socrates at Heraclea stoned Anytus to death 
for his role in Socrates’ death. Xenophon, “Apology of Socrates to the Jury,” The Shorter Socratic 
Writings: Apology of Socrates to the Jury, Oeconomicus, and Symposium, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1996) 17. 
688 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: 
Bell, 1901) 73. 
689 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, “Federalist No. 63,” The Federalist Papers, ed. 
Ernest O'Dell (Sundown, TX: CreateSpace, 2010) 289. 
690 The external point of view is the view of a person who feels no obligation that he “should” follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56. The external point of 
view is present in people engaging in mere “social habits” and “group habits.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept 
of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56, 57.  
691 The internal point of view, on the other hand, is the view of a person who feels obligated to follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56-57. 
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is that private citizens generally obey the primary rules of obligation.692 It is sufficient that each 
member of the population obeys the primary rules “for his part only” and “from any motive 
whatsoever.” In Hart’s terminology, it is sufficient that citizens take an external point of view 
toward primary rules. 693 Since Athenian citizens generally obeyed the primary rules of 
obligation, the Athenian legal system satisfied Hart's first condition for a valid legal system.  
 The second condition for the existence of a valid legal system under Hart's positivism is 
that public officials adopt the rule of recognition as their “public standard of official 
behavior.”694 Officials must feel themselves obligated to adopt and abide by the rule of 
recognition, and they must censure those public officials who fail to do so. In Hart’s terms, it is a 
minimum necessary condition that officials take the internal point of view toward secondary 
rules.695 Since the dikasts and other legal officials adopted the rule of recognition, the Athenian 
legal system satisfied Hart's second condition for legal validity.  
B. The Insufficiency of Autonomy and Consent for Legal Validity 
 Since legal validity determines the enforceability of law, the standard for legal validity 
represents the most fundamental issue for any legal system. As demonstrated in Chapter I, the 
experience of the English Revolution of 1603-1701 established the necessity of autonomy and 
                                                 
692 “[P]rimary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do.” Examples of 
primary rules include torts and criminal laws. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) 91. 
693 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116. “There are therefore 
two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, 
those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be 
generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity 
and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of 
official behaviour by its officials.” 
694 The rule of recognition provides “a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of 
obligation,” and it serves as Hart’s ultimate criterion for the validity of law.  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 94-95, 105. A rule is legally valid, and therefore 
enforceable, if it conforms to the requirements set forth in the rule of recognition. Id. at 103. 
695 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 117.  
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consent in determining legal validity. The trial of Socrates, however, reveals that autonomy and 
consent by themselves are insufficient to provide an acceptable standard of legal validity.  
 Autonomy and consent suffer from two shortcomings. First, autonomy and consent do 
not sufficiently protect the minority in a democracy from the tyranny of the majority. The 
Athenian ostrakismos procedure, which permitted the exile and execution of any innocent 
individual by the popular will, illustrates the need for such protection. 
 Second, autonomy and consent do not sufficiently protect against the conviction and 
execution of the innocent. By themselves, the principles of autonomy and consent still permit a 
legal system to treat its subjects as means to an end, just as Athenian law permitted Athens to 
treat Socrates as the means to a political end. 
 The trial of Socrates provides a compelling illustration of the need for procedural due 
process to protect against the conviction of the innocent.696 Procedural due process requires that 
defendants have the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 697 The court must submit every juror to 
pre-trial examination, and the court must exclude all jurors who cannot lay aside preconceived 
notions of guilt or innocence. 698 The court must draw the jury from a cross section of the 
community that is broadly representative of the community at large. 699 The jury verdict must be 
unanimous. 700  
 The court must change the venue of the trial if inflammatory publicity has repeatedly 
occurred within the community.701  The court must limit evidence to those facts tending to prove 
                                                 
696 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
697 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
698 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
699 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
700 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
701 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).  
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or disprove the specific charges against the defendant.702 The court must exclude evidence if its 
prejudicial value outweighs its probity.703 
 Every defendant has the right to assistance of counsel.704 The prosecution must prove 
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.705 Criminal statutes must be definite and 
certain in order to be enforceable. Vague statues are void.706 Furthermore, the prosecution must 
show that the defendant possessed a mens rea, a specific intent to perform the prohibited acts.707 
 Lastly, procedural due process does not permit excessive punishment. The punishment 
must not be disproportionate to the crime.708 The graphe prosecution of Socrates violated each of 
the foregoing requirements of procedural due process. Consequently, Socrates was condemned 
despite his innocence of the charges against him. 
C. A Principle of Reason is Necessary for Legal Validity 
 Socrates' trial demonstrates the need for a third principle, a principle of reason, to 
overcome the shortcomings of autonomy and consent. This principle, at a minimum, must (1) 
protect against the tyranny of the majority and (2) the conviction and execution of the innocent.  
The chapters that follow demonstrate additional requirements for the principle of reason.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 THE GALILEO AFFAIR 
“The intention of the Holy Spirit is to teach us how one goes to heaven and not how heaven goes.” 
       Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, 1615. 
 The heresy trial of Galileo in 1633 was the climax of a series of events that began in 
1613 with the publication of Galileo's Sunspot Letters. Historians refer to these events 
collectively as the Galileo Affair. In addition to the 1633 trial, the Galileo Affair included 
denunciations of Galileo in 1615 and 1624 before the Congregation of the Holy Office.709   
 The Galileo Affair exemplifies the need for validity restraints on legal systems to ensure 
they treat their subjects as ends in themselves. Like the trial of Socrates, the Galileo Affair 
reveals that autonomy and consent, although necessary, are insufficient by themselves to provide 
an acceptable standard of legal validity. A principle of reason incorporating procedural due 
process is also required to protect against the conviction and punishment of innocent parties. 
Pope Paul III created the Congregation of the Holy Office in 1542 for the purpose of 
defending and upholding Catholic faith and morals, including the suppression of heresy and 
heretics previously handled by the Medieval Inquisition. 710  After 1542, the Congregation of the 
Holy Office and the Inquisition became practically synonymous. The experience of the Holy 
Office demonstrates that even a legal system subscribing to the noble intention of saving 
immortal souls will embrace torture and terror if unrestrained by the principles of reason, 
autonomy, and consent.  
                                                 
709 A “Congregation” is a committee of cardinals charged with conducting a department of church 
business. Maurice Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U 
of Cal P, 1989) 14. 
710 The Second Vatican Council changed the name of the Congregation of the Holy Office to the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1965.  Maurice Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U of Cal P, 1989) 14. 
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 In 1616, as Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, Pope Urban VIII had been Galileo's greatest 
protector from charges of heresy before the Holy Office. In 1633, however, Pope Urban VIII 
initiated and managed the prosecution of Galileo as a political stratagem to preserve his papacy. 
The Habsburgs sought to replace Urban VIII as Pope after reversals in the Thirty Years War, 
publicly charging that Urban VIII was tolerant of heretics.711 Urban targeted Galileo to disprove 
this charge. 
The Holy Office based Galileo's 1633 heresy prosecution on Galileo's violation of a 
putative 1616 injunction from the Holy Office. This unsigned, unwitnessed, and unnotarized 
document ordered Galileo to “abandon completely the above-mentioned opinion that the sun is 
the center of the world and the earth moves, nor henceforth hold, teach, or defend in any way 
whatever, orally or in writing; otherwise the Holy Office would start proceedings against him.” 
The document also recited that Galileo promised to obey its terms. 712  
The Holy Office charged that Galileo's 1632 Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, 
Ptolemaic and Copernican violated the 1616 injunction. As demonstrated below, however, the 
evidence in the Holy Office's own records compels the conclusion that the 1616 injunction was a 
subterfuge designed to obtain Galileo's conviction and abjuration for political ends. Galileo was 
                                                 
711 Mario Biagioli, Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1994) 335. Habsburg clients also charged that Urban was secretly in league with the 
Protestants. Some claimed that Urban VIII was a secret Protestant himself, and threatened to have him 
deposed by convening a General Council. David Marshall Miller, “The Thirty Years’ War and the Galileo 
Affair,” History of Science 46 (1) (2008): 49-74, 72 n. 96. The Habsburgs leveled heresy charges after 
Urban VIII rejected Habsburg demands that he utilize such “spiritual arms” as excommunication and 
interdict against the Protestant heretics and their allies, including France. Pope Urban VIII refrained from 
taking these steps because Cardinal Richelieu had threatened that France would break with the Roman 
Church if the Pope proceeded against France.  David Marshall Miller, “The Thirty Years’ War and the 
Galileo Affair,” History of Science 46 (1) (2008): 49-74, 61. 
712 February 26, 1616, Special Injunction of the Father Commissary of the Holy Office to Galileo, 
published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 
1989) 147-48. 
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thus condemned for violating an injunction that he never received. Nevertheless, the procedures 
and actions of the Holy Office satisfied all of legal positivism’s requirements for legal validity. 
I. Legal Proceedings before the Congregation of the Holy Office 
A. Legal Definitions of Heresy 
Galileo’s condemnation states that Galileo rendered himself “vehemently suspected of 
heresy” for adopting the “formally heretical” view that “the sun is the center of the world and 
motionless.” 713 The Holy Office recognized two categories of heresy, “formal heresy” and 
“suspicion of heresy.” The Holy Office defined “formal heresy” as acts involving teaching, 
preaching, or writing matters against the articles of the Holy Faith, the decrees of the Sacred 
Councils, the determinations made by the Supreme Pontiffs, or the Holy Scriptures as interpreted 
by the Roman Catholic Church. Formal heretics included those who rejected the Holy Faith and 
followed or praised Islam, Judaism, or other sects. Formal heresy, in contrast to suspicion of 
heresy, involved a mens rea. The formal heretic committed heretical acts from evil intentions. 714  
 “Suspicion of heresy” was a lesser offense than formal heresy. The Holy Office defined 
suspicion of heresy as possessing, reading, writing, or distributing books forbidden in the Index 
or by other decrees. 715 Suspicion of heresy also included “occasionally uttering propositions that 
offend the listeners,” bigamy, taking holy orders when married, or listening to sermons by 
                                                 
713 June 22, 1663 Sentence published in Maurice Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History 
(Berkeley: U of Cal P, 1989) 287-91, 288, 291.  
714 Eliseo Masini, Sacro Arsenale Pvero Prattica Dell’officio Della Santa Inquisizione (Genoa: Appresso 
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heretics, even on a single occasion. Depending on the gravity of the offense, the Holy Office 
categorized suspicion of heresy as either “vehement” or “slight.” 716 
B. Initiation of Proceedings 
 The Holy Office recognized two procedures for initiating legal proceedings. The first 
procedure involved the filing of a third party complaint with the Holy Office. The complaining 
party in such cases was required to make a declaration of the purity of his motivation and to give 
a deposition before the Holy Office. The second procedure permitted the initiation of a 
proceeding at the discretion of an inquisitor acting on publicly available knowledge or publicly 
expressed opinion.717 
C. Procedure before the Holy Office 
 Proceedings before the Holy Office bore little resemblance to modern trials. The 
inquisitors did not bear the burden of proving that the defendant had actually committed a 
heretical offense or performed any particular act. Instead, the prosecution sought to establish 
heretical tendencies.718   
 The U.S. Constitution prohibits compelling defendants to give evidence against 
themselves.719 Beginning in 1140, canon law expressly prohibited the use of coerced confessions 
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as well.720 Nevertheless, the Holy Office considered confessions, even if obtained by torture, to 
be the purest and most reliable evidence.721 The express goal of all proceedings before the Holy 
Office was to obtain the confession of the accused by any necessary means.722  
The Holy Office justified coerced confessions on two grounds. First, the Holy Office 
maintained that the ultimate goal of the inquisition was the reclamation of an errant soul, not the 
punishment of errant actions, and confessions were essential to reclaiming the soul.723 The 
Church viewed the inquisitor as an impartial spiritual father whose efforts to reclaim souls must 
be unimpeded by legal safeguards.724 Second, the inquisitors sought to establish a heretical 
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tendency based on the secret thoughts and opinions of the accused.725 Since heretical tendencies 
involved mental processes, they often were not susceptible to material proof.726  
 The Holy Office gave itself every procedural and psychological advantage in extracting 
the confession. The Holy Office prejudged the accused as guilty before arresting him, and the 
prosecuting inquisitors served as the final judges in the cases they chose to prosecute. There was 
no presumption of innocence. Instead, the Holy Office presumed every suspect to be guilty.727 In 
cases of “vehement suspicion,” such as Galileo’s, there was not even a requirement of any 
evidence. By legal fiction, the “vehement suspicion” itself satisfied all evidentiary 
requirements.728  
The first demand made upon the accused in his trial was an oath that he would obey all 
the demands of the Church, answer all questions asked of him, betray all heretics known to him, 
and perform any penance imposed upon him. Refusal to take this oath constituted an admission 
of contumacious heresy.729  The Holy Office denied the accused any right to counsel, and any 
person that defended an accused heretic exposed himself to similar charges of heresy.730 The 
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Holy Office cloaked every aspect of the trial in secrecy, justifying the secret conduct of trials as 
necessary to prevent the further dissemination of heresy.731 Members of the Holy Office faced 
severe punishment for speaking or writing about past or present cases.732  
The Holy Office also concealed the accusers’ identities, thus depriving the accused of 
any opportunity to confront his accusers. The Holy Office concealed the evidence supporting 
those charges and the identity of the witnesses against him. This denied the accused any 
opportunity to challenge the evidence against him or cross-examine adverse witnesses.733 The 
Holy Office did not even inform defendants of the charges against them.734 
 Inquisitions before the Holy Office could be a protracted affair, and there were no time 
limits on duration of the proceedings.735 The Holy Office permitted no bail, imprisoning the 
accused for the entire duration of the trial, often under harsh conditions.736 Restricted diet 
reduced the body and weakened the will, rendering the prisoner less able to resist alternate 
threats of death and promises of mercy.737  
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If these measures failed to secure a confession, or if the inquisitors lacked sufficient 
evidence to support their suspicions, the inquisitors had discretion to torture the accused to 
extract his confession.738 In Galileo’s case, the Pope expressly directed the Holy Office to 
conduct Galileo’s interrogation under a formal threat of torture.739 This routine utilization of 
torture to obtain confessions was anomalous, as canon law since the twelfth century prohibited 
any use of torture by clerics as well as the coercion of confessions in ecclesiastical 
proceedings.740  
The express purpose of torture, as stated in Eliseo Masini’s 1621 inquisition manual, 
was “to make up for the shortcomings of witnesses, when they cannot adduce a conclusive proof 
against the culprit.”741 Although each accused was only subject to being tortured once, 
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inquisitors sidestepped this limitation by characterizing subsequent torture sessions as 
continuations of the original session.742  If the accused confessed under torture but later retracted 
the confession, the law presumed that the confession was true and that the retraction was perjury. 
The retraction proved that the accused was an impenitent heretic, and the inquisitors remanded 
the accused to the secular authorities for execution at the stake without further hearing.743  
The threat of punishment was an additional tool for obtaining confessions. Punishments 
ranged in severity from “minor penalties of humiliation” to public burning at the stake. 744 At the 
end of the trial, the inquisitors read the assessment of penalties and the accused received a final 
opportunity to confess his heresy. If the accused confessed, the inquisitors announced the 
accused reconciled to the Church and carried out his punishment.745 If he refused, however, he 
was “handed over to the civil arm” to be publicly burned alive. The civil authorities conducted 
all executions lest there be any blood upon the Holy Office. 746 
The inquisitorial procedure lacked even minimal safeguards to protect the accused 
innocent from false conviction. As English jurist Sir John Fortescue observed, the inquisitorial 
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procedure placed every man’s life and liberty at the mercy of any enemy who could suborn two 
unknown witnesses to swear against the accused. 747 No accused could escape the Holy Office if 
his inquisitors vehemently suspected heresy or otherwise desired his condemnation.  
II. Prelude to Galileo's First Inquisition 
A. The Starry Messenger (1610) 
Galileo achieved fame in 1610 by publishing his discovery of mountains on the moon 
and moons orbiting Jupiter in Siderius Nuncius (Starry Messenger). Galileo skillfully translated 
his scientific fame into political patronage, first by presenting his telescope to the Venetian 
Senate, then by naming Jupiter's moons the Mediciean Stars after the ruling family of Tuscany. 
The Medici rewarded Galileo with a position in the Florentine court and a sinecure at the 
University of Pisa.748 Since the dukedom of Tuscany kept close ties to the Vatican, entry into the 
Tuscan court afforded Galileo access to social, political, and religious influence. Galileo quickly 
capitalized on his entry into the Roman orbit.749 
Galileo traveled to Rome in 1611. The Jesuits of the Collegio Romano lauded Galileo 
and elected him to the exclusive Accademia dei Lincei.750 Membership in the Accademia 
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brought Galileo into contact with many of Rome's liberal literati.751 Galileo was proud of his 
membership and thereafter added the terms “Lyncaeus” or “Linceo” to his signature and to the 
title pages of his publications.752 Galileo's growing reputation, however, had already attracted the 
attention of the Congregation of the Holy Office, which first investigated Galileo in 1611.753  
B. Letters on Sunspots (1613) 
The Accademia dei Lincei published Galileo's Letters on Sunspots (Istoria e 
Dimostrazioni intorno alle Macchie Solari) in 1613. Galileo's Letters on Sunspots disagreed with 
the German Jesuit Christoph Scheiner's claim that sunspots were small planets, and Galileo 
correctly identified them instead as marks on the surface of the sun.754 Galileo's Letters on 
Sunspots added to Galileo's renown, but Galileo's defense of Copernicanism in the Letters on 
Sunspots placed him at the center of a growing storm of controversy.  
                                                                                                                                                
bore an illustration of a lynx on the cover with the words “...with lynx like eyes, examining those things 
which manifest themselves, so that having observed them, he may zealously use them.” Thomas G. Bergin, 
ed., Encyclopedia of the Renaissance (Oxford: New Market Books, 1987) 2, 137. The academy's founder 
Frederico Cesi bestowed his personal motto on the academy: “Minima cura si maxima vis,” meaning “care 
of the least things produces the greatest results.”  
751 William R. Shea and Mariano Artigas, Galileo in Rome: The Rise and Fall of a Troublesome Genius 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004) 30-44. 
752 David Freedberg, The Eye of the Lynx: Galileo, His Friends, and the Beginnings of Modern Natural 
History (Chicago: U Chi. P, 2002) 73. 
753 A former scribe, Silvestro Pagnoni, denounced Galileo to the Venetian Inquisition in 1604 for casting 
horoscopes and telling clients that the predictions were indubitable. Pagnoni tailored his accusations to 
match the condemnations of astrological determinism by the Council of Trent and the papal bull of 1586. 
A secret informer also denounced Cesare Cremonini, Galileo's friend and colleague at the University of 
Padua. The Venetian authorities dismissed the charges as the slanders of a mortal enemy. Some 
unauthorized person in Venice forwarded the charges to Rome, however, and the Roman Congregation of 
the Holy Office investigated Galileo in 1611 based on those charges. Michael H. Shank, “Setting the 
Stage: Galileo in Tuscany, the Veneto, and Rome,” The Church and Galileo, ed. Ernan McMullin (South 
Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005) 57-87, 66. 
754 Galileo wrote his Letters on Sunspots to the wealthy Augsburg Magistrate Mark Wesler, a well-known 
patron of the new sciences, in response to Christoph Scheiner's Letters on Sunspots, published through 
Wesler in 1612. Scheiner desired to save the perfection of the sun. Scheiner described sunspots as small 
intramercurial planets. Galileo correctly identified sunspots as markings on the solar surface. By studying 
the position of sunspots on successive days, Galileo inferred that the Sun rotates, and established its 
rotation period as close to one lunar month. Dan Hofstader, The Earth Moves: Galileo and the Inquisition 
(New York: Norton, 2009) 90-92.  
  
191 
Although Copernicus published his great work De revolutionibus orbium coelestium 
seventy years earlier, the telescopic evidence supporting Copernicanism was new. The discovery 
of Jupiter's moons, sunspots, and the phases of Venus brought Copernican ideas of the earth's 
motion and the sun's rest to the public and gave Copernican ideas a new credibility among 
astronomers. This new evidence also rendered the Aristotelian model of the universe as a series 
of concentric spheres increasingly untenable.  
Theologians sympathetic to the Aristotelian model sounded the alarm, summoning what 
Galileo termed the “terrible weapon” of scripture to their cause. 755 On December 14, 1613, 
Galileo received a disturbing letter from Benedetto Castelli, a Benedictine abbot and 
mathematician. Castelli was a former student of Galileo who succeeded Galileo at the University 
of Pisa. Castelli's letter explained that Castelli had encountered scriptural objections to Galileo's 
ideas at a meal in the Medici palace. Some of the objections came from the Dowager Grand 
Duchess of Tuscany, Christina of Lorraine.756  
This was troubling news. If the scriptural arguments of the Aristotelians persuaded his 
Medici patrons, Galileo might have to choose between the science supporting Copernicanism 
and the benefits of the Medici's patronage. Galileo hastily drafted a response to Castelli's letter in 
which Galileo examines “some general questions about the use of holy Scripture in disputes 
involving physical conclusions.” 757 The Holy Office would later use this letter against Galileo. 
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C. Galileo's Letter to Castelli (December 21, 1613) 
Galileo's letter to Castelli argues for the priority of sensory experience and 
experimentation over scripture in describing natural phenomena. Galileo's approach to scripture 
utilizes, and sometimes exaggerates, exegetical principles implicit in Augustine's commentary on 
Genesis, De Genesi ad litteram, as well Augustine's City of God.758 Galileo writes to Castelli that 
Scriptures have to “accommodate the incapacity of ordinary people.” Readers should not 
interpret all passages of Scripture literally, such as those that attribute hands and eyes to God. It 
thus follows that “in disputes about natural phenomena, [scripture] should be reserved to the last-
place.”  
Although scripture and nature both derive from God, scripture is necessarily open to 
multiple interpretations. Nature, on the other hand, “is inexorable and immutable” and is in no 
way bound to accommodate human understanding. Therefore, “whatever sensory experience 
places before our eyes or necessary demonstrations prove to us concerning natural effects should 
not be called into question on account of Scriptural passages whose words appear to have a 
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different meaning, since not every statement of the Scripture is bound to obligations as severely 
as is each effect of nature.” 759  
It is obvious, Galileo continues, that two truths can never contradict one another. 
Therefore, “the task of wise interpreters is to strive to find the true meanings of Scriptural 
passages that would agree with those physical conclusions of which we are already certain and 
sure from clear sensory experience or from necessary demonstrations.” Even though scripture is 
inspired, Galileo argues, its interpreters are not. 760 
Galileo next argues that the scriptures are limited to doctrines that bear on human 
salvation. Natural science lies outside their scope. “The authority of Holy Writ has merely the 
aim of persuading men of those articles and propositions which are necessary for their salvation 
and surpass all human reason, and so could not become credible through some other science or 
any other means except the mouth of the Holy Spirit itself.” 761 Where knowledge of nature is 
concerned, “the one who supports the true side will be able to provide a thousand experiments 
and a thousand necessary demonstrations for his side, whereas the other person can have nothing 
but sophisms, paralogisms, and fallacies.”  
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scripture. 
760 Ernan McMullin, “Galileo's Theological Venture,” The Church and Galileo, ed. Ernan McMullin 
(South Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005)88-116, 100. 
761 Ernan McMullin, “Galileo's Theological Venture,” The Church and Galileo, ed. Ernan McMullin 
(South Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005)88-116, 101. McMullin notes that this argument by Galileo is the 
Principle of Scriptural Limitation “in its strongest form.” The Principle of Scriptural Limitation provides 
that since the primary concern of scripture is with human salvation, we should not look to Scripture for 
knowledge of the natural world. Galileo would summarize this argument as “the intention of the Holy 
Spirit is to teach us how one goes to heaven and not how heaven goes” in a letter to the Grand Duchess 
Christina. Galileo's 1615 Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 87-118, 96. 
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Galileo concludes by addressing the text in Joshua 10:13 regarding the sun's motion.762 
Aristotelians argued that a literal interpretation of that text was inconsistent with Copernicanism. 
Galileo demonstrates that a literal interpretation of the text, which states that the sun stood still, 
was instead consistent with Copernicanism and inconsistent with the Aristotelian model of the 
universe as a series of concentric spheres.763 
III. Galileo's First Inquisition (February 7, 1615) 
A. Friar Caccini Denounces Galileo (December 21, 1614) 
Dominican Friar Tommaso Caccini publicly denounced Galileo as a Copernican on 
December 21, 1614, at the Church of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. 764  Although Caccini's 
superior wrote a letter to Galileo on January 10, 1615, apologizing for Caccini's “excessive 
zeal,”765 Caccini's fellow Dominican Niccolo Lorini filed a secret complaint against Galileo with 
the Congregation of the Holy Office on February 7, 1615.  
Lorini attached a copy of Galileo's December 21, 1613, letter to Castelli in support of his 
allegations. 766 Lorini wrote that he was motivated to file his complaint by Caccini's sermon 
against Galileo.767 Lorini requested that the Holy Office keep his complaint a secret.768  
                                                 
762 Joshua 10:13. “So the sun stood still, and the moon stopped, until the nation avenged themselves of 
their enemies. Is it not written in the book of Jashar? And the sun stopped in the middle of the sky and did 
not hasten to go down for about a whole day.”  (New American Standard translation). 
763 December 21, 1613 Letter of Galileo to Castelli published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 49-54, 52: “Given this, I say that this passage 
shows clearly the falsity and impossibility of the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic world system, and on the 
other hand agrees very well with the Copernican one.” 
764 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 300, 
302. 
765 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 300, 
302. 
766 February 7, 1615 Complaint of Lorini against Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 134-35. Lorini states: “I have come 
across a letter that is passing through everybody's hands here, originating among those known as 
'Galileists,' who, following the views of Copernicus, affirm that the earth moves and the heavens stand 
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Friar Caccini gave a deposition against Galileo to the Holy Office in Rome on March 20, 
1615. 769 Caccini charged Galileo with suspicion of heresy for holding “two propositions: the 
earth moves as a whole as well as with diurnal motion; the sun is motionless.” 770 Caccini based 
his charges on Galileo's letter to Castelli and Galileo's Sunspot Letters. He also cited hearsay 
sources including “public notoriety,” an unnamed Florentine of the Attavanti family, a priest 
named Father Fernando Ximenes, and the Bishop of Corona.771  
B. Cardinal Bellarmine's Letter to Foscarini (April 12, 1615) 
An assessor retained by the Holy Office to review Galileo's December 21, 1613, letter to 
Castelli found that “though it sometimes uses improper words, it does not diverge from the 
pathways of Catholic expression.” 772 Galileo's letter to Castelli, of course, represented only the 
opinions of a layman and cited no theological authorities. In February or March of 1615, 
however, the Carmelite theologian and philosopher Paolo Antonio Foscarini awakened the 
Church hierarchy to a threat of Copernicanism from within its own ranks. Foscarini published a 
book, Letter on the Pythagorean and Copernican Opinion of the Earth's Motion and Sun's Rest, 
                                                                                                                                                
still. In the judgment of all our Fathers at this very religious convent of St. Mark, it contains many 
propositions which to us seem either suspect or rash...” 
767 February 7, 1615 Complaint of Lorini against Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 135: “And I also inform you that the 
occasion of my writing was one or two public sermons given in our church of Santa Maria Novella by 
Father Tommaso Caccini, commenting on the book of Joshua in chapter 10 of the said book.” 
768 February 7, 1615 Complaint of Lorini against Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 135: “I also beg Your Most Illustrious 
Lordship that this letter of mine (I am not referring to the other letter mentioned above) be kept secret by 
you, as I am sure you will, and that it be recorded not as a judicial deposition but only as a friendly notice 
between you and me, as between a servant and a special patron.”  
769 March 20, 1615 Deposition of Friar Tommaso Caccini published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 136-41. 
770 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 138. 
771 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 138. 
772 1615 Consultant’s Report on Galileo's December 21, 1613, Letter to Castelli published in Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 135-36. 
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arguing that Copernicanism was compatible with scripture.773 Many of Foscarini's arguments 
mirrored those asserted in Galileo's letter to Castelli.774  
On April 12, 1615, the Jesuit theologian and Cardinal Robert Bellarmine sent a letter to 
Foscarini commenting on Foscarini's Letter. Bellarmine states in his letter that his comments 
apply to Galileo as well as Foscarini. Bellarmine, the most influential and respected theologian 
and churchman of his time, makes three points in his letter.775 First, Bellarmine praises Galileo 
and Foscarini for “proceeding prudently by limiting yourselves to speaking suppositionally and 
not absolutely, as I have always believed that Copernicus spoke.” 776  
Second, Bellarmine reminds Foscarini that the Council of Trent prohibits any 
interpretation of scripture that contradicts the meaning established by the common consensus of 
the Holy Fathers. “[I]f Your Paternity wants to read not only the Holy Fathers, but also the 
modern commentaries on Genesis, the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, and Joshua, you will find all 
agreeing in the literal interpretation that the sun is in heaven and turned around the earth with 
great speed, and that the earth is very far from heaven and sits motionless at the center of the 
world.” Bellarmine ominously adds, “consider now, with your sense of prudence, whether the 
                                                 
773 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 300. 
Foscarini's book, published in Naples in 1615, is entitled Letter on the Pythagorean and Copernican 
Opinion of the Earth's Motion and Sun's Rest and on the New The Pythagorean World System, in which 
are harmonized and reconciled those passages of the Holy Scripture and those theological propositions 
which can never be adduced against this opinion. 
774 Like Galileo, Foscarini's exegesis applied the Augustinian interpretive principles of Accommodation, 
Scriptural Limitation, Prudence, and Demonstration. See note 50, supra. There is no reason to believe, 
however, that Foscarini read Galileo's letter to Castelli before composing his own analysis of the 
compatibility of Copernicanism with scripture. Ernan McMullin, “Galileo's Theological Venture,” The 
Church and Galileo, ed. Ernan McMullin (South Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005) 88-116, 103. 
775 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 30. An English translation of Cardinal Bellarmine's April 12, 1615 letter to Foscarini appears at 
pages 67-69. Pope Pius XI canonized Bellarmine in 1930, and declared Bellarmine a Doctor of the 
Universal Church in 1931. Bellarmine is the patron saint of catechists. 
776 April 12, 1615, Letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to Foscarini published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 67-69, 67. 
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Church can tolerate giving Scripture a meaning contrary to the Holy Fathers and to all the Greek 
and Latin commentators.”777  
Lastly, Bellarmine closes his letter with a warning. If a demonstration showed that the 
earth orbited the sun, “then one would have to proceed with great care in explaining the 
scriptures that appear contrary, and say rather that we do not understand them than that what is 
demonstrated is false.” 778 
C. The Council of Trent and Interpretation of Scripture 
Bellarmine's letter illustrates the emphasis placed by the Roman Catholic Church on 
controlling scriptural interpretation. Martin Luther initiated the Reformation in 1517. Two 
Protestant departures from Catholicism include the claim that scripture should be available to 
every individual in the vernacular, and the claim that every individual should be allowed to 
interpret scripture for himself.  
Scripture was widely interpreted by Protestants as providing that salvation was a gift of 
God's grace, based on faith alone, and not on works.779 Salvation therefore did not require 
compliance with the sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, every believer 
served as his own priest with direct access to God.780 There was thus no need for a clerical 
hierarchy such as existed in Roman Catholicism, a hierarchy that Protestants viewed as corrupted 
                                                 
777 April 12, 1615, Letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to Foscarini published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 67-69, 67-68. 
778 April 12, 1615, Letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to Foscarini published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 67-69, 68-69. 
779 See, e.g., Ephesians 2:8-9: “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, 
it is the gift of God; not as a result of works, so that no one may boast.” Galatians 2:16: “[N]evertheless 
knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the Law but through faith in Christ Jesus, even we 
have believed in Christ Jesus, so that we may be justified by faith in Christ and not by the works of the 
Law; since by the works of the Law no flesh will be justified.” [New American Standard translation]. 
780 See Ephesians 2:18: “for through Him [the crucified Christ] we both have our access in one Spirit to the 
Father.”  [New American Standard translation]. 
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by temporal concerns. A broad acceptance of these doctrines threatened the continued existence 
of Roman Catholicism. 
The Council of Trent convened from 1545-1563 to formulate its response to Protestant 
gains. One of the Council's first concerns was reestablishing a tight control over scriptural 
interpretation. At its Fourth Session on April 8, 1546, the Council of Trent issued the following 
decree regarding scriptural interpretation:  
Furthermore, to check unbridled spirits, it decrees that no one relying on his own 
judgment shall, in matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of 
Christian doctrine, distorting the Holy Scriptures in accordance with his own 
conceptions, presume to interpret them contrary to that sense which holy mother 
Church, to whom it belongs to judge of their true sense and interpretation, has 
held and holds, or even contrary to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers, even 
though such interpretations should never at any time be published. Those who act 
contrary to this shall be made known to ordinaries and punished in accordance 
with the penalties prescribed by the law.781 
 
 The Galileo Affair did not involve the authority of scripture. It involved the authority of 
the Church to act as the sole interpreter of scripture. Galileo and Foscarini advanced cogent 
arguments that Copernicanism was consistent with scripture. The Church's objection to Galileo 
and Foscarini was not that they challenged the authority of scripture per se, but rather that their 
interpretation of scripture conflicted with the interpretation mandated by the consensus of the 
Church Fathers. This was the conduct prescribed by the Council of Trent, and this is why 
Bellarmine's letter expressly warns Foscarini to consider “whether the Church can tolerate 
giving Scripture a meaning contrary to the Holy Fathers.” 782  
                                                 
781 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 12. The Fifth Session of the Council of Trent also restricted the teaching of scripture on June 17, 
1546. Its decree held in part as follows: “[So] that under the semblance of piety impiety may not be 
disseminated, the same holy council has decreed that no one be admitted to this office of instructor, 
whether such instruction be public or private, who has not been previously examined and approved by the 
bishop of the locality as to his life, morals, and knowledge.”  Id.  
782 This is also the reason that Copernicus delayed publishing his De revolutionibus orbium coelestium 
until he was on his deathbed. Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary 
History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 25. 
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D. The Holy Office's First Investigation of Galileo (November, 1615) 
The Holy Office followed up the March 20, 1615 deposition of Friar Tommaso Caccini 
by summoning and deposing the two witnesses named by Caccini in his deposition. The Holy 
Office deposed Father Master Ferdinando Ximenes, a forty-year-old Dominican priest, in 
Florence on November 13, 1615.783 The Holy Office deposed Lord Giannozzo Attavanti, a 
thirty-three year old Florentine nobleman, in Florence on November 14, 1615. 784  
Father Ximenes denied having ever seen or spoken to Galileo. He admitted hearing 
Galileo's students discussing “the sun's immobility,” which Ximenes maintained, “is a doctrine 
diametrically opposed to true theology and philosophy.” Lord Attavanti admitted hearing Galileo 
defend Copernicanism, but also claimed that “I have never heard Mr. Galileo say things that 
conflict with Holy Scripture or with our holy Catholic faith.”  Attavanti referred to Galileo's 
Letter on Sunspots as his main source of information regarding Galileo's views. Eleven days 
later, on November 25, 1615, the Holy Office decided to examine Galileo's Letter on Sunspots. 
785
 
E. Galileo Travels to Rome (December, 1615) 
Aware of the gathering opposition to Copernicanism in Rome, as well as rumors that the 
Holy Office might condemn him, Galileo traveled to Rome in December 1615. Lodging at the 
                                                 
783 November 13, 1615, Deposition of Father Master Ferdinando Ximenes published in Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 141-43.  
784 November 14, 1615, Deposition of Lord Giannozzo Attavanti published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 143-46, 144: “I have never heard 
Mr. Galileo say things that conflict with Holy Scripture or with our holy Catholic faith. But in regard to 
philosophical and mathematical matters, I have heard Mr. Galileo say, in accordance with Copernicus's 
doctrine, that the earth moves both around its center and as a whole, and the sun likewise moved around its 
center but (viewed from outside) does not have progressive motion, according to some letters published by 
him in Rome under the title On Sunspots, to which I refer in all this.”  
785 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 301, 
328 n. 46. 
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Tuscan embassy, Galileo hoped to prevent the condemnation of Copernicanism and his own 
disgrace as a heretic.786  
The Holy Office's examination of Galileo's Letter on Sunspots failed to reveal any 
explicit assertion of the Earth's motion or other presumably heretical assertion. 787 Nevertheless, 
the Holy Office thought it necessary to consult a panel of eleven expert theologians for an 
opinion on Friar Caccini's allegations against Galileo in the Caccini deposition of March 20, 
1615.788 The theologians issued their report on February 24, 1616.789  
The theologians' report first addressed the proposition that “the sun is the center of the 
world and completely devoid of locomotion.” The consultants unanimously assessed this 
proposition as “foolish and absurd in philosophy, and formally heretical since it explicitly 
contradicts in many places the sense of Holy Scripture, according to the literal meaning of the 
words and according to the common interpretation and understanding of the Holy Fathers and 
the doctors of theology.” 
The report then addressed the proposition that “the Earth is not the center of the world, 
nor motionless, and it moves as a whole and also with diurnal motion.” The consultants 
unanimously assessed this proposition, like the first, as foolish and absurd in philosophy. 
Concerning theological truth, the consultants found that the proposition “is at least erroneous in 
faith.” 
                                                 
786 David Marshall Miller, “The Thirty Years’ War and the Galileo Affair,” History of Science 46 (1) 
(2008): 49-74, 52 n. 20.  
787 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 29. 
788 Annibale Fantoli, “The Disputed Injunction and Its Role in Galileo's Trial,” The Church and Galileo, 
ed. Ernan McMullin (South Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005) 117-149, 118. An English translation of 
Caccini's deposition appears in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History 
(Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 136-41. 
789 February 24, 1616 Consultant’s Report on Copernicanism published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 146-47. The report contains the names 
and ecclesiastical offices of the eleven consultants.  
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IV. Prelude to Galileo's Second Inquisition  
A. Bellarmine's Oral Warning to Galileo (circa March 1, 1616) 
A meeting of the Holy Office took place in the presence of Pope Paul V the next day, 
February 25, 1616. After being informed of the unanimous assessments of the eleven theologians 
against Galileo's propositions, the Pope ordered Cardinal Bellarmine “to call Galileo before 
himself and warn him to abandon these opinions; and if he should refuse to obey, the Father 
Commissary, in the presence of a notary and witnesses, is to issue him an injunction to abstain 
completely from teaching or defending this doctrine and opinion or from discussing it; and 
further, if he should not acquiesce, he is to be imprisoned.” 790 The March 3, 1616, minutes of 
the Holy Office reflect that Cardinal Bellarmine complied with the Pope's order.  
When Bellarmine instructed Galileo to abandon these opinions, the minutes reflect that 
Galileo acquiesced.791 Therefore, under the Pope's February 25, 1616, order recorded in the 
minutes, the Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi had no authority to issue any injunction 
to Galileo “in the presence of a notary and witnesses.” The March 3, 1616, minutes do not refer 
to any such injunction.  
Nevertheless, an unsigned, unwitnessed, and unnotarized document purporting to be a 
copy of such an injunction would be fortuitously “discovered” in 1632. An unprecedented 
Special Commission, appointed by the Pope to determine whether to prosecute Galileo for 
                                                 
790 February 25, 1616, Minutes of the Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 147. 
791 March 3, 1616, Minutes of the Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 148: “The Most Illustrious Lord 
Cardinal Bellarmine having given the report that the mathematician Galileo Galilei had acquiesced when 
warned of the order by the Holy Congregation to abandon the opinion which he held till then, to the effect 
that the sun stands still at the center of the spheres of the Earth is in motion...” 
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heresy before the Holy Office, would discover the injunction.792 The main charge in Galileo's 
1633 heresy trial would be that Galileo violated this injunction. 
B. The Decree of the Index against Copernicanism (March 5, 1616) 
On March 5, 1616, the Congregation of the Index, the arm of the Church responsible for 
book censorship, published a decree intended to assure that Copernicanism would not “creep any 
further to the prejudice of Catholic truth.” 793 The decree contained three main points. First, it 
stated that the doctrine of the earth's motion is false, contrary to the Bible, and a threat to 
Catholicism. Second, it “completely prohibited and condemned” Foscarini's Letter on the 
Pythagorean and Copernican Opinion of the Earth's Motion in which Foscarini “tries to show 
that the above-mentioned doctrine of the sun's rest at the center of the world and the earth's 
motion is consonant with the truth and does not contradict Holy Scripture.” 794 Third, the decree 
suspended circulation of Copernicus' On the Revolutions of Spheres pending its correction and 
revision.795  
The Index's March 5, 1616, decree mentions neither Galileo nor his work. Thanks to the 
efforts of the Florentine Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, the future Pope Urban VIII, Galileo escaped 
                                                 
792 Jules Speller, Galileo's Inquisition Trial Revisited (Frankfurt: Lang, 2008) 176. 
793 March 5, 1616, Decree of the Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 148-49. 
794 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 148-
150, 149. The decree also “prohibits, condemns, and suspends”...”all other books that teach the same” as 
Foscarini. Id. 
795 The Church eventually corrected Copernicus in 1620. The corrections deleted or partially modified 
approximately one dozen passages containing (a) religious references, or (b) language indicating that 
Copernicus considered the Earth's motion as a literal description of physical reality, rather than a 
convenient manner of speaking in order to make astronomical calculations and predictions. Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 30. 
The Church placed similar restrictions on similar books, including Diego de Zuniga's On Job. Zuniga, an 
Augustinian, argued like Foscarini that Copernicanism was consistent with scripture. 
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direct condemnation and Copernicanism escaped formal condemnation as a heresy.796 Galileo 
even received an audience with Pope Paul V. Galileo reported that he was warmly received by 
the Pope for three quarters of an hour, and that Pope Paul V reassured Galileo that Galileo 
“could feel safe” as long as Pope Paul V lived. 797  
C. Bellarmine's Certificate to Galileo (May 26, 1616) 
Although Galileo escaped official censure, he soon began receiving letters from friends 
in Venice and Pisa recounting that the Congregation of the Holy Office tried and condemned 
Galileo, forced him to recant, and given him appropriate penalties. Galileo took these letters to 
Cardinal Bellarmine and persuaded Bellarmine to write a brief and clear statement of what had 
actually occurred. 798 Bellarmine certified on May 26, 1616, that Galileo had not abjured or 
received any penances. Instead, Galileo had only been “notified” that “the doctrine attributed to 
Copernicus (that the earth moves around the sun and the sun stands at the center of the world 
without moving from east to west) is contrary to Holy Scripture and therefore cannot be 
defended or held.”799  
                                                 
796 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 32. Barberini was skeptical that anyone could ever disprove Copernicanism necessarily. Since 
God was omnipotent, God could have created any type of universe He chose, including a geokinetic 
universe. To argue that the universe was necessarily geostatic erroneously limited God’s omnipotence. Id. 
at 32-33. 
797 March 12, 1616, Letter to the Tuscan Secretary of State published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 151-53. Galileo writes: “I pointed out 
to His Holiness the maliciousness of my persecutors and some of their false calumnies, and here he 
answered that he was aware of my integrity and sincerity. Finally, since I appeared somewhat insecure 
because of the thought that I would be always persecuted by their implacable malice, he consoled me by 
saying that I could live with my mind at peace, for I was so regarded by His Holiness and the whole 
Congregation that they would not easily listen to the slanderers, and that I could feel safe as long as he 
lived.” 
798 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 302. 
799 May 26, 1616, Certificate of Cardinal Bellarmine, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 153: “We, Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, have 
heard that Mr. Galileo Galilei is being slandered or alleged to have abjured in our hands and also to have 
been given salutary penances for this. Having been sought about the truth of the matter, we say that the 
above-mentioned Galileo has not abjured in our hands, or in the hands of others here in Rome, or 
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This certificate, authored by Bellarmine in his own handwriting, provides the most 
detailed, undisputed, contemporary description of the warning given to Galileo. Importantly, the 
certificate makes no mention of any injunction by Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi to 
Galileo. Cardinal Bellarmine's May 26, 1616, certificate will provide the foundation of Galileo's 
defense in 1633. 
D. Urban VIII Becomes Pope (August 6, 1623) 
 Galileo refrained from defending or explicitly discussing Copernicanism for the next 
several years. The Florentine Cardinal Maffeo Barberini became Pope Urban VIII in 1623. The 
election of Barberini as Pope Urban VIII marked the beginning of a chain of political 
developments that culminated in Galileo’s 1633 heresy trial. As a Cardinal, Maffeo Barberini 
had been Galileo's greatest protector before the Holy Office. Barberini was instrumental in 1616 
in preventing the Holy Office from condemning Copernicanism as a heresy and condemning 
Galileo as a heretic. 800 As the politically vulnerable Pope Urban VIII, however, Barberini would 
become Galileo's greatest persecutor.  
 Pope Urban VIII began his reign as an admirer of Galileo, and his personal secretary was 
one of Galileo’s closest acquaintances. When Galileo published The Assayer (Il Saggiatore) 
regarding comets in 1623, Galileo dedicated the book to the new Pope. Galileo even included the 
Barberini family’s crest of three bees on its frontispiece.801 
                                                                                                                                                
anywhere else that we neither know, any opinion or doctrine of his; nor has he received any penances, 
salutary or otherwise. On the contrary, he has only been notified of the declaration made by the Holy 
Father and published by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, whose content is that the doctrine 
attributed to Copernicus (that the earth moves around the sun and the sun stands at the center of the world 
without moving from east to west) is contrary to Holy Scripture and therefore cannot be defended or held. 
In witness whereof we have written and signed this with our own hands, on this 26th day of May 1616. 
The same mentioned above, Robert Cardinal Bellarmine.” 
800 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 32.  
801 An anonymous complainant filed against Galileo with the Congregation of the Holy Office in 1624 
claiming that the atomistic theory of matter in Galileo's The Assayer (Il Saggiatore) conflicted with the 
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 Galileo visited Rome in the spring of 1624 and stayed for six weeks. The new Pope 
received Galileo warmly and granted him weekly audiences. Although no record of these 
conversations survives, subsequent events indicate that Galileo concluded from these meetings 
that hypothetical discussions of Copernicanism, such as its hypothetical consequences or its 
utility in performing astronomical calculations, were acceptable to the Pope.  
E. Galileo's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems (February 21, 1632) 
 Returning to Florence, Galileo began work on the volume that he ultimately published in 
February 1632, as Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican. This 
work catalyzed Galileo's heresy trial in 1633. The Dialogue portrays a series of discussions 
between three men over the course of four days. Salviati is an expert who takes the Copernican 
side. Simplicio is a scholar who adopts the Ptolemaic side. Sagredo is an intelligent, educated, 
and inquisitive layman. Sagredo knows little about the topic, but listens carefully and scrutinizes 
the arguments of the other two.  
 Notwithstanding his good relations with the new Pope, Galileo's experiences with the 
Congregation of the Holy Office in 1616 highlighted the need for caution in writing a new work 
on Copernicanism. Galileo cautiously treated Copernicanism as merely hypothetical throughout 
the Dialogue. Galileo opened the Dialogue by proposing the earth’s motion as a hypothetical 
cause of earth’s tides. To emphasize the hypothetical character of his new work, Galileo 
originally entitled it Dialogue on the Tides.  
 The book’s censors, however, demanded changes that would help vindicate the March 5, 
1616, decree of the Congregation of the Index. That decree had declared that the doctrine of the 
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earth's motion is false, contrary to the Bible, and a threat to Catholicism. 802  The final edition of 
the book’s Preface therefore stated that it sought to prove to non-Catholics that Catholics 
understood the scientific issues in the Copernican controversy. The Catholic decision to reject 
Copernicanism in favor of the Ptolemaic model of the universe “did not derive from ignorance of 
others’ thinking.” Instead, the Church based its decision on “piety, religion, acknowledgement of 
divine omnipotence, and the weakness of the human mind.” 803  
 Even though the scientific arguments presented in the book seem to favor the 
Copernican model, Galileo's character Salviati presents the arguments for Copernicanism as 
inconclusive. The Copernican model remains only a hypothesis in the Dialogue. Throughout the 
book, Salviati carefully qualifies his arguments for Copernicanism by insisting that the only 
purpose of the discussion is to provide information and enlightenment. The discussion does not 
seek a final resolution of the issue. That is a task reserved for the proper authorities. 804 
 As a final caution, Galileo closes the Dialogue by repeating Pope Urban VIII's favorite 
argument regarding Copernicanism. The Pope believed this argument was unanswerable. Since 
God was omnipotent, God could have created any type of universe He chose, including a 
Copernican universe. To argue that the universe was necessarily Ptolemaic erroneously limited 
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God’s omnipotence.805 After reciting the Pope's argument, Simplicio ends the Dialogue by 
observing that God has the power to accomplish His ends “in many ways, some of them even 
inconceivable by our intellect. Thus, I immediately conclude that in view of this it would be 
excessively bold if someone should want to limit and compel divine power and wisdom to a 
particular fancy of his.” 806  
F. Urban VIII and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) 
 
 The Galileo Affair of 1616-1633 played out against a grander conflict, the Thirty Years 
War of 1618-1648. The Thirty Years War began as a conflict between Catholics and Protestants, 
but it also involved the rivalry between the Bourbon and Habsburg dynasties for political 
preeminence in Europe. 807  As the war developed, Urban VIII attempted to navigate his papacy 
between the Scylla of France and the Charybdis of Habsburg Europe.  
 Urban's policies favored France and antagonized the Habsburgs. By 1632, however, 
Catholic reversals in the Thirty Years War rendered Urban's papacy so vulnerable to Habsburg 
political initiatives that Urban could no longer act as Galileo’s protector. Instead, Urban reversed 
his field and elected “to use Galileo as a scapegoat to reassert, exhibit, and test his authority and 
power.” 808 The Dialogue's cautious presentation of Copernicanism as a mere hypothesis would 
provide Galileo no protection in the new political environment.  
 The Thirty Years War began on May 23, 1618, with the second Defenestration of 
Prague. Two of the Holy Roman Emperor’s Legates ordered Bohemian Protestants to stop 
construction of chapels on Catholic clergymen's land. The Protestants responded by throwing 
                                                 
805 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 32-33. 
806 Galileo Galilei, “Ending,” Galileo on the World Systems: A New Translation and Guide, trans. Maurice 
A. Finocchiaro (U Cal. Press: Berkeley, 1997) 306-307. 
807 Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (New York: New York Review Books, 2005) 271. 
808 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 12.  
  
208 
them out of a high window in the Hradcany castle. The victims survived by landing on a heap of 
refuse.809 
 Catholics under the leadership of the Habsburgs held the upper hand during the early 
years of the Thirty Years War. Prior to Urban VIII, the papacy had generally favored the Spanish 
under the Habsburgs. French support elected Urban Pope in 1623, however, and the new Pope’s 
election reignited the Bourbon and Habsburg rivalry. Fearing that the increase of Habsburg 
power in the Italian peninsula threatened his own temporal interests, Urban attempted to utilize 
French influence to thwart Habsburg ambitions on the peninsula.810   
G. The Mantuan Affair (1627-1629) 
 The Bourbon and Habsburg rivalry erupted in armed conflict in northern Italy when the 
Duke of Mantua died without legitimate bodily issue on Christmas Day, 1627. The Duchy 
rightfully devised to a French nobleman, but the Habsburgs would not allow a French ally to 
control the strategically important Duchy, which linked the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire to 
Habsburg Spain. When the Habsburgs invaded Mantua in 1628, the new Duke of Mantua 
enlisted French aid. The War of the Mantuan Succession began as a peripheral conflict to the 
Thirty Years War when a French army crossed the Alps to support the new Duke in 1629.811  
 The Pope supported the French side, and the Habsburgs regarded this as a betrayal. Life 
in the Vatican during this period was trying for the new Pope. Urban complained that there were 
so many Spanish spies in the Vatican he could not speak above a whisper.812 He slept so poorly 
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from worrying about Mantua that he had all the birds in the gardens killed so their chirping 
would not awaken him during the night.813  
 The Mantuan Affair significantly eroded the political position of the Pope, formerly 
Galileo's most powerful ally and protector. The Mantuan affair also soured the Vatican’s 
relations with Galileo's Florence. Galileo’s Medici patrons felt constrained by Spanish military 
might to side with the Habsburgs. By 1630, Galileo had lost the political protection of both the 
Medicis in Tuscany and the Pope in Rome. 814 
H. Catholic Reversals in the Thirty Years War (1630-1632)  
 Urban’s political position became even more tenuous when the tide of the Thirty Years 
War turned against the Catholics and the Habsburgs. On July 4, 1630, the Lutheran Gustavus 
Adolphus of Sweden invaded Germany. After forging an alliance with France and obtaining 
French financing under the Treaty of Bärwalde on January 23, 1631, Gustavus Adolphus began 
reversing Catholic and Habsburg gains in the war. 
 On September 17, 1631, the Protestants crushed the Catholic and Habsburg army at 
Breitenfeld, near Leipzig. Two thirds of the Catholic forces died and the rest were scattered. The 
Habsburgs quickly lost control of the Rhine Valley, and the Swedish army invaded the Catholic 
stronghold of Bavaria in the spring of 1632. In only two years, Protestants had pushed 
Catholicism in Germany to the verge of extinction. A Swedish invasion of Italy seemed 
imminent.815 
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 The Habsburgs blamed Urban VIII for these reversals. They demanded that Urban VIII 
send them papal troops, give them taxing concessions, and employ such “spiritual arms” as 
excommunications and interdicts against the Protestant heretics and their allies, including 
France. Adding to Urban’s political dilemma, France's Chief Minister Cardinal Richelieu 
privately threatened to break with the Roman Church if the Pope should proceed against 
France.816  
 Urban VIII responded to these demands by seeking a middle path between the 
Habsburgs and France. He granted only a small portion of the financial concessions requested by 
the Habsburgs, even though previous Popes had routinely granted such concessions. Urban VIII 
also refused the Habsburg’s request for troops, and failed to declare the conflict a holy war. 
Urban focused instead on persuading France to break with Sweden and intervene on behalf of 
Catholicism in Germany.817  
I. The “Scandal of the Consistory” (March 8, 1632) 
 Urban VIII's policies infuriated the Habsburgs. In the aftermath of the Breitenfeld 
disaster, the Spanish Ambassador Cardinal Gasparo Borgia confronted the Pope at a consistory 
meeting on March 8, 1632. Borgia denounced the Pope at this meeting before the entire College 
of Cardinals, accusing Urban VIII of favoring heretics and lacking apostolic zeal.818 Borgia even 
called for a Council to assess the Pope's will and ability to defend Christianity.  
 Borgia then blamed the Pope for the Catholic reversals in the Thirty Years War. He 
began reading a statement that ended “... any injury suffered by the Catholic religion must be 
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ascribed not to himself, the most pious and obedient King [Phillip IV of Spain], but to your 
Holiness.”819 The Pope interrupted the ambassador before he finished, and the consistory 
meeting degenerated into a shouting and shoving match between the cardinals. The Swiss Guard 
was required to restore order.820 Borgia distributed the text of his address to each of the cardinals 
during the melee. 
 Threats soon arrived from Naples and Spain that their kingdoms might intervene 
militarily against Urban VIII on the side of Cardinal Borgia. On March 11, 1632, another 
confrontation ensued between Borgia and the Pope at the Holy Office. Cardinal Ludovico 
Ludovisi, a supporter of Cardinal Borgia, threatened to have Urban VIII deposed as a protector 
of heresy by convening a General Council.821  
 News of the “Scandal of the Consistory” and the accusation that the Pope tolerated 
heresy circulated quickly through the chancelleries of Europe, and tensions mounted. On April 6, 
1632, the Holy Roman Emperor's special envoy Cardinal Pázmány charged that Urban VIII was 
secretly in league with the Protestants, and rumors circulated that Urban was a secret 
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Protestant.822 On April 7, 1632, Gustavus Adolphus reached Bavaria, the heart of German 
Catholicism. The Swedes plundered the Jesuit colleges and expelled the Catholic priests.823  
 The Florentine Ambassador, Francesco Niccolini, reported to his government that 
allegations that Urban VIII protected heresy catalyzed the growing protest against him. 
According to Niccolini's “authoritative diplomatic source,” the Spanish party would use 
surveillance of orthodoxy and intransigence towards heretics as its political instrument against 
the Pope.824  
J. Urban VIII Decides to Prosecute Galileo  
 Thus, in the spring of 1632, Pope Urban VIII found his position in real and immediate 
jeopardy.825 A powerful Protestant army, brilliantly led by Gustavus Adolphus and financed by 
France, was massing beyond the Alps to invade Italy. The Pope even faced military threats from 
the Catholic kingdoms of Naples and Spain.  
 The Spanish party sought his deposition for leniency towards heretics. “Cardinal Borgia 
had dominated the consistory and isolated the pope, who knew that he could now count only on 
his relatives.” 826 The Pope was politically, psychologically, and physically isolated.827  
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 At precisely this moment in history, on February 21, 1632, the first copies of Galileo’s 
Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems appeared in Florence. Scientific circles received the 
book well, but a number of complaints soon emerged from Rome.828 Galileo could no longer rely 
on the Pope to protect him from these complaints.829  
 It was imperative that Urban VIII appear to act forcefully, and soon. “The Pope needed 
to make an example of someone, and Galileo was his man.” 830 Galileo provided the scapegoat 
Urban VIII needed to reassert his authority and demonstrate that he was a firm, decisive, and 
great papal prince. 831 On Urban's orders, the Congregation of the Index stopped all sales of 
Galileo’s Dialogue during the summer of 1632 and confiscated all unsold copies.832  
K. Political Advantages of Prosecuting Galileo 
 The prosecution of Galileo offered Pope Urban VIII four political advantages.833 First, 
Galileo was famous and politically connected. Humbling Galileo would prove that the Pope still 
controlled the lives of powerful men.834   
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 Second, Galileo’s Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems was only mildly heretical, 
if it was heretical at all.835 Censors in both Rome and Florence gave the work their imprimatur 
prior to its publication. The heresy prosecution of Galileo under the Pope’s direction would 
demonstrate that Urban VIII was a diligent and aggressive defender of the faith. It would also 
undermine Spanish accusations that Urban VIII was weak on heresy.836   
 Third, Galileo was a Tuscan. His Medici patrons were allies of Urban’s Habsburg 
adversaries. Punishing Galileo punished the Medici for siding against Urban. Punishing Galileo 
showed the world the perils of opposing the Pope.837 
 Fourth, Galileo offended Urban by placing Urban's arguments in the mouth of Simplicio, 
the clear loser in the debate of the Dialogue. The Dialogue argued for Copernicanism by tacitly 
mocking the Pope. The Pope’s political circumstances could not permit any personal insult to go 
unpunished.838  
V. Galileo's Second Inquisition 
A. The Special Commission 
Pope Urban VIII could not reap the political benefits of prosecuting Galileo unless the 
public perceived Urban as personally engaged in the proceedings. The Congregation of the Holy 
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Office, however, cloaked every aspect of its heresy trials in secrecy. The Holy Office justified its 
secrecy as necessary to prevent further dissemination of heresy.839 
In order to avoid this secrecy requirement, Urban appointed a three member Special 
Commission to examine the Dialogue and investigate its publication before referring Galileo's 
case to the Holy Office.840 The three Special Commissioners were Agostino Oreggi, Melchior 
Inchofer, and Niccolo Riccardi. Each Special Commissioner was unfriendly to Galileo.841  The 
Special Commission answered to the Pope’s loyal nephew, Cardinal Francesco Barberini, 
ensuring Urban's control of Galileo’s case. 842 
The Special Commission met five times and reported its findings in September, 1632. 
The Commission's findings asserted four complaints against Galileo’s Dialogue. The most 
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serious complaint was that Galileo violated an injunction dated February 26, 1616.843 The 
Special Commission first discovered this injunction, in 1632.844 Father Michelangelo Segizzi, the 
Father Commissary of the Holy Office, putatively issued it to Galileo in 1616.845  
The second complaint was that Galileo's Dialogue presented Copernicanism 
“absolutely” as a factual matter. The third complaint was that the book was actually a defense of 
Copernicanism. Galileo presented Ptolemaic as “impossible” but treated Copernican arguments 
“as demonstrative and necessary.” The fourth compliant involved a series of irregularities in 
obtaining the various permissions required for publication.  
 The Special Commission considered Galileo’s violation of the Segizzi injunction to be 
irreparable. 846 Since the injunction recited that Galileo acquiesced to its terms “and promised to 
obey,” the Special Commission concluded that Galileo's case must be forwarded to the 
Congregation of the Holy Office.” 847  
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B. Galileo is Summoned to Rome 
 Pope Urban VIII accepted the Special Commission's conclusions and forwarded 
Galileo's case to the Holy Office for prosecution.  At a meeting of the Holy Office on September 
23, 1632, chaired by the Pope, the Holy Office summoned Galileo to Rome.848   
Galileo and the Tuscan government spent the autumn of 1632 attempting to move 
Galileo's trial from Rome to Florence.849 When these efforts failed, Galileo made out his will and 
left for Rome on January 20, 1633.850 Sixty-eight years old and ill, Galileo traveled three weeks 
through plague-infested regions to complete the journey. When Galileo arrived in Rome on 
February 13, 1633, the Holy Office told him to wait in seclusion until authorities called him for 
interrogation.  
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Office chaired by the Pope considered the medical certificate and disregarded it. The Holy Office 
responded by sending Galileo an ultimatum. If Galileo did not come to Rome of his own accord, the Holy 
Office would send officers to Florence to bring Galileo to Rome in chains. Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
“Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 36. 
850 January 15, 1633 Letter of Galileo to Elia Diodati published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 223-26. Galileo describes himself as “troubled” 
and states the following: “I am about to go to Rome, summoned by the Holy Office, which has already 
suspended my Dialogue. From reliable sources, I hear the Jesuit Fathers have managed to convince some 
very important persons that my book is execrable and more harmful to the Holy Church than the writings 
of Luther and Calvin. Thus I am sure it will be prohibited, despite the fact that to obtain the license I went 
personally to Rome and delivered into the hands of the Master of the Sacred Palace; he examined it very 
minutely (changing, adding, and removing as much as he wanted), and after licensing it he also ordered it 
to be reviewed again here [in Florence]. This reviewer did not find anything to modify, and so, as a sign of 
having read and examined it most diligently, he resorted to changing some words; for example, in many 
places he said universe instead of nature, title instead of attribute, sublime mind in place of divine; and he 
asked to be excused by saying that he predicted I would be dealing with very bitter enemies and very 
angry persecutors, as indeed it followed.” 
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The Holy Office kept Galileo waiting for a month. According to government officials, 
Galileo's trip to Rome and the anxiety of waiting once he got there were partial punishment in 
advance of Galileo's proceeding. 851 The Holy Office decided Galileo's guilt months before his 
trial began. 
C. Galileo’s First Deposition (April 12, 1633) 
 Galileo’s first deposition took place on April 12, 1633. The questions focused on the 
events of 1616 and his 1632 Dialogue.852 Galileo admitted that he had written the Dialogue. 
Galileo also admitted receiving an oral admonition from Cardinal Bellarmine to abandon 
Copernicanism. Galileo's testimony was completely consistent with the March 3, 1616, minutes 
of the Holy Office.853  
 The Holy Office then surprised Galileo by confronting him with the February 26, 1616, 
Segizzi injunction. In contrast to Cardinal Bellarmine's gentle warning that Copernicanism 
“cannot be defended or held,” the unsigned, unwitnessed, and unnotarized Segizzi injunction 
sternly ordered Galileo to “abandon completely the above-mentioned opinion that the sun is the 
center of the world and the earth moves, nor henceforth hold, teach, or defend in any way 
whatever, orally or in writing; otherwise the Holy Office would start proceedings against 
                                                 
851 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 36. 
852 April 12, 1633, Deposition of Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 256-62.  
853 March 3, 1616, Minutes of the Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 148. The Minutes of March 3, 
1616 record that Galileo “acquiesced when warned of the order by the Holy Congregation to abandon the 
opinion which he held till then, to the effect that the sun stands still at the center of the spheres of the Earth 
is in motion.” [Emphasis added]. 
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him.”854 The Segizzi injunction recited that Galileo had acquiesced to its terms and promised to 
obey them.  
 Galileo denied that he had ever received such an injunction or been informed of such 
terms. He further denied that the Dialogue violated any of the terms of the false injunction. 
“With the said book I had neither held nor defended the opinion of the earth’s motion and the 
sun’s stability; on the contrary, in the said book I show the contrary of Copernicus’s opinion and 
show that Copernicus’s reasons are invalid and inconclusive.”855 
 Galileo then dropped his own bombshell on the Holy Office. To corroborate his 
testimony, Galileo produced a copy of Cardinal Bellarmine’s May 26, 1616, certificate 
describing the events of 1616. 856 Cardinal Bellarmine’s certificate corroborated Galileo’s 
testimony that Cardinal Bellarmine had only warned Galileo that “Copernicanism cannot be 
defended or held.” Bellarmine's certificate made no mention of the Segizzi injunction or its 
terms. Galileo further advised the Holy Office that he had brought the original to Rome in 
Cardinal Bellarmine’s own handwriting.  
                                                 
854 February 26, 1616, Special Injunction of the Father Commissary of the Holy Office to Galileo, 
published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 
1989) 147-48. 
855 April 12, 1633, Deposition of Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 262. 
856 May 26, 1616, Certificate of Cardinal Bellarmine, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 153: “We, Robert Cardinal Bellarmine, have 
heard that Mr. Galileo Galilei is being slandered or alleged to have abjured in our hands and also to have 
been given salutary penances for this. Having been sought about the truth of the matter, we say that the 
above-mentioned Galileo has not abjured in our hands, or in the hands of others here in Rome, or 
anywhere else that we know, any opinion or doctrine of his; nor has he received any penances, salutary or 
otherwise. On the contrary, he has only been notified of the declaration made by the Holy Father and pub-
lished by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, whose content is that the doctrine attributed to Copernicus 
(that the earth moves around the sun and the sun stands at the center of the world without moving from 
east to west) is contrary to Holy Scripture and therefore cannot be defended or held. In witness whereof 
we have written and signed this with our own hands, on this 26th day of May 1616. The same mentioned 
above, Robert Cardinal Bellarmine.” 
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 The production of Bellarmine’s certificate surprised and disoriented Galileo's inquisitors. 
Their carefully orchestrated strategy, beginning with the Special Commission's Report,857 
depended on the authenticity of the Segizzi injunction. Since the false injunction was an 
unexecuted, unwitnessed, and unnotarized document that was not referenced anywhere in the 
1616 record, the inquisitors' strategy depended on the Holy Office's intimidating Galileo.  
 Their strategy was a breathtaking failure. The Bellarmine certificate, unknown to the 
strategists in the Holy Office when they planned Galileo's trial, cast irresolvable doubts on the 
authenticity of the Segizzi injunction. To make matters worse, Galileo was the only surviving 
witness from the 1616 proceeding who could corroborate the authenticity of the unexecuted 
Segizzi injunction. 858 Cardinal Bellarmine died in 1621,859 and Commissary General Segizzi 
died in 1625.860  
 By the end of Galileo's first deposition, the inquisitors realized than the Segizzi 
injunction was uncorroborated and that its authenticity was unprovable. Galileo's oral testimony 
and Cardinal Bellarmine's certificate conclusively impeached its authenticity. Cardinal 
Bellarmine's certificate, on the other hand, was unimpeachable. Galileo possessed the original, 
and the entire certificate was in Bellarmine's own writing.  
 Galileo's testimony was consistent with the entirety of the legal record. The Segizzi 
injunction was entirely inconsistent. The only explanation accounting for all these facts was that 
the recently discovered Segizzi injunction was a subterfuge.  
                                                 
857 September, 1632, Special Commission Report on the Dialogue, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 218-22, 222. 
858 The Segizzi injunction recited that Commissary General Segizzi had delivered the injunction to Galileo. 
Galileo had promised to obey it in Cardinal Bellarmine's presence at Cardinal Bellarmine's residence on 
February 26, 1616. February 26, 1616, Special Injunction of the Father Commissary of the Holy Office to 
Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U 
Cal. P, 1989) 147-48. 
859 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 314. 
860 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 322. 
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 The Holy Office abruptly ended Galileo's deposition. The Holy Office swore Galileo to 
silence regarding the day’s proceedings and ordered him to remain in its headquarters.861 
Galileo's inquisitors would take two weeks before deciding on their next step.  
D. The Consultants’ Reports on the Dialogue (April 17, 1633) 
 Five days later, on April 17, 1633, three theologians retained as consultants by the Holy 
Office issued formal evaluations of Galileo’s Dialogue.862 Consultant Agostino Oreggi found 
that Galileo “held and defended” Copernicanism.863 The other two consultants found that Galileo 
violated the Segizzi injunction. 864 Consultant Melchior Inchofer found that Galileo “teaches and 
defends” Copernicanism, and further that Galileo “is vehemently suspected of firmly adhering to 
this opinion, and indeed that he holds it.” 865 Consultant Zaccaria Pasqualigo concluded that 
Galileo violated the Segizzi injunction's prohibition not to “teach or defend” Copernicanism, and 
“strongly suspected” Galileo of “holding” Copernicanism. 866  
E. The Plea Bargain (April 27, 1633) 
 After the unfavorable developments in Galileo's first deposition, it took until April 27, 
1633, for Commissary General Fra Vincenzo Maculano da Firenzuola to decide on his next 
move. Firenzuola approached Galileo with a deal. If Galileo would confess his error, then the 
                                                 
861 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 37, 
262. The Holy Office housed Galileo in the chief prosecutor’s apartment. 
862 The three members were Agostino Oreggi, Melchior Inchofer, and Niccolo Riccardi. Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 355 n. 64. Two of the 
consultants were members of the papal Special Commission. Agostino Oreggi and Melchior Inchofer also 
served as consultants to the Holy Office in Galileo's 1633 proceeding. 
863 April 17, 1633, Report on the Dialogue by Agostino Oreggi published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 262. 
864 September, 1632, Special Commission Report on the Dialogue, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 218-22. 
865 April 17, 1633, Report on the Dialogue by Melchior Inchofer published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The 
Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 262-70, 262. 
866 April 17, 1633, Report on the Dialogue by Zaccaria Pasqualigo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 271-76, 271. 
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Holy Office would enter into an unprecedented “extrajudicial” resolution of Galileo's case. 
Galileo’s punishment would be limited to imprisonment in his own house. The aged Galileo, 
suffering from poor health and the mental strain of ten weeks' isolation, tentatively accepted the 
offer. He requested “a little time,” however, “to think about the way to render his confession 
honest.” 867  
 The Commissary General wrote a letter the next day hoping to persuade Cardinal 
Francesco Barberini to approve this course of action. 868 If Cardinal Barberini agreed, the 
Commissary General would depose Galileo again and place Galileo's agreed confession on the 
record.  
F. Galileo’s Second Deposition (April 30, 1633) 
 Cardinal Barberini agreed with the plan, and the Holy Office recalled Galileo for a 
second deposition. The inquisitors instructed Galileo to answer one question: “That he state 
whatever he wished to say.” 869 Galileo answered that he had reread the Dialogue since his 
earlier deposition on April 12, 1633. Not having seen the book for so long, Galileo explained, “I 
found it almost a new book by another author.”  
 Galileo now freely confessed that the arguments for Copernicanism based on sunspots 
and the tides were too strong and presented too powerfully. “If I had to write out the same 
arguments now,” he testified, “there is no doubt I would weaken them in such a way that they 
could not appear to exhibit a force which they really and essentially lack.”  
                                                 
867 April 28, 2011 Letter from the Commissary General to Cardinal Barberini, published in Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 276-77.  
868 April 28, 2011 Letter from the Commissary General to Cardinal Barberini, published in Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 277: “The Tribunal 
will maintain its reputation; the culprit can be treated with the benignity; and, what ever the final outcome, 
he will know the favor done to him, with all the consequent satisfaction one wants in this.” 
869 April 30, 1633, Deposition of Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 277-79. 
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 Galileo insisted that the arguments in the Dialogue, although erroneous, did not result 
from any heretical intent on Galileo's part. Quoting Cicero, Galileo claimed that his fault was 
simply being “more desirous of glory than was suitable.” “My error then was, and I confess it, 
one of vain ambition, pure ignorance, and inadvertence.” 870 
 The inquisitors closed the deposition and swore Galileo to silence, but Galileo's mild 
confession did not satisfy them. The record states that Galileo returned “after a little” and finally 
told the Holy Office what it wanted to hear: 
And for greater confirmation that I neither did hold nor do hold as true the 
condemned opinion of the earth’s motion and sun’s stability, if, as I desire, I am 
granted the possibility and the time to prove it more clearly, I am ready to do 
so… I promise to reconsider the arguments already presented in favor of the said 
false and condemned opinion and to confute them in the most effective way that 
the blessed God will enable me. So I beg this Holy Tribunal to cooperate with me 
in this good resolution, by granting me the permission to put it into practice. 
[Emphasis added]. 871  
The inquisitors then allowed the exhausted Galileo to return to the Tuscan embassy, ordering 
him not to discuss his case with anyone. The Holy Office ordered Galileo to remain at the 
Tuscan embassy until summoned to return.872 
G. Galileo’s Third Deposition and Defense (May 10, 1633) 
  Galileo was recalled for a third deposition on May 10, 1633, and informed that he could 
make a defense to the Holy Office within eight days if he so wished.873 Galileo chose to make his 
defense that very day.874 Producing the original of Cardinal Bellarmine’s May 26, 1616, 
                                                 
870 April 30, 1633, Deposition of Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 277-79, 278. 
871 April 30, 1633, Deposition of Galileo published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 277-79, 278-79. 
872 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 306. 
873 May 10, 1633, Deposition of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 279. 
874 May 10, 1633, Defense of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 279-281, 279. 
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certificate,875 Galileo explained that the certificate did not contain the injunction against 
“teaching” Copernicanism “in any way whatsoever” contained in the contested Segizzi 
injunction.  
 Galileo further argued that any “flaws” in the Dialogue were “inadvertent.” Such flaws 
“were not introduced through the cunning of an insincere intention, but rather through the vain 
ambition of appearing clever above and beyond the average among popular writers.” 876 Galileo 
closed his defense by appealing to the “clemency and kindness” of his inquisitors. He asked them 
to consider that this process had already taken years off his life due to his declining health, his ten 
months of constant mental distress, and his long and tiresome journey to Rome. 
H. The Pope Threatens Galileo with Torture (June 21, 1633) 
 The Holy Office drafted its Final Report to the Pope summarizing Galileo’s deposition 
testimony in May or June of 1633.877 The trial could have ended at this point, but the Pope was 
not yet satisfied.878 The Pope ordered yet another deposition of Galileo, but this fourth deposition 
would be different. The Pope now ordered that the inquisitors conduct the fourth deposition under 
a formal threat of torture.879   
                                                 
875 May 26, 1616, Certificate of Cardinal Bellarmine, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 153 
876 May 10, 1633, Defense of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 279-281, 281. 
877 Final Report to the Pope, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary 
History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 281-86. 
878 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. 
P, 1989) 38. 
879 David Marshall Miller, “The Thirty Years’ War and the Galileo Affair,” History of Science 46 (1) 
(2008): 49-74, 65. The procedure manual for the Holy Office contained an entire chapter entitled “On the 
Manner of Interrogating Culprits by Torture.” Eliseo Masini, Sacro Arsenale Pvero Prattica Dell’officio 
Della Santa Inquisizione (Genoa: Appresso Giuseppe Pavoni, 1621) 120-51. The chapter begins as follows: 
“The culprit having denied the crimes with which he has been charged, and the latter not having been fully 
proved, in order to learn the truths it is necessary to proceed against him by means of a rigorous 
examination; in fact, the function of torture is to make up for the shortcomings of witnesses, when they 
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 Galileo’s fourth deposition took place on June 21, 1633. Galileo “was told to tell the 
truth, otherwise one would have recourse to torture.”880 Galileo replied by insisting that he was 
not a Copernican. He wrote the Dialogue, not because he thought Copernicanism was true, but 
rather to render a “beneficial service.” Returning to the favorite argument of Pope Urban VIII, the 
argument Galileo had placed in the mouth of Simplicio at the end of the Dialogue, Galileo stated 
that his intent in the Dialogue was to demonstrate that physical and astronomical evidence was 
inadequate to prove Copernicanism with certainty. Galileo concluded by stating, “I do not hold 
this opinion of Copernicus, and I have not held it after being ordered by injunction to abandon it. 
For the rest, here I am in your hands; do as you please.” 881 
I. Galileo's Condemnation and Abjuration (June 22, 1633) 
 The Holy Office condemned Galileo the next day for rendering himself “according to this 
Holy Office vehemently suspected of heresy.”882 The basis of the condemnation was Galileo's 
holding and believing “a doctrine which is false and contrary to the divine and Holy Scripture.” 
This doctrine was “that the sun is the center of the world and does not move from east to west, 
and the earth moves and is not the center of the world, and that one may hold and defend as 
probable an opinion after has it been declared and defined contrary to Holy Scripture.” 883 
 The Holy Office offered to absolve Galileo on condition that he “abjure, curse, and 
detest” these heresies. Galileo made a public abjuration that same day at the Church of Santa 
                                                                                                                                                
cannot deduce a conclusive proof against the culprit.” Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 363 n. 84. 
880 June 21, 1633, Deposition of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 286-87. 
881 June 21, 1633, Deposition of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 287. 
882 June 22, 1633, Sentence of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 287-91, 291. 
883 June 22, 1633, Sentence of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 287-91, 291.  
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Maria sopra Minerva.884 In order to make an example of Galileo “so that others would abstain 
from similar crimes in the future,” the Holy Office prohibited the sales of Galileo’s Dialogue on 
the Two Chief World Systems.885 The Holy Office also assigned Galileo a penance of reciting the 
seven penitential Psalms once a week for the next three years. Lastly, Galileo was condemned to 
formal imprisonment in the Holy Office at its pleasure.  
 Three of the ten inquisitors found the Sentence too lenient and refused to sign it. One was 
Cardinal Gaspare Borgia, the Spanish ambassador and leader of the Spanish party. Borgia had 
confronted the Pope in the “Scandal of the Consistory” a year earlier, and it was Borgia's 
supporters who sought to depose Urban VIII for leniency towards heretics.886 If not for Borgia, 
Galileo's 1633 prosecution may never have happened. 
 After six months, the Holy Office finally allowed Galileo to return to Tuscany. Galileo 
lived the remainder of his life under house arrest in Arcetri, near Florence, and died on January 8, 
1642. He rests in a plain grave with no inscription in the Church of Santa Croce in Florence.887 
Since 1927, the Museo di Storia del Scienza in Florence has displayed the fully extended middle 
finger of Galileo's right hand in a gold and crystal receptacle.   
 Pope Urban VIII survived the Spanish threats and remained Pope for eleven more years 
until his death in 1644. His policies made him unpopular. Upon his death, protestors destroyed his 
bust on Capitoline Hill.    
                                                 
884 June 22, 1633, Abjuration of Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 292-93: “With sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, 
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VI. Evaluation of Galileo's Second Inquisition 
A. Galileo's Second Inquisition was a Staged Political Trial  
 The records of Galileo's prosecutions by the Holy Office compel the conclusion that the 
1633 prosecution of Galileo was a staged show trial with a predetermined outcome. Galileo's 
prosecution consisted of a coordinated series of extraordinary legal maneuvers, unsupported by 
any authenticated evidence, pursued for the political end of preserving Urban VIII's papacy 
during a period of political and military crisis.  
The most disturbing aspect of the Galileo Affair is the inquisitors' reliance on the “false” 
Segizzi injunction of February 26, 1616. The Holy Office never authenticated the Segizzi 
injunction, and its authentication became impossible after Galileo's first deposition. The Holy 
Office nevertheless retained the Segizzi injunction as the centerpiece of its strategy. There is no 
evidence that Galileo ever received the Segizzi injunction. To the contrary, the record of the 
Galileo Affair from 1616 to 1633 supports the conclusion that the Segizzi injunction was a 
subterfuge. Seven grounds compel this conclusion.    
First, no one has ever seen the Segizzi injunction. Although Galileo's entire 1633 heresy 
trial hinged on the authenticity of the Segizzi injunction, 888 no one has ever seen the original. 
Although the Segizzi injunction is clearly the most important document in the Galileo Affair, it 
is the only document missing from the Galileo archives.889 
                                                 
888 June 22, 1633 Sentence, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary 
History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 287-93: “In execution of this decree, on the following day at the palace 
of and in the presence of the Cardinal Bellarmine, after being gently admonished by the said Lord 
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889 Apologists for the Church's role in the Galileo Affair speculate, without any evidence, that the 
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Second, the Holy Office never authenticated the Segizzi injunction. The Holy Office 
provided no evidence, and none appears anywhere in the record, that the Segizzi injunction was 
authentic or actually existed. The original Segizzi injunction would have contained a notary's 
seal and the signatures of witnesses. 890 The document used in the 1633 trial was unsigned, 
unwitnessed, and unnotarized. There is not even a single reference to the Segizzi injunction 
anywhere in the records of the Holy Office until the Special Commission “discovered” it in 
1632.  
Third, the Segizzi injunction was illegal. The Pope's order required Cardinal Bellarmine 
to deliver his warning to Galileo in the form of an “evangelical admonition,” a denunciatio 
evangelica. This required a two-step procedure. The first step of this format was a charitable 
admonition, or caritativa monitio. The law required that Segizzi conduct the caritativa monitio 
in secret in order to be legally valid.891 The Segizzi injunction relates, however, that there were at 
least four others besides Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine in the room during the caritativa 
monitio.892 This circumstance invalidates the entire denunciatio evangelica procedure, including 
Segizzi's injunction.  
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Fourth, Cardinal Bellarmine's certificate contradicts the Segizzi injunction. The Holy 
Office's final report to the Pope concedes the authenticity of the Bellarmine certificate. 893 The 
account of events in Cardinal Bellarmine's certificate directly contradicts the terms of the Segizzi 
injunction. Bellarmine's certificate never mentions the Segizzi injunction, and it does not even 
indicate that Segizzi was present at the meeting with Galileo. The injunctive language in the two 
documents is irreconcilable as well. 894   
Fifth, the Segizzi injunction violated the Pope's order of February 25, 1616. 895 The 
Pope's order instructed the Father Commissary to issue his injunction against Galileo only if 
                                                 
893 June, 1633, Final Report to the Pope published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 281-86, 284: “as is evident from the certificate written 
for him in the cardinal's own hand.” 
894 May 26, 1616, Certificate of Cardinal Bellarmine, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 153. Cardinal Bellarmine gently warned 
Galileo that “Copernicanism cannot be defended or held.” The Segizzi injunction, on the other hand,  
“orders and enjoins” Galileo to “abandon completely the above-mentioned opinion that the sun stands still 
at the center of the world and the earth moves, and henceforth not to hold, teach, or defend it in any way 
whatever, either orally or in writing; otherwise the Holy Office would start proceedings against him.” 
February 26, 1616, Special Injunction of the Father Commissary of the Holy Office to Galileo, published 
in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 147-
48. 
895 The injunction recites that Segizzi issued the injunction “in the name of His Holiness the Pope and the 
whole Congregation of the Holy Office” on February 26, 1616. February 26, 1616, Special Injunction of 
the Father Commissary of the Holy Office to Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo 
Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 147-148. This is the next day following the 
Pope's order as recorded in the minutes of the Holy Office. February 25, 1616, Minutes of the 
Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary 
History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 147. 
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Galileo refused to acquiesce to Cardinal Bellarmine's warning.896 The minutes of the Holy Office 
record that Galileo acquiesced on March 3, 1616. 897  
Sixth, the Segizzi injunction was “discovered” under suspicious circumstances.  The 
Segizzi injunction was first “discovered” by Pope Urban VIII's Special Commission in 1632. 898 
The Special Commission had the greatest motive to create a subterfuge. 899 Its three members 
were antipathetic to Galileo, and each found that Galileo's violation of the Segizzi injunction 
                                                 
896 February 25, 1616, Minutes of the Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. 
Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 147. The minutes 
reflect that the Pope ordered Cardinal Bellarmine “to call Galileo before himself and warn him to abandon 
these opinions; and if he should refuse to obey, the Father Commissary, in the presence of a notary and 
witnesses, is to issue him an injunction to abstain completely from teaching or defending this doctrine and 
opinion or from discussing it; and further, if he should not acquiesce, he is to be imprisoned.” [Emphasis 
added]. 
897 March 3, 1616, Minutes of the Congregation of the Holy Office published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 148. The Minutes of March 3, 
1616 record that Galileo “acquiesced when warned of the order by the Holy Congregation to abandon the 
opinion which he held till then, to the effect that the sun stands still at the center of the spheres but that the 
Earth is in motion.” [Emphasis added]. 
898 Jules Speller, Galileo's Inquisition Trial Revisited (Frankfurt: Lang, 2008) 176; Annibale Fantoli, “The 
Disputed Injunction and Its Role in Galileo's Trial,” The Church and Galileo, ed. Ernan McMullin (South 
Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005) 117-149, 118. See February 26, 1616, Special Injunction of the Father 
Commissary of the Holy Office to Galileo, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A 
Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 147-48. The first reference to this Segizzi injunction 
appears in the September, 1632, Special Commission Report On Galileo’s Dialogue, published in Maurice 
A. Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 218-22: “In 1616 
the author had from the Holy Office the injunction that 'he abandon completely the above-mentioned 
opinion that the sun is the center of the world and the Earth moves, nor henceforth hold, teach, or defend it 
in any way whatever, orally or in writing; otherwise the Holy Office would start proceedings against him. 
He acquiesced in this injunction and promised to obey.' “ 
899 The decree condemning Galileo bases its judgment almost exclusively on Galileo's failure to comply 
with the terms of the Segizzi injunction. June 22, 1633 Sentence, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 287-93: “[A]fter being informed 
and warned in a friendly way by the same Lord Cardinal, you were given an injunction by the then Father 
Commissary of the Holy Office (404) in the presence of a notary and witnesses to the effect that you must 
completely abandon the said false opinion, and that in the future you could neither hold, nor defend, nor 
teach it in any way whatever, either orally or in writing; having promised to obey, you were dismissed.” 
Because of the importance of the Segizzi injunction to the 1633 conviction of Galileo, apologists for the 
Church's role in the Galileo Affair are compelled to defend the Segizzi injunction as factual and judicially 
valid. Apologists have advanced imaginative scenarios to explain the shortcomings listed above. These 
scenarios are wholly speculative, however, and unsupported by any evidence. For a favorable discussion 
of some of these scenarios by an author admittedly inclined to accept them, see Annibale Fantoli, “The 
Disputed Injunction and Its Role in Galileo's Trial,” The Church and Galileo, ed. Ernan McMullin (South 
Bend, IN: U Notre Dame P, 2005) 117-149, 120-123. 
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rendered Galileo's prosecution for heresy “unavoidable.” 900 The Special Commission also had 
the greatest opportunity to create a subterfuge, since the injunction was “discovered” in the Holy 
Office's own records. 
In sum, the only explanation that accounts for all the facts in the Galileo Affair is that 
the Segizzi injunction was a politically motivated subterfuge. Any impartial tribunal would have 
excluded the Segizzi injunction for three reasons. 901 The first is the inability of Galileo's 
inquisitors to provide any evidence of its authenticity. The second is the inconsistency of the 
Segizzi injunction with the entirety of all other Holy Office records of the Galileo Affair. The 
third is the weight and preponderance of the undisputed evidence presented by Galileo that the 
Segizzi injunction was not authentic. 902  
B. The Holy Office's Legal System Satisfies Hart's Conditions for a Valid Legal System  
 Despite its reliance on torture, coerced confessions, and subterfuge, the legal system 
utilized by the Congregation of the Holy Office satisfies legal positivism's requirements for a 
valid legal system. As explained in Chapter II, Hart utilizes the external 903 and internal points of 
                                                 
900 September, 1632, Special Commission Report on the Dialogue, published in Maurice A. Finocchiaro, 
The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U Cal. P, 1989) 218-22, 222. 
901 The Segizzi injunction would be inadmissible under American law, for example, for a number of 
reasons. The Segizzi injunction violates the “best evidence” rule, which requires the original document for 
admissibility. The Segizzi injunction does not constitute a court record because it lacks the necessary 
formal execution and notarization. The Segizzi injunction is hearsay since it consists of an out of court 
declaration offered for its truth. It is thus inadmissible for any purpose because it fails to satisfy any 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Lastly, the absence of the original in the records of the Holy 
Office is admissible as evidence that the Segizzi injunction never existed.  
902 The claim that the Segizzi injunction was authentic contradicts (1) the order of Pope Paul V as recorded 
in the minutes of the Holy Office on February 25, 1616, (2) Bellarmine's report to the Holy Office, 
recorded in the minutes of the Holy Office on March 3, 1616, (3) Bellarmine's certificate of May 26, 1616, 
the authenticity of which is admitted by the Holy Office, and (4) Galileo's uncontradicted testimony in 
1633, which Galileo refused to change, even under threat of torture. 
903 The external point of view is the view of a person who feels no obligation that he “should” follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56. The external point of 
view is present in people engaging in mere “social habits” and “group habits.”  
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view 904 to explain the two conditions required for the existence of a valid legal system. The first 
condition is that private citizens generally obey the primary rules of obligation.905 It is sufficient 
that each member of the population obeys the primary rules “for his part only” and “from any 
motive whatsoever.” In Hart’s terminology, it is sufficient that citizens take an external point of 
view toward primary rules. 906 Since those subject to the proceedings of the Holy Office 
generally obeyed the primary rules of obligation, the Holy Office's legal system satisfied Hart's 
first condition for a valid legal system.  
 The second condition for the existence of a valid legal system under Hart's positivism is 
that public officials adopt the rule of recognition as their “public standard of official 
behavior.”907 Officials must feel themselves obligated to adopt and abide by the rule of 
recognition, and they must censure those public officials who fail to do so. In Hart’s terms, it is a 
minimum necessary condition that officials take the internal point of view toward secondary 
rules.908 The legal system of the Holy Office satisfies Hart's second condition for legal validity. 
Church officials clearly felt themselves obligated to adopt and abide by the applicable rule of 
recognition, and severely sanctioned any officials who refused to do so.  
 
 
                                                 
904 The internal point of view, on the other hand, is the view of a person who feels obligated to follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56-57. 
905 A primary rule is a rule that imposes an obligation or a duty. “[P]rimary rules are concerned with the 
actions that individuals must or must not do.” Examples of primary rules include torts and criminal laws.  
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 91. 
906 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116.  
907 The rule of recognition provides “a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of 
obligation,” and it serves as Hart’s ultimate criterion for the validity of law.  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 94-95, 105. A rule is legally valid, and therefore 
enforceable, if it conforms to the requirements set forth in the rule of recognition. Id. at 103. 
908 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 117.  
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C. The Galileo Affair Confirms the Necessity of Procedural Due Process Protections 
 Since legal validity determines the enforceability of law, the standard for legal validity 
presents a fundamental issue for any legal system. The experience of the English Revolution of 
1603-1701 established the necessity of autonomy and consent in determining legal validity. The 
trial of Socrates, however, revealed that autonomy and consent are insufficient by themselves to 
provide an acceptable standard of legal validity. The trial of Socrates established that a principle 
of reason incorporating procedural due process is also required to protect against (1) the tyranny 
of the majority and (2) the conviction and punishment of the innocent. 
 The Galileo Affair, like the trial of Socrates, confirms the necessity of procedural due 
process protections to protect the innocent from conviction. In addition to the procedural 
protections discussed in the trial of Socrates in Chapter III, the experience of the Galileo Affair 
demonstrates that defendants must not be compelled to testify against themselves.909 Any 
confessions must be voluntary, and the use of physical or psychological coercion in obtaining a 
confession requires its exclusion from evidence.910  
 Defendants must receive speedy and public trials.911 The court must not deny bail 
unreasonably.  The court must presume the innocence of the defendant. Evidence is required to 
convict the defendant. Suspicions alone are not sufficient.912  
 The defendant must receive the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him.913 The defendant must enable the defendant to compel the attendance of witnesses 
to testify on his behalf.914 The court must not subject the defendant to double jeopardy for the 
                                                 
909 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
910 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
911 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
912 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
913 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
914 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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same offense.915 Evidentiary rules must protect against the admission of fraudulent evidence, and 
the court must not impose any punishment prior to conviction.916  
 The Congregation of the Holy Office denied all these protections to Galileo.  
Consequently, Galileo was condemned despite his innocence of the charges against him. 
Nevertheless, even when combined with the principles of autonomy and consent, procedural due 
process protections are still insufficient to ensure that legal systems treat their subjects as ends in 
themselves.  
 The discussion of the Soviet legal system that follows illustrates the need for substantive 
as well as procedural due process. The experience of the Soviet legal system also demonstrates 
the necessity that legal systems recognize their subjects' status as rational creatures with free 
will.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
915 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
916 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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CHAPTER V 
LEON TROTSKY AND THE MOSCOW TRIALS 
“A club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the most efficient is the court. For us there is 
no difference between a court of law and summary justice. Our judge is above all a politician, a worker in 
the political field, and therefore he must know what the government wants and guide his work 
accordingly.”                                                               Soviet Commissar of Justice N.V. Krylenko, 1923. 
 
The three “Moscow Trials” of 1936,917 1937,918 and 1938,919 prosecuted under the Soviet 
Criminal Code of 1934, were part of Stalin's “Great Terror” from 1936-1939. The Soviet legal 
experience demonstrates the effectiveness of law as an instrument of terror if laws are 
unrestrained by the principles of autonomy, consent, and reason.  
The Soviet legal experience also demonstrates two final requirements for a viable 
standard of legal validity. The first is the requirement that legal systems must recognize and treat 
their subjects as rational beings with a free will. The second is the requirement of substantive 
due process. Laws must provide reliable guideposts by which people, as rational beings with free 
wills, may orient their own behavior to achieve a society based on ordered liberty.  
The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., a panel of three military 
judges, convicted the defendants in the Moscow Trials of conspiring to engage in acts of 
espionage and terrorism under the direction of Leon Trotsky. The purported goals of these 
conspiracies included the liquidation of the Soviet leadership to obtain power; the destruction of 
the Soviet economy through sabotage; the invasion, defeat, and dismemberment of the Soviet 
Union by foreign powers; and the reinstatement of capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie. 
                                                 
917 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the 
Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.S.R., Moscow, August 19-24, 1936 (People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR: Moscow, 1936). 
918 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-
Soviet Trotskyite Centre Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., 
Moscow, January 23-30, 1937 (People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR: Moscow, 1937). 
919 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-
Soviet “Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites,” heard before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.S.R., Moscow, March 2-13, 1938 (People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR: Moscow, 1938). 
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Stalin carefully orchestrated the three Moscow Trials to purge the Soviet political 
leadership of any actual or potential opponents to his consolidation of power. Stalin first 
arranged the assassination of his most potent political rival, Sergei Kirov, on December 1, 1934. 
Stalin then used the assassination of Kirov to justify amendments to the Criminal Code that 
“simplified” criminal prosecutions, such as the denial of the right to counsel, the denial of any 
right to appeal, and immediate execution of death sentences. Once he had amended the Criminal 
Code, Stalin purged his political opponents in the Moscow Trials by falsely accusing them of 
conspiring with Trotsky to kill Kirov and commit other “counterrevolutionary” crimes.  
The defendants in the three Moscow Trials included most of the “Old Bolsheviks,” the 
architects of the “great socialist experiment.” 920 The Military Collegium convicted each of the 
fifty-four defendants, most on the strength of confessions obtained under torture. 921 Forty-seven 
defendants were shot, and the remaining seven received long prison terms.  
The Military Collegium convicted Trotsky and his son Lev Sedov in absentia in the 
1936 and 1937 trials. Both had been exiles since 1928. Sedov died under suspicious 
circumstances after an appendectomy in Paris on February 16, 1938. Trotsky died in Mexico on 
August 21, 1940, after Soviet agent Ramon Mercader plunged an ice ax into his skull.  
The Moscow Trials were one facet of Stalin’s “Great Terror,” a judicial reign of terror 
                                                 
920 Sidney Hook, “Memories of the Moscow Trials,” Commentary 77(3) (1984): 57-63, 58. The balance of 
the leadership was “silently eliminated” without coming to trial by being imprisoned, deported, or killed. 
Leites, Nathan and Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow Trials (Glencoe, IL: Free, 
1954) 13.  
921 Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Boris I. Nicolaevsky (New York: New Leader, 1962) 20, 27. “ It 
became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic activists who were branded in 1937-1938 as 
enemies were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists; they 
were only so stigmatized, and often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves with 
all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes.” Id. at 20. “Now, when the [1937-1938] cases of some of these so-
called 'spies' and 'saboteurs' were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions 
of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman 
tortures.” Id. at 22.  
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instigated by Stalin across Russia from 1936 through 1939. Utilizing data released in 1987-1989 
during Gorbachev’s glasnost, historian Robert Conquest estimates that Stalin’s agents arrested 8 
million Russians during the Great Terror. Stalin’s agents executed an estimated 1.5 million of 
these.  Approximately 2 million died in camps, 600,000 to 700,000 by execution. At the end of 
the Terror, approximately 1 million remained in prisons, and the camp population had increased 
from 5 million to 8 million.922 
According to Khrushchev, of the 139 candidates and members of the Party's Central 
Committee elected in 1934, Stalin had 98 arrested and shot by 1938. Of the 1,966 delegates to 
the 1934 Party Congress, Stalin had 1,098 arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary crimes.923 
Stalin also targeted the military leadership during the Great Terror. Stalin purged 3 of the 5 
Marshals; 13 of the 15 Army Commanders; 8 of the 9 Fleet Admirals and Admirals Grade I; 50 
of the 57 Corps Commanders; 154 of the 186 Divisional Commanders; all 16 of the Army 
Commissars; 25 of the 28 Corps Commissars; 58 of the 64 Divisional Commissars; all 11 of the 
Vice Commissars of Defense; and 98 out of 108 members of the Supreme Military Soviet.924  
Convicting and executing such large numbers required a streamlined legal system 
operating with assembly line efficiency.925 Under the system of “socialist legality,” political 
considerations played the decisive role in deciding questions of guilt, innocence and punishment. 
The state did not punish criminals for committing criminal acts but rather for their “social 
dangerousness.” Coerced confessions replaced evidence, and the Criminal Code authorized the 
                                                 
922 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 484-86. According 
to Conquest, the Soviet government estimates that a total number of 40 million Russians died under 
Stalin’s regime, not counting those who died during WW II.  Approximately half died during the peasant 
terror of 1929 to 1933, and the other half from 1937 to 1953.  
923 Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Boris I. Nicolaevsky (New York: New Leader, 1962) 20-21.  
924 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 450-51. 
925 Paul Gregory, “Simplified Methods and Efficiency: Stalin’s Terror Managers,” J. of Comparative 
Economics 37 (2) (2009) 207-16. 
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intentional punishment of innocent parties. 926  
“Troikas” composed of a Chekist officer, a Party representative, and a representative of 
the prosecutor's office often replaced the courts in processing criminal allegations.927 Troikas 
operated in secret, conducted no hearings, held no trials, and rarely saw their victims face to 
face. From August 1937 to November 1938, troikas averaged more than 1500 death sentences 
daily.928 Nevertheless, despite its terror, the Soviet legal system satisfied all of legal positivism's 
requirements for a valid legal system. 
I. The Soviet Legal System 
A. Revolutionary Violence and Dictatorship 
 Lenin viewed the proletariat as “unconscious” and thus unable, on its own, to progress 
beyond trade unionism.929 In 1917 Lenin wrote that the Party must be “the teacher, the guide, the 
leader” of the workers.930 Lenin formed the Communist Party to function as a disciplined group 
of elite revolutionaries who would lead the “unconscious” masses to power. A party dictatorship 
                                                 
926 Vladimir Gsovski, “Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-
28, 321. 
927 Vladimir Gsovski, “Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-
28; Paul Gregory, “Simplified Methods and Efficiency: Stalin’s Terror Managers,” J. of Comparative 
Economics 37 (2) (2009) 207-16, 211-212; Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: 
Vintage, 1994) 401-03; and Doriane Lambelet, “The Contradiction between Soviet and American Human 
Rights Doctrine: Reconciliation through Perestroika and Pragmatism,” Boston U. Intl. L. J. 7 (1989): 61-
83, 61-62. 
928 Paul Gregory, “Simplified Methods and Efficiency: Stalin’s Terror Managers,” J. of Comparative 
Economics 37 (2) (2009) 207-16, 211-212. 
929 V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2004) 22: “As against this, the 
opportunism which now holds sway trains the membership of the workers' party to be the representatives 
of the better-paid workers, who lose touch with the rank and file, 'get along' fairly well under capitalism, 
and sell their birthright for a mess of pottage, i.e., renounce their role of revolutionary leaders of the 
people against the bourgeoisie.” Accord, Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of 
Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1978) 24.  
930 V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2004) 22: “By educating the workers' 
party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power and of 
leading the whole people to Socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the teacher, the 
guide, the leader of all the toilers and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the 
bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie.” [Emphasis in original]. 
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would temporarily rule in the name of the proletariat. In time, the party dictatorship would 
transform into a classless socialist society.931 
  Communism did not come to Russia through popular uprising or popular vote.932 A 
small minority cloaked in democratic slogans imposed Communism on Russia through a coup 
d'état. 933 Although the Bolsheviks claimed to represent industrial workers, industrial workers 
constituted only 1 to 2% of Russia's population. On the eve of Lenin's November 7, 1917 coup, 
only 5.3% of the industrial workers were members of the Bolshevik party.934 Lenin thus 
recognized, both theoretically and practically, that the nature of the Bolshevik takeover meant 
that the new regime must rule through dictatorship.  
 Lenin defined dictatorship as “power that is limited by nothing, by no laws, that is 
                                                 
931 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
1978) 24. As Lenin wrote in 1917: “Furthermore, during the transition from capitalism to Communism 
suppression is still necessary; but it is now the suppression of the exploiting minority by the exploited 
majority. A special apparatus, a special machine for suppression, the 'state,' is still necessary, but this is 
now a transitional state; it is no longer a state in the proper sense of the word; for the suppression of the 
minority of exploiters by the majority of the wage slaves of yesterday is comparatively so easy, simple and 
natural a task that it will entail far less bloodshed than the suppression of the risings of slaves, serfs, or 
wage laborers and will cost mankind far less.” V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Whitefish, MT: 
Kessinger, 2004) 76-77. 
932 Robert Conquest describes the failure of the Bolsheviks under Lenin to gain popular support as follows: 
“It is clear from reports of the meeting of the Central Committee nine days before the October Revolution 
in 1917 that the idea of the rising was 'not popular,' that 'the masses received our call with bewilderment.' 
Even the reports from most of the garrisons were tepid. The seizure of power was, in fact, an almost purely 
military operation, carried out by a small number of Red Guards, only partly from the factories, and a 
rather large group of Bolshevized soldiery. The working masses were neutral. Then, and in the Civil War 
that followed, by daring and discipline a few thousand comrades imposed themselves on Russia, against 
the various representatives of all political and social trends, and with the certain prospect of joint 
annihilation if they failed.” Conquest estimates the size of the central core of the Party in October 1917 as 
5,000 to 10,000. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 4-5. 
933 The most prominent slogan was “Bread, Land, Peace and All Power to the Soviets.”  Richard Pipes, 
Communism: A Brief History, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), 38: “Lenin's coup took place on 
November 7 when pro-Bolshevik units took over all the strategic points in the capital without firing a shot. 
Lenin later said that taking power in Russia was as easy as 'lifting a feather.' The reason was that he had 
cleverly camouflaged the seizure of power by himself and his party as the transfer of 'all power to the 
Soviets,' which slogan promised grassroots democracy rather than dictatorship.” Id. 
934 Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), 39. 
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restrained by absolutely no rules, that rests directly on coercion.” 935 Centralized and organized 
violence was necessary, according to Lenin, to “crush the exploiters.” Centralized and organized 
violence was also necessary, Lenin wrote, to lead the masses in the work of organizing the 
socialist economy. 936 Lenin insisted that “revolutionary violence” was essential “against the 
faltering and unrestrained elements of the toiling masses themselves.”937 
 Lenin's study of history persuaded him that past social revolutions had failed by stopping 
halfway, thus allowing their class enemies to survive and regroup.938 To avoid repeating this 
mistake, Lenin resorted to terror to destroy his opponents and control the rest of the 
population.939 “Total” and “merciless” violence was required to achieve the goal of altering 
human nature to create the “new man” and his new society.940  
 The Soviets converted Russian legal institutions into organs of systematic terror. In 
                                                 
935 V.I. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochienii (Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., vol. 41 (Moscow: Institut 
Markszima-Leninizma, 1958-65) 383. 
936 V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2004) 22: “The proletariat needs state 
Power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, both to crush the resistance of 
the exploiters and to lead the enormous mass of the population-the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the 
semi-proletarians-in the work of organizing socialist economy.” 
937 Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: Vintage, 1960) 207. 
938 In a 1908 essay, “Lessons of the Commune,” Lenin praised the 1871 Paris uprising after the French 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War as the first proletariat revolution. Lenin argued, however, that the Paris 
Commune's “excessive generosity” was a cardinal weakness. “It should have exterminated its enemies,” 
wrote Lenin, instead of trying “to exert moral influence on them.” V.I. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochienii 
(Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., vol. 16 (Moscow: Institut Markszima-Leninizma, 1958-65) 452, 
quoted in Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 790. 
939 Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001) 39. 
940 Richard Pipes, “The Fall of the Soviet Union,” The Collapse of Communism, ed. Lee Edwards 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000) 45. Marx wrote the following regarding the steps necessary to achieve the 
new society: “The present generation resembles the Jews who Moses led through the wilderness. It must 
not only conquer a New World, it must also perish in order to make room for the people who are fit for a 
New World.” Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France: 1848-1850 (New York: International, 1964) 14. 
Trotsky described the “new man” that would emerge, god-like, under Communism as follows: “Man will 
become immeasurably stronger, wiser, and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his 
movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. 
The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge 
new peaks will rise.” Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket, 2005) 206-07.  
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Lenin's words, “the courts shall not do away with terrorism; to promise such a thing would mean 
to cheat ourselves or other people.” 941 Although Lenin believed that the necessary brutalities 
should be carried out “in the briefest possible time because the masses will not tolerate the 
prolonged application of brutality,” 942 the Soviet legal system incorporated terror as a permanent 
apparatus of the Soviet government.  
B. Lenin Destroys the Traditional Legal Institutions (November 22, 1917) 
  The first step in the introduction of mass terror to Soviet Russia was the elimination of 
all legal restraints on power. Lenin was a lawyer and viewed the law and the courts as tools 
utilized by the ruling class to enforce its interests. 943 He believed that one of the cardinal 
mistakes of the Paris Commune was its failure to abolish the French legal system, and he did not 
intend to repeat that mistake. 944  
 On November 22, 1917, Lenin issued a decree abolishing the professions associated with 
the judicial system, including the legal profession, the Procurator (the Russian equivalent of the 
Attorney General), and most justices of the peace.945 Lenin's decree provided that pre-existing 
laws were enforceable only to the degree that they did “not contradict the revolutionary 
conscience and the revolutionary sense of legality.” The 1917 decree also dissolved almost all 
                                                 
941 Vladimir Gsovski, “Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-
28, 316. 
942 Richard Pipes, ed., The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archives (New Haven: Yale UP, 1996) 153. 
Lenin wrote these words in 1922 in a secret communication to the Politburo in which he authorized the 
mass executions of Orthodox clergymen. 
943 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
1978) 25. Lenin studied law at the University of St. Petersburg and received a “first” in the state law 
examination of 1891. He practiced law in the city of Samara for approximately a year before becoming a 
full-time revolutionary. 
944 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 796. 
945 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 797. The practice of law was at first 
opened to “all who enjoy civil rights.” The government soon rejected this arrangement, however, in favor 
of establishing a body of legal representatives appointed by the local government organs on a salary basis. 
The state treasury collected the clients' fees. Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of 
Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1978) 31. 
  
242 
the existing courts, including the Senate, the highest court of appeals.946  
 Only the mestnye sudy (“local courts”) remained temporarily intact, and their jurisdiction 
was limited to minor offenses against private citizens.947 The decrees of the political rulers in the 
Soviet government would guide verdicts, not pre-existing laws. If these were lacking, then an 
undefined sotsialisticheskoe pravosoznanie (“socialist sense of justice”) would guide verdicts.948 
In March 1918, narodyne sudy (“People's Courts”) replaced the remaining mestnye sudy (“local 
courts”). These courts were given jurisdiction of all citizen-on-citizen crimes. 
C. Lenin Establishes the Revolutionary Tribunals (November 22, 1917) 
 In keeping with the traditional Russian approach of treating crimes against the state 
differently from crimes against private citizens, Lenin's November 22, 1917, decree also 
established a new type of court, the Revolutionary Tribunal. 949  Modeled on a similar institution 
of the French Revolution, the Revolutionary Tribunal was responsible for prosecuting 
“counterrevolutionary crimes,” which included economic crimes and sabotage.950 Judges on 
these Revolutionary Tribunals usually had no legal training. The only qualification for service 
was the ability to read and write.951  
 On December 21, 1917, the Commissariat of Justice ordered that the Revolutionary 
Tribunal set its penalties according to the circumstances of the case and the dictates of 
                                                 
946 An English translation of this “Decree No. 1” appears in Samuel Kucherov, The Organs of Soviet 
Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation (Leiden: Brill, 1970) 23-25. 
947 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 797. 
948 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 798. Accord, Vladimir Gsovski, 
“Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-28, 316. 
949 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
1978) 31. 
950 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 798. Accord, Vladimir Gsovski, 
“Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-28, 316. 
951 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 799. 
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“revolutionary conscience.” 952 “Revolutionary conscience” was undefined. Those living under 
Bolshevik rule now lived under an extraordinary legal system. Although courts for ordinary 
crimes and courts for crimes against the state nominally existed, the courts had no laws to guide 
them. Amateur judges sentenced citizens for violating unwritten crimes. Presiding judges 
defined offenses and set penalties according to their individual “revolutionary conscience.”  
 Since 1864, Russia had adopted the Western legal principles of nullum crimen sine lege 
(no crime without a law) and nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law). Russia now 
abandoned these principles. Russia under the Bolsheviks was literally a society without law.953 
D. Russian Courts of the “Red Terror” (1918) 
 The “Red Terror” was a massive repression launched after the attempted assassination of 
Lenin on August 30, 1918.954 Izvestiya officially announced The “Red Terror” on September 3, 
1918 in an article entitled “Appeal to the Working Class.” The “Appeal” called for the workers 
to “crush the hydra of counterrevolution with massive terror! ... Anyone who dares to spread the 
slightest rumor against the Soviet regime will be arrested immediately and sent to concentration 
camp.” 955  
 A ruling in November 1918 prohibited judges of the narodyne sudy (“People's Courts”) 
from applying any laws enacted before the revolution of October 1917.956 The ruling also freed 
                                                 
952 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 798. 
953 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 799. 
954 The attempt occurred after Lenin gave a speech at the Grain Commodity Exchange in Moscow. Lenin 
had closed the speech with the words, “We shall die or triumph!” The attempted assassin was Fannie 
Efimovna Kaplan, the daughter of a Ukrainian schoolteacher and a former anarchist and bomb maker. 
Kaplan shot Lenin twice, once in the arm and once in the juncture of the jaw and neck. The bullets had 
cross incisions on their tips and traces of curare, a South American poison used on arrows. Kaplan 
testified, “I shot Lenin because I believe him to be a traitor. By living long, he postpones the idea of 
socialism for decades to come.” Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 806-11. 
955 Stéphane Courtois, ed. The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999) 73-74. 
956 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 797-98. Accord, Vladimir Gsovski, 
“Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-28, 316. 
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the judges of the narodyne sudy from observing any formal rules of procedure or evidence.957 
The ruling lastly instructed the judges to determine guilt, not based on evidence or law, but on 
their subjective impressions of the facts and the parties.958  
E. “Streamlining” Criminal Prosecutions (1919) 
 Lenin sought to build a world populated by “good citizens.” This required the 
elimination of the “bad citizens,” and Lenin regarded terror as an indispensable instrument of 
revolutionary government in eliminating undesirables.959 The Revolutionary Tribunals, however, 
were not removing “bad citizens” quickly enough to satisfy Lenin. The judges worked 
lackadaisically, passed mild sentences, and exhibited a reluctance to impose the death penalty. In 
1918, the year that included the Red Terror, the Revolutionary Tribunals tried 4,483 defendants. 
Only 14 received the death penalty.960  
 To address this lack of production, the People's Commissariat of Justice enacted a 
document in 1919 entitled “Leading Principles of Criminal Law.” The Commissariat redefined 
crime as “any act or omission dangerous to the given system of social relations.” 961 The 
“Leading Principles” stated that the proletariat should utilize criminal law for repressing its class 
enemies. The task of the criminal law was “the struggle against the breakers of the new 
                                                 
957 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 798. Accord, Vladimir Gsovski, 
“Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-28, 316. 
958 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 798. Martin Latsis, the chief of the 
Ukrainian Cheka, gave the following directions to his police officers, who had full powers to initiate and 
decide criminal cases extrajudicially during the Red Terror: “Do not look in the file of incriminating 
evidence to see whether or not the accused rose up against the Soviets with arms or words. Ask him 
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Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia - 
Past, Present, and Future (New York: Farrar, 1994). 
959 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 790. 
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961 Stephen C. Thaman, “Russia,” The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, ed. Kevin Jon Heller and 
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conditions of common life in the transitional period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Only 
the “final smashing” of the bourgeois and intermediate classes could accomplish the goal of 
annihilating “both the state as an organization of coercion, and law as a function of the state.” 962  
 The Commissariat made more changes to streamline prosecutions before the 
Revolutionary Tribunals. In March 1920, the Revolutionary Tribunals received discretion to 
deny the plaintiff and defendant the right to call and question witnesses, or even to appear to 
plead their case. The Revolutionary Tribunals could halt proceedings and render judgment at any 
time.963 
 Even with these changes, the Revolutionary Tribunals remained too slow and 
cumbersome to satisfy Lenin's quest for a power that was “limited by nothing, by no laws,” that 
was “restrained by absolutely no rules,” and that rested “directly on coercion.” 964 Lenin 
increasingly came to rely on the Cheka, the Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya (“Extraordinary 
Commission”) or political police, which he endowed with an almost unrestricted license to 
kill.965  
F. Revised Law Codes under the “New Economic Policy” (1921-1928) 
 The “War Communism” economic policy of the Soviet government during the years of 
the civil war and foreign intervention from 1918 to 1920 ended with the collapse of the Soviet 
                                                 
962 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
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economy.966 The real value of Russian money in circulation on November 1, 1917, was 1,919 
billion rubles. By July 1, 1921, this value had dropped 98.5% to 29 billion rubles. Production 
and distribution in the Soviet economy were at a standstill and the nation was bankrupt. 967 When 
the anticipated revolution in the West failed to materialize, the hope of transforming “War 
Communism” into genuine communism proved unviable. 
 In April 1921, Lenin admitted that the Soviet government had erred by going “too far on 
the path of nationalization of commerce and industry, and in the suppression of local trade.” The 
whole program of War Communism, Lenin now said, “was but a temporary measure.” 968 The 
Xth Congress thus introduced a “New Economic Policy,” known under the abbreviation of NEP, 
on March 21, 1921.969  
 The NEP was a mixed economic system containing both capitalist and socialist 
elements. The NEP permitted private trade, and permitted private businesses to operate under 
state license. The NEP legalized the hiring of labor and the renting of land for agricultural 
purposes in 1925. Foreign firms could do business in Russia based on “concessions.” 970   
                                                 
966 “War Communism” involved a number of sweeping measures designed to place the entire economy, 
including labor, production, and distribution, under the exclusive management of the Communist Party. 
These measures included the nationalization of the means of production, with the temporary exception of 
agriculture; nationalization of transport; nationalization of all but the smallest enterprises; the liquidation 
of private commerce and nationalization of the retail and wholesale trade; the replacement of private 
commerce by a government-controlled distribution system; the elimination of money as a unit of exchange 
and accounting in favor of a system of state regulated barter; the imposition of the entire national economy 
of a single plan; and the introduction of compulsory labor for all able-bodied male adults, and on occasion 
also for women, children, and elders. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 
671-679, 673. 
967 From January 1, 1917, to January 1, 1923, the quantity of money in Russia increased 200,000 times and 
the price of goods increased a staggering 100 million times. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New 
York: Knopf, 1990) 687.  
968 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
1978) 32-33. 
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(Leiden: Brill, 1970) 78. 
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 The restoration of the bourgeois market system required the restoration to an equal 
degree of the bourgeois legal system. Lenin dispatched his jurists to review the prerevolutionary 
Russian law codes, as well as the German, Swiss, and French codes, and adapt them to the extant 
Soviet economic conditions. The result was a flurry of new legal codes.971 
 The mixed economic system under the NEP utilized a mixed legal system as well. The 
treatment of commerce, property, contracts, and torts incorporated a number of traditional 
concepts from European law. Since law was a “disciplining principle that helps strengthen the 
Soviet state and develop the socialist economy,”972 however, the civil law contained a number of 
provisions that reflected the revolutionary purposes of the new Soviet social system.  
 The most famous of these was Article 1 of the Civil Code: “Civil rights should be 
protected by law except in instances when they are exercised in contradiction with their social-
economic purpose.” 973 The Civil Code provided further that any legal transaction “directed to 
the obvious prejudice of the state” was invalid, and all profits accrued from such transactions 
were forfeit to the state as “unjust enrichment.”  
                                                                                                                                                
interests of the proletarian dictatorship. A large “socialist sector” of industry remained in the hands of the 
state. This sector included banking, insurance, transport, the production of raw materials, and foreign 
trade. The state continued to own the land and control its use, and the state maintained its ownership of the 
means of production and continued to fix prices. The NEP adopted a new strategy but shared the same end 
as the War Communism program, the socialization of the entire economy once it achieved economic 
heights.  
 
971 1922 and 1923 produced a Judiciary Act, a Civil Code, a Code of Civil Procedure, a Criminal Code, a 
Code of Criminal Procedure, a Land Code, and a new Labor Code. The Soviet Government also enacted a 
new Criminal Code and a new Family Code in 1926. Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An 
Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1978) 34. 
972 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Vintage, 1994) 401. This view of law is 
consistent with the tsarist conception of law as a means of maintaining order rather than ensuring justice. 
N.M. Korkunov, Russkoe gosudarstvemmoe pravo (St. Petersburg: Stasiulevicha, 1909) 215-22.  
973 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
1978) 36. [Emphasis added]. The Nazis later copied this principle. This principle represented an attempt to 
counteract the absolutist and conceptual character of the private rights granted in other sections of the 
Civil Code. Under this provision, a man might own his house, but if he had an extra room in it, he could be 
required to take in a tenant. “Thus Article 1 brought back in through the window what had been shown out 
through the door.” 
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 The new criminal codes continued the practices of the Red Terror and the Revolutionary 
Tribunals. Under the system of “socialist legality,” political considerations played the decisive 
role in deciding questions of guilt, innocence and punishment. Courts were “an organ of 
government power,” wrote N. V. Krylenko, later People's Commissar of Justice, in his 1923 
treatise on the Soviet judiciary. “A club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the 
most efficient is the court. For us there is no difference between a court of law and summary 
justice. Our judge is above all a politician, a worker in the political field, and therefore he must 
know what the government wants and guide his work accordingly.” 974  
 The Soviet rulers did not intend, Krylenko continued, to have “their own hands bound” 
by the codification of the criminal law. The new Criminal Code had to leave room for the 
arbitrary imposition of punishment.975 To accomplish these goals, the new Criminal Code would 
deny due process, authorize the punishment of innocent parties, and legitimize terror as a 
principle of law. 
G. Absence of Due Process Protections under the 1926 Criminal Code 
 Criminal prosecutions under the 1926 Criminal Code lacked even basic due process 
protections. No warrant was required to authorize an arrest. Prosecutorial approval was 
sufficient, even if first obtained after the arrest.  
 There was no writ of habeas corpus. The Criminal Code permitted authorities to hold a 
suspect on mere suspicion for 14 days without informing the suspect of the charges against him. 
In actual practice, however, there was no limit on the period that authorities could hold a suspect 
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without adjudication. Investigators were wholly exempt from judicial supervision and were only 
accountable to the prosecutor or the secret police for their actions. 976  
 Authorities held prisoners incommunicado. Defendants had no right to counsel until the 
completion of all pre-trial investigations, procedures, and the drafting of the bill of charges.977 
All pretrial proceedings excluded the defendants.978  
 There was no presumption of innocence, and the burden of proving innocence, with the 
attached quandary of proving a negative, was on the accused.979 There was no protection from ex 
post facto laws, and authorities applied laws retroactively.980 Courts also had discretion under 
Article 14 of the 1926 Criminal Code to suspend the statute of limitations in cases involving 
“counterrevolutionary” offenses.981  
 The State also enjoyed an unequal right of appeal over the defendant. The accused could 
only appeal up one level. Prosecutors, however, enjoyed unlimited appeals. 
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 Defendants received no protection against double jeopardy. Prosecutors could move to 
reopen any case for any reason, including a claim that that the punishment was too lenient. There 
was no time limit on the prosecution's reopening cases, and the prosecution could reopen the 
same case multiple times. The defendant did not receive notice that his case was under review, 
and the defendant had no right to appear regarding the reopening of a case.982    
 State security agencies, including the Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, and MVD, had the 
power to convict and punish any defendant. These agencies could assume jurisdiction of any 
criminal case and dispose of the case without interference from any court. These agencies 
operated without any rules of criminal law or procedure.983    
H. Soviet Legal Theory under the 1922 and 1926 Criminal Codes 
  Beginning with the 1922 Criminal Code, Soviet theorists sought to develop a new theory 
of criminal law derived from Marxist principles. Soviet legal theorists adopted a deterministic 
approach to human behavior, a class point of view of justice, and the view that human beings are 
the product of their economic conditions. These theorists saw crime as a social phenomenon 
produced by social circumstances, not as a wrongful act involving a moral failing.  
 The Soviets therefore detached the characterization of crime and the justification of 
punishment from any moral basis. 984 The Criminal Code of 1926 omits the elements of moral 
guilt and moral condemnation from its statement of the purposes underlying criminal law. The 
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Code also omits these elements from the terminology of the criminal law, as explained below. 
 The new Soviet theory of criminal law developed four significant departures from the 
traditional principles of criminal law in the West. The first involved the concept of crime. Soviet 
theorists saw social danger as the basic element of crime. Crimes were therefore defined in 
terms of “socially dangerous acts,” and the 1926 Criminal Code abandoned the use of the term 
“crime” altogether. 985  
 Article 6 of the 1926 Criminal Code defines “social danger” as danger to the Soviet 
regime or its legal order.986 A finding of “social dangerousness” replaced any finding of 
individual guilt or blameworthiness in determining the judicial sanction imposed on the 
defendant. Soviet law thus permitted, at least in theory, the dismissal of a criminal who 
committed a prohibited act if the criminal or the violative act was not “socially dangerous.” 987  
 A second major departure from traditional criminal law principles involved the Soviet 
theory of punishment. The 1926 Criminal Code specifically provided that “the criminal 
legislation of the USSR shall have no purposes of retribution and penalization.” 988 Judicial 
penalties, therefore, were not considered to be punishment, retribution, or expiation, and the 
1926 Criminal Code abandoned the use of the term “punishment” altogether.989 Instead, the Code 
referred to judicial penalties as “measures of social defense.” The death penalty was the 
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“supreme measure of social defense.” 990  
 A third major departure from traditional criminal law principles involved the punishment 
of the innocent. Authorities could punish a person in the absence of any criminal conduct if that 
person represented a threat of “social danger.” 991 Article 7 of the 1926 Criminal Code provided: 
With regard to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts or who 
represent a danger because of their connection with a criminal environment or 
because of their past activity, measures of social defense of a judicial-
correctional, medical, or medico-educational character shall be applied.992 
The mere “connection with a criminal environment” was sufficient to warrant a criminal penalty. 
Furthermore, under Article 58 governing “counterrevolutionary” offenses, authorities could 
assess punishment against innocent family members and innocent dependents of convicted 
criminals.993 
 A fourth major departure from traditional criminal law principles involved the doctrine 
of “crime by analogy.” 994 Abandoning the traditional principle of “no crime, no punishment 
without a previous law,” Article 16 of the 1926 Criminal Code permitted punishment for an act 
even if the act was not prohibited by law. It was sufficient for conviction that the act was 
analogous to a prohibited act: 
If any socially dangerous act is not directly provided for by the present Code, 
the basis and limits of responsibility for it shall be determined by application of 
those articles of the Code which provide for crimes most similar to it in 
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nature.995 
As with the provisions of Article 1 of the Civil Code discussed above, the Nazis also copied the 
doctrine of crime by analogy. 996 The Soviet detachment of crime and punishment from any 
moral basis, coupled with the absence of due process protections for the accused, provided the 
Soviet government unrestricted power to impose arbitrary punishment. 
I. Political Crimes under the Criminal Codes of 1922, 1926, and 1934 
 Lenin gave his jurists precise instructions for the treatment of political crimes in the 
1922 recodification of Soviet law. Lenin defined political crimes as “the propaganda and 
agitation or participation in organizations or assistance to organizations that help (by means of 
propaganda and agitation)” the international bourgeoisie. He instructed his jurists to make all 
such crimes punishable by death. 997  
 Lenin also directed that Soviet law embody his views on the legitimacy and necessity of 
terrorizing the Russian people for political ends. On May 17, 1922, Lenin instructed his 
Commissar of Justice D.I. Kurskii to provide “a principled and politically correct (and not 
merely narrowly juridicial) essence and justification of terror. The court is not to eliminate terror 
- to promise this would be deceitful and delusional - but provide foundation for and legalize it on 
principle, clearly, without falsity or embellishment.” 998 The Russian legal system thus 
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abandoned the mission of dispensing justice and officially embraced the mission of terrorizing 
its own people. The systematic terror of the population through legalized executions was 
justified, with no sense of irony, as a means of protecting the “unconscious” proletariat from 
exploitation.  
 The result of Lenin's instructions was the prohibition of “counterrevolutionary” activities 
under Article 58 of the Russian Criminal Code. “Counterrevolutionary” activities were defined 
to include any action directed toward subverting or weakening the power of the government, the 
external security of the USSR, or the fundamental economic, political, and national gains of the 
proletarian revolution. 999 Article 58, as amended through Stalin's initiative in 1934, would 
provide the basis for Stalin's allegations against Trotsky and the other defendants in the three 
Moscow Trials in 1936, 1937, and 1938. Soviet law would finally realize Lenin's goal of a 
“power that is limited by nothing, by no laws, that is restrained by absolutely no rules, that rests 
directly on coercion.” 1000  
II. Trotsky's Rivalry with Stalin 
A. Trotsky's Theory of “Permanent Revolution” 
 Leon Trotsky was born Lev Davidovich Bronshtein, the son of a prosperous Ukrainian 
farmer, on November 7, 1879. Bronshtein adopted the name “Trotsky” for a false passport he 
used while escaping from a Siberian prison in 1902.1001 During the early days of the Soviet 
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Union, Trotsky served as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He later played a major 
role in the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War as the commander of the Red Army.  
 Trotsky won election as one of the five full members of the first Politburo in 1919 along 
with Stalin and Lenin. Trotsky developed a political rivalry with Stalin,1002 and the rivalry 
intensified after Lenin's death on January 21, 1924. Trotsky and Stalin were the chief 
protagonists in the contest to succeed Lenin, and their rivalry included a fierce theoretical debate 
over the right road to socialism.1003 
 Together with Alexander Parvus, Trotsky developed a theory of “uninterrupted” or 
“permanent revolution,” 1004 which Lenin adopted in his “April Theses” of April 4, 1917. 1005 
“Permanent revolution” was a theoretical accommodation of Russia's inadequate political and 
economic development. The Russian Social-Democrats advocated a two-phase revolution in 
which a distinct phase of “bourgeois” rule preceded socialism.1006 They considered a bourgeois-
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democratic revolution to be necessary for overthrowing the autocracy and clearing the way for 
advanced capitalist development.1007  
 Trotsky recognized the problems presented by Russia's economic and political 
underdevelopment. Trotsky nevertheless theorized that Russia's proletariat, with the support of 
the peasantry, could accomplish both the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution. The 
socialist revolution would follow close upon the heels of the bourgeois revolution, and this two-
phase revolution would be “uninterrupted” or “permanent.”  
 Russia possessed inadequate economic development to complete a socialist revolution. 
Trotsky maintained that the ultimate success of the Russian socialist revolution would depend on 
the spread of socialist revolution to advanced capitalist countries, such as England and Germany. 
The Russian Revolution would serve as the catalyst for an international socialist revolution.1008 
Despite the collapse of the Hungarian Socialist Republic in 1919, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks 
believed as late as 1923 that the socialist revolution would spread to Germany.1009  
B. Stalin's Theory of “Socialism in One Country” 
 When the German socialist revolution failed to materialize, Stalin rejected Trotsky's 
theory of permanent revolution and its claim that the ultimate success of the Russian Revolution 
depended on other proletarian revolutions in Europe. In 1924, Stalin advanced his own theory of 
“Socialism in One Country.” 1010  
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 Stalin's theory maintained that the proletariat in one country could overthrow the power 
of the bourgeoisie. “After consolidating its power and taking the peasantry in tow, the proletariat 
of the victorious country can and must build up a Socialist society.” Once the Socialist society is 
achieved, “the development and support of revolution in other countries is an essential task of 
the victorious revolution.” 1011  
 For Stalin, “building up a Socialist society” in the Soviet Union meant forcibly 
socializing the country from above. It also required the removal of his ideological opponents 
among the Old Bolsheviks, particularly Trotsky, who clung to the theory of permanent 
revolution. 1012 The two theories were irreconcilable. As Trotsky observed, “the theory of 
socialism in one country, which rose on the yeast of the reaction against October, is the only 
theory that consistently and to the very end opposes the theory of the permanent revolution.” 1013  
C. Stalin Targets Trotsky 
 Trotsky's objections to socialism in one country may have been ideologically 
impeccable, but they were politically disastrous, 1014 and Stalin ultimately outmaneuvered 
Trotsky in the Party. Stalin's theory of socialism in one country proved more attractive than 
Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution.1015 Stalin and his supporters successfully orchestrated 
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Trotsky's denunciation by the Party in 1924. Trotsky was expelled from the Party in 1927 and 
then from the Soviet Union in 1929.  
 Stalin then secured the condemnation of the exiled Trotsky and his son Lev Sedov in the 
first two Moscow Trials in 1936 and 1937. 1016 The Dewey Commission held its hearings 
regarding the 1936 Moscow Trial in April, 1937, and published its finding that the trial was a 
“frame-up” 1017 the following September.  
 Stalin had Trotsky assassinated in Mexico on August 20, 1940. 1018 Stalin's agent Ramon 
Mercader had gained acceptance in Trotsky's household by seducing the American Trotskyite 
Sylvia Ageloff. An experienced mountain climber, Mercader chose a cut-down ice ax as his 
murder weapon. Concealing the weapon in his raincoat, Mercader visited Trotsky on the pretext 
of receiving Trotsky's comments on an article Mercader had written.  
 As Trotsky read the article, Mercader stood behind him and delivered a “tremendous 
blow” to Trotsky's head. The blow was not immediately fatal. According to Mercader, Trotsky 
screamed for “very long, infinitely long.” One of Trotsky's guards described the scream as “a cry 
prolonged and agonized, half-scream, half sob.” 1019 Trotsky died the next day, aged 61. 
 Trotsky presaged his grisly death four years earlier. Writing in his journal on December 
30, 1936, Trotsky noted that Stalin now regarded Trotsky's 1929 exile as a mistake. Trotsky's 
ideas were proving to have a life of their own.  Stalin had been weighing the political pros and 
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cons of liquidating Trotsky since Lenin's death in 1924, and Trotsky anticipated that Stalin 
would attempt Trotsky's liquidation. When Stalin acted against him, wrote Trotsky, it would not 
be “by any ideological measures: Stalin conducts a struggle on a totally different plane. He seeks 
to strike not at the ideas of his opponent, but at his skull.” 1020  
III. The Moscow Trials 
The three Moscow Trials constituted the final phase of conflicts that arose within the 
Party leadership after Lenin's first stroke on May 26, 1922.1021 Stalin used the Moscow Trails to 
take revenge on the “Oppositionists,” including Trotsky, who opposed his consolidation of 
power. 
The inspiration for Stalin's purge of his Party opponents, ironically, may have come 
from Stalin's greatest foreign rival, Adolf Hitler. Stalin was impressed when Hitler carried out 
his own purge during the “Night of the Long Knives” on June 30, 1934.1022 Stalin certainly 
recalled how the crisis atmosphere created by the attempted assassination of Lenin on August 30, 
1918, had facilitated the Red Terror. Stalin thus began formulating a plan that would remove all 
political rivals. The first step would be an assassination that would produce a crisis that Stalin 
could manipulate to his advantage.  Stalin's eventual victim would be Sergei Mironovich Kirov, 
a rising star in the Party. As described below, Kirov emerged as a threat to Stalin's ambitions 
during the “Ryutin and Smirnov Affairs.”  
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A. The Ryutin and Smirnov Affairs (June 1932-January 1933) 
Stalin's success in expelling Trotsky from the Party and securing Trotsky's exile from the 
Soviet Union fueled Stalin's ambition for complete mastery of the Soviet Union. As Khrushchev 
observed in 1956, after Stalin defeated Trotsky, “Stalin ceased to an ever greater degree to 
consider the members of the party's Central Committee and even the members of the Political 
Bureau. Stalin thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he needed were 
statisticians; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.” 1023  
The Ryutin Affair involved one of the last attempts to block Stalin's consolidation of 
power. Marteman Ryutin, a former member of the Central Committee, wrote two documents 
opposing Stalin in June 1932. The first was a broadside entitled “Appeal to All Members of the 
All-Union Communist Party.” The Appeal argued, “Stalin and his clique will not and cannot 
voluntarily give up their positions, so they must be removed by force... as soon as possible.” 
Stalin interpreted the Appeal as a call for his assassination.1024  
The second Ryutin document, nearly 200 pages in length, was entitled “Stalin and the 
Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship,” often called “Ryutin's Platform.” The Platform called for 
a reinstatement of Trotsky, and four of its thirteen chapters attacked Stalin's character. Ryutin 
called Stalin “the gravedigger of the revolution” and “the evil genius of the party and the 
revolution.”1025  
On September 23, 1932, Stalin succeeded in having Ryutin arrested and expelled from 
the Party. The OGPU, a forerunner of the KGB, requested instructions from the Politburo as to 
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whether it should shoot Ryutin. Stalin argued that Ryutin deserved the death penalty because 
Ryutin's “Appeal” sought to incite acts of terrorism and a palace coup. Moderates on the 
Politburo were reluctant to agree, however, mindful of Lenin's prescription against spilling 
Bolshevik blood.  
Sergei Mironovich Kirov spoke “with particular force against the recourse to the death 
penalty” and persuaded the Politburo to reject Stalin's arguments for the death penalty.1026 Ryutin 
ultimately received 10 years' imprisonment. Stalin never forgot his defeat by Kirov in the Ryutin 
Affair. 1027  The defendants in each of the three Moscow Trials were forced to confess complicity 
in the Ryutin plot.  
A second plot to remove Stalin, the “Smirnov Affair,” became public in January 1933. 
This plot involved three Old Bolsheviks. A.P. Smirnov had been a Party member since 1896, 
V.P. Eismont since 1907, and V.N. Tolmachev since 1904. Stalin again wanted his opponents 
shot. Kirov again succeeded in arguing against the death penalty.1028  
B. The Assassination of Sergei Kirov (December 1, 1934) 
Kirov was quickly becoming a favorite of the Party. When the delegates to the XVIIth 
Congress elected Kirov to the Central Committee in 1934, Kirov received only three negative 
votes, while Stalin received 292. Kirov served as the Secretary of the Central Committee and 
held a seat on the Politburo. As First Secretary of the Leningrad Party organization,  Kirov 
controlled an independent source of power in the Leningrad workers.1029 He was the best orator 
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the Party had produced since Trotsky, and some delegates to the XVIIth Congress in 1934 even 
advocated replacing Stalin with Kirov as Secretary General.1030  
Stalin wanted to dispose of Kirov. Kirov interfered with Stalin's control of the Politburo, 
and Kirov posed a major obstacle to Stalin's goal of absolute power. The Ryutin and Smirnov 
affairs had taught Stalin, however, that he could not easily obtain consent for the execution of 
Party members for purely political offenses. Furthermore, it was difficult to find a political 
excuse for attacking Kirov.  
Stalin chose to solve the Kirov problem by assassination. 1031 An assassination removed 
Kirov as an obstacle to Stalin's consolidation of power, and it created an atmosphere of crisis in 
which Stalin could blame his political enemies for Kirov's murder. Stalin could then eliminate 
these enemies without the irksome Politburo debates that had restricted him in the Ryutin and 
Smirnov Affairs.1032 
Stalin directed the head of the NKVD, Genrikh Yagoda, to arrange the assassination. 
The NKVD selected thirty-year-old Leonid Nikolayev, an unemployed and disaffected Party 
member, and supplied him with a loaded pistol. After the NKVD removed Kirov's security detail 
on the evening of December 1, 1934, Nikolayev waited for Kirov in the shadows on the third 
floor of the Smolny Institute in St. Petersburg. When Kirov appeared in the corridor, Nikolayev 
shot him from behind in the back of the neck.1033  
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Stalin moved quickly to conceal his role in Kirov's assassination. Stalin immediately 
called for the swift punishment of the murderers and all those whose negligence enabled the 
assassination. Next, the NKVD officer responsible for Kirov's security, Mikhail Borisov, died 
under suspicious circumstances the morning after the murder on the way to his interrogation. 
Twelve of the top functionaries of the NKVD in Leningrad were relieved of their duties and 
given light prison sentences “for failing to prevent the assassination.”1034 Stalin had them shot in 
1937. 1035  
In a foreshadowing of the Moscow Trials, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 
of the USSR tried, convicted, and executed Leonid Nikolayev on December 29, 1934. Vasili 
Ulrikh presided as Chairman at the trial. Stalin would use Kirov's assassination as justification 
for the three Moscow Trials, and he would use the Military Collegium, chaired by Ulrikh, as 
their forum.   
C. The “Kirov Amendments” to the Criminal Code (December 1-10, 1934) 
Almost all the necessary pieces for the Moscow Trials were now in place. Stalin had 
created an atmosphere of crisis, a heinous crime for which someone must pay, and he had 
selected his court and presiding judge. The final step in Stalin's preparation was revision of the 
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laws.  
Just as Lenin had changed the Russian legal system by decree to facilitate the Red 
Terror, Stalin moved to facilitate his purge by making his own changes. Stalin implemented the 
“Kirov amendments” in two steps.  
 The first step involved a unilateral decree issued by Stalin on December 1, 1934. Stalin's 
decree directed all investigative agencies “to speed up the cases of those accused of the 
preparation or execution of acts of terror.” Stalin ordered courts to execute death sentences 
“immediately after the passage of such sentences,” and he prohibited all appeals and pardons. 1036 
 Khrushchev observed in 1956 that this decree “became the basis for mass acts of abuse 
against socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases, the accused were charged 
with 'the preparation' of terroristic acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases 
might be re-examined, even when they stated before the court that their 'confessions' were 
secured by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against 
them.”1037  
 The second step in implementing the “Kirov amendments” involved amending the 
Soviet Criminal Code to deny defendants the right to prepare their cases, the right to assistance 
of counsel, and the right to appeal their convictions. The Soviet Government formally amended 
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the Criminal Code on December 10, 1934, by adding new Articles 466-470.  These new Articles 
governed cases involving terrorist organizations and terrorist acts under Articles 58-8 and 58-11 
of the 1926 Criminal Code. Violations of Articles 58-8 and 58-11 formed the core charges in all 
three of the Moscow Trials.  
 The new Article 466 mandated that investigators complete all investigations of alleged 
terrorism in no more than ten days. Article 467 required that defendants receive their indictment 
only one day before trial. Article 468 required that no lawyers could assist the defendants. 
Article 469 denied all appeals or requests for clemency, and Article 470 required that courts 
conduct executions immediately after sentencing.1038 Under Stalin's direction, the NKVD used 
the period from July 1935 to August 1936 to interrogate witnesses and obtain confessions in 
preparation for the first Moscow Trial.1039  
D. The Trial of the Sixteen of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center (August 1936) 
The first of the three Moscow Trials, the “Trial of the Sixteen,” took place from August 
19 to August 24, 1936, before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., a 
panel of three military judges.1040 The sixteen defendants represented a large part of the old 
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from 1926 until 1948, presiding over all three of the Moscow Trials. Ulrikh advanced to his position by 
developing a reputation for “efficiency” in handling cases, often conducting entire trials and rendering 
verdicts in only 15 minutes. The Military Collegium under Ulrikh tried an estimated 40,000 “enemies of 
the people: behind closed doors, sentencing most of them to death.” Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov, “Mass 
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Bolshevik guard, and two of the defendants, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, were former 
prominent party leaders.1041 Stalin regarded Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev as genuine rivals 
whom he must crush.  Together with Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev had formed a troika in the 
fall of 1923 that focused on the marginalization of Trotsky within the Party.1042 After obtaining 
the official Party denunciation of Trotsky in 1924, however, Stalin abandoned this troika and 
formed a new alliance in 1925 with Pravda’s editor Nikolai Bukharin and Soviet Prime Minister 
Alexei Rykov. When the first troika with Stalin finally disintegrated in 1925, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev turned to Trotsky for political support, forming the “United Opposition” against 
Stalin.1043 
The defendants were charged under articles 19,1044 58(8),1045 and 58(11) 1046 of the 
                                                                                                                                                
Terror and the Court: The Military Collegium of the USSR,” Europe-Asia Studies 58 (4) (2006) 589-602, 
589. 
1041 The defendants in the “Trial of the Sixteen” included G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Evdokimov, 
I.N. Smirnov, I.P. Bakayev, V. A. Ter-Vaganyan, S. V. Mrachkovsky, E. A. Dreitzer, E. S. Holtzman, I. I. 
Reingold, R. V. Pickel, V. P. Olberg, K. B. Berman-Yurin, Fritz David (I. I. Kruglyansky), M. Lurye,  and 
N. Lurye. 
1042 This troika controlled the Party apparatus through Stalin's Secretariat and controlled Pravda through 
its editor Nikolai Bukharin. In the fall of 1923, the troika of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev managed 
delegate selection prior to the XIIIth Party Congress and secured a majority of seats. The troika then 
orchestrated the denunciation of Trotsky and Trotskyism at the XIIIth Party Congress from January 16 to 
January 18, 1924. Lenin died soon after on January 21, 1924. After Trotsky was defeated, tensions 
mounted between Stalin and the other two members of the troika.  
1043 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 9-11. 
1044 “19. Attempts at any crime, and likewise preparatory actions for crime, manifested in the finding or 
employment of tools, means and the creation of conditions of crime, are punishable in the same way as 
crimes committed; accordingly, the court when choosing a measure of social defense of a judicial-
corrective character must be guided by the dangerousness of the person committing the crime or the 
attempt, the degree of preparation of the crime, and the nearness of the arrival of its consequences, and 
likewise the reasons for which the crime was not carried to a conclusion. In cases, where the crime was not 
carried out due to the voluntary refusal of the person, who had intended to carry out the crime, to 
perpetrate it, the court will impose measures of social defense corresponding to those acts that actually had 
been carried out by the attempter or preparer.” 
1045 “58-8. The perpetration of terrorist acts, directed against representatives of Soviet authority or activists 
of revolutionary worker's and peasants' organizations, and participation in the performance of such acts, 
even by persons not belonging to a counterrevolutionary organization, shall be punishable by measures of 
social defense, indicated in article 58-2 of this code. [6 June 1927 (SU No 49, art. 330)].” Article 58-2 
provided: “58-2. Armed uprising or incursion with counterrevolutionary purposes on Soviet territory by 
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Criminal Code of 1934 for forming a “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center,” a conspiracy to 
seize power by assassination of the Soviet leadership. The conspiracy allegedly carried out the 
assassination of Sergei Kirov on December 1, 1934, and planned the assassination of other 
leaders, including Stalin.  
All sixteen defendants, after purportedly waiving counsel and choosing to represent 
themselves, confessed to plotting with Trotsky to murder Kirov, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders. 
The Military Collegium convicted all sixteen defendants, had them shot, and confiscated their 
property. The Military Collegium also convicted Trotsky and his son Lev Lvovich Sedov in 
absentia but did not sentence them.1047 
E. The Trial of the Seventeen of the “Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center.” (January 1937) 
The Military Collegium conducted the second Moscow Trial, the “Trial of the 
                                                                                                                                                
armed bands, seizure of power in the center or areas with the same purposes, or, in particular, with the 
purpose of forcibly severing from the USSR and an individual union republic, any part of its territory, or 
of breaking agreements between the USSR and foreign states, shall be punishable by--the supreme 
measure of social defense-- shooting, or proclamation as an enemy of the workers, with confiscation of 
property and with deprivation of citizenship of the union republic, and likewise of citizenship of the Soviet 
Union and perpetual expulsion beyond the borders of the USSR, with the allowance under extenuating 
circumstances of reduction to deprivation of liberty for a term of no less than three years, with confiscation 
of all or part of one's property [6 Jun 1927 (SU No 49, art 330)].” 
1046 “58-11. Any type of organizational activity, directed toward the preparation or carrying out of crimes 
indicated in this chapter, and likewise participation in an organization, formed for the preparation or 
carrying out of one of the crimes indicated in this chapter, shall be punishable by--measures of social 
defense, indicated in the corresponding articles of this code. [6 June 1927 (SU No 49, art. 330)].” 
1047 The verdict provided as follows regarding Trotsky and his son: “Lev Davidovich Trotsky, and his son, 
Lev Lvovich Sedov, now abroad, convicted by the evidence of the accused I.N. Smirnov, E. S. Holtzman, 
Dreitzer, V. Olberg, Fritz David (I. I. Kruglyansky), and Berman-Yurin, and also by the materials in the 
present case as having directly prepared and personally directed the organization in the USSR of terroristic 
acts against the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet State, are subject, in the event of their being 
discovered on the territory of the USSR, to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the 
Supreme Court of the USSR.” People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court 
Proceedings in the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre Heard Before the Military 
Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, August 19-24, 1936 (New York: Fertig, 1967) 
180. 
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Seventeen,” from January 23 to January 30, 1937.1048 Unlike the first trial, these defendants did 
not represent genuine political rivals to Stalin's power. Some defendants were former Trotskyites 
who represented the most distinguished remaining figures of the old Bolsheviks. Stalin wanted 
revenge against these former Trotskyites for opposing him in the 1920s, and the second Moscow 
Trial operated as a preventative clean sweep of the remaining Trotskyites.1049 
Georgy Pyatakov was a former Trotskyite who had switched to Stalin's side and 
remained loyal to Stalin for years, but Stalin viewed him as a potential leader and thus as a 
potential threat.1050 Karl Radek, another former Trotskyite, had operated with great daring and 
skill in Berlin in 1919 in attempting to bring about the international socialist revolution. He was 
a former member of the Central Committee, and he had helped write the Soviet Constitution of 
1936. 1051 Grigori Sokolnikov was a former Soviet Commissar of Finance and the ablest 
remaining Trotskyite politician. Sokolnikov had been a major leader of Stalin's opposition in 
1926.1052 Leonid Serebryakov was a former Deputy Commissar of Railways. He was expelled 
from the Party for running an illegal printing press in a last ditch effort to make a Trotskyite 
appeal to the workers.1053  
Other defendants held prominent positions of authority over Soviet industry. Ten of the 
seventeen defendants were top officials in the NKTP, the People's Commissariat of Heavy 
                                                 
1048 The seventeen defendants included Y.L. Pyatakov, K.B. Radek, G.Y. Sokolnikov, L.P. Serebryakov, 
N.I. Muralov, Y.A. Livshitz, Y.N. Drobnis, M.S. Boguslavsky, I.A. Knyazev, S.A. Rataichak, B.O. 
Norkin, A.A. Shestov, M.S. Stroilov, Y.D. Turok, I.Y. Hrasche, G.E. Pushin, and V.V. Arnold. 
1049 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 147. 
1050 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 140. 
1051 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 9. 
1052 Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow Trials (Glencoe, IL: 
Free, 1954) 10. When Stalin's troika with Zinoviev and Kamenev dissolved in 1925, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev allied themselves with Sokolnikov, who was then Soviet Commissar of Finance. Stalin wanted 
revenge for Sokolnikov's earlier opposition. 
1053 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 9. 
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Industry.1054 
The seventeen defendants were accused of treason, espionage, acts of diversion, 
undermining, wrecking activities, and the preparation of terrorist acts in violation of articles 
58(1a),1055 58(8), 58(9),1056 and 58(11) of the Criminal Code. The indictment claimed that 
Defendants Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov and Serebryakov, under Trotsky’s direction, formed an 
underground conspiracy in Moscow in 1933 referred to as the “Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center.” 
This group acted in parallel with the “Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center,” made the subject 
of the first trial.  
The principal aims of the parallel “Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center” were to overthrow the 
government, restore capitalism, and restore the power of the bourgeoisie. To accomplish these 
goals, the defendants engaged in diversions, espionage, and terrorist activities designed to 
undermine the economic and military power of the Soviet Union. They also sought to expedite 
the armed attack of the Soviet Union by Germany and Japan. Lastly, they sought to assist 
Germany and Japan in defeating the Soviet Union and establishing a Trotskyite government.  
All defendants pled guilty to the charges against them. Karl Radek, Grigori Sokolnikov, 
                                                 
1054 Oleg V. Khlevniuk, In Stalin's Shadow: The Career of “Sergo” Ordzhonikidze (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 
1995) 118-19. The NKTP was the Narodnyi komissariat tyazheloi promyshlennosti, the People’s 
Commissariat of Heavy Industry.  
1055 “58-1a. Treason to the motherland, i.e. acts done by citizens of the USSR in damage to the military 
power of the USSR, its national sovereignty, or the inviolability of its territory, such as: espionage, 
betrayal of military or state secrets, crossing to the side of the enemy, flight (by surface or air) abroad, 
shall be punishable by--the supreme measure of criminal punishment-- shooting with confiscation of all 
property, or with mitigating circumstances-- deprivation of liberty for a term of 10 years with confiscation 
of all property [20 July 1934 (SU No 30, Art. 173)].” 
1056 “58-9. Destruction or damage with a counterrevolutionary purpose by explosion, arson, or other means 
of railroad or other routes and means of transportation, means of public communication, water conduits, 
public depots and other structures, or state and community property, shall be punishable by--measures of 
social defense, indicated in art. 58-2 of this code. [6 June 1927 (SU No 49, art. 330)].” 
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and Valentin Arnold received prison terms of ten years.1057 M.S. Stroilov, the chief engineer for 
the Kuzbass Coal Trust, received eight years. These four defendants did not escape death for 
long. Cellmates killed Radek and Sokolnikov in 1939, and guards shot Arnold and Stroilov in 
prison in 1941.1058  
The Military Collegium had the remaining thirteen defendants shot.1059 The sentence in 
the second trial again convicted Trotsky and his son Lev Lvovich Sedov in absentia but did not 
stipulate any penalty for them.1060 
F. The Trial of the Twenty-One of the “Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites” (March 1938) 
The Military Collegium conducted the third Moscow Trial, the “Trial of the Twenty-
One,” from March 2 to March 13, 1938.1061 Historian Robert Conquest describes this largest of 
the three Moscow Trials as “little more than a victory parade.” Stalin had crushed his opposition 
and the semi-independent voices among his own supporters in the previous trials. Stalin used the 
                                                 
1057 The prosecution accused Arnold, former chauffeur to Stalin's protégé and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Vyacheslav Molotov, with attempting to kill Molotov by driving his car into a ditch. Robert Conquest, The 
Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 156-59. 
1058 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 165. 
1059 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-
Soviet Trotskyite Centre Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., 
Moscow, January 23-30, 1937 (Moscow: People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937) 579. 
1060 The verdict provided as follows regarding Trotsky and his son: “Enemies of the people, Lev 
Davidovich Trotsky, and his son, Lev Lvovich Sedov, now abroad, who were in 1929 deported from the 
USSR and by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of February 20, 1932, were 
deprived of citizenship of the USSR, having been convicted by the testimony of the accused Y.L. 
Pyatakov, K.B. Radek, A.A. Shestov, and N.I. Muralov, and by the evidence of V.G. Romm and D.P. 
Bukhartsev, who were examined as witnesses at the trial, as well as by the materials in the present case, of 
personally directing the treacherous activities of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet center, in the event of there 
being discovered on the territory of the USSR, are liable to immediate arrest and trial by the Military 
Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.” People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of 
Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre Heard Before the Military Collegium 
of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, January 23-30, 1937 (Moscow: People’s Commissariat of 
Justice of the USSR, 1937) 580. 
1061 The defendants included Nikolai Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, G.G. Yagoda, N.N. Krestinsky, K.G. 
Rakovsky, A.P. Rosengoltz, V.I. Ivanov, M.A. Chernov, G.F. Grinko, I.A. Zelensky, S.A. Bessonov, A. 
Ikramov, F. Khodjayev, V.F. Sharangovich, P.T. Zubarev, P.P. Bulanov, L.G. Levin, D.D. Pletnev, I.N. 
Kazakov, V.A. Maximov-Dikovsky, and P.P. Kryuchkov. 
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third Moscow Trial to tie together the threads of opposition, terror, sabotage, treachery, and 
espionage alleged in the earlier trials into a single great conspiracy.1062  
Two of the defendants, Nikolai Bukharin and A.I. Rykov, had joined with Stalin to form 
Stalin's second troika in 1925. Bukharin had been the editor of Pravda and Rykov had been 
Soviet Prime Minister. Together they helped Stalin secure the expulsion of Stalin's former troika 
members Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev from the Party in December 1927. Zinoviev and 
Kamenev had been victims of Stalin's first Moscow Trial in 1936. Bukharin and Rykov now 
shared their fate.  
A surprising defendant in the third trial was G.G. Yagoda. As head of the NKVD, 
Yagoda had organized the assassination of Kirov for Stalin in 1934. He had also supervised the 
arrests, interrogations, and “confessions” of the defendants for the first Moscow Trial. Yagoda 
had fallen out of favor with Stalin, however, after expressing sympathy for defendants Grigory 
Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev in the first Moscow Trial. Stalin dismissed Yagoda as head of the 
NKVD on September 26, 1936, for being “unequal to the task of exposing the Trotskyite-
Zinonievite bloc.”1063 
This third Moscow Trial included allegations of “medical murders” against three 
Kremlin physicians, sixty-eight year old Lev Levin, sixty-six year old Dimitry Pletnev, and 
Ignaty Kazakov. The indictments accused these physicians of conspiring with Yagoda to execute 
a series of murders by poisoning or mistreating their patients. The alleged victims included the 
author Maxim Gorky; Gorky's son, Maxim Peshkov; Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, Yagoda's 
predecessor as head of the NKVD; and Valerian Kuybishev, a Politburo member and Stalin's 
                                                 
1062 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 341. 
1063 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 138.  
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primary economic advisor. 1064 
The 21 defendants were accused of forming a conspiratorial group named the “Bloc of 
Rights and Trotskyites” to conduct espionage on behalf of England, Poland, Germany, and 
Japan. They were also accused of wrecking, diversionist, and terrorist activities in violation of 
articles 58(1a), 58(2),1065 58(7),1066 58(8), 58(9), 58(11), and 58(13)1067 of the Criminal Code. As 
in the first two Moscow Trials, Trotsky was the alleged inspiration for their conspiracy and the 
defendants allegedly carried out Trotsky’s direct instructions. The alleged goals of the 
conspirators included undermining the military power of the USSR, provoking a military attack 
against the USSR, dismembering the USSR for the benefit of foreign states, and restoring 
capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie.  
All of the defendants purportedly refused counsel except for the alleged medical 
murderers, Levin, Pletnev, and Kazakov. All but three of the defendants received the death 
sentence. Pletnev received twenty-five years in prison. Christian Rakovsky, a Trotskyite and 
                                                 
1064 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 375-90. Conquest 
argues that each of the physician defendants was innocent. 
1065 “58-2. Armed uprising or incursion with counterrevolutionary purposes on Soviet territory by armed 
bands, seizure of power in the center or areas with the same purposes, or, in particular, with the purpose of 
forcibly severing from the USSR and an individual union republic, any part of its territory, or of breaking 
agreements between the USSR and foreign states, shall be punishable by--the supreme measure of social 
defense-- shooting, or proclamation as an enemy of the workers, with confiscation of property and with 
deprivation of citizenship of the union republic, and likewise of citizenship of the Soviet Union and 
perpetual expulsion beyond the borders of the USSR, with the allowance under extenuating circumstances 
of reduction to deprivation of liberty for a term of no less than three years, with confiscation of all or part 
of one's property [6 Jun 1927 (SU No 49, art 330)].” 
1066 “58-7. The undermining of state production, transport, trade, monetary relations or the credit system, 
or likewise cooperation, done with counterrevolutionary purposes, by means of corresponding use of state 
institutions and enterprises or impeding their normal activity, and likewise use of state institutions and 
enterprises or impeding their activity, done in the interests of former owners or interested capitalist 
organizations, shall be punishable by--measures of social defense, indicated in article 58-2 of this code. [6 
June 1927 (SU no 49, art. 330)].” 
1067 “58-13. Active participation or active fighting against the working class and revolutionary movement, 
manifested in a responsible or secret position in the tsarist regime, or with counterrevolutionary 
governments in a period of civil war, shall be punishable by-- measures of social defense, indicated in art. 
58-2 of this code. [6 June 1927 (SU No 49, art. 330)].” 
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former member of the Central Committee, received twenty years.1068  Sergei Bessonov, who as 
Counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin had allegedly been a contact man for Trotsky and 
Sedov, received fifteen years.1069 
IV. The Dewey Commission  
A. Support for the Moscow Trials in the American Liberal Community 
Stalin’s prosecution of the three Moscow Trials received significant international 
support, including strong support from the American liberal community.1070 Two influential 
liberal magazines, The New Republic and The Nation, ran editorials arguing that the Moscow 
Trials were legitimate,1071 and articles in the New York Times repeatedly defended Stalin and the 
Moscow Trials.1072  
Philosopher Sidney Hook wrote that support for the Moscow Trials required “important 
segments of the American liberal community to betray their own principles.” 1073 “The greatest 
shock connected with the trials,” recalled Hook, “was the discovery that hundreds of people 
proud of the liberal American heritage, which they had invoked in criticizing injustice in the 
                                                 
1068 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 359-61. 
1069 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 344. 
1070 See, e.g., Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 463-
476; Jacob Heilbrunn, “The New York Times and the Moscow Show Trials,” World Affairs 153 (3) (1991): 
87-101; Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 33-
40. 
1071 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 37. The 
editorials argued that the trials must be legitimate. Otherwise, Stalin would not allow them to proceed, 
since the trials were hurting Moscow’s reputation at a time of mounting international danger. 
1072 Jacob Heilbrunn, “The New York Times and the Moscow Show Trials,” World Affairs 153 (3) (1991): 
87-101. 
1073 Sidney Hook, “Memories of the Moscow Trials,” Commentary 77(3) (1984): 57-63, 57. Bertrand 
Pautenaude describes Hook as one of John Dewey’s “most illustrious former doctoral students at 
Columbia University,” “a leading Marxist philosopher and a professor at New York University. Hook was 
not a Trotskyist, but after years of tortured relations with the American Communist Party, he had turned 
against Soviet communism.” Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2009) 39. 
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United States, Italy, Germany, and Spain, abandoned that heritage when questions were raised 
about justice in the Soviet Union.” 1074  
The reporting of Walter Duranty and Harold Denny of the New York Times exemplified 
American support for the Moscow Trials.1075 As the Times correspondent for the first two trials, 
Duranty discounted claims of confessions induced by torture as “preposterous” and “sheer 
romance.” The Soviet secret police eschewed torture, he wrote, because they realized that torture 
produces confessions that are “untrue and therefore useless.”1076 Rather than indicating the use of 
torture, the inherent improbabilities in the confessions merely reflected the innate Russian desire 
“to unburden the soul.” 1077 The confessions proved that the accusers had shown the defendants 
“sufficient proof” of their guilt.1078 
Duranty characterized the Moscow Trials as “growing pains” necessary for the 
maturation of the Soviet state, no more troubling than “the pimples on the nose of an 
                                                 
1074 Sidney Hook, “Memories of the Moscow Trials,” Commentary 77(3) (1984): 57-63, 57. 
1075 Jacob Heilbrunn, “The New York Times and the Moscow Show Trials,” World Affairs 153 (3) (1991): 
87-101.  
1076 Walter Duranty, “Why Stalin Wages Merciless War on Trotsky,” New York Times Magazine, 7 Feb. 
1937: 22. 
1077 Walter Duranty, “Why Stalin Wages Merciless War on Trotsky,” New York Times Magazine, 7 Feb. 
1937: 22: “Russians are different. There comes a point when their resistance breaks and they say 
‘nichevo’… to use an American expression, ‘spill the works.’ In other words: ‘If I am caught and they 
have the goods on me, why not come clean?’ – corresponding to the ‘unburdening of the soul’ which is the 
basis… of the confession in the Roman Catholic Church.” Trotsky called this claim regarding the Russian 
soul a lie in his speech, “I Stake My Life.” Directing his remarks directly to Walter Duranty, Trotsky said, 
“You lie gentlemen, about the Russian soul. You lie about the human soul in general.” Trotsky attributed 
the confessions to desperate attempts by the defendants to save their lives and their families, already held 
as hostages. Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 
36-37, 34. 
1078 Walter Duranty, “Why Stalin Wages Merciless War on Trotsky,” New York Times Magazine, 7 Feb. 
1937: 22. “Russians know-and knew before the Revolution-that their people will confess if confronted not 
by torture but with sufficient proof. In the recent trial Russians were faced with such groups. And 
accordingly confessed.” 
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adolescent.” 1079 In any event, the first two Moscow Trials conclusively exposed Trotsky as a 
murderer and a sordid conspirator.1080 Stalin, not Trotsky, was “Lenin’s disciple and a prolonger 
of Lenin’s work.”1081 “Like Lenin, Stalin kept in touch with the masses. Trotsky went his own 
way and preferred intrigue and conspirative cabals.”1082 
Harold Denny was the Times correspondent for the third Moscow Trial. Denny 
emphasized the confession of Grigory Yagoda, the secret police chief who extracted the 
confessions used in the first Moscow Trial. For Denny, Yagoda’s complicity in the conspiracies 
explained the Soviet leadership’s ignorance of such widespread espionage, and this in turn 
proved the Moscow Trials were not “fakes.” 1083 Even Russian schoolchildren recognized the 
justice of the Moscow Trials in calling for the deaths of these “fascist reptiles and hirelings.” 1084  
Denny also defended the use of coerced confessions from unseen witnesses in the trials. 
The use of torture, Denny argued, “did not necessarily prove that the confessions were in essence 
                                                 
1079 Walter Duranty, “Suspicion in Soviet Sharp since Trial,” New York Times, 4 Feb. 1937: 8: “even such 
events as the recent trial are … no more than ‘growing pains’ of the Soviet Union, to use Lenin’s phrase in 
the sense that he doubtless intended. The amazingly rapid progress of this nation from a state of slavery to 
discipline and self-government, from childhood to manhood, and, last but not least, from backward 
agrarianism to modern industrialization cannot be accomplished without such distressing phenomena as 
the pimples on the nose of an adolescent or more serious abscesses like this ‘Trotskyist’ trial.” 
1080 Walter Duranty, “Why Stalin Wages Merciless War on Trotsky,” New York Times Magazine, 7 
February 1937: 3, discussed in Jacob Heilbrunn, “The New York Times and the Moscow Show Trials,” 
World Affairs 153 (3) (1991): 87-101. 
1081 Walter Duranty, “Why Stalin Wages Merciless War on Trotsky,” New York Times Magazine, 7 
February 1937: 3. 
1082 Walter Duranty, “Why Stalin Wages Merciless War on Trotsky,” New York Times Magazine, 7 
February 1937: 3. 
1083 Harold Denny, “Wide Plot Shown in Moscow Trial,” New York Times, 14 Mar. 1938. “If Mr. Yagoda 
was a traitor, as I fully believe he was, that flaw [the Soviet leaders’ long ignorance of the alleged 
widespread conspiracies] disappears.” 
1084 Harold Denny, “20 Admit Charges,” New York Times, 3 Mar. 1938: 15. “Even children call for death. 
Pionerskaya Pravda published today a resolution by schoolchildren in many parts of Russia demanding 
that the court order the shooting of all fascist reptiles and hirelings.” 
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untrue.” 1085 Stalin still has supporters in American academia that make similarly specious 
arguments. J. Arch Getty asserts that Stalin was innocent of complicity in Kirov's murder. As 
proof, Getty relies on Yagoda's confession in the 1938 Moscow Trial that Stalin's opposition was 
responsible.1086  
Khrushchev admitted in 1956 that the confessions of the defendants in the Moscow 
Trials were false. Interrogators subjected the defendants to “barbaric,” “cruel,” and “inhuman 
tortures” to obtain their confessions. 1087 As historian Robert Conquest observes, “not even high 
intelligence or a sensitive spirit are of any help once the facts of a situation are deduced from a 
political theory, rather than vice versa.” 1088 
Joseph E. Davies, the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1936 to 1938, was another 
supporter of the Moscow Trials. Davies wrote on June 8, 1938, “I shall always feel under a 
special obligation to Walter Duranty who told the truth as he saw it and has the eyes of 
                                                 
1085 Harold Denny, “Wide Plot Shown in Moscow Trial,” New York Times, 14 Mar. 1938: “However much 
coercion may or may not have been used on the various prisoners and unseen witnesses, it does not 
necessarily prove that the confessions in essence were untrue.” 
1086 J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 
(New York: Cambridge U P, 1988) 208: “Similarly, the head of the NKVD at the time, Genrikh Iagoda (to 
whom Stalin allegedly gave instructions to kill Kirov), confessed in open court in 1938 to having killed 
Kirov at the instigation of the opposition. If Stalin had used Iagoda to assassinate Kirov, it would have 
been very dangerous to allow him to appear later before the microphones of the world press. Iagoda knew 
that he would be shot anyway, it would have been easy for him to let slip that Stalin had put him up to it. 
Stalin would not have taken the risk of such a damaging assertion's coming to light.” 
1087 Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Boris I. Nicolaevsky (New York: New Leader, 1962) 20, 27. “ It 
became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic activists who were branded in 1937-1938 as 
enemies were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists; they 
were only so stigmatized, and often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves with 
all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes.” Id. at 20. “Now, when the [1937-1938] cases of some of these so-
called 'spies' and 'saboteurs' were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions 
of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman 
tortures.” Id. at 22. 
1088 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 463. Conquest 
was speaking of English poet John Cornford who wrote a poem praising Stalin’s murder of Sergei Kirov, 
which Stalin then used as a pretext for the first Moscow Trial. Cornford wrote, “Nothing is ever born 
without screaming and blood.” Conquest describes this poem as an “illustration of the way in which the 
generous impulse of Western Communism could be befouled by Stalinism.” Id.   
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genius.”1089 Davies later praised Stalin’s Great Terror as a “decisive and energetic effort” that 
“established order in the country and freedom from treason.” 1090  
Warner Brothers made Davies’ memoir, Mission to Moscow,1091 into a film that 
whitewashed the Moscow Trials.1092 The film, like Denny’s coverage, emphasizes Yagoda’s 
confession in the third trial. The defendants calmly explain that they confessed to clear their 
consciences, and they repeatedly acknowledge Trotsky as the mastermind behind their 
conspiracies.1093 Davies, sitting in the audience, accepts their confessions. “Based on twenty 
years of trial practice,” he tells a pool of reporters, “I am inclined to believe these confessions.” 
1094  
Washington’s Office of War Information praised the film’s portrayal of the Moscow 
Trials. “The presentation of the Moscow trials is a high point in the picture that should do much 
to dispel the fears which many honest persons have felt with regard to our alliance with 
Russia.”1095 Years later, the film’s producer Robert Bruckner described Mission to Moscow as 
“an expedient lie for political purposes, glossily covering up important facts with full or partial 
                                                 
1089 Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941) 352.  
1090 Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin’s Prosecutor: The Life of Andrei Vyshinsky (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 
1991) 343 n. 22. Davies continued to applaud Stalin’s purge trials during World War II: “It is quite clear 
that all these trials, purges and liquidations which at the time seemed harsh, and shocked the whole world 
so much, were part of a decisive and energetic effort on the part of Stalin’s Government to protect itself 
not only from a coup d’état from within but also from an attack from without. The purge established order 
in the country and freedom from treason.” 
1091 Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941). 
1092 Jacob Heilbrunn, “The New York Times and the Moscow Show Trials,” World Affairs 153 (3) (1991): 
87-101, 98. Stalin ordered the showing of the film throughout the Soviet Union. 
1093 This section of the film is publicly available on You Tube as parts 6 and 7 of “Mission to Moscow.” 
The trial scene begins at 3:03 of part 6. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lufRqSJY-qA&NR=1 and 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoO8eyPNeH8&feature=related.  
1094 Davies’ opinion notwithstanding, the Rand Corporation published a detailed analysis in 1954 of the 
inconspicuous verbal techniques used by the defendants to communicate to insiders the falsity of their 
putative confessions. Leites, Nathan and Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation: The Case of the Moscow 
Trials (Glencoe, IL: Free, 1954) 278-336. 
1095 Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to War (New York: Free Press, 1987) 205. 
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knowledge of their false presentation.” 1096 
B. Persuading Dewey to Serve 
Although the exiled Trotsky vigorously denounced the Moscow Trials, his denunciations 
received little credence, and his refutations failed to sway liberal-to-left opinion in the United 
States. “Part of the problem was that Trotsky’s voice could barely be heard above the murderous 
din orchestrated in Moscow.” 1097 Shortly after the second Moscow Trial, on February 9, 1937, 
Trotsky attempted to speak by telephone from Mexico to a capacity crowd of more than 6,000 in 
New York’s Hippodrome. The crowd heard a few faint words in Russian, a loud click, and then a 
burst of static. Mexican sabotage prevented the crowd from hearing Trotsky's voice that night. 
1098  
When attempts to reestablish the telephone connection failed, Max Shachtman read an 
English text of Trotsky’s speech. The conclusion expressed Trotsky’s desire to appear before a 
neutral commission of inquiry to answer the charges brought against him in Moscow. “If this 
commission decides that I am guilty of the slightest degree of the crimes which Stalin imputes to 
me,” Trotsky promised, “I pledge in advance to place myself voluntarily in the hands of the 
executioners of the G.P.U.” 1099  
Such a commission had been widely discussed, but it was uncertain whether it would 
come to reality. One man who sought to make it real was Sidney Hook, a former doctoral student 
of John Dewey. Hook found “something inherently incredible in the notion that most of the 
architects of ‘the great experiment’ - which still enjoyed high prestige in the West - were agents 
                                                 
1096 David Culbert, ed., Mission to Moscow, (Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin P, 1980)16-17. Regarding 
Davies, Bruckner commented, “I did not fully respect Mr. Davies' integrity, both before, during and after 
the film.” 
1097 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 35. 
1098 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 36.  
1099 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 37. 
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of the Western secret police.” 1100 Conversely, Hook worried that “if the bizarre court 
proceedings were a rigmarole played out for some dark punitive purpose of Stalin and his 
regime, the promise of socialism was revealed as a ghastly mockery of its great humanist 
ideals.”1101 
Deciding that he “could not rest until the truth about the Moscow trials was known,” 
Hook worked to persuade his famous teacher Dewey to chair a neutral commission in Trotsky’s 
case. Dewey considered Trotsky’s case of equal importance to the Dreyfus affair and the trial of 
Sacco and Vanzetti,1102 but he was reluctant to undertake such a task. Seventy-eight years old, 
Dewey was “weary, and desirous of being left alone,” 1103 and his family objected to his 
“dirtying his hands” in Communist politics. “Dewey’s reluctance also stemmed from the fact 
that, despite his métier and his interest in the Soviet Union, he had not studied Marxism nor paid 
much attention to Soviet politics.” 1104  
Nevertheless, to Trotsky’s delight, Hook finally persuaded Dewey to serve.1105 Dewey's 
decision to serve is a monument to his character, as his participation on the Commission isolated 
him from many long-time friends and associates. Dewey explained that a major factor in his 
acquiescence to Hook's requests was “the campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at 
dissuading him.”1106 The New Republic, for example, ran editorials arguing that the Moscow 
                                                 
1100 Sidney Hook, “Memories of the Moscow Trials,” Commentary 77(3) (1984): 57-63, 58. 
1101 Sidney Hook, “Memories of the Moscow Trials,” Commentary 77(3) (1984): 57-63, 58. 
1102 Dewey voiced this opinion at the March 1, 1938, meeting of the “Committee for the Defense of Leon 
Trotsky.” Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 38. 
1103 Sidney Hook, “Memories of the Moscow Trials,” Commentary 77(3) (1984): 57-63, 59.  
1104 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 38. 
1105 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 39. 
Dewey consented to Hook’s request on March 19, 1937. Trotsky described the day that he learned that 
Dewey was coming to Mexico as “a great holiday in my life.” 
1106 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 39.  
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Trials were legitimate and opposed Dewey's participation on the Commission. 1107 Dewey also 
stated that declining the chairmanship of the Commission “would be false to my lifework.” 1108 
 On May 26, 1937, Dewey sent a letter to New Republic editor Bruce Bliven repudiating 
the New Republic's editorial campaign against a public hearing for Trotsky.1109 “I cannot 
understand how the Journal which identified liberalism with the spirit of full and free discussion 
could take the attitude of belittling in advance the attempt to give Mr. Trotsky a full opportunity 
for hearing,” wrote Dewey. Dewey complained further that the New Republic had 
“unconsciously if not deliberately” repeated “the familiar attitude of the Communist Party in 
saying that some members of the Inquiry are Trotskyites. Unless believing that Trotsky has a 
right to a hearing is proof of being a Trotskyite, no member of the Inquiry, including the 5 men 
on the French sub-commission,1110 is or ever has been a Trotskyite.” In protest, Dewey refused to 
write for the New Republic ever again. 1111 
                                                 
1107 See Malcolm Cowley, “The Trial of the Trotskyites in Russia,” The New Republic, 2 September 1936: 
88-89; Malcolm Cowley, “Review of The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center, by G.L. Piatakov,” 
The New Republic, 7 April 1937: 276-70. Even though Dewey was a founder of the New Republic, the 
magazine forced Dewey to resign from its editorial board. Will Reissner, “Introduction,” Not Guilty: 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 
2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) ix. 
1108 Dewey Commission, The Case of Leon Trotsky: Transcript of Proceedings in the Hearings of the 
Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials 
Held April 10-17, 1937 (New York: Merit, 1968) 5: “Speaking, finally, not for the Commission, but for 
myself, I had hoped that a chairman might be found for these preliminary investigations whose experience 
better fitted him for the difficult and delicate task to be performed. But I have given my life to the work of 
education, which I have conceived to be that of public enlightenment in the interests of society. If I finally 
accepted the responsible post I now occupy, it was because I realized that to act otherwise would be false 
to my lifework.” 
1109 John Dewey, letter to Bruce Bliven, 26 May 1937, Sidney Hook Collection of John Dewey, 1926-
1972, Southern Illinois University Special Collections Research Center, Carbondale, Illinois.  
1110 The Dewey Commission held hearings through three sub-commissions. One of these was the rogatory 
sub-commission or “Commission Rogatoire” created by the Comité pour l'enquête sur le Procès de 
Moscou'. The Commission Rogatoire took the testimony of Trotsky's son Leon Sedov and four other 
witnesses during eleven sessions held in Paris from May 12 to June 22, 1937.  
1111 Christopher Phelps, Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist (Ann Arbor: U Michigan P, 2005) 
158. 
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The next step for Hook was recruiting members of the Commission of Inquiry. 
Opponents leveled a barrage of hostile propaganda against the proposed Commission. This 
pressure was “manifest most forcibly through the periphery of the Communist Party, which 
upheld Moscow's version of the trials, but it was also reflected in organs of liberal opinion such 
as the New Republic and the Nation.” 1112  An “Open Letter to American Liberals” urging a 
boycott of the Commission of Inquiry was published in Soviet Russia Today and circulated 
widely in the United States.1113 It warned “all men of goodwill” to withhold any assistance to the 
Commission. The Open Letter characterized critics of the Moscow Trials as interfering in 
domestic Soviet affairs, giving aid and comfort to “fascist forces throughout the world,” and 
“dealing a blow to the forces of progress.” 1114 Eighty-eight professors, writers, and artists signed 
the Open Letter, including Theodore Dreiser, Lillian Hellman, Max Lerner, Dorothy Parker, and 
Nathanael West.1115 
Despite an “aggressive hostility on the part of a sizable component of the New York 
intellectual milieu in which it was initiated,” Dewey and Hook “were able to put together a 
group of persons well enough known in the liberal community to command respect.” 1116 On 
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April 2, 1937, five members of Dewey’s Commission of Inquiry boarded the Sunshine Express 
for Mexico City. 1117 The world would finally hear Trotsky’s voice. 
C. Procedure of the Dewey Commission 
 The Dewey Commission conducted its activities after the second Moscow Trial of 
January 23-30, 1937, but before the third Moscow Trial of March 2-13, 1938. Three sub-
commissions took testimony. The first sub-commission, the “Preliminary Commission,” held 
thirteen hearings in Coyoacan, Mexico from April 10 to April 17, 1937.1118 Chaired by Dewey, 
the Preliminary Commission heard testimony from Trotsky and his secretary Jan Frankel 
regarding the Soviet charges against Trotsky and Trotsky's counter-charges against the Soviet 
government. 1119  
 The second sub-commission, the “Commission Rogatoire” created by the Comité pour 
l'enquête sur le Procès de Moscou', held eleven sessions in Paris from May 12 to June 22, 1937. 
The Commission Rogatoire took the testimony of Trotsky's son Leon Sedov and four other 
                                                                                                                                                
and Suzanne La Follette, author, journalist, and former editor of The Freeman and The New Freeman. 
John F. Finnerty, former counsel for Sacco and Vanzetti, served as counsel for the Commission. Carleton 
Beals, a journalist specializing in Latin American affairs, resigned on April 16, 1937, after the eleventh 
session in Mexico. Mr. Albert Goldman, a Chicago labor attorney, acted as counsel for Leon Trotsky. 
1117 Bertrand Pautenaude, Trotsky: Downfall of Revolutionary (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 40. 
Dewey originally planned to request a US visa for Trotsky so that Trotsky could testify before the 
Commission in New York. The slight prospect of success and the press of time, however, prompted the 
decision to send a five-member “preliminary commission” to Mexico under Dewey’s leadership to take 
Trotsky’s testimony. Id. at 39.  
1118 The five members of the Preliminary Commission included John Dewey, Carleton Beals, Suzanne 
Lafollette, Otto Ruehle, and Benjamin Stolberg. John F. Finerty acted as counsel for the Preliminary 
Commission. Finerty was the former counsel for Sacco and Vanzetti. Chicago labor attorney Robert 
Goldman acted as counsel for Leon Trotsky.  
1119 The transcript of the Preliminary Commission's hearings is published as Dewey Commission, The 
Case of Leon Trotsky: Transcript of Proceedings in the Hearings of the Preliminary Commission of 
Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials Held April 10-17, 1937 (New 
York: Merit, 1968). The Preliminary Commission invited the Soviet government to appear at its sessions 
with the right to cross-examine witnesses and offer evidence and rebuttal of their testimony. The 
Preliminary Commission also requested the Soviet government to provide the records of the preliminary 
hearings to the first two Moscow Trials. The invitees ignored these requests. Dewey Commission, Not 
Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow 
Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) 7. 
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witnesses. 1120 The third sub-commission took testimony in New York from eleven witnesses in 
five hearings on July 26 and July 27, 1937. 1121 The Dewey Commission issued its findings on 
September 21, 1937.  
 The Military Collegium convicted Trotsky and Sedov in absentia in the first two 
Moscow Trials. The main goal of the Dewey Commission was to provide a neutral forum for 
Trotsky to present his case. The Dewey Commission achieved this goal despite the remarkable 
propaganda campaign waged against it and despite lacking the power to compel testimony and 
the production of evidence. In the process, the Dewey Commission exposed remarkable 
contradictions in the Soviet Government's fabricated evidence.  
 Nevertheless, the findings of the Dewey Commission are subject to three criticisms. 
First, since the Dewey Commission did not possess the full powers of a court of law, it could not 
conduct a truly adversary proceeding. Although the Dewey Commission invited the Soviet 
Government and other parties adverse to Trotsky to attend the proceedings, cross-examine 
witnesses, and offer evidence, they uniformly declined.1122 The Dewey Commission described its 
procedure as similar to a Senate investigating committee and the National Labor Relations 
                                                 
1120 The four other witnesses were Victor Serge, Eugene Bauer, Franz Pfemfert, and Alexandra Pfemfert. 
Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against 
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Board.1123  
 Second, since the Dewey Commission did not have the power to compel production of 
evidence from the Soviet government, much of the documentary evidence supporting the 
Commission's findings lacked the indicia of reliability usually required for admission. Five of 
the 34 exhibits were publications authored by Trotsky himself, and eight more were publications 
about Trotsky. The Commission accepted no fewer than 69 affidavits into evidence.1124 All these 
documents constituted inadmissible hearsay since they consisted of out-of-court assertions 
offered as evidence of the truth of their contents. 1125  
 Third, the cross-examinations of the witnesses, particularly Trotsky, were wholly 
inadequate. Commission Counsel John Finerty bears responsibility for this shortcoming. The 
Dewey Commission recognized the importance of cross-examination in its final report: “In the 
absence of any representative of the prosecution, an increased burden of cross examining 
witnesses fell upon the members of the sub-commissions and their counsel.” 1126 Nevertheless, 
Commission Counsel John Finerty obstructed questions impeaching Trotsky's direct testimony 
by threatening to resign if the Commission permitted them. Finerty also advised the Committee, 
                                                 
1123 Dewey Commission, Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) 6. 
1124 Dewey Commission, The Case of Leon Trotsky: Transcript of Proceedings in the Hearings of the 
Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials 
Held April 10-17, 1937 (New York: Merit, 1968) xix-xx. 
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Committee. The following erroneous statement appears on page 6 of the final report: “In accepting 
evidence [this Commission] has been guided by the so-called 'best evidence rule,' under which it has 
received only the best evidence which the circumstances made available.” Dewey Commission, The Case 
of Leon Trotsky: Transcript of Proceedings in the Hearings of the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into 
the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials Held April 10-17, 1937 (New York: Merit, 
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1126 Dewey Commission, Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) 8. 
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erroneously, that such questions “were highly improper” and “would be sufficient cause for 
mistrial in any ordinary court.” 1127 
 One of the members of the Preliminary Commission, Carleton Beals, resigned in protest 
at the responses he claimed to receive from Trotsky, his fellow Commission members, and the 
Commission's counsel Finerty regarding a line of questions he posed to Trotsky in Mexico on 
April 16, 1937.1128 According to Beals, the Commission abandoned its original plan to take up 
the various aspects of the case topically and cross-examine on each section of the evidence. 
Instead, the Commission decided to permit Trotsky to complete his entire defense before 
allowing cross-examination. Furthermore, each Commissioner was required to submit his written 
                                                 
1127 Dewey Commission, The Case of Leon Trotsky: Transcript of Proceedings in the Hearings of the 
Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials 
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Held April 10-17, 1937 (New York: Merit, 1968) 411-14. For a discussion of this exchange from an author 
sympathetic to Trotsky, see Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940 (London: Velso, 
2003) 304-05. 
1128 Beals' letter of resignation is contained in Dewey Commission, The Case of Leon Trotsky: Transcript 
of Proceedings in the Hearings of the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against 
Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials Held April 10-17, 1937 (New York: Merit, 1968) 416-17. Dewey 
responded to Beals' resignation by stating: “I wish to make, on behalf of the Commission, a brief 
statement: In expressing their regret of the Preliminary Commission at Mr. Beals' resignation, I wish to say 
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this morning to continue his personal cross-examination.” Id.  
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questions in advance to counsel for the Commission John F. Finerty. 1129  
 The record corroborates Beals' claims, at least in part. Although there are intermittent 
questions from time to time throughout the sessions, no significant examination of Trotsky by 
anyone other than Trotsky's counsel Albert Goldman appears in the record until the tenth and 
eleventh sessions. In these late sessions, Commission Counsel John F. Finnerty asks most of the 
questions.  
 Even then, Finerty asks questions that bolster Trotsky's case rather than probe its 
weaknesses. Finerty even states on the record that he does not intend to treat Trotsky as a hostile 
witness, but only to ask questions “to develop facts that in my opinion are necessary for an 
intelligent conclusion by the Commission on the questions here involved.”  Finerty's questions 
were so solicitous that the El Nacional reported that Finerty was “Trotsky's friend” and serving 
as Trotsky's counsel.1130  
 Finerty's responsibility was to the Committee, not Trotsky. Finerty's failure to conduct a 
meaningful cross-examination unfairly compromised the ability of the Committee to evaluate the 
evidence fully and fairly when making its findings. Finerty's obstruction of Beals' attempted 
cross-examination also precipitated Beals' criticism in the Saturday Evening Post that the 
Commission was not conducting a serious inquiry. 1131 
D. Findings of the Dewey Commission 
 Despite these shortcomings, the Dewey Commission exposed many of the contradictions 
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contained in the Soviet Government's fabricated evidence. One illustrative example of the 
contradictions in the evidence against the defendants involved the testimony of defendant E. S. 
Holtzman. Holtzman gave testimony in the first Moscow Trial regarding an alleged meeting with 
Trotsky's son Lev Sedov in Copenhagen.  
 Holtzman claimed that he acted as an intermediary between defendants Ivan Smirnov, 
Sedov, and Trotsky in furtherance of a conspiracy to murder Stalin. According to Holtzman, 
Trotsky maintained that “it was necessary to remove Stalin” in order to bring the Trotskyites to 
power.1132 Holtzman testified on August 21, 1936, that he stayed in the Hotel Bristol in 
Copenhagen in December 1932. He met Sedov in the lounge of the Hotel Bristol before going to 
a meeting with Trotsky:  
Sedov said to me: “As you are going to the USSR, it would be a good thing if 
you came with me to Copenhagen where my father is...” I agreed, but I told him 
that we could not go together for reasons of secrecy. I arranged with Sedov to be 
in Copenhagen within two or three days, to put up at the Hotel Bristol and meet 
him there. I went to the hotel straight from the station and in the lounge met 
Sedov. About 10 AM we went to see Trotsky.1133 
The Military Collegium sentenced Holtzman to death on August 24, 1936, 1134 and Article 470 of 
the Criminal Code of 1936 required Holtzman's immediate execution.  
 Trotsky testified before the Preliminary Subcommittee that although he was in 
                                                 
1132 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the 
Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.S.R., Moscow, August 19-24, 1936 (New York: Fertig, 1967) 100. 
1133 Dewey Commission, The Case of Leon Trotsky: Transcript of Proceedings in the Hearings of the 
Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials 
Held April 10-17, 1937 (New York: Merit, 1968) 146; People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR. 
Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre Heard Before the 
Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, August 19-24, 1936. (New York: 
Fertig, 1967) 100. 
1134 People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the 
Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.S.R., Moscow, August 19-24, 1936 (New York: Fertig, 1967) 179-180. Holtzman's final plea in the 
1936 trial was as follows: “Here in the dock beside me, is a gang of murderers, not only murderers, but 
fascist murderers. I do not ask for mercy.” Id. 172. 
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Copenhagen from November 23 to December 2, 1932, he never met Holtzman there. Trotsky 
also testified that Sedov was not in Copenhagen at the time. The testimony of Sedov and 
Trotsky's secretary Jan Frankel corroborated Trotsky's testimony.  
 One week after Holtzman's execution, an article appeared on the front page of a Danish 
newspaper that apparently corroborated Trotsky's testimony. This article explained that its 
owners demolished the Hotel Bristol in 1917, fifteen years before the meeting between Sedov 
and Holtzman allegedly took place.1135  
 Sedov denied inviting Holtzman to go to Copenhagen, and he further denied that he had 
ever been to Copenhagen. Sedov also provided considerable evidence that he was taking 
examinations at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin at that time. The testimony of four 
witnesses stated that they spoke daily with Sedov in Berlin during this period. Other 
corroborating evidence for Sedov's testimony included testimony of witnesses in Copenhagen 
who spoke by telephone with Sedov in Berlin, Sedov's attendance book from the Technische 
Hochschule in Berlin, and Sedov's passport.1136  
 The Dewey Commission concluded appropriately that Holtzman's testimony in the first 
Moscow Trial was false. Properly corroborated testimony established that Sedov was not in 
Copenhagen at the time of Trotsky's visit in November and December 1932. Holtzman did not 
meet Sedov in Copenhagen and go with him to meet Trotsky, and Holtzman did not meet with 
                                                 
1135 Socialdemokraten, 1 Sept. 1936, 1. Socialdemokraten was a publication of the Danish Social 
Democratic Party. This article and the extensive propaganda efforts by the Soviet government to explain 
away its claims are recounted in detail in Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New 
York: Oxford UP, 1990) 99-100; Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above 1928-1941 
(New York: Norton, 1990) 372; and Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (Phoenix: 
London, 2004) 170. The primary Soviet argument was that Holtzman stayed at another hotel that was near 
a Cafe Bristol. 
1136 Dewey Commission, Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) 76-96. 
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Trotsky in Copenhagen.1137 Based on these and numerous other “inherent improbabilities” in the 
testimony of the Moscow defendants,1138 the Dewey Commission reached the following findings: 
(1) The conduct of the Moscow trials was such as to convince any unprejudiced 
person that no effort was made to ascertain the truth. 
(2) While confessions are necessarily entitled to the most serious consideration, 
the confessions themselves contain such inherent improbabilities as to convince 
the Commission that they do not represent the truth, irrespective of any means 
used to obtain them... 
(22) We therefore find the Moscow trials to be frame-ups. 
(23) We therefore find Trotsky and Sedov not guilty.1139 
 
V. Evaluation of the Soviet Legal System 
A. The Soviet Legal System Satisfies Hart's Conditions for a Valid Legal System 
 As explained in Chapter II, Hart utilizes the external 1140 and internal points of view 1141 
to explain the two conditions required for the existence of a valid legal system. The first 
condition is that private citizens generally obey the primary rules of obligation.1142 It is sufficient 
that each member of the population obeys the primary rules “for his part only” and “from any 
                                                 
1137 Dewey Commission, Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) 96. 
1138 The Dewey Commission also adduced persuasive evidence to the falsity of the following important 
claims by the prosecution in the Moscow trials: (1) that Georgy Piatakov, an Old Bolshevik, took an 
airplane flight on December 12, 1935 from Berlin to Oslo to visit Trotsky at the Hotel Bristol in Oslo for 
purposes of furthering Trotsky's conspiracy; (2) that a relationship existed between Lev Sedov and 
German industrialists, including an alleged “kick-back” arrangement; and (3) that Trotsky was deeply 
involved in the murder of Kirov. See Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 
1972) 247-319. 
1139 Dewey Commission, Not Guilty: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against 
Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, 2nd ed. (New York: Monad, 1972) xxi, xxiii. 
1140 The external point of view is the view of a person who feels no obligation that he “should” follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56.  
1141 The internal point of view, on the other hand, is the view of a person who feels obligated to follow the 
law. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 56-57.  
1142 A primary rule is a rule that imposes an obligation or a duty.  “[P]rimary rules are concerned with the 
actions that individuals must or must not do.” Examples of primary rules include torts and criminal laws.  
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 91. 
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motive whatsoever.” In Hart’s terminology, it is sufficient that citizens take an external point of 
view toward primary rules. 1143 Soviet citizens generally obeyed the primary rules of obligation. 
The Soviet legal system therefore satisfies Hart's first condition for a valid legal system.  
 The second condition for the existence of a valid legal system under Hart's positivism is 
that public officials adopt the rule of recognition as their “public standard of official 
behavior.”1144 Officials must feel themselves obligated to adopt and abide by the rule of 
recognition, and they must censure those public officials who fail to do so. In Hart’s terms, it is a 
minimum necessary condition that officials take the internal point of view toward secondary 
rules.1145  
 The Soviet legal system satisfies Hart's second condition for legal validity. Soviet 
officials clearly felt themselves obligated to adopt and abide by the applicable rule of 
recognition, which often equated to the will of Lenin or Stalin. Soviet officials rarely challenged 
the legal validity or enforceability of their decrees. Officials ruthlessly censured any who did. It 
is indeed difficult to imagine a legal system with more aggressive censure of public officials than 
the censures imposed during Stalin's Great Terror.  
B. The Lessons of the Soviet Experience 
 Since legal validity determines the enforceability of law, the standard for legal validity 
presents a fundamental issue for any legal system. The experience of the English Revolution of 
1603-1701 established the necessity of autonomy and consent in determining legal validity. The 
trial of Socrates, however, revealed that autonomy and consent are insufficient by themselves to 
                                                 
1143 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 116.  
1144 The rule of recognition provides “a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of 
obligation,” and it serves as Hart’s ultimate criterion for the validity of law.  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of 
Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 94-95, 105. A rule is legally valid, and therefore 
enforceable, if it conforms to the requirements set forth in the rule of recognition. Id. at 103. 
1145 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 117.  
  
291 
provide an acceptable standard of legal validity. The trial of Socrates established that a principle 
of reason incorporating procedural due process is also required to protect against (1) the tyranny 
of the majority and (2) the conviction and punishment of the innocent. The Galileo Affair, like 
the trial of Socrates, confirms the necessity of procedural due process protections to protect the 
innocent from conviction.  
 The Moscow trials and the Soviet legal experience demonstrate two additional 
requirements for the principle of reason. The first is the requirement that legal systems must 
recognize and treat their subjects as rational beings with a free will. The second is the 
requirement of substantive due process. Laws must provide reliable guideposts by which people, 
as rational beings with free wills, may themselves orient their behavior and achieve a society 
based on ordered liberty. 
C. Respect for Human Beings as Rational Creatures with Free Will 
 Unless a legal system respects the status of human beings as a rational creature with a 
free will, it will not treat its subjects as ends in themselves. Following Aristotle's views on praise 
and blame, the Western tradition only assigns criminal blame if the defendant is guilty of both an 
actus reus, a wrongful act, and a mens rea, the voluntary intention to commit that act. 
Punishment is justified by the intentional decision of the defendant to commit the criminal act.  
 Soviet legal theory rejected this traditional view of criminal law. Beginning with the 
1922 Criminal Code, Soviet legal theorists adopted a deterministic view of man that depicted 
human beings as the involuntary products of their economic conditions. Soviet legal theorists 
accordingly viewed crime, not as an intentional wrongful act, but as a social phenomenon 
produced by social circumstances.  
 These new views of man's nature and the nature of crime led Soviet legal theorists to 
make four significant departures from the traditional principles of Western criminal law. First, 
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Soviet law abandoned the traditional requirements of actus reus and mens rea for criminal 
liability. “Social dangerousness” became the new grounds for criminal liability.  
 Second, Soviet law abandoned the traditional concept of punishment. Soviet legal 
theorists rejected the traditional views of punishment, retribution, or expiation. Instead, they 
considered judicial penalties as “measures of social defense.”  
 Third, Soviet law institutionalized the punishment of the innocent. Soviet law authorized 
the punishment of a subject in the absence of any criminal conduct or intent, so long as 
authorities perceived the subject as a threat of “social danger.”  
 Lastly, Soviet law adopted the doctrine of “crime by analogy.” Abandoning the 
traditional western principle of “no crime, no punishment without a previous law,” the 1926 
criminal code permitted punishment for an act even if the act was not prohibited by law. Soviet 
courts simply based convictions on “analogous” statutes.  
 The Soviet legal system produced by these departures enabled Stalin's government to 
execute, without any meaningful trial, an estimated 2,200,000 Russians during the Great 
Terror.1146 The Soviet legal system did not regard its subjects as ends in themselves. By design, 
the Soviet legal system treated every subject as the means to a political end. 
D. Laws Must Provide Substantive Due Process 
 The status of human beings as rational beings with free wills entitles individuals to 
orient their own behavior to achieve a society based on ordered liberty. Law performs the 
essential function of providing general rules by which people may orient their own behavior. In 
                                                 
1146 Utilizing data released in 1987-1989 during Gorbachev’s glasnost, historian Robert Conquest 
estimates that Stalin’s agents arrested 8 million Russians during the Great Terror. Stalin’s agents executed 
an estimated 1.5 million of these.  Approximately 2 million died in camps, 600,000 to 700,000 by 
execution. At the end of the Terror, approximately 1 million remained in prisons, and the camp population 
had increased from 5 million to 8 million. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New 
York: Oxford UP, 1990) 484-86. 
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order to accomplish this function, laws must serve as dependable guideposts. One such guidepost 
is that the law will not punish innocent parties.  
 Lon Fuller sets out eight principles that illustrate the requirements for dependable 
guideposts in substantive law.1147 Together, these eight principles ensure that a legal system 
provides substantive due process to its subjects. First, society must state its laws in general terms 
in a manner that guarantees due process. Criminal statutes, for example, must give fair warning 
of the prohibited conduct and the penalty for the prohibited conduct.  
 Second, society must promulgate its laws publicly. Third, society must not apply its laws 
retroactively. Fourth, society must express its laws in understandable terms. Fifth, laws must be 
consistent with one another. Sixth, laws must not render compliance impossible by requiring 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties.  
 Seventh, laws must be steady over time. They must not be changed so frequently that the 
subjects cannot rely upon them. Lastly, society must apply its laws in a manner consistent with 
their wording. As explained in the following chapter, the Soviet legal system law violated all 
eight of these principles.  
E. A New Standard for Legal Validity 
 In conclusion, by applying the experimental method to evaluate legal principles by their 
effects and the social consequences they produce, we can now state a new standard for legal 
validity. This standard of validity requires legal systems to treat their subjects as ends in 
themselves. Legal systems that consistently treat their subjects as means to other ends may 
manifest the judicial power of the state, but they are not valid legal systems. They become 
arbitrary and unjust, destabilizing the societies that suffer their injustice 
                                                 
1147 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) 38-39.  
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   The principles of reason, consent, and autonomy ensure that legal systems treat their 
subjects as ends in themselves. The principle of reason recognizes that every subject is a rational 
creature with a free will. The requirements of procedural due process protect against the 
punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority.  Legal systems that respect their 
subjects' status as ends in themselves permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The 
requirements of substantive due process ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to 
individuals in orienting their behavior.  
 The principle of consent provides that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of 
those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation 
sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. 
  The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws wield supremacy over 
political rulers. Political rulers are subject to the same law as the citizenry at large. Lastly, 
political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.   
 Although this standard of legal validity consists of three principles, each principle is 
indivisible from the other two. The foundation concept of each principle connects to the 
foundation concepts of the other two principles, just as each corner of a triangle connects to the 
other two corners. Each of these principles recognizes that every individual is a rational creature 
with a free will, and each seeks a legal system that treats all of its subjects as ends in themselves.  
 The following chapter evaluates the legal systems of ancient Athens, the Congregation 
of the Holy Office, and Soviet Russia under this validity standard.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: A NEW STANDARD FOR LEGAL VALIDITY 
“But if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an 
action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from 
consideration--I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.”  
G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 1958 
I. A New Standard for Legal Validity 
 This dissertation formulates a new standard for legal validity that requires legal systems 
to treat their subjects as ends in themselves. Legal systems that consistently treat their subjects as 
means to other ends may manifest the judicial power of the state, but they are not valid legal 
systems. As demonstrated in the foregoing chapters, these legal systems inevitably become 
arbitrary, unjust, and destabilizing to their client societies. The history of law in the Western 
tradition is thus a history of revolution.  
 In formulating this new standard of legal validity, this dissertation rejects the 
inconsistencies and uncertainties inherent in natural law theory.1148 It also rejects the narrow 
linguistic methodology of legal positivism that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from 
its application, and thus produces an incomplete model of law.1149  
 In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard 
for legal validity based on practical experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law 
and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the 
experimental method to the social consequences they produce. 1150 Because legal history 
                                                 
1148 See discussion in text at pages 1-2, supra. 
1149 See discussion in text at pages 2-4, supra. 
1150 John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law,” The Great Legal Philosophers, ed. Clarence Morris 
(Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) 508-10.  
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provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential 
feature of this method.1151 
 The experience of the English Revolution of 1603-1701 established the necessity of the 
principles of autonomy and consent in determining legal validity.1152 The trial of Socrates, 
however, revealed that autonomy and consent are insufficient by themselves to provide an 
acceptable standard of legal validity. The trial of Socrates established that a principle of reason 
incorporating procedural due process is also required to protect against the punishment of the 
innocent and the tyranny of the majority. 1153 
 The Galileo Affair, like the trial of Socrates, confirms the necessity of procedural due 
process protections to protect the innocent from conviction.1154 The Moscow trials and the Soviet 
legal experience demonstrate two additional requirements for the principle of reason. The first is 
the requirement that legal systems respect the status of their subjects as rational beings with a 
free will. The second is the requirement of substantive due process. Laws must provide reliable 
guideposts by which people, as rational beings with free wills, may orient their own behavior in 
a society based on ordered liberty.1155 
 The consequences produced by the legal principles involved in the English Revolution 
and the trials of Socrates, Galileo, and Trotsky demonstrate that legal systems will not treat their 
subjects as ends in themselves unless their laws satisfy three principles. I therefore adopt these 
three principles to form a new standard for legal validity. The first principle, the principle of 
reason, requires legal systems to recognize that every subject is a rational creature with a free 
                                                 
1151 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Random 
House, 1930) 221. 
1152 See discussion in text at pages 45-48, supra. 
1153 See discussion in text at pages 177-79, supra. 
1154 See discussion in text at pages 233-34, supra. 
1155 See discussion in text at pages 290-93, supra. 
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will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the 
punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority.  Legal systems that respect their 
subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own 
behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws 
provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.  
 The second principle, the principle of consent, provides that the legitimacy of law 
derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of 
stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence 
consent. 
  The third principle, the principle of autonomy, establishes the authority of law. Laws 
must wield supremacy over political rulers. Political rulers must be subject to the same law as 
the citizenry at large. Lastly, political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their 
will.   
 Although the laws in the trials of Socrates, Galileo, and Trotsky satisfied all of legal 
positivism's requirements for legal validity,1156 they did not satisfy any of the requirements in our 
new standard of legal validity. Consequently, each trial convicted an innocent man. The 
following discussion explains how Athenian law, canon law, and Soviet law violated the 
principles of reason, consent, and autonomy.   
II. The Principle of Reason 
 The principle of reason makes three demands of a legal system. First, its laws must 
respect the status of every subject as a rational creature with a free will.  Second, its laws must 
incorporate procedural due process protections against the punishment of the innocent and the 
tyranny of the majority. Third, its laws must satisfy the demands of substantive due process by 
                                                 
1156 See discussion in text at pages 176-77, 231-32, and 289-90, supra. 
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providing reliable guideposts by which people, as rational creatures with free wills, may orient 
their own behavior in a society based on ordered liberty. 
A. Procedural Due Process 
 Procedural due process protections are required to protect against convicting the 
innocent and the tyranny of the majority. These guarantees generally function by achieving a 
balance between the state's ability to prosecute its subjects and the subjects' ability to defend 
themselves. Procedural due process, at a minimum, requires prior notice of the charges against 
the defendant and the potential penalties. It also requires a fair hearing before an impartial 
tribunal. 
 The procedural due process guarantees under the United States Constitution expand 
these protections to include the following nineteen enumerated rights and protections. The 
Fourth Amendment protects against (1) unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) requires 
search warrants based upon probable cause and (3) supported by oath or affirmation. The Fifth 
Amendment protects against arbitrary prosecution by (4) requiring grand jury indictments for 
civilian citizens. The Fifth Amendment protects all citizens against (5) double jeopardy and (6) 
being compelled to testify against themselves in criminal cases. The state cannot deprive any 
citizen of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, which requires (7) notice and (8) a 
fair hearing (9) before an impartial tribunal.  
 The Sixth Amendment requires that all criminal defendants receive (10) a speedy and 
(11) public trial by (12) an impartial jury in (13) a previously established district. The state must 
(14) inform all criminal defendants of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. All 
criminal defendants must (15) be allowed to confront all witnesses testifying against them, and 
all criminal defendants must (16) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in their favor. 
All criminal defendants must (17) have the assistance of counsel for their defense. The Eighth 
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Amendment prohibits the state from (18) unreasonably denying bail by requiring excessive bail 
and (19) forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, including punishment of the 
innocent. 
B. Substantive Due Process 
 Substantive due process requires that laws provide reliable guideposts by which people, 
as rational creatures with free wills, may orient their own behavior in a society based on ordered 
liberty. Lon Fuller sets out eight principles that illustrate the requirements for dependable 
guideposts in substantive law.1157 First, society must state its laws in general terms in a manner 
that guarantees due process. Criminal statutes, for example, must give fair warning of the 
prohibited conduct and the penalty for the prohibited conduct.  
 Second, society must promulgate its laws publicly. Third, society must not apply its laws 
retroactively. Fourth, society must express its laws in understandable terms. Fifth, laws must be 
consistent with one another. Sixth, laws must not render compliance impossible by requiring 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties. Seventh, laws must be steady over time. They 
must not be changed so frequently that the subjects cannot rely upon them. Lastly, society must 
apply its laws in a manner consistent with their wording. 
C. Athenian Law Violated the Principle of Reason 
 The absence of adequate procedural due process protections in the Athenian legal system 
allowed the conviction of the innocent in ostrakismos, graphe, and eisangelia proceedings. With 
                                                 
1157 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) 38-39. Fuller presents 
his principles through the literary device of King Rex, a well-intentioned but incompetent king who 
violates these principles in formulating his laws. Each violation produces adverse consequences. Fuller 
also argues that these procedural principles of internal morality constrain the substantive norms of a 
system, since an evil legal system would have difficulty incorporating these principles. Lon L. Fuller, 
“Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart,” 71 (4) Harv. L. Rev. (1958): 630–672, 
661.See also Matthew Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 103-186. 
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regard to Athens' substantive law, the graphai, ostrakismos, and eisangeliai proceedings violated 
all eight of Fuller's principles listed immediately above.  
 These violations of the principle of reason combined to permit frivolous prosecutions for 
political purposes. The targets of prosecution were often those who contributed the most to 
Athens, as in the cases of Themistocles, the Areopagites, Pericles, Alcibiades, the Arginusae 
generals, and Socrates. The legal system treated these targeted individuals, not as ends in 
themselves, but as means to a political end. 
1. Athenian Law Intentionally Punished the Innocent  
The most remarkable aspect of Athenian law was the ostrakismos, which permitted the 
de jure exile and killing of innocent subjects in the absence of any wrongdoing. Cleisthenes 
instituted ostrakismos as a means of preventing the revival of dictatorship, but it served this 
purpose for only three years. 1158 Because it lacked any due process protections against abuse, it 
quickly became the favored tool of the envious, the spiteful, and the politically ambitious.  
 The Athenian ostrakismos procedure provided none of the minimal due process 
protections of prior notice or a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. First, the targeted 
subjects received no prior notice that they were the subject of an ostrakismos proceeding. 
Second, the targeted subject did not receive a fair hearing.  There was no trial and no opportunity 
to address the ekklesia before voting. No evidence of wrongdoing was required, and the law 
provided no defense. The first vote was final, and no appeal was possible.  
Third, the ostrakismos proceeding did not provide an impartial tribunal. Members of the 
ekklesia pursued their own self-interest, usually mitigation of their personal jealousies, in 
deciding the ostrakismos.1159 In sum, ostrakismos permitted the exile and execution of innocent 
                                                 
1158 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 30-
31. 
1159 Plutarch, “Aristides,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden (Boston: Little, Brown, 
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subjects, for any motive whatsoever, with no judicial process.  
Since ostrakismos required no evidence of wrongdoing and provided no due process 
protections, the ekklesia often made imprudent decisions that it later regretted. 1160 Ostrakismos 
did more than deprive Athens of her most talented leaders. Ostrakismos actually transformed its 
victims into some of Athens’ most dangerous enemies.1161   
2. Athenian Law Lacked Procedural Due Process Protections  
The trial of Socrates, like all proceedings before the heliaea, lacked important 
procedural due process protections. The heliaea provided none of the minimal due process 
protections of prior notice and a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.  
First, defendants before the heliaea did not receive adequate prior notice. Although 
defendants like Socrates received notice of the nominal charges against them in an indictment 
prior to trial,1162 the Athenian statutes were undefined and silent as to the penalty for their 
violation. 1163  Defendants therefore had no prior notice of either the prohibited conduct or the 
penalty for engaging in such conduct.    
Second, defendants before the heliaea did not receive a fair hearing. The hearings were 
unfair for several reasons. Since the governing statutes were usually undefined, each dikast 
defined the crime and set the penalty anew in every case. Every dikast applied his newly defined 
                                                                                                                                                
1880) 230, 233, 506; Plutarch, “Themistocles,” Plutarch's Lives, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1914) 2; Diodorus Siculus, The Historical Library of Diodorus, trans. G. Booth, vol. 1 
(London: McDowell, 1814) 404 (discussing the ostracism of Themistocles). 
1160 See discussion in text at page 133, supra.  
1161 See discussion in text at page 133, supra. 
1162 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Dover, 
1992) 25; Plato and Xenophon, Apologies, trans. Mark Kremer (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2006) 31; 
Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: Bell, 
1901) 72. 
1163 The asebeia statute involved in Socrates' case stated as follows: “If anyone commits asebeia, let 
anyone who wishes submit a graphe.” Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1978) 129, 199. 
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law and newly determined penalty retroactively. There were no meaningful rules of evidence, 
and the litigants had no right to counsel. Every case was determined on an ad hoc basis without 
regard to precedent. The heliaea decided even capital cases in the heat of a single sitting, and 
there was no appeal from their decisions. The lack of procedural safeguards allowed dikasts to 
decide cases outside the charges and outside the evidence, as occurred in Socrates' case.  
Third, the heliaea did not provide an impartial tribunal to decide the case. There was no 
presiding judge, and the evidence and arguments presented at trial were not limited to the 
charges stated in the indictment. Since the laws were undefined, each dikast sat as an interested 
legislator as well as a judge in each case. His partiality was unrestrained. 
The universal standing of any citizen to sue public officials for malfeasance, combined 
with the absence of procedural safeguards for due process, invited the filing of graphe actions 
for purely political ends. Consequently, the heliaea were often political rather than judicial 
bodies in practice.1164 Aristotle observes that the power of the heliaea changed the Athenian 
constitution into a direct democracy with “the people playing the tyrant.” 1165 The absence of 
procedural due process protections permitted the dikasts, inter alia, to convict Socrates on 
charges outside the indictment and for reasons outside the evidence. 
3. Athenian Law Lacked Substantive Due Process   
 The principle of reason requires that the substantive rules of law provide dependable 
guideposts and provides eight requirements for such guideposts. The asebeia statute involved in 
Socrates' case gives no definition for asebeia, and it specifies no penalty. It simply provided as 
follows: “If anyone commits asebeia, let anyone who wishes submit a graphe.” 1166 As 
                                                 
1164 Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969) 83. 
1165 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Toronto: Dover, 2000) 96. 
1166 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 129, 199.  
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demonstrated below, the Athenian asebeia statute violated all eight requirements for dependable 
guideposts in substantive law.  
 First, the Athenian asebeia statute fails to state its terms in a manner that guarantees due 
process by failing to give fair warning of the prohibited conduct and the penalty for engaging in 
such conduct. Second, Athens did not adequately promulgate the asebeia statute. Its 
promulgation was fatally incomplete in that it failed to define the prohibited conduct and failed 
to state the penalty for such conduct. 
 Third, the asebeia statute violated the prohibition against retroactive application. The 
prohibited conduct and penalty were not determined until the trial, after the allegedly impious act 
was already committed. Fourth, the asebeia statute violated the requirement for expression in 
understandable terms by failing to provide the needed terms. The prohibited conduct, asebeia, is 
undefined, and no penalty for asebeia is stated.  
 Fifth, the asebeia statute fails the consistency requirement. Since most Athenian statutes 
were undefined, there was no means of determining their consistency with one another. Sixth, by 
failing to define the prohibited conduct, the asebeia statute renders compliance with its terms 
impossible.  
 Seventh, the asebeia statute fails the requirement for steadiness over time. The 
prohibited impious conduct and potential penalties change with each new dikast in each new 
case. Subjects are therefore unable to rely upon their provisions. Lastly, the asebeia statute is 
incapable of consistent application, since it contains no wording defining the prohibited conduct 
or the potential penalties.  
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D. Canon Law Violated the Principle of Reason  
1. Canon Law Did Not Respect its Subjects' Status as Rational Creatures with Free Wills 
Heresy prosecutions denied the status of their subjects as rational creatures with free 
wills. The essence of the heresy prosecution was the elimination of all freedom of opinion and 
belief on any subject addressed by the Church. The inquisitor's burden of proof in heresy 
prosecutions did not require evidence of any heretical act. Instead, the inquisitors only needed to 
form a subjective suspicion of a heretical tendency based on the secret thoughts and opinions of 
the accused.1167  
2. Canon Law Lacked Procedural Due Process Protections  
 Procedural due process protections seek to prevent the conviction of innocent parties. 
These protections function by balancing the state's ability to prosecute its subjects with the 
subjects' ability to defend themselves. The Church viewed the inquisitor as an impartial spiritual 
father whose efforts to reclaim souls must be unimpeded by legal safeguards.1168 The Inquisition 
therefore designed its procedures to give every possible advantage to the inquisitors and every 
disadvantage to the targeted individual.1169 The inquisitors did not even bear the burden of 
proving that the defendant had actually committed a heretical offense or performed any 
particular act. Instead, the prosecution sought to establish heretical tendencies.1170  
                                                 
1167 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: 
Citadel, 1954) 96. 
1168 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: 
Citadel, 1954) 101: “All the safeguards which human experience had shown to be necessary in judicial 
proceedings of the most trivial character were deliberately cast aside in these cases, where life and 
reputation and property through three generations were involved. Every doubtful point was decided ‘in 
favor of the faith.’” 
1169 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: 
Citadel, 1954) 101. 
1170 Wade Rowland, Galileo’s Mistake: A New Look At the Epic Confrontation between Galileo and the 
Church (New York: Arcade, 2003) 242. 
  
305 
 No accused could escape the Holy Office if his inquisitors vehemently suspected heresy 
or otherwise desired his condemnation.  As Sir John Fortescue observed in 1470, the inquisitorial 
procedure placed every man’s life and liberty at the mercy of any enemy who could suborn two 
unknown witnesses to swear against the accused.1171 The procedure employed against Galileo 
violated every guarantee of procedural due process contained in the United States Constitution. 
 There was no protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in the form of 
probable cause or sworn warrants. The Holy Office issued its citations and arrested suspected 
heretics in secret.1172 There were no grand juries or indictments to protect against arbitrary 
prosecution, and there was no protection against double jeopardy. 
 Canon law provided the accused no protection against giving compelled testimony 
against himself. Instead, the Holy Office always compelled the accused to testify against himself. 
The first demand made upon the accused in his trial was an oath that he would obey all the 
demands of the Church, answer all questions asked of him, betray all heretics known to him, and 
perform any penance imposed upon him. Refusal to take this oath constituted an admission of 
contumacious heresy.1173   
 The express goal of all proceedings before the Holy Office was to obtain the confession 
of the accused by any necessary means. The confession was the center of the inquisitorial 
process, and “no effort was deemed too great, no means too repulsive, to secure it.” 1174 Even 
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1173 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: 
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1174 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: 
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though canon law expressly prohibited the use of coerced confessions in 1140,1175 the Holy 
Office considered confessions, even if obtained by torture, to be the purest and most reliable 
evidence.1176  
The inquisitors had discretion to torture the accused to extract his confession.1177 In 
Galileo’s case, the Pope expressly directed the Holy Office to conduct Galileo’s interrogation 
under a formal threat of torture.1178 This routine utilization of torture to obtain confessions was 
anomalous, as canon law since the twelfth century prohibited any use of torture by clerics as well 
as the coercion of confessions in ecclesiastical proceedings.1179  
The express purpose of torture, as stated in Eliseo Masini’s 1621 inquisition manual, 
was “to make up for the shortcomings of witnesses, when they cannot adduce a conclusive proof 
against the culprit.” 1180 Although each accused was only subject to being tortured once, 
inquisitors sidestepped this limitation by characterizing subsequent torture sessions as 
continuations of the original session.1181  If the accused confessed under torture but later 
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retracted the confession, the law presumed that the confession was true and that the retraction 
was perjury. The retraction proved that the accused was an impenitent heretic, and the inquisitors 
remanded the accused to the secular authorities for execution at the stake without further 
hearing.1182  
The accused received no notice of the nature of the charges and the accusations against 
them. The third question asked of Galileo in his 1633 trial was whether he knew or could guess 
why the Holy Office had summoned him to Rome. 1183  
The accused heretic did not receive a fair trial. There was no presumption of innocence. 
Instead, the Holy Office presumed every suspect to be guilty.1184 In cases of “vehement 
suspicion,” such as Galileo’s, there was not even a requirement of any evidence. By legal fiction, 
the “vehement suspicion” itself satisfied all evidentiary requirements.1185  
The accused did not receive a jury or an impartial tribunal. The Holy Office prejudged 
the accused as guilty before arresting him. The prosecuting inquisitors served as the final judges 
in the cases they chose to prosecute.  
The accused did not receive a speedy trial. Inquisitions before the Holy Office could be a 
protracted affair, and there were no time limits on duration of the proceedings.1186 The accused 
heretic did not receive a public trial. The Holy Office cloaked every aspect of the trial in secrecy, 
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justifying the secret conduct of trials as necessary to prevent the further dissemination of 
heresy.1187  
The Holy Office did not permit the accused to confront the witnesses against him or 
subpoena witnesses on his own behalf. The Holy Office concealed the evidence supporting those 
charges and the identity of the witnesses against him. This denied the accused any opportunity to 
challenge the evidence against him or cross-examine adverse witnesses.1188 
 The Holy Office denied the accused any right to counsel, and any person that defended 
an accused heretic exposed himself to similar charges of heresy.1189 The Holy Office permitted 
no bail, imprisoning the accused for the entire duration of the trial, often under harsh 
conditions.1190 Restricted diet reduced the body and weakened the will, rendering the prisoner 
less able to resist alternate threats of death and promises of mercy.1191  
Lastly, the accused received no protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The 
accused faced torture to compel his confession, the possibility of death by burning, and the 
psychological burden of an eternity without hope.  
E. Soviet Law Violated the Principle of Reason  
 A fundamental requirement of the principle of reason is that law shall not convict or 
punish innocent subjects. Soviet law violated this fundamental requirement by codifying the de 
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jure punishment of innocent subjects who committed no crime. Soviet trial procedure violated 
every guarantee of procedural due process provided by the United States Constitution, and 
Soviet law did not comply with any of the eight requirements of substantive due process. 
1. Soviet Law Punished the Innocent 
 Following Aristotle's views on praise and blame, the Western tradition only assigns 
criminal blame if the defendant is guilty of both an actus reus, a wrongful act, and a mens rea, 
the voluntary intention to commit that act. Punishment is justified by the intentional decision of 
the defendant to commit the criminal act.  
 Contrary to this view, Soviet law required neither an actus reus nor a mens rea to 
impose criminal liability. Soviet theorists adopted their view of crime from the Italian positivist 
school of criminology, particularly the work of Enrico Ferri.1192 The Italian positivist school 
considered criminal conduct the result of the actor's social and physical circumstances rather 
than the actor's willful choice.  
 Ferri defined crimes in terms of acts that “disturb the conditions of existence and shock 
the average morality of a given people at a given moment.” He viewed punishment as 
“protective measures” taken by society against such acts. Since criminals possessed almost no 
freedom of will,1193 the rationale for punishing offenders should not be deterrence or 
rehabilitation. Instead, Ferri advocated the incapacitation of criminals by “protective measures” 
that minimized their danger to society. 1194  
 Soviet legal theorists adopted much of Ferri's positivist criminology in both the 
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terminology and provisions of the 1926 Criminal Code. 1195  Soviet law adopted Ferri's 
repudiation of individual responsibility for criminal actions, and thus dispensed with actus reus 
and mens rea as requirements for criminal liability. The result was the de jure punishment of 
innocent subjects.  
 Article 7 of the 1926 Criminal Code, for example, authorized punishment of any person, 
even in the absence of any criminal act, if that person represented a threat of “social danger.” 1196 
Article 6 of the 1926 Criminal Code defined “social danger” as “any act or inaction, directed 
against the Soviet structure or violating good order, established by worker-peasant authority in 
the period of time transitional to the Communist structure.” [Emphasis added]. Inaction-literally, 
the complete absence of any criminal act- was therefore sufficient to render one “socially 
dangerous” and subject to punishment. 
 Another provision of Soviet law permitting the de jure punishment of innocent subjects 
was Article 58 of the 1926 Criminal Code.  Article 58 governed “counterrevolutionary” offenses 
and authorized authorities to assess punishment against innocent family members and innocent 
dependents of convicted criminals.1197 Article 58-1c, for example, subjected the innocent 
relatives of military deserters to Siberian exile for five years, even if they had played no part in 
the desertion.1198 
 A third provision of Soviet law permitting the punishment of innocent subjects was the 
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doctrine of “crime by analogy” 1199 established under Article 16 of the 1926 Criminal Code. The 
doctrine of crime by analogy authorized punishment for actions or inactions that the law did not 
prohibit. It was sufficient for conviction that the act was analogous to a prohibited act: 
If any socially dangerous act is not directly provided for by the present Code, 
the basis and limits of responsibility for it shall be determined by application of 
those articles of the Code which provide for crimes most similar to it in 
nature.1200 
The Nazis later adopted the doctrine of crime by analogy in Germany. 1201  
2. Soviet Law Lacked Procedural Due Process Protections  
 Soviet law after the Revolution is remarkable for its abandonment of procedural due 
process protections. As explained in Chapter V, supra, a directive in November 1918 freed the 
judges of the narodyne sudy (“People's Courts”) from observing any substantive laws, any 
formal rules of procedure, and any formal rules of evidence.1202 The directive instructed judges 
to determine guilt, not based on evidence or law, but on their subjective impressions of the facts 
and the parties.1203  
 Criminal prosecutions under the 1926 Criminal Code lacked even basic due process 
protections. No warrant was required to authorize an arrest. Prosecutorial approval was 
sufficient, even if first obtained after the arrest.  
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 There was no writ of habeas corpus. The Criminal Code permitted authorities to hold a 
suspect on mere suspicion for 14 days without informing the suspect of the charges against him. 
In actual practice, however, there was no limit on the period that authorities could hold a suspect 
without adjudication. Investigators were wholly exempt from judicial supervision and were only 
accountable to the prosecutor or the secret police for their actions. 1204  
 Authorities held prisoners incommunicado. Defendants had no right to counsel until the 
completion of all pre-trial investigations, procedures, and the drafting of the bill of charges.1205 
All pretrial proceedings excluded the defendants.1206  
 There was no presumption of innocence, and the burden of proving innocence, with the 
attached quandary of proving a negative, was on the accused.1207 There was no protection from 
ex post facto laws, and authorities applied laws retroactively.1208 Courts also had discretion under 
Article 14 of the 1926 Criminal Code to suspend the statute of limitations in cases involving 
“counterrevolutionary” offenses.1209  
 The State also enjoyed an unequal right of appeal over the defendant. The accused could 
only appeal up one level. Prosecutors, however, enjoyed unlimited appeals. 
 Defendants received no protection against double jeopardy. Prosecutors could move to 
reopen any case for any reason, including a claim that that the punishment was too lenient. There 
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was no time limit on the prosecution's reopening cases, and the prosecution could reopen the 
same case multiple times. The defendant did not receive notice that his case was under review, 
and the defendant had no right to appear regarding the reopening of a case.1210    
 State security agencies, including the Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, and MVD, had the 
power to convict and punish any defendant. These agencies could assume jurisdiction of any 
criminal case and dispose of the case without interference from any court. These agencies 
operated without any rules of criminal law or procedure.1211    
 In closing, the procedure in Soviet trials, particularly the three Moscow Trials, shared 
remarkable similarities with inquisition proceedings before the Congregation of the Holy Office. 
Both systems violated all nineteen of the procedural due process guarantees contained in the 
United States Constitution. Both systems made the confession of the accused the center of the 
entire trial process, and “no effort was deemed too great, no means too repulsive, to secure it.” 
Confessions obtained under torture and duress often constituted the entirety of the evidence in 
the trial.  
3. Soviet Law Lacked Substantive Due Process  
 Soviet law violated all eight requirements of substantive due process for dependable 
guidelines in law. The first principle is that authorities must express laws in general terms in a 
manner that guarantees due process. Criminal laws, for example, must give fair warning of the 
prohibited conduct and the penalty for engaging in such conduct.  
 Soviet law was remarkable in its failure to provide meaningful standards of conduct for 
its subjects. Lenin's November 22, 1917 decree, for example, instructed judges to enforce laws 
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only to the degree that the laws “did not contradict the revolutionary conscience and the 
revolutionary sense of legality.” 1212 The November 22, 1917 decree also directed judges to issue 
verdicts according to the “socialist sense of justice.” The Commissariat of Justice instructed the 
Revolutionary Tribunals on December 21, 1917 to set criminal penalties according to the tapes 
of “revolutionary conscience.”1213 All of these terms, “revolutionary conscience,” “revolutionary 
sense of legality,” and “socialist sense of justice” were undefined. Such terms provide no 
meaningful guidance to Russian subjects who faced summary execution for their violation. 
 A ruling in November 1918 prohibited judges of the narodyne sudy (“People's Courts”) 
from applying any laws enacted before the revolution of October 1917.1214 The ruling also 
instructed the judges to determine guilt, not based on evidence or law, but on their subjective 
impressions of the facts and the parties.1215 Russian subjects were subject to criminal penalties, 
but the prohibited conduct and the penalty for engaging in such conduct was wholly undefined. 
There were no laws. 
 The eventual codification of Soviet law, such as the 1926 Criminal Code, offered little 
improvement. The definition of crime as “socially dangerous” action or inaction in Articles 6 
and 7, the doctrine of “crime by analogy” in Article 16, and the authorized punishment of 
innocent parties under Article 58 fail the substantive due process requirement that laws give fair 
warning of the prohibited conduct and the penalty for engaging in such conduct.  
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 Soviet law failed the second requirement that society must promulgate its laws publicly. 
The promulgation of Soviet law was fatally incomplete. Soviet law failed to define the 
prohibited conduct and failed to state the penalty for such conduct. Soviet law violated the third 
requirement prohibiting retroactive application of laws. The prohibited conduct and penalty were 
not determined until the trial, after the allegedly criminal act was completed. 
 Fourth, Soviet law failed the requirement that laws be expressed in understandable 
terms. Soviet law failed to define the prohibited conduct and fails to state the penalty for such 
conduct in any terms. Fifth, Soviet law failed the requirement that laws be consistent with one 
another. Since the prohibited conduct and penalties were undefined, there was no means of 
assuring consistency between the laws. Sixth, Soviet law failed the requirement that laws must 
not render compliance impossible by requiring conduct beyond the powers of the affected 
parties. By failing to define prohibited conduct, Soviet law rendered compliance with the statute 
impossible for its subjects.  
 Seventh, Russian law failed the requirement that laws must not be changed so frequently 
that the subjects cannot rely upon them. The prohibited conduct and potential penalties changed 
with each new case and each new tribunal. Lastly, Soviet law failed the requirement that 
authorities apply laws in a manner consistent with their wording. Since Soviet law provided no 
wording defining the prohibited conduct or the potential penalties, application consistent with 
the law's wording was impossible. 
III. The Principle of Consent 
 The second principle in the standard of legal validity is the principle of consent. The 
principle of consent provides that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject 
to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the 
subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.  Legal systems that satisfy the principle 
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of consent tend to adopt limitations on the powers of government in the form of legal rights of 
the subjects that laws may not transgress.1216  
A. Athenian Law Violated the Principle of Consent 
 Athenian law did not satisfy the principle of consent. Since Athens' laws were 
undefined, their terms were unknown. Athenian subjects could not consent to unknown terms. 
 The asebeia statute used in Socrates' trial provided as follows:  “If anyone commits 
asebeia, let anyone who wishes submit a graphe.” 1217  The asebeia statute gives no definition 
for asebeia, 1218 and it specifies no penalty for asebeia.1219  
 Even the heliastic oath taken by each dikast reflects the pervasiveness of undefined laws 
in the heliaea. “I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees passed by 
the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there is no law, in consonance with my sense of what is 
most just, without favor or enmity. I will vote only on the matters raised in the charge, and I will 
listen impartially to the accusers and defenders alike.” 1220  
B. Canon Law Violated the Principle of Consent 
 The legal system employed by the Congregation of the Holy Office in the Galileo Affair 
did not satisfy the principle of consent. The Holy Office did not derive its power and authority 
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from the consent of its subjects, and Galileo never consented to the jurisdiction of the Church or 
its Congregations over his work or person. The power and authority exercised by the Holy 
Office, like all power and authority under canon law, derived from the Pope. 1221  
 Pope Paul III established the Congregation of the Holy Office in 1542 for the purpose of 
defending and upholding Catholic faith and morals. The Holy Office assumed the suppression of 
heresies and heretics formerly handled by the Medieval Inquisition. The Holy Office thus 
became virtually synonymous with the Inquisition from 1542 onward. 1222  
 The Congregation of the Holy Office applied canon law. Canon law does not derive its 
authority from the consent of its subjects. Instead, canon law recognizes eight contributing 
sources: (1) sacred scripture, (2) divine tradition, (3) laws made by the Apostles, (4) the 
teachings of the Church Fathers, (5) the decrees of the Pope, (6) ecumenical councils, (7) the 
Roman Congregations of Cardinals, such as the Congregation of the Index and the Congregation 
of the Holy Office, and (8) custom. 1223  
 Although custom usually evidences consent, canon law holds that all eight sources of 
canon law listed above ultimately reduce to one source, the authority of the sovereign Pope. 
Scripture and divine tradition do not constitute canon law unless the Holy See promulgates their 
prescriptions. The laws made by the Apostles and the teachings of the Church Fathers only 
become canon law by the consent and authority of Peter and his successor Popes. Councils are 
not ecumenical unless approved by the Pope, and the Congregations of Cardinals only exercise 
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canon law; accord, Sebastian Bach Smith, Elements of Ecclesiastical Law, 9th ed. (New York: Benziger, 
1887) 11-12, explaining that all sources of canon law ultimately reduce to one source, the authority of the 
sovereign Pope. 
1222 Maurice Finocchiaro, “Introduction,” The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley: U of Cal 
P, 1989) 14. 
1223 Sebastian Bach Smith, Elements of Ecclesiastical Law, 9th ed. (New York: Benziger, 1887) 11-12. 
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powers and authority conferred upon them by the Pope. Lastly, custom does not obtain the force 
of law without the sanction of the Apostolic See. 1224 
C. Soviet Law Violated the Principle of Consent 
 Soviet law did not satisfy the principle of consent. Lenin founded Soviet law on the 
coercion of its subjects, not their consent. Communism did not come to Russia through popular 
uprising or popular vote.1225 A small minority imposed Communism on Russia through a coup 
d'état. 1226  
 Lenin sought to establish a “power that is limited by nothing, by no laws, that is 
restrained by absolutely no rules, that rests directly on coercion.” 1227 Centralized and organized 
violence was necessary, according to Lenin, to “crush the exploiters” and to lead the masses in 
the work of organizing the socialist economy. 1228 Lenin insisted that “revolutionary violence” 
was even essential “against the faltering and unrestrained elements of the toiling masses 
themselves.”1229 Lenin thus sought to convert Russian legal institutions into organs of systematic 
terror. In Lenin's words, “the courts shall not do away with terrorism; to promise such a thing 
would mean to cheat ourselves or other people.” 1230 
 During the period of “War Communism” from 1918 to 1921, Lenin destroyed the 
existing Russian legal system, not by consent of the people, but through a series of fiats that first 
                                                 
1224 Sebastian Bach Smith, Elements of Ecclesiastical Law, 9th ed. (New York: Benziger, 1887) 12. 
1225 Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), 39; Robert 
Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 4-5. 
1226 Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), 38. 
1227 V.I. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochienii (Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., vol. 41 (Moscow: Institut 
Markszima-Leninizma, 1958-65) 383. 
1228 V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2004) 22. 
1229 Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (London: Vintage, 1960) 207. 
1230 Vladimir Gsovski, “Reform of Criminal Law in the Soviet Union,” Social Problems 7 (4) (1960) 315-
28, 316. 
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destroyed the legal profession, then the court system, and finally all laws that existed prior to the 
Revolution.1231 Once Lenin destroyed these institutions, Lenin established Revolutionary 
Tribunals by unilateral decree. He “streamlined” their proceedings by removing all restrictions 
on their procedures and their judgments.1232 When he deemed the terror inflicted by these 
tribunals to be insufficient, he increasingly came to rely on the Cheka, the Chrezvychaynaya 
Komissiya (“Extraordinary Commission”) or political police, which he endowed with an almost 
unrestricted license to kill.1233   
 During the period of the “New Economic Policy” from 1921-1928, Lenin instituted and 
guided the new codifications of Russian law, not by consent of the people, but by personal fiat. 
1234 The new criminal codes continued the practices of the Red Terror and the Revolutionary 
Tribunals. N. V. Krylenko, later People's Commissar of Justice, wrote in his 1923 treatise on the 
Soviet judiciary that the court system functioned, not as a servant of the people, but as “an organ 
of government power.” “A club is a primitive weapon,” wrote Krylenko, “a rifle is a more 
efficient one, the most efficient is the court. For us there is no difference between a court of law 
and summary justice.” 1235  
 Stalin's handling of the Kirov Affair in 1934 offers a final example of the lack of consent 
in Soviet law. After arranging Kirov's assassination, Stalin issued a unilateral decree on 
                                                 
1231 See discussion of the decrees of November 22, 1917, and December 21, 1917, in Chapter V, supra. 
1232 See discussion of Lenin's “streamlining” in March 1920 in Chapter V, supra.  
1233 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990) 800. 
1234 See discussion of the production in 1922 and 1923 of the Soviet Judiciary Act, Civil Code, Code of 
Civil Procedure, Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, Land Code, and Labor Code in Chapter V at 
pages 245-48, supra. The Soviet Government also enacted a new Criminal Code and a new Family Code 
in 1926. Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 
1978) 34. 
1235 G. M. Razi, “Legal Education and the Role of the Lawyer in the Soviet Union and the Countries of 
Eastern Europe,” Cal. L. Rev. 48 (5) (1960): 776-804, 792; Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An 
Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1978) 36.  
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December 1, 1934, directing all investigative agencies “to speed up the cases of those accused of 
the preparation or execution of acts of terror.” Stalin ordered courts to execute death sentences 
“immediately after the passage of such sentences,” and he prohibited all appeals and pardons. 1236 
This decree and the other “Kirov amendments” to the Criminal Code initiated by Stalin after 
Kirov's murder became the tools for accomplishing Stalin's “Great Terror,” including the 
Moscow Trials of 1936-1938.1237  
IV. The Principle of Autonomy 
 The third principle governing legal validity is the principle of autonomy, which 
established the authority of law. Laws must wield superiority over political rulers. The ruler must 
be under the same laws as his subjects, and the laws must not be subject to arbitrary change to 
reflect the will of the political ruler. To paraphrase de Bracton, the law makes the king; the king 
does not make the law.1238 To paraphrase Aristotle, rightly constituted laws must be the final 
sovereign. 1239 
A. Athenian Law Violated the Principle of Autonomy 
The Athenian legal system violated the principle of autonomy in three significant 
aspects. The first was Solon's constitution of 594 B.C. that gave political rulers supremacy over 
law. The second was the failure of Athenian statutes to define the conduct they prohibited and 
the penalty for such conduct. The third was the ease by which political rulers could amend the 
law to reflect their will.  
                                                 
1236 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 41.  
1237 According to Soviet archives, Stalin's “security organs” detained 1,548,366 persons during the height 
of the Great Terror in 1937 and 1938. Stalin's “security organs” shot 681,692 of these detainees. This 
averages more than 1,000 Russian subjects shot each day. Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001) 67. 
1238 Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England), ed. 
George E. Woodbine, trans. Samuel E. Thorne, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) 33.  
1239 Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1946) 127.  
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First, Solon's constitution violated the principle of autonomy by giving the political 
rulers supremacy over law. Solon gave the dikasts supremacy over law by empowering the 
heliaea to decide any disputes regarding their interpretation.1240  
Second, Athenian statutes violated the principle of autonomy by failing to define the 
conduct they prohibited and the penalty for such conduct. Each dikast was required to define the 
prohibited conduct and the penalty anew in every case. This gave the dikast, as the political 
ruler, supremacy over law.  
 Third, Athenian law violated the principle of autonomy by permitting the political rulers 
to arbitrarily amend the law to reflect their will. A simple majority vote at one meeting of the 
boule and one meeting of the ekklesia was enough to abolish any existing law, however 
fundamental, or to make any new one, however drastic.1241 Pericles' political enemies, for 
example, created a new law to facilitate the political prosecution of Anaxagoras to embarrass 
Pericles.1242 
 The Athenians eventually recognized the need for the principle of autonomy and the 
dangers of allowing political rulers to amend the laws to reflect their will. After Athens' fall in 
the Peloponnesian War, the Thirty Tyrants amended the laws in 404 B.C. to maintain their rule 
by terror. The new laws gave the Thirty Tyrants the power to execute any Athenian without trial. 
Once the Thirty Tyrants were deposed, Athens recodified her laws in 403 B.C. to make them 
more difficult to amend. 1243 
 
                                                 
1240 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. Sir Frederic G. Kenyon (Seaside, OR: Merchant, 2009) 12.  
1241 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 48. 
1242 Plutarch, “Pericles,” Plutarch’s Lives of Illustrious Men, trans. John Dryden, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: 
Coates, 1900) 264. See discussion in the text at pages 166-169, supra.  
1243 Douglas MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978) 48. See 
discussion in text at pages 162-64, supra.  
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B. Canon Law Violated the Principle of Autonomy  
The canon law system utilized by the Congregation of the Holy Office violated the 
principle of autonomy in two aspects. First, canon law did not wield superiority over the political 
rulers of the Church, the Popes and the Congregation of the Holy Office. Second, the Popes and 
the Congregation of the Holy Office disregarded and evaded any provisions of canon law that 
interfered with their prosecution of heresy.  
First, canon law violated the principle of autonomy by failing to wield supremacy over 
the political ruler of the Church. The Pope held “supreme power” and “jurisdictional supremacy” 
over all aspects of canon law. 1244  
Second, the political rulers of the Church evaded or ignored the provisions of canon law 
forbidding the use of coerced confessions, forbidding torture, and mandating secrecy in heresy 
prosecutions. The Holy Office routinely ignored two provisions forbidding the use of coerced 
confessions. Beginning in 1140, and continuing until 1918, canon law mandated that 
ecclesiastical proceedings could only accept spontaneous confessions. Canon law expressly 
prohibited the use of coerced confessions.1245 Nevertheless, the Holy Office considered 
confessions, even if coerced by torture, to be the purest and most reliable evidence.1246  
 Canon law also forbade torture in 1140, continuing until 1918, but proceedings before 
the Inquisition began utilizing torture in its proceedings soon after the Fourth Lateran Council in 
                                                 
1244 P. Charles Augustine, A Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, vol. 1 (St. Louis: Herder, 1918) 
10, 19. Augustine explains that the Pope holds “supreme power” and “jurisdictional supremacy” over all 
canon law. Accord, Sebastian Bach Smith, Elements of Ecclesiastical Law, 9th ed. (New York: Benziger, 
1887) 11-12. 
1245 Edward Peters, Torture (Philadelphia: U Penn Press, 1996) 52-53.  
1246 Wade Rowland, Galileo’s Mistake: A New Look At the Epic Confrontation between Galileo and the 
Church (New York: Arcade, 2003) 243. 
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1215.1247 The express goal of all proceedings before the Holy Office became the securing of a 
confession of heresy from the accused by any necessary means.1248 In Galileo’s case, the Pope 
expressly directed the Holy Office to conduct Galileo’s interrogation under a formal threat of 
torture. 1249 
 Another example of the ecclesiastical evasion of canon law in Galileo's case involved 
the secrecy provisions of proceedings before the Holy Office. The Congregation of the Holy 
Office cloaked every aspect of its heresy trials in secrecy,1250 and members of the Holy Office 
faced severe punishment for speaking or writing about their cases.1251 In Galileo's case, however, 
the Pope evaded the Holy Office's secrecy requirements for political reasons by appointing an 
unprecedented three member Special Commission to examine Galileo's Dialogue on the Two 
                                                 
1247 Edward Peters, Torture (Philadelphia: U Penn Press, 1996) 52-53. After the April 6, 1252, murder of 
the Papal inquisitor of Lombardy, Pope Innocent IV issued a papal bull entitled Ad extirpanda on May 15, 
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The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: Citadel, 1954) 33-35. 
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torture chamber during the interrogation of the prisoner, their presence rendered them “irregular.” They 
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Inquisition: A Critical and Historical Study of the Courses Power of the Church, trans. Bertrand L. 
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any violations of these provisions of canon law. Elphège Vacanard, The Inquisition: A Critical and 
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1248 Henry Charles Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation (New York: 
Citadel, 1954) 106. 
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287, 363 n. 85.  
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Chief World Systems. The Special Commission publicly recommended that the Pope refer 
Galileo's case to the Congregation of the Holy Office for prosecution.1252  
C. Soviet Law Violated the Principle of Autonomy 
 The Soviet legal system violated the principle of autonomy in three aspects. First, the 
political rulers, particularly Lenin, wielded supremacy over law by destroying and creating legal 
institutions at will. Second, the political rulers wielded supremacy over law by governing 
without law, without court procedures, and without rules of evidence. Third, the political rulers, 
particularly Lenin and Stalin, wielded supremacy over law by creating and amending new laws 
at will.  
 The first aspect of Soviet law's violation of autonomy was Lenin's destruction and 
creation of legal institutions at will during the early years of Bolshevik rule. On November 22, 
1917, Lenin issued “Decree No. 1 on Courts,” 1253 a decree abolishing the professions associated 
with the judicial system, including the legal profession, the Procurator (the Russian equivalent of 
the Attorney General), and most justices of the peace.1254 The 1917 decree also dissolved almost 
all the existing courts, including the Senate, the highest court of appeals.1255 When the 
functioning courts refused to recognize the validity of the decree, Lenin used the Red Army to 
                                                 
1252 David Marshall Miller, “The Thirty Years’ War and the Galileo Affair,” History of Science 46 (1) 
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1253 Technically, the Council of People's Commissars issued “Decree No. 1 on Courts.” Nevertheless, 
Lenin personally revised the decree, and Lenin personally supervised its passage. According to Piotr 
Ivanovich Stuchka, the first president of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union and author of the first 
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force them to cease operations.1256 
 Lenin's decree of November 22, 1917, also established a new type of court, the 
Revolutionary Tribunal. 1257  Modeled on a similar institution of the French Revolution, the 
Revolutionary Tribunal was responsible for prosecuting “counterrevolutionary crimes,” which 
included economic crimes and sabotage.1258 In March 1918, Lenin replaced the mestnye sudy 
(“local courts”) with the narodyne sudy (“People's Courts”).  
 The second aspect of Soviet law's violation of autonomy was the rule by political rulers 
without law, without court procedures, and without rules of evidence. During the Red Terror, a 
November 1918 ruling prohibited judges of the narodyne sudy (“People's Courts”) from 
applying any laws enacted before the revolution of October 1917. The ruling also freed the 
judges of the narodyne sudy from observing any formal rules of procedure or evidence. The 
November 1918 ruling lastly instructed the judges to determine guilt, not based on evidence or 
law, but on their subjective impressions of the facts and the parties.1259  
 In March 1920, the government freed the “Revolutionary Tribunals” that Lenin created 
in his November 22, 1917 decree from all legal, procedural, and evidentiary restrictions except 
for stipulated minimum punishments.1260 The Revolutionary Tribunals now possessed the 
discretion to deny the parties the right to call witnesses on their behalf, to question adverse 
witnesses, or even to appear to plead their case. They also had discretion to halt proceedings and 
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render judgment at any time.1261  
 The NKVD “Special Board” provides another example of rule by political rulers without 
law, without court procedures, and without rules of evidence. At Stalin's direction, the Politburo 
created the NKVD “Special Board” on November 5, 1934.1262 The Special Board possessed the 
authority to sentence Russian subjects to labor camps for being “socially dangerous” under 
Article 8 of the Corrective Labor Code.1263 The Special Board was unrestricted in issuing 
convictions and ruled without any evidentiary requirements. Its proceedings involved no judicial 
officials, no judges, no attorneys, and no rules of procedure.1264 Defendants had no right to 
appear or to present their defense, and the Special Board usually tried its cases in absentia.  
 The Special Board ignored restrictions on its sentences. Although the maximum 
authorized sentence was five years, the Special Board routinely issued sentences of 8 to 10 years 
and routinely resentenced its convicts at the end of their terms. 1265  
 The third aspect of Soviet law's violation of autonomy was the arbitrary creation and 
amendment of new laws at the will of the political rulers. The Soviet Constitution granted 
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supreme legislative authority to the Central Committee.1266 At Lenin's direction, Soviet jurists 
created a new series of legal codes during the years of the New Economic Policy from 1921 to 
1928. Soviet jurists formulated these new codes and the political rulers implemented them 
without the consent of their subjects.1267  
 The arbitrary creation and amendments of laws continued under Stalin. After arranging 
Kirov's assassination, Stalin issued a unilateral decree on December 1, 1934, directing all 
investigative agencies “to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of 
acts of terror.” Stalin ordered courts to execute death sentences “immediately after the passage of 
such sentences,” and he prohibited all appeals and pardons. 1268 This decree became Stalin's 
charter for imposing the Great Terror. 1269  
V. Conclusions 
 Valid legal systems treat their subjects as ends in themselves. The experiences of 
seventeenth century England, ancient Athens, the Congregation of the Holy Office, and Soviet 
Russia demonstrate that legal systems inherently tend to treat their subjects as means to ends. 
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Legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves unless forced to comply with the 
principles of reason, consent, and autonomy.  
A. Two Consequences of Invalid Laws 
 Two inevitable consequences result when a legal system fails to treat its subjects as ends 
in themselves. First, the legal system inevitably treats its subjects as means to the ends of the 
political rulers. The Stuarts treated their subjects as means to the ends of collecting illegal 
revenues and establishing the Stuart brand of religion. The democratic regime in Athens treated 
Socrates as the means to securing its existence against the threat of oligarchy. Urban VIII treated 
Galileo as the means to securing Urban's hold on the papacy. Stalin treated Trotsky as the means 
of consolidating Stalin's consolidation of power. Legal systems convicted Socrates, Galileo, and 
Trotsky even though each was innocent of the charges against him.  
 The second inevitable consequence of a legal system failing to treat its subjects as ends 
in themselves are the negative, and sometimes horrific, effects of these legal systems on their 
societies. Stuart absolutism precipitated a century of political and religious turmoil including 
brutal religious persecution, the two Bishop's Wars, three English civil wars, the execution of 
Charles I, the Protectorate, the Restoration, and ultimately the Glorious Revolution. Political 
prosecutions prevented ancient Athens from achieving political stability and led to her defeat in 
the Peloponnesian War. Heresy prosecutions helped precipitate the Protestant Reformation and 
plunge all of Europe into religious wars for decades. The Galileo Affair continues to tarnish the 
reputation and credibility of the Roman Catholic Church four centuries later.  
B. The Soviet Legal Holocaust  
 The Soviet legal system exhibited the most egregious violations of the principles of 
reason, consent, and autonomy, and the Soviet subjects suffered the most for it. Lenin 
unilaterally abolished the legal system to eliminate all legal restraints on power as the first step 
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in introducing mass terror.1270 Isaac Steinberg, the Communist Commissar of Justice, objected to 
the execution of suspects without trial. “Why do we bother with a Commissariat of Justice?” 
asked Steinberg. “Let's call it frankly the Commissariat for Social Extermination and be done 
with it!” “Well put,” replied Lenin, “that's exactly what it should be. But we can't say that.”1271 
 Lenin's dismemberment of Russian legal institutions resulted in the complete collapse of 
the Soviet economy. 1272 The replacement laws put in place by Soviet leaders continued Lenin's 
policy of mass terror through law. 1273 These laws provided the tools for accomplishing Stalin's 
“Great Terror,” including the three Moscow Trials. 1274 
1. The “Great Terror” 
 The impact of these laws on Soviet subjects was staggering. Utilizing data released in 
1987-1989 during Gorbachev’s glasnost, historian Robert Conquest estimates that Stalin’s 
agents arrested 8 million Russians during the Great Terror. Stalin’s agents executed an estimated 
1.5 million of these.  Approximately 2 million died in camps, 600,000 to 700,000 by execution. 
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At the end of the Terror, approximately 1 million remained in prisons, and the camp population 
had increased from 5 million to 8 million.1275 
2. “Dekulakization” and the “Terror-Famine”  
 These laws also permitted the imposition of policies designed to crush two segments of 
Soviet society that opposed the Stalinist regime. Stalin's policy of “dekulakization” from 1929 to 
1933 targeted the “kulaks,” the economically better off peasants who represented the most 
influential and recalcitrant opponents to Stalin's policies.1276 Dekulakization involved the 
liquidation or deportation to the Arctic of millions of peasants and their families as well as the 
confiscation of all their property. Stalin called “dekulakization” a second revolution, a 
“revolution from above.”1277 
 The second segment of Soviet society that opposed Stalin was the Ukraine and the 
largely Ukrainian Kuban region. Stalin's regime imposed forced collectivization by effectively 
abolishing private ownership of land and concentrating the remaining peasantry on “collective” 
farms under Party control. Ukrainian nationalist sentiment motivated many Ukrainians to oppose 
Stalin's policies.  To crush this opposition, Stalin imposed the Holodomor or “terror-famine” on 
the region during 1932 and 1933.  
 Stalin created the famine by increasing grain quotas on the region to make them 
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belongings confiscated and were deported either to hard labor camps or, with their families, to Siberian 
exile. Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History (London: Weidenfeld, 2001) 58-59. 
1277 Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (New York: International, 1939) 306-06. 
  
331 
impossibly high.1278 His regime then created a famine in the Ukraine by removing every handful 
of food and preventing any aid from reaching the Ukraine. 1279   
 Together, the policies of “dekulakization” and the “terror-famine” resulted in an 
estimated 14.5 million deaths, roughly half from “dekulakization” and half from the “terror-
famine.” Approximately 3.5 million victims of “dekulakization” died in hard labor camps. 1280 
Exact numbers are unavailable. As Khrushchev observed in his memoirs, “no one was keeping 
count.” 1281 
C. The Soviet View of Man 
 Every legal system reflects a view of man in the way it treats its subjects. The Soviet 
legalization of mass terror, like Lenin's regarding the Commissariat of Justice as a Commissariat 
for Social Extermination, reflected Soviet law's rejection of man's status as a rational creature 
with free will. Soviet law viewed man instead as the involuntary product of his economic 
conditions.  
 Soviet theorists regarded humanity as a stepping-stone to a “new man” and a “new 
society.” Marx wrote, “The present generation resembles the Jews who Moses led through the 
wilderness. It must not only conquer a New World, it must also perish in order to make room for 
the people who are fit for a New World.” 1282 Trotsky wrote rhapsodically of the communist 
                                                 
1278 Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1986) 220-24. 
1279 Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1986) 4, 97, 210-13, 217-24. Accord, Richard Pipes, Communism: A Brief History (London: 
Weidenfeld, 2001) 60.  
1280 Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1986) 299-307. 
1281 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. Strobe Talbott (London: 
Little, Brown, 1974) 120. 
1282 Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France: 1848-1850 (New York: International, 1964) 14 [emphasis 
added]. 
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“superman” that the new society would produce. “Man will become immeasurably stronger, 
wiser, and subtler; the forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The average human type 
will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will 
rise.” 1283  
 As Dewey observed, the vicious element in the socialist vision was that the end was so 
important that it justified the use of any means.1284 In Soviet Russia, the absence of a viable 
standard of legal validity permitted the state to pursue its ends of the “new man” and the “new 
society” by securing the deaths of millions through legal processes. In fact, however, the means 
employed determined the horrific ends that the Soviets actually attained. 
 The sad chronicle of legal history, from ancient Athens to the Soviet Holocaust, 
demonstrates the necessity of a standard of validity based on the principles of reason, consent, 
and autonomy. In the absence of such a standard, laws will not treat their subjects as ends in 
themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as means to other ends. Once laws do this, 
men have no rest from evil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1283 Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (Chicago: Haymarket, 2005) 206-07. 
1284 John Dewey, “Significance of the Trotsky Inquiry,” The Later Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston, vol. 11 (Carbondale, IL: S. Illinois UP, 2008) 332: “The vicious element in the whole 
conception is that the end is so important that it justifies the use of any means. This idea is so deeply 
ingrained in the Communists, that our own radicals resort to it and even excuse the present assassinations 
on that basis. In fact, however, it is the means that are employed that decide the ends or consequences that 
are actually attained.” 
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